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Abstract 
The women’s antinuclear protest group Women Strike for Peace (WSP) formed a 
visible part of the US peace movement during the Cold War, recording several 
successes and receiving a positive historical assessment for its maternal, respectable 
image. This study provides a revised history of WSP, querying the identity of the group 
in order to produce a more comprehensive and problematic historical narrative. It is the 
first study to examine WSP from its founding in 1961 through to the closure of its 
National Office in 1990. The thesis examines key events in the group’s history and 
challenges established historical understandings of the group, positing that existing 
perceptions offer an image of uniformity that overlooks the differing experiences of 
WSP activists and the complexity of their memories.  
 This study draws on aspects of memory theory to inform its examination of 
WSP’s historical record. It contends that social influences and personal identity had a 
significant impact on the way in which former members recalled their experiences, 
while assessing the relationship between collective and individual identity within WSP. 
By placing the group into the changing cultural and societal environment of Cold War 
America, this thesis is the first to demonstrate the importance of contextual background 
to understanding the development of WSP activists’ memory and identity. Whereas 
existing examinations of Women Strike for Peace apply its maternal image to the 
entirety of its history, this study finds such interpretations of identity and historical 
understanding to be static and argues that the transformation in activist identities 
informed changing perceptions of the group’s past successes. 
The thesis makes extensive use of branch records and the recollections of 
individuals recorded through oral interviews and memoirs to query established 
understandings of WSP. It finds that the desire of leading figures to project a moderate, 
maternal image resulted in the establishment of a framework within which WSP 
activists understood their identity and activism. This framework resulted in an historical 
narrative that overlooks the diversity within the group, the tensions between members 
that emerged over issues such as hierarchical structure, civil disobedience, and feminist 
activism, and the regional disparity of the national organisation. The perspectives of 
leading figures have often been consulted to the detriment of grassroots voices that can 
offer a more complex, contentious depiction of WSP’s history. Accounting for the 
construction of WSP’s history, memory, and identity, this thesis challenges our view of 
the experience of peace activism in the 20th century United States. 
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Introduction: History, Memory, and Women Strike for 
Peace 
 
In the introduction to her defining study of the antinuclear activist group Women 
Strike for Peace (WSP), Amy Swerdlow made her aims clear. “I recognize that my 
purpose was not only to add the story of WSP to the historical record, but also to make 
certain that the middle-aged women of WSP are recognized as significant actors.”1 
Throughout her academic life, the former WSP leader lamented the “historical 
amnesia” afforded the organisation and, from the outset of her book, she presented the 
group as “ignored or misrepresented” in the histories produced by “male movement 
leaders and historians of the social movements of the 1960s.”2 Swerdlow’s attitude 
mirrored that of her fellow WSP activists (or WSPers) who wished to express their 
belief that the organisation had made a significant contribution to the United States 
peace movement. Another leading figure, former National Coordinator Ethel Taylor, 
published an anecdotal account of WSP’s history in 1998, framing her memoir around 
the emphatic assertion, “we made a difference!”3 Promoting the significant impact of 
WSP, former activists collectively developed a narrative for their organisation’s 
history that emphasised its cohesion, creativity, and success. 
Women Strike for Peace emerged in the fall of 1961 as a vehicle for women 
across the US to call for global disarmament, with a ban on the testing of nuclear 
weapons seen as the first step towards that end. Frustrated with the perceived failings 
of contemporary peace groups such as the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy 
(SANE) and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), 
Dagmar Wilson, a children’s illustrator and peace activist from Washington, D.C., 
contacted female acquaintances and suggested staging their own demonstration.4 They 
sent an appeal to known activists and called on women to “strike for peace” on 1 
November 1961. Thousands came out in support, organising various activities in cities 
across the country. The “strike” met with positive press and public reception and the 
                                                 
1 Amy Swerdlow, Women Strike for Peace: Traditional Motherhood and Radical Politics in the 1960s 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 12. 
2 Amy Swerdlow, “Ladies’ Day at the Capitol: Women Strike for Peace Versus HUAC,” Feminist 
Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Autumn 1982): 493; Swerdlow, Women Strike for Peace, 12. 
3 Ethel Taylor, We Made a Difference: My Personal Journey with Women Strike for Peace 
(Philadelphia: Camino Books, 1998). 
4 Swerdlow, Women Strike for Peace, 57. 
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original participants unanimously agreed to continue their efforts, using variations of 
the “Women Strike for Peace” moniker to identify themselves. The group became 
renowned for their image as concerned housewives and mothers, couching their 
critique of militarism in tones acceptable to the tense climate of Cold War politics.5 
Following the passing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, the organisation 
broadened its scope to campaign for myriad peace and social justice issues. It became 
a visible part of the anti-Vietnam War movement during the late 1960s, supported the 
women’s liberation movement of the 1970s, and was involved in resurgent antinuclear 
activism during the 1980s. Though the group’s National Office closed in 1990, the 
commitment of some individual activists and local branches ensured that WSP 
retained a presence into the 21st century. 
The recollections of WSP activists frequently spoke to the robust identity of 
their organisation, with their individual reflections coalescing to produce a narrative 
that sought to mark the group as distinct and exceptional among its peers.6 Although it 
exhibited similarities with other organisations, WSPers drew boundaries between their 
group and its contemporaries, such as SANE, WILPF, the Student Nonviolent 
Coordinating Committee (SNCC), and Students for a Democratic Society (SDS). 7  
They depicted their group as distinct, exceptional, and more successful than its peers, 
advancing unique “organisational identity claims” to foster a collective identity 
between individual members.8 WSP members emphasised their political neutrality and 
the lack of activist experience held by participants prior to the foundation of their 
group.9 They depicted WSP as a harmonious, cohesive unit of like-minded women, 
united by the desire to protect the health and wellbeing of the world’s children.10 
Activists recalled WSP’s loose system of coordination, with its lack of formal 
structure and absence of leaders, as a distinctive feature and a forerunner to later 
groups that adopted similar organisational strategies. Swerdlow dedicated a chapter of 
                                                 
5 Ibid, 3. 
6 Lynn Abrams, Oral History Theory (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010), 106. 
7 Swerdlow, Women Strike for Peace, 164; “Eleanor Garst to Ruth Pinkson re: History of WSP for 20th 
Anniversary,” AU WSP Archives, Box 2, History 1961-1994. 
8 Jo Reger, ““Motherhood and the Construction of Feminist Identities: Variations in a Women’s 
Movement Organization,” Sociological Inquiry, Vol. 71, No. 1 (Winter 2001): 85-110; David A. 
Whetten, “Albert and Whetten Revisited: Strengthening the Concept of Organizational Identity,” 
Journal of Management Inquiry, Vol. 15, No. 3 (September 2006): 220. 
9 Wilson interview, 5 April 1989, ARS.0056; Amy Swerdlow, “‘Pure Milk, Not Poison’: Women Strike 
for Peace and the Test Ban Treaty of 1963,” in Rocking the Ship of State: Toward a Feminist Peace 
Politics, eds. Adrienne Harries and Ynestra King (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 227; Taylor, We 
Made a Difference, x.  
10 Taylor, We Made a Difference, xvi; Wilson interview, 5 April 1989, ARS.0056. 
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Women Strike for Peace to a discussion of the method of “nonorganization” adopted 
by members, reinforcing the notion that WSP worked well due to its fostering of a 
community that developed strong bonds between its participants.11 Additionally, most 
accounts reflect positively on the experience of working in WSP and emphasised the 
significant impact the group made politically and socially while transforming the lives 
of its members.12  
These depictions, though revealing, mask a complicated and fragmented story. 
The organisation’s internal dynamics, ideology, and the practices of its members 
suggest that WSP’s experience was not all that dissimilar from other groups. The 
impression that they were politically inexperienced housewives veiled the substantial 
experience of political activism and community organising many WSPers brought to 
the group’s formation. The influence enjoyed by key decision-makers throughout the 
organisation’s history contrasts with the repeated claim that WSP was a 
“nonorganization” with a non-hierarchical structure in which women were “all 
leaders.”13 Indeed, the story of WSP’s national organisation often stands at odds with 
the experiences of local activists. Archival records note frequent instances of 
disagreement and heated arguments over strategy, policy, and identity, undermining 
portrayals of WSP’s harmonious environment.  The attitudes of WSPers on the west 
coast of the United States conflicted markedly with the views of members in the east 
and branches separated themselves from the national organisation by adopting 
different titles, such as Women for Peace (WFP). Moreover, existing depictions of 
Women Strike for Peace adopt a narrative that rigidly places it in the historical context 
of early 1960s test ban protests and late 1960s anti-war activism, neglecting later 
developments and causes championed by members.14  
This thesis provides a revised history of WSP by extending the scope of 
analysis beyond the 1960s and 1970s for the first time, providing the first examination 
of the group’s 1980s experience up to the closure of its National Office in 1990. 
Informed by branch archives and the recollections of activists, it interrogates three 
                                                 
11 Swerdlow, Women Strike for Peace, 70-96. 
12 Taylor, We Made a Difference, x; Swerdlow, Women Strike for Peace, 4-5. 
13 Harriet Hyman Alonso, “Review,” review of Women Strike for Peace: Traditional Motherhood and 
Radical Politics in the 1960s, by Amy Swerdlow, The American Historical Review, Vol. 99, No. 5 
(December 1994): 1773-1774. 
14 Robert Kleidman, Organizing for Peace: Neutrality, the Test Ban, and the Freeze (Syracuse: 
Syracuse University Press, 1993); Charles DeBenedetti and Charles Chatfield, An American Ordeal: 
The Antiwar Movement of the Vietnam Era (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1990), 54. 
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aspects of WSP’s history. First, it examines the historical assessments of WSP 
activists through the theoretical lens of memory studies to analyse the reciprocal 
relationship between memory and identity. It challenges understandings of the past 
advanced by former members by contextualising the organisation’s activities and 
highlights the impact of contemporary circumstances on the development of activists’ 
identity and memory. As such, it assesses the way in which the historical image of 
WSP came to be created by those involved in its activities. Second, the thesis 
questions established understandings of Women Strike for Peace, depicting key 
moments of transition in the group’s history while demonstrating the ranging and 
conflicting attitudes of its members and assessing the level of activists’ engagement 
with the social movements of the Cold War United States. In doing so, it shows the 
organisation as a diverse, multifaceted, layered, and fragmented institution. Third, the 
dissertation engages with members’ notions of success and draws on voices both 
within and outside Women Strike for Peace to examine the extent to which the group 
“made a difference.” These assessments were informed, not only by perceptions of 
WSP’s substantive achievements, but by the extent to which the organisation had a 
significant influence on the lives of its activists. This thesis makes a unique 
contribution to knowledge by providing the first study to address the influence of 
memory and identity on the history of Women Strike for Peace, therefore filling a 
significant gap in the historiography of 20th century peace activism. 
 
The Historiography of Women Strike for Peace 
Swerdlow’s original polemic on the historical amnesia displayed towards WSP arose 
at a time when many scholars acknowledged a dearth of material concerning the 
history of women’s peace activism. Sybil Oldfield wrote in 1989 that, despite their 
important contribution to the 20th century peace movement, women were “hardly 
heard” within pacifist discourse as history circles continued to ignore their influence.15 
In 1993, esteemed peace historian Harriet Hyman Alonso framed her expansive study 
of the women’s peace movement with the proclamation that it represented “the 
introductory overview” that had not been available to her when teaching courses on 
                                                 
15 Sybil Oldfield, Women Against the Iron Fist (Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1989), i. 
  
5 
  
the subject.16 Introductions to studies of women’s peace activism frequently invoke 
this sense of historical neglect. Yet the phenomenon continues, extending beyond US 
history. British academic Jill Liddington wrote several pieces in the 1980s and early 
1990s decrying the lack of knowledge “about the story of the magnificent fight” by 
earlier generations of women’s peace activists, lamenting that “there was no one 
accessible account” to which an interested party could turn. 17  Though neglect is 
certainly not limited to the history of any one specific women’s peace organisation, a 
2011 master’s thesis by Laura Dane Bridgewater supported the claim that a 
particularly virulent “amnesia” exists towards Women Strike for Peace.18  
 References to WSP in secondary literature often praise the actions of its 
members, but do not provide great detail of its history beyond describing its place 
within a wider context of peace activism. Charles DeBenedetti and Charles Chatfield 
mentioned WSP several times throughout An American Ordeal: The Antiwar 
Movement of the Vietnam Era, but did not expand on the organisation’s character.19 
Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan depicted the group’s actions in a favourable light, 
but did not provide extended detail of the group’s inner workings.20 Tom Wells also 
praised the “dogged women of Women Strike for Peace” in his overview of the anti-
Vietnam War movement, but provided little further exposition of the group’s 
activities.21 Works on the antinuclear campaign by Milton Katz, Gerard DeGroot and 
Lawrence S. Wittner, among others, refer to Women Strike for Peace as an integral 
part of the movement without providing the type of organisational analysis afforded 
groups such as SANE.22 Dedicated studies of women’s peace organisations also tend 
                                                 
16 Harriet Hyman Alonso, Peace As a Woman’s Issue: A History of the U.S. Movement for World Peace 
and Women’s Rights (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1993), 4. 
17 Jill Liddington, “The Women’s Peace Crusade: The History of a Forgotten Campaign,” in Over Our 
Dead Bodies: Women Against the Bomb, ed. Dorothy Thompson (London: Virago Press, 1983), 198; 
Jill Liddington, The Road to Greenham Common: Feminism and Anti-Militarism in Britain Since 
1820 (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991), 4. 
18 Laura Dane Bridgewater, “Caught Between Cold War Conservatives and Radical Feminists: The 
Fading of Women Strike for Peace from American Memory” (MA diss., Lehigh University, 2011).  
19 DeBenedetti and Chatfield, An American Ordeal. 
20 Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald Sullivan, Who Spoke Up?: American Protest Against the War in Vietnam, 
1963-1975 (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1985). 
21 Tom Wells, The War Within: America’s Battle Over Vietnam (London: University of California 
Press, 1994), 48. 
22 Gerard J. DeGroot, The Bomb: A Life (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2004); Milton S. 
Katz, Ban the Bomb: A History of SANE, the Committee for a SANE Nuclear Policy, 1957-1985 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1986); Lawrence S. Wittner, Resisting the Bomb: A History of the 
World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1954-1970 (Vol. 2 of The Struggle Against the Bomb) 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997); Lawrence S. Wittner, Toward Nuclear Abolition: A 
History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement, 1971 to the Present (Vol. 3 of The Struggle 
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to focus on the historic WILPF or on specific instances of protest, such as the 
Greenham Common peace camp.23  
This lack of interest prompted WSP activists to take it upon themselves to 
record their stories. The organisation funded and distributed several commemorative 
publications during the 1970s to raise awareness of its achievements.24 During the 
1980s activists became involved in oral history projects, created several historical 
exhibitions, and sourced materials for various archival collections and museums in 
order to publicise their stories.25 Following the closure of the National Office, former 
members drew on their recollections to produce memoirs and offer articles for 
collections that discussed their experience in Women Strike for Peace.26 The suite of 
memoirs, oral recollections, and other ephemera that emerged from WSPers remains a 
significant source of historiographical information relating to the organisation. 
                                                                                                                                            
Against the Bomb) (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003); Lawrence S. Wittner, Confronting the 
Bomb: A Short History of the World Nuclear Disarmament Movement (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 2009). 
23 Joyce Blackwell, No Peace Without Freedom: Race and the Women’s International League for 
Peace and Freedom, 1915-1975 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2004); Linda K. 
Schott, Reconstructing Women’s Thoughts: The Women’s International League for Peace and 
Freedom Before World War II (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1997); Sasha Roseneil, 
Disarming Patriarchy: Feminism and Political Action at Greenham (Buckingham: Open University 
Press, 1995); Liddington, The Road to Greenham Common; Sasha Roseneil, Common Women 
Uncommon Practices: The Queer Feminisms of Greenham (London: Cassell, 2000); Mima Cataldo et 
al., The Women’s Encampment for a Future of Peace and Justice (Philadelphia: Temple University 
Press, 1987). 
24 “Memo: Special Commemorative Issue, 1970,” UWS SWAP Archives, 3-13, Women Strike for 
Peace, 1962-2000; “Journal of Women Strike for Peace Commemorating Eighteen Years of 
Conscientious Concern for the Future of the World's Children,” SCPC WSP Archives, A1, Box 2, 
Documents Describing WSP History; Shingo Shibata ed., Phoenix: Letters and Documents of Alice 
Herz (Amsterdam: B.R. Gr̈ner B.V., 1976). 
25 “Women’s Peace Oral History Project,” Women's International League for Peace and Freedom 
Collection ARS.0056, Stanford University Archive of Recorded Sound; “Missoula Women for Peace 
Oral History Project,” OH 389, Archives & Special Collections, Maureen and Mike Mansfield 
Library, The University of Montana-Missoula. 
26 Judith Porter Adams ed., Peacework: Oral Histories of Women Peace Activists (Boston: Twayne, 
1991); Alice Sachs Hamburg, Grass Roots: From Prairie to Politics: The Autobiography of Alice 
Sachs Hamburg (Berkeley: Creative Arts Books Company, 2001); Lorraine Gordon, Alive at the 
Village Vanguard: My Life In and Out of Jazz Time (Milwaukee: Hal Leonard, 2006); Taylor, We 
Made a Difference; Dagmar Wilson, “Tainting the Antinuclear Movement: HUAC and the 
irrepressible Women Strike for Peace,” in The Price of Dissent: Testimonies to Political Repression 
in America, eds. Bud Schultz and Ruth Schultz (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), 278-
288; Barbara Bick, Walking the Precipice: Witness to the Rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan (New 
York: The Feminist Press, 2009); Pat Cody and Fred Cody, Cody’s Books: The Life and Times of a 
Berkeley Bookstore, 1956-1977 (San Francisco: Chronicle Books, 1992); Judy Kaplan and Linn 
Shapiro eds., Red Diapers: Growing Up in the Communist Left (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 
1998); Suzanne Braun Levine and Mary Thom eds., Bella Abzug: How One Tough Broad from the 
Bronx Fought Jim Crow and Joe McCarthy, Pissed Off Jimmy Carter, Battled for the Rights of 
Women and Workers, Rallied Against War and for the Planet, and Shook Up Politics Along the Way 
(New York: Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, 2007); James W. Clinton ed., The Loyal Opposition: 
Americans in North Vietnam, 1965-1972 (Niwot, CO: University of Colorado Press, 1995). 
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Amy Swerdlow’s academic career became key to the organisation’s historical 
record. Leaving her position in the group to pursue a PhD in women’s history, 
Swerdlow directed her efforts to highlighting WSP’s significant place in the peace 
movement.27 She also intended to engage with detractors, particularly those within the 
second-wave feminist movement, who had criticised the group’s propensity to 
advance an identity of domesticity and maternalism as a justification for their political 
agency. 28  Achieving a doctorate for her history of the group’s test ban activism, 
Swerdlow published several articles on Women Strike for Peace throughout her career 
before her authoritative account of the group’s history emerged in 1993.29 Women 
Strike for Peace highlighted various successful endeavours while noting the 
empowering affect WSP had on the people involved. Gender history professor Lisa M. 
Fine labelled Swerdlow’s work an “important corrective to much of the 
‘misinformation’ currently circulating in the popular culture,” while Gloria Steinem 
asserted that “no historian, activist, or self-respecting woman should be without” the 
book.30  
Interest in the organisation increased markedly following the publication of 
Swerdlow’s book and scholars have continued to place WSP in the historical context 
of which it was a part. Amy Schneidhorst’s extensive work on women’s activism in 
Chicago demonstrates WSP’s influence on women activists and the grassroots peace 
and justice movements they led. Schneidhorst has made exhaustive use of oral history 
and organisational sources to shed light on the political ideologies underpinning WSP, 
the context of Old Left and Popular Front activism that WSPers emerged from, and 
their relationship to “younger” activists during the 1960s.31 Andrea Estepa also made 
significant contributions to understandings of Women Strike for Peace, demonstrating 
                                                 
27 “Letter from Amy Swerdlow, 78/79,” SCPC WSP Archives, A3, Box 13, 1974-1979. 
28 Swerdlow, Women Strike for Peace, 233-243. 
29 Amy Swerdlow, “The Politics of Motherhood: The Case of Women Strike for Peace and the Test Ban 
Treaty,” (PhD diss., Rutgers University, 1984); Swerdlow, “Ladies’ Day at the Capitol”; Swerdlow,  
“‘Pure Milk, Not Poison’”; Amy Swerdlow, “‘Not My Son, Not Your Son, Not Their Sons’: Mothers 
Against the Vietnam Draft,” in Give Peace a Chance: Exploring the Vietnam Antiwar Movement, eds. 
Melvin Small and William D. Hoover (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1992), 159-170; Amy 
Swerdlow, “Ella Tulin: Fully Empowered,” Feminist Studies, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Spring 2007): 88-106; 
Swerdlow, Women Strike for Peace. 
30 Lisa M. Fine, “Review,” review of Women Strike for Peace: Traditional Motherhood and Radical 
Politics in the 1960s, by Amy Swerdlow, Labour/Le Travail, Vol. 35 (Spring 1995): 360-362; 
Swerdlow, Women Strike for Peace, cover page. 
31 Amy C. Schneidhorst, Building a Just and Secure World: Popular Front Women’s Struggle for 
Peace and Justice in Chicago During the 1960s (New York: Continuum, 2011); Amy Schneidhorst, 
“‘Little Old Ladies and Dangerous Women’: Women’s Peace Activism and Social Justice in Chicago, 
1960-1975,” Peace & Change, Vol. 26, No. 3 (July 2001): 374-390. 
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its ideological links to radical groups of the 1960s and the transforming identities of 
activists.32 Concern with the experience of individual activists also rose following 
Swerdlow’s work. Alice Herz and Margaret Russell have received some dedicated 
study, while works on Bella Abzug, though predominantly involving her law work 
and years in the United States Congress, have nevertheless discussed her relationship 
to Women Strike for Peace.33 Various studies use the experience of WSP activists to 
inform broader research topics. For example, Mary Hershberger, Judy Tzu-Chun Wu, 
and Jessica M. Frazier used WSP’s relationship with North Vietnamese women to 
discuss transnational activism in various terms.34  Adam Rome referenced Women 
Strike for Peace in relation to environmental activism, while Velma García-Gorena 
linked WSPers to instances of maternal activism within the Mexican antinuclear 
movement.35  
Although recent studies have added to the group’s historiography, Swerdlow’s 
work remains highly influential and is frequently cited as the “foundation” to analysis 
of WSP.36 The former WSPer’s academic credentials are noteworthy. She earned her 
PhD from Rutgers University having previously completed her MA under the 
tutorship of pioneering women’s historian Gerda Lerner at Sarah Lawrence College, 
                                                 
32 Andrea Estepa, “Taking the White Gloves Off: Women Strike for Peace and the Transformation of 
Women’s Activist Identities in the United States, 1961-1980,” (PhD diss., Rutgers University, May 
2012); Andrea Estepa, “Taking the White Gloves Off: Women Strike for Peace and ‘the Movement,’ 
1967-73,” in Feminist Coalitions: Historical Perspectives on Second-Wave Feminism in the United 
States, ed. Stephanie Gilmore (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2008), 84-112. 
33 Cheyney Ryan, “The One Who Burns Herself for Peace,” in Bringing Peace Home: Feminism, 
Violence and Nature, eds. Karen J. Warren and Duane L. Cady (Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 1996) , 16-32; Ian McKay, “Margaret Ells Russell, Women Strike for Peace, and the Global 
Politics of ‘Intelligent Compassion,’ 1961-1965,” in Worth Fighting For: Canada’s Tradition of War 
Resistance from 1812 to the War on Terror, eds. Lara Campbell et al. (Toronto: Between the Lines, 
2015), 119-134; Leandra Zarnow, “The Legal Origins of ‘The Personal is Political’: Bella Abzug and 
Sexual Politics in Cold War America,” in Breaking the Wave: Women, Organizations, and Feminism, 
1945-1985, eds. Kathleen A. Laughlin and Jacqueline Castledine (New York: Routledge, 2011), 28-
46; Levy, The Political Life of Bella Abzug, 1920-1976: Political Passions, Women’s Rights, and 
Congressional Battles (Plymouth: Lexington Books, 2013). 
34 Mary Hershberger, Traveling to Vietnam: American Peace Activists and the War (Syracuse: Syracuse 
University Press, 1998); Jessica M. Frazier, “Collaborative Efforts to End the War in Viet Nam: The 
Interactions of Women Strike for Peace, the Vietnamese Women’s Union, and the Women’s Union of 
Liberation, 1965-1968,” Peace and Change, Vol. 37, No. 3 (July 2012): 339-365; Judy Tzu-Chun 
Wu, Radicals On the Road: Internationalism, Orientalism, and Feminism During the Vietnam Era 
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2013). 
35 Adam Rome, “‘Give Earth a Chance’: The Environmental Movement and the Sixties,” The Journal 
of American History, Vol. 90, No. 2 (September 2003): 525-554; Velma García-Gorena, Mothers and 
the Mexican Antinuclear Power Movement (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1999). 
36 Estepa, “Taking the White Gloves Off, Women Strike for Peace and the Transformation of Women’s 
Activist Identities in the United States, 1961-1980,” 4; Wesley G. Phelps, “Women’s Pentagon 
Action: The Persistence of Radicalism and Direct-Action Civil Disobedience in the Age of Reagan,” 
Peace and Change, Vol. 39, No. 3 (July 2014): 342. 
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New York. She later became Professor of History and Director of the Graduate 
Program in Women’s History at Sarah Lawrence. Meticulous archival research and 
interviews contributed to Women Strike for Peace and Swerdlow argued from the 
outset that she represented an objective historical voice. She declared her book “not 
the work of a participant observer. It is true that in the 1960s and early 1970s I was an 
active participant in WSP, but I was not a conscious or systematic observer. My 
research and analysis for this book were undertaken twenty years later.”37  
Nevertheless, Swerdlow’s former position within WSP naturally informed her 
insight, meaning that impressions of the organisation necessarily draw on participant-
observation of the group’s past.38 She was a founding member of WSP in New York, 
participated in its first demonstration in November 1961, and travelled around the 
world as a representative of the group, embarking on high profile trips to Geneva, 
Hanoi, and Cuba during the 1960s.39 She served as editor for the national newsletter, 
Memo, and often edited the New York/New Jersey/Connecticut newsletter single-
handedly, the production being described “as if it were speaking for the entire 
WSP.”40 She also worked as the press officer for New York Women Strike for Peace 
and, as a point of contact for both WSP members and the nation’s media, Swerdlow 
put herself in a unique position to write the history of the movement from an insider’s 
perspective. Participant-observation can provide a “rich experiential context” allowing 
an author to “become aware of incongruous or unexplained facts” and “sensitive to 
their possible implications and connections with other observed facts.”41 However, 
such involvement with the organisation under study can also result in some 
subjectivity. In the introduction to Women Strike for Peace, Swerdlow openly 
declared her love for the group, stating that she considered her “time in WSP among 
the happiest and most exhilarating of my life.”42 Such sentiment appears throughout 
her account and references to her involvement in WSP activities alternate between 
                                                 
37 Swerdlow, Women Strike for Peace, 11. 
38 Pinkson interview, October 1987, ARS.0056. 
39 Swerdlow, Women Strike for Peace, 5. 
40 Kathleen L. Endres and Therese L. Lueck eds., Women’s Periodicals in the United States: Social and 
Political Issues (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996), 260. 
41 Jo Freeman, The Politics of Women’s Liberation: A Case Study of an Emerging Social Movement and 
its Relations to the Policy Process (New York: David McKay Company, Inc., 1975), xii-xiii; Howard 
Becker and Blanche Greer, “Participant Observation and Interviewing: A Comparison,” Human 
Organization, 16, No.3 (1957): 28-32.  
42 Swerdlow, Women Strike for Peace, 9. 
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first-person and third-person perspectives. 43   Harriet Hyman Alonso’s review of 
Swerdlow’s book labelled it a “memoir/history,” while others challenged the “heroic” 
and “favourable treatment” she gave the organisation.44  
Swerdlow’s positive assessment of WSP parallels other laudatory appraisals 
offered by those involved in social movement organisations of the 1960s. Discussing 
the reunion of SNCC activists in 1988, Cheryl Lynn Greenburg noted the adulation 
participants afforded the organisation’s past efforts while they downplayed the 
“bitterest of fights” endured. 45  Nancy Janovicek likewise observed that cynicism 
towards memory assumes “that the narrators are always too nostalgic about the 1960s 
and are always aggrandising their own participation in events.” 46  However, the 
influence WSP activists’ had on the construction of their group’s historical record 
makes study of their reflections particularly revealing. An examination of the 
influences guiding these recollections, especially when members’ interpretations 
conflict with archival records, presents new understandings of the history, memory, 
and identity of Women Strike for Peace. 
 
The Identity of Women Strike for Peace 
Several recent studies have reassessed historical perceptions of Women Strike for 
Peace by highlighting the intricacies of the group’s identity. Amy Schneidhorst 
reflected on WSPers’ maternal identity by considering its use as a tactical tool 
necessary to craft the group’s cohesive image.47 Lawrence Wittner, while conceding 
that WSPers took “their maternal responsibilities quite seriously,” argued that the 
“reality” behind the group’s image “was far more complex.” Members of the 
organisation were better educated than the majority of women in the United States, 
while all the leading figures had activist experience.48 Andrea Estepa, in her 2012 PhD 
                                                 
43 Ibid, 195. 
44 Alonso, “Review,” 1773-1774; Terry Anderson, “Review: Women and Peace,” American Studies, 
Vol. 36, No. 1 (Spring 1995): 123-125. 
45 Cheryl Lynn Greenberg ed., A Circle of Trust: Remembering SNCC (New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press, 1998), 12-13. 
46 Nancy Janovicek, “‘If You’d Told me You Wanted to Talk About the ‘60s, I Wouldn’t Have Called 
You Back’: Reflections on Collective Memory and the Practice of Oral History,” in Oral History Off 
the Record: Toward an Ethnography of Practice, eds. Anna Sheftel and Stacey Zembrzycki 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 185-200. 
47 Schneidhorst, Building a Just and Secure World; Schneidhorst, “‘Little Old Ladies and Dangerous 
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thesis, argued that WSP formed an integral part of the American New Left, assessing 
the radical ideologies inherent in some activists’ rhetoric and as a force that motivated 
some campaigns.49 Meanwhile Jessica M. Frazier considered WSP’s manipulation of 
maternal identities, seeing in the group’s transnational activism political acumen often 
absent in other accounts.50  
This thesis contributes to these existing studies, but develops the inquiry 
further to investigate how and why common depictions of WSP developed, while 
explaining the impact WSPers’ identities had on the construction of narratives 
surrounding their organisation. Although existing studies provide differing 
perspectives on the identities of WSP activists, none have investigated the links 
between members and the development of historical image.  
The complexity of WSP’s identity presents some illuminating avenues of 
research. Activists invested a lot of themselves in their organisation. To paraphrase the 
thoughts of women’s peace activist scholar Cynthia Cockburn, activists’ attitudes 
towards their group suggest that Women Strike for Peace was not just something they 
did, but something they were.51 Women projected their own views and attitudes onto 
WSP while drawing on the experience of the group to inform their understanding of 
themselves. From the foundation of the group through to the closing of its National 
Office in 1990, WSP activists displayed a vested interest in how the group appeared. 
Many linked their life stories to their experience as a part of WSP. Former National 
Coordinator Ethel Taylor’s memoir depicted her life through reference to the group’s 
activities, advocating the group’s impact on her life by stating that WSP “sustains me. 
Outside of my family and my friends, WSP to me is the most important entity.”52 
Such proclamations exemplify the descriptions of activist identity found throughout 
studies of “new social movements.”53 
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Yet the identity of Women Strike for Peace remains difficult to define. Despite 
frequent references to the organisation’s activities, studies seem conflicted over how 
best to describe its members. Alonso’s authoritative Peace as a Women’s Issue notes 
that the initial appeal of Women Strike for Peace lay in its projection of an image of 
“respectable, middle-class, middle-aged peace ladies in white gloves and flowered 
hats.”54 However, she later argues that WSP made groups such as WILPF “seem 
staid,” holding an appeal for “younger, budding feminists” due to their radical actions 
and “contagious sense of humour.”55  Alonso subsequently observed that younger 
members of the women’s liberation movement felt “put off by the middle-class 
WSPers.”56 These changing assessments are representative of the fraught relationship 
WSP developed with the feminist movement. Yet accounts continue to offer varied 
perspectives on the group’s identity. Former members offered conflicting 
representations of themselves, particularly when discussing their backgrounds prior to 
joining WSP. Though the conclusion to Amy Swerdlow’s book acknowledged that 
WSP members were not the “political neophytes” they often claimed to be, some 
continued to assert their prior political naivety.57  
Women Strike for Peace unquestionably contributed to a number of political 
and social campaigns.  In describing WSP, Professor Ian McKay observed the various 
ways it has been analysed:  
As a forerunner of radical separatist feminism in the US, a continuation of 
conventional “motherist ideology,” a movement that fatally weakened 
McCarthyism, a vintage example of the spontaneity of “the Sixties,” an 
early version of environmental activism, and a moment in the career of 
Congresswoman Bella Abzug – all interpretations that shed some light on 
its history.58 
People initially flocked to the group in 1961 to protest weapons testing and call for 
nuclear disarmament specifically, though calls for a stronger UN role in global politics 
also demonstrated the liberal-internationalist inclination of early appeals. Similarly, 
WSP’s demand for reduced US involvement in places such as Vietnam, Cuba, and 
                                                                                                                                            
Collective Action,” in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, eds. Aldon D. Morris and Carol 
McClurg Mueller (London: Yale University Press, 1992), 53-76; Alberto Melucci, Nomads of the 
Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contemporary Society (London: Hutchinson 
Radius, 1989); Vera Taylor and Nancy E. Whittier, “Collective Identity in Social Movement 
Communities: Lesbian Feminist Mobilization,” in Frontiers in Social Movement Theory, 104-129. 
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56 Ibid, 231. 
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Central America presented it as an anti-imperial organisation. Its enthusiastic 
campaign to ban “War Toys” showed concern for the prevalence of violence and 
militaristic attitudes within society. Although WSP’s official position stated its single-
issue concern for nuclear disarmament, WSPers can, therefore, justifiably be labelled 
as activists concerned with peace generally. Yet describing WSP as strictly a peace 
activist organisation risks overlooking the welfare and social justice campaigns its 
members championed throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. WSPers committed 
themselves to “Feed the Cities” and “Women Organized for a Sane Approach to Drug 
Abuse.” 59  The organisation’s environmental activism during the 1970s further 
complicates the historical record. WSP’s complicated relationship with the women’s 
liberation movement prevents a simple explanation of the group’s priorities as a 
gender-based movement. It is clear, however, that many in Women Strike for Peace 
made significant contributions to women’s rights campaigns and received plaudits for 
their participation. 60  Historical accounts can rightfully depict WSPers as 
environmental activists, as part of the feminist movement, and as significant 
contributors to the peace and disarmament movements. These definitions, however, 
are wholly dependent on the historical context within which the group is being 
discussed. Aligning WSP with any one movement inadequately illustrates the broader 
history and character of the organisation. 
 Recent developments in studies of organisational identity provide some insight 
into the character of Women Strike for Peace. Political sociologists Kristin A. Goss 
and Michael T. Heaney, considering the range of campaign issues WSP encompassed 
during its life, identify the group as part of a broader “anti-violence” movement.61 A 
similar analysis may arise from Goss, Heaney, and Fabio Rojas’ understanding of 
“hybrid activism.”62 They explain that a hybrid is “an organisation where identity is 
comprised of two of more types that would not normally be expected to go together.” 
Discussing the dynamic involved in “Organizing Women as Women,” Goss and 
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Heaney argue persuasively that “in gender politics, hybridity typically refers to the 
combining of maternalism and egalitarianism.”63 Heaney and Rojas further developed 
the idea of hybrid activism by explaining that actors may only “have tenuous or 
conditional attachments to an identity.”64 Groups can allow “different sets of beliefs 
and meanings” to produce “multiple frames” among members, ultimately creating 
internal tensions and disagreements. 65  Collectively, these theories of group and 
individual dynamics explain the varying identities of WSP activists and the problems 
the group faced during its history.  
Discussion of identity must also allow for the change in attitudes that occur 
over time. Ann Ferguson argues that “the self is constantly in flux, made up as it is of 
a collection of aspects that change relative to the social context in which a person 
finds herself.”66 Beth Dixon too writes on identity with reference to the changing 
circumstances affecting an individual.67 These natural changes to self-identity also 
impact on the manner in which individuals recall their past experiences. Alessandro 
Portelli argues that the helpfulness of oral narratives rests “not so much in their ability 
to preserve the past, as in the very changes wrought by memory. These changes reveal 
the narrators’ effort to make sense of the past and to give a form to their lives.”68  
Historian David Thelen quotes Jean Piaget and B. Inhelder in proclaiming identity’s 
impact on memory: “If we change the way we think about the world we automatically 
update memories to reflect our new understanding.”69 This phenomenon is particularly 
relevant to understandings of the collective identity of activist groups who are 
engaged in continual dialogue with contemporary social contexts.70 
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Assessing WSP based solely on the context of its activities during the 1960s 
therefore risks abridging its history. This thesis explores the entire duration of the 
organisation’s history to reveal the impact contemporary circumstances had on 
members’ reflections of the past.71 As the perception of their identity changed from 
1961 to 1990, so too did their historical viewpoints. Women Strike for Peace traversed 
transformative periods in American social history, surviving from the beginning of the 
1960s through the rise of the women’s liberation movement, the resurgence of 
American conservatism, and increased nuclear fears in the 1980s before witnessing 
the end of the Cold War. Naturally, WSP underwent substantial changes during its 30 
year existence. But its period of activism also had an impact on the identity of 
members and, consequently, on their historical understanding. This thesis contributes 
to recent interest in WSP’s identity, but expands on existing studies to consider the 
manner in which the complex and changing identity of WSPers affected historical 
depictions of the organisation. 
  In analysing WSP’s complex identity this thesis necessarily deals with the 
issue of representation. As a group ostensibly devoid of leadership, members often 
questioned who spoke for and best represented their organisation. As these 
conversations show much of the internal organisational dynamics of Women Strike 
for Peace they also reveal further problems in accurately describing the group’s 
character. The diverse attitudes of its members allow historians to label certain women 
as being representative of WSP as a whole. For example, historical descriptions often 
cite Bella Abzug as a fundamental part of WSP, yet her personality and political views 
unsettled other activists. 72  On the other hand, Alice Herz, though seemingly an 
archetypal member of the organisation, often receives little acknowledgement for her 
role in WSP despite her unprecedented self-immolation in 1965.73 With participation 
granted to whoever wished to join, WSP held diverse opinions on political and 
personal issues. Pacifist attitudes wavered throughout the group, even among leading 
figures. Some, such as Dagmar Wilson, were staunch in their pacifist beliefs, whereas 
others adamantly denied such sentiments and openly supported violent revolutionary 
movements, exclaiming that they would “pick up a gun to fight for my child, if 
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necessary.” 74  By referencing the differing attitudes of WSP members, this thesis 
shows the instability of historical representation and provides a more comprehensive 
and complex overview of the group’s collective identity. 
Analysis of the disparate geographical composition of WSP also allows insight 
into the organisation’s varied identity. In 2000, Byron A. Miller argued that scholars 
neglected the “geographic variations in resources, political opportunities, place-
specific characteristics, and spatial interactions” that affected the mobilisation of 
social movements. With specific reference to the peace movement in different parts of 
Boston, Miller highlighted “place-specific conditions” and “place-specific strategies” 
adopted by Nuclear Weapons Freeze campaigners.75  Only through analysis of local 
area activism and the variations in approach, he argued, can understandings of a 
national organisation become comprehensive. Harriet Alonso supported this view, 
arguing that “we come to know and understand major leaders” through broad histories 
of organisations, but “we are not as familiar with the rank and file of organisations” 
unless studies consider activities at a local level.76  Raymond A. Mohl, Professor of 
History at the University of Alabama-Birmingham, also highlighted the importance of 
studying local elements of peace movements, “as civil rights historians have been 
doing for two decades.”77  
An engagement with local and regional activism is particularly relevant for 
Women Strike for Peace. Although a national organisation, WSP prided itself on 
decentralised coordination and local activists’ ability to mamage their own affairs. 
Local communities had their own WSP founders and leaders, used their own 
distinctive logos, and developed their own strategies and campaigns. Amy 
Schneidhorst, in focusing on women’s activism in the Chicago, provides a prescient 
example of the benefits of such studies. Yet most historical depictions have attempted 
to discuss the group’s experiences in a national sense. For example, even the titles of 
Swerdlow and Taylor’s works downplay the geographical variances of the 
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organisation. Taylor dismissed any notion of regional differences with the comment, 
“but what’s in a name? We were all dedicated to the same cause.”78 Both used the 
national moniker “Women Strike for Peace” to describe the organisation, but this label 
represented those working on the east coast more than those in other areas of the 
United States. From the group’s inception, Midwestern and west coast activists 
dropped the word “strike” and referred to themselves as Women for Peace or Women 
Act for Peace. Some appraisals note the existence of this dynamic, with Andrea 
Estepa in particular noting how activists experienced a different reception to their 
work in different parts of the US.79  
While the scope of this thesis prevents a detailed investigation of local 
activities, it does deliver an overview of the regional dynamics involved with 
organising Women Strike for Peace. This provides a more nuanced synopsis of the 
group’s history than currently exists and demonstrates issues relating to 
representation. It also highlights the way in which geographical distinctions 
manifested themselves in the identity and memory of activists. Branches exhibited 
different strategies and priorities depending on their location. These differing 
experiences impacted on the way activists recalled their time in WSP, with some 
demonstrating affiliation to their local branch rather than the national organisation.80   
Many former members’ commentaries on Women Strike for Peace assess the 
extent to which the group “made a difference.” Themes of success and significance 
are an important part of historical descriptions of WSP. This thesis is, therefore, 
obliged to engage with arguments relating to social movement success in order to 
reveal aspects of WSPers identity and perspectives on their past. William Gamson’s 
ground-breaking work concerning pre-World War II social activism provides an 
insightful paradigm within which to query notions of success.81 Gamson identified 
two outcomes to represent a social protest movement’s impact; the achievement of 
goals (or “advantages”) as outlined by the challenging group; and the acceptance of 
that group as legitimate spokespeople for their constituency by the antagonist.82 This 
framework merits success on the extent to which these criteria have been fulfilled, 
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though Gamson allowed scope to credit groups with only partially achieving these 
benchmarks. The coding also takes into account the necessity of studying the 
perceptions of three groups of people: the social group itself; the antagonist; and 
historians studying the context.83 Only by using the shared opinions of these three 
groups, Gamson believed, can a reliable measure of success arise. Though some social 
scientists dispute the conclusions drawn from the study itself, they generally accept 
the soundness of the method of coding used to define and measure success.84 
Although the historiography relating to WSP offers favourable reflections of 
the group’s activities, it contests some of the perceptions of success advanced by its 
members. Political historians covering the test ban debate reduce the role played by 
social activists in securing the treaty’s passage in 1963.85 Likewise historiography of 
the anti-Vietnam War movement and antinuclear protest often debates the extent to 
which peace activists achieved their aims. 86  Scholarly attitudes of women’s roles 
among the peace movement also contest the glowing reflections of WSP activists. 
Sara Evans and Barrie Thorne famously discussed the “ultimate indignity” of work 
among the male-dominated peace movement during the Vietnam War, while Heather 
Marie Stur recently wrote about the war’s reinforcement of traditional gender 
stereotypes.87 
Gamson’s coding provides a useful framework, but there remain difficulties in 
adequately measuring the impact of any particular social movement. Though Jeffrey 
W. Knopf advocated a social movement’s impact “simply because it existed,” his 
conclusion faces scrutiny from those who have sought to evidence perceived gains.88 
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Melvin Small, attempting to judge the impact of peace protesters on the American 
government, evaluated the difficulty in measuring the impact of any social movement 
on decision makers.89 He quoted the work of James N. Rosenau on public opinion and 
foreign policy to demonstrate “the complexity of this problem,” noting the 
identification of “three strata of the public, sixteen kinds of opinion makers, and ten 
channels of communication that could become the components of a formal model.”90 
Joshua W. Busby, Associate Professor at the LBJ School of Public Affairs, also 
believed that influence on policymakers was difficult to gauge. “Sometimes weak 
actors may get what they want not because they were influential but because their 
demands were consistent with what governing parties wanted.”91  
Analyses of “new social movements” have broadened these definitions of 
success to consider the impact an activist organisation has on the cultivation of 
collective identity for its own members. As Alberto Melucci wrote in 1989, “if what 
movements do to construct a sense of ‘we’ is not considered accessory or residual” but 
an actual aim of the movement, “then our understanding of concepts such as efficacy 
and success is correspondingly modified.” 92  William Gamson concurs with this 
assessment, arguing that the “construction of a collective identity is the most central 
task of ‘new’ social movements,” particularly for New Left groups in the civil rights 
and women’s movements. In this sense, the transformative impact of belonging to an 
organisation such as Women Strike for Peace marked success in itself. 93  Recent 
studies advance this line of reasoning. K. Jill Kiecolt suggests that “‘a task of all 
social movements’ is to get participants to incorporate the movement’s collective 
identity into their self-definition.”94 As such, the cultivation of strong bonds between 
individuals and groups in Women Strike for Peace is an important measure of the 
organisation’s success. James M. Jasper, in The Art of Moral Protest: Culture, 
Biography, and Creativity in Social Movements, further problematizes the issue by 
noting that “emotional inspiration” can provide as much motivation for activism as 
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specific goals relating to substantive political achievements. “People may even protest 
without thinking they can win,” he argues.95 
Any assessment of WSP’s success may prove difficult to measure, but an 
analysis of the perception of activists draws further insight into how members wished 
others to perceive their group. Activists who saw the organisation as a vehicle for 
feminist activism defined their organisation’s successes through reference to the 
transformative impact Women Strike for Peace had on the feminist sensibilities of its 
members. Amy Swerdlow, consistently working from a feminist standpoint, argued 
that women found “to their surprise” that they could develop their talents in Women 
Strike for Peace and move beyond the previously limiting realm of domestic life.96 
Ethel Taylor, on the other hand, wrote that WSP “made a difference” as an antinuclear 
activist group, advocating its significance among the peace movement while 
continuing to appeal for more members to join the cause.97 Through engagement with 
differing perspectives of success, this thesis reveals diverse attitudes and identities 
exhibited by WSP activists throughout the life of the organisation. It also 
demonstrates the various, often conflicting, perspectives of members, problematizing 
understandings of the group’s membership while complicating existing historical 
depictions of the organisation.  
 
Methodology and Memory 
Stories are of vital importance to the production of organisational identity. Kiecolt 
argues that “probably the most common source of identity work is narrative,” as when 
social movement participants tell “stories about themselves,” they “wittingly or 
unwittingly direct attention to particular aspects of their and others’ self-concepts.”98 
Robert Wuthnow observes that “people in groups do not simply tell stories – they 
become their stories.” 99  The telling and retelling of stories by activists has a 
significant impact on the creation and subsequent reinforcing of collective identity and 
group image. According to social movement theorists Debra Friedman and Doug 
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McAdam, such battles for “control of the group’s image” are often vital for its 
“survival chances.” 100  Jeffrey Olick notes that movements are “concerned, 
even…obsessed” with extolling stories and narratives in order to secure knowledge of 
their exploits with a wider audience.101 Stories told by activists reveal how they saw 
their organisation and how they wished it to be received by a wider audience. Using 
memory studies, this thesis examines the historical productions of WSP activists in 
order to produce a clearer understanding of the organisation’s history, memory, and 
identity. 
WSP activists used various methods to advance the history of their 
organisation and this thesis draws on a number of salient historical productions. It uses 
the memoirs and autobiographies of several leading figures to ascertain their 
experiences in WSP and their attitudes towards the organisation. These writings 
contributed to the public history of Women Strike for Peace and provide evidence of 
the image WSPers wished to publicise. National Coordinator Ethel Taylor, San 
Francisco leader Alice Hamburg, New York WSPer Lorraine Gordon, and National 
Secretary Barbara Bick wrote memoirs and autobiographies that discussed, with 
differing emphasis, their involvement in Women Strike for Peace. The writings of 
other members, Bella Abzug, Alice Herz, Pat Cody, and Elise Boulding among them, 
also provided insight into the workings of the group. In order to provide an accurate 
assessment of the history and identity of Women Strike for Peace, this study 
aggregates the individual productions of WSP members to note points of contention 
and conflict in memories of the organisation. Doing so leads to validation of certain 
events while also revealing common themes present throughout memory of the 
organisation. 
This thesis also draws on historical understandings dispersed internally by 
WSP members. By invoking the past through speeches to national and local meetings 
and with the production of commemorative journals, WSP created an insular narrative 
of the past that informed the identities of its members. Anniversary celebrations 
served as mnemonic devices to frame activists’ historical perspectives, highlighting 
key events and successes that members drew on to understand the group’s character. 
These productions show the historical understanding WSP activists circulated among 
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themselves and allow this thesis to make an unprecedented examination of the group’s 
folklore. 
In aiming to produce a more comprehensive assessment of WSP, this study 
endeavours to highlight the attitudes of those not covered in existing historical works. 
While they present valuable insight into the group’s history, the memoirs, 
autobiographies, and historical productions of WSP emerged from the organisation’s 
“key women.” 102  Leading figures naturally exercised considerable influence, but 
relying on these documents alone creates a problem of representation. As such, this 
study makes use of a wealth of private correspondence among activists found in 
WSP’s archives. The letters found prove crucial to indicating the private attitudes held 
by WSP’s grassroots members, while more public complaints also exhibit an 
alternative vision of the group’s cohesion. Additionally, the research uses materials 
from local branch archives in Los Angeles, San Francisco, Berkeley, Seattle, Chicago, 
New York, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C. The extensive archival material 
reveals the inner workings of WSP’s local branches while also allowing comparative 
analysis to be made of the attitudes, functions, and campaigns of different regional 
bases for the first time. The official records within these archives allow the study to 
calibrate the memories of WSPers and observe whether established understandings 
conform to official records.  
As an examination of WSP history with reference to the attitudes and 
memories of its members, this study would have benefitted from conducting 
interviews with former WSP activists. Unfortunately, owing to the age of the 
organisation, the vast majority of former WSPers are now deceased. A surviving 
member was reached, but owing to other commitments they were unable to be 
interviewed. As the organisation refrained from keeping membership lists, the search 
for other former activists proved unsuccessful. However, while the unavailability of 
former WSPers prevented this study from conducting oral interviews, activists 
engaged enthusiastically with oral history projects during their lives. A number gave 
extensive interviews as part of the Women’s Peace Oral History Project, run by Judith 
Porter Adams during the 1980s. The project recorded numerous women’s peace 
activists from WSP and WILPF, later publishing the transcripts of some of the 
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interviews, and provides a rich collection of personal memories. The University of 
Montana-Missoula also produced recordings with local activists of Missoula Women 
for Peace. These interviews provide significant insight into attitudes and experiences 
of WSP activists and, while acknowledging that some limitations arise from this 
approach, they have proven invaluable to the research carried out here. This study is 
able to combine historical understandings produced by WSP members of varying 
prominence, from various locations, made at various times to provide a more 
comprehensive assessment of WSP’s history, memory, and identity. 
The use of personal reflections to inform historical studies has distinguished 
precedence and has particular salience for studies of activists, as encouraged by 
historian Margo Perkins. In Autobiography as Activism she argues that the act of 
producing a memoir has value in itself and that critical analysis of an individual’s 
writing allows insight into the attitudes of those involved in a movement.103 Lindsey 
Dodd similarly defended the “long pedigree” of using first-person narratives in 
historical research.104  
Nevertheless, some drawbacks to using such sources should be highlighted. In 
Childhood and Child Labour in the British Industrial Revolution, a study that makes 
exhaustive use of the autobiographies of former child workers, Jane Humphries 
acknowledges the various weaknesses and pitfalls of using memoirs as sources of 
historical fact. She cites small sample sizes, conscious manipulation of the past, and 
the possible “failures of memory.”105 However, Humphries’ work provides a robust 
defence of such studies.106  As she reflects, “many of the alleged weaknesses of 
memoirs are irrelevant when they are used not as eyewitness accounts of external 
events but as a source of information about their own author’s experience.”107 Martha 
Solomon uses the autobiographies of Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Anna Howard 
Shaw to argue that “the writing of an autobiography is not simply a recording of 
recollections,” but “an attempt to formulate and convey the significance and value 
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one perceives in one’s life.”108 William L. Howarth labelled the works of significant 
social movement activists “oratorical autobiographies,” asserting that “they are 
characterized by a desire to show one’s life as in some way an idealized pattern of 
human behaviour.” 109  The inherently subjective nature of memoirs presents an 
opportunity for salient analysis of WSP when they are taken as evidence of personal 
attitudes towards the past. 
Understandings drawn out from memory studies are central to the research 
method. A rich taxonomy exists to describe forms of recollection. For example, while 
semantic memory deals with learned knowledge, episodic memory describes an 
individual’s recollection of particular events and incidents (episodes).110 This study 
concerns itself predominantly with the concept of “autobiographical memory” and its 
relationship to historical accounts of a social group. Using the definition of Professor 
of Psychology William F. Brewer, autobiographical memory refers to “memory for 
information related to the self” and includes the personal memory of specific episodes 
in a person’s life, the knowledge of autobiographical facts, and generic memories of 
personal experiences.111 In this sense, autobiographical memory relates to individual 
memory and the agency of single participants in the production of historical accounts.  
The benefits of such an approach for this study of WSP come through the 
indelible link between autobiographical memory and notions of personal identity. A 
psychological study by Williams, Conway, and Cohen explains that a “bidirectional” 
– or reciprocal - relationship exists between memory and identity, with a person’s 
knowledge of themselves informing an understanding of their own past experiences. 
Simultaneously, recognising the manner of historical experience serves to inform an 
individual’s sense of their morality, personality, and identity. 112 Geoffrey Cubitt noted 
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the “vital” role memory played in informing an individuals’ identity. 113  Memory 
theorists Lynn Abrams and John A. Robinson both explained that a respondent 
providing a recollection “is directly or indirectly telling us something about him or 
himself.”114  “Life memories,” as such, “tell us something about remembering and 
about the rememberer.”115 These works suggest that analysing the form, content, and 
context of the recollections produced by members of Women Strike for Peace reveals 
unexamined insight into the identity of activists. Aggregating and comparing these 
stories produces a more comprehensive and complicated story of the organisation.  
This method of analysis also provides insight into the social influences at play 
within WSP. As Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan argue, a person’s memory is 
unavoidably “fashioned by the social bonds of that individual’s life.” 116  Joan 
Tumblety finds that the impact of such influences on the testimony of individuals was 
“inevitable,” while Lynn Abrams asserts that historians can never be sure whether the 
narratives offered by individuals are actually expressions of a “collective 
consciousness.”117 Bridget Fowler, meanwhile, contends that: 
One cannot in fact think about the events of one’s past without discoursing 
upon them. But to discourse upon something means to connect within a 
single system of ideas our opinions as well as those of our circle…the 
framework of collective memory confines and binds our most intimate 
remembrances to each other.118 
This study analyses the extent to which social dynamics created “cultural scripts” that 
informed WSPers’ recollections. 119  Oral historian Lindsey Dodd defined cultural 
scripts as “recognizable, standardized reworkings of the past,” essentially an accepted 
mode of discussing a shared history.120 Gary Alan Fine notes that for a particular 
incident to become folklore it needs “to be usable,” and relate to “experiences that at 
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least a significant proportion of the group’s members have in common.”121 Assessing 
the form of WSPers’ recollections and the presence and influence of cultural scripts 
reveals how perceptions were framed around a desirable historical image.  
The dynamics of group conformity also provide illuminating points of 
analysis. In his work on history and memory, Geoffrey Cubitt outlines that familiarity 
with a group’s attitudes towards its past “is part of what is involved in becoming, in 
the fullest sense, a member of the group in question.”122 James Fentress and Chris 
Whickham, writing in Social Memory, observed the “supply and demand” 
requirements on memory. In order to “survive beyond the immediate present,” 
reflections must “fit” the desired image of a group. 123  In this sense the attitudes 
displayed by WSP activists towards their past developed through interaction with their 
fellow members. Cubitt succinctly explains that practical considerations often 
influence the manner with which recollections are transmitted. Rather than 
constructing an accurate historical record, members of a group “may find it more 
important to develop an account of things that is coherent, or that commands general 
assent within the group, or that minimises friction, or that enhances self-esteem, or 
that legitimises certain claims or structures.”124 
 Additionally, as identity changes, so too does memory. The passage of time 
and the shifting social and cultural environment in which memories are transmitted 
naturally influences their form. As sociologist and historian Jeffrey Olick explained 
the idea of “presentism,” memory and images are produced “in the present for present 
purposes,” and therefore assume an understandable alteration due to “the structure of 
interests and needs of the present.”125 
 This study also acknowledges the presence of “silence” in activists’ 
recollections, observing its relevance to understanding the production of memory and 
historical accounts. Much work on the subject relates to the influence of trauma and 
past suffering on individuals’ reluctance to discuss particular life events.126 Similarly, 
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Paul Ricoeur writes on the relationship between remembering and “forgetting,” 
explaining that certain historical events are “overly remembered” at the expense of 
others.127 This thesis investigates how the absence of recollections served to shape a 
particular narrative of Women Strike for Peace. In one sense, silence can reflect 
hegemony. A crucial argument made throughout Sue Campbell’s work highlighted 
“the importance of paying attention to those whose voices have been silenced or 
whose pasts have been written for them by the dominant and powerful.”128 Examining 
the attitudes and recollections of actors who have, thus far, remained muted in WSP 
history provides useful insight into the relationships and dynamics that governed the 
organisation. But reluctance to discuss particular events may also suggest intent to 
gloss over periods that members felt unrepresentative of their organisation or 
themselves. 129  The presence of silences, analysis of where they occur, and a 
discussion of why they appear adds much to understandings of WSP’s historical 
image. It reveals currently overlooked events in the group’s past while suggesting that 
a desired and “appropriate” representation of the organisation existed in the minds of 
WSPers.  
The relationship between gender and memory provides an additional aspect of 
this study. Several projects have touched upon gender differences in the reproduction 
of memory, but have yet to offer adequate conclusions. For example, a 1997 study 
found that men outperformed women on visuospatial tasks, whereas women 
evidenced better skills in verbal fluency and episodic memory tasks. Though a 2013 
project found similar conclusions, neither could adequately explain the reasons behind 
the differences. 130  A 15-year study into diaries and autobiographical memory 
conducted by Kansas State University observed that “female superiority in event 
dating was consistent across studies,” but was reluctant to identify specific causes. 
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Gender socialisation, its authors suggested, may have contributed to performances, 
with female participants often responsible as “event daters” in their everyday lives.131  
 Differing social experiences between men and women appears to have an 
effect on the framing and transmission of memory. Professor of Gender History Lynn 
Abrams asserted that “there is no evidence from memory tests that women and men 
have different memory functions,” but that “gendered socialization” may explain the 
contrasts in recollections.132 Beth Dixon, in a study of gender and identity, argues that 
the significant role gender plays in the establishment of an individual’s identity within 
society necessarily impacted the perspective a respondent placed on past events.133 Ely 
and McCabe note gender differences in the recollections of conversations. In their 
study, women recounted speech verbatim with more frequency than their male 
counterparts, who seemed content to project the general subject of discussion. This 
suggests a differing perspective on the importance of the content and meaning of 
social interactions in memory.134 Deborah Tannen draws explicit dichotomies in the 
use of speech to recollect past events between the genders. In You Just Don’t 
Understand!, a work focusing on gendered differences in communication styles, 
Tannen asserts that men’s history will depict competition, whereas women are far 
more likely to paint favourable images of community and mutual cooperation.135 
Isabelle Bertaux-Wiame has written extensively on women’s depictions of the past, 
noting the frequent use of plural prefixes “we” and “one” as substitutes for the 
individualistic “I” seen more prominently in men’s recollections.136 The implication is 
that women are more inclined to recognise the contribution of others, that the history 
of communal activity is more worthwhile than an individual account, and that 
conversations are recollected with clarity. 
The prevalence of certain themes within women’s recollections also indicates a 
gender difference. Luisa Passerini, who has written extensively on the methodological 
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implications of oral history, feels it important to recognise the sense of irreverence and 
rebellion that women’s groups include when recollecting particular instances of 
activism.137 While rebellion represented a major theme in the histories presented by 
her subjects, however, Passerini sometimes questions the authenticity of their 
rebellious position. Examining the contrast in given perspectives, she noted that 
“irreverence is a narrative stereotype which does not so much point to real behaviour 
as project affirmations of identity” and that the use of such a narrative tool was largely 
“symbolic.” 138  Fentress and Whickham, discussing Passerini’s work, agree that 
women’s memories depict groups working on the margins of society and celebrating 
their position as outsiders.139   
Studies considering gender differences in the transmission of memory 
generally acknowledge that the field lacks robust conclusions at present. Reports 
remain “speculative,” prefacing their findings with the caveat that “additional 
research” is necessary while recognising the “destabilizing” impact that research into 
the subject could have.140 Nevertheless, an investigation into the history of Women 
Strike for Peace can draw on some of the informative findings relating to the 
formulation and transmission of memory to explain particular impressions of past 
events. 
The research for this thesis considers the risks involved with critiquing 
personal recollections for historical analysis. Feminist scholar and memory theorist 
Sue Campbell warned of the consequences of labelling an individual’s recollection as 
“false,” arguing that “memory, self, and person are historically braided concepts” to 
the extent that undermining the recollections of an individual could entail an attack 
on their “selfhood and personhood.”141  The notion of “interpretive authority,” as 
discussed by Katherine Borland, also has salience. In appraising an anecdote 
recounted by her grandmother, Borland explained that her own feminist standpoint 
had imposed a political rendering onto the story with which the narrator emphatically 
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disagreed. She acknowledged having unwittingly constructed “a second-level 
narrative” from her source material, “based upon, but at the same time reshaping” the 
narrative originally expressed. 142  While making clear that her reading did not 
“betray” the “original narrative,” Borland nevertheless accepted the care required in 
reassessing the significance of particular memories, explaining that interpretations of 
personal accounts “if not sensitively presented, may constitute an attack on our 
collaborators’ carefully constructed sense of self.”143 Oral historian Lindsey Dodd 
provided further elucidation of this risk. She argued that, unless scholars were aware 
of the multiple facets and interactions at play between memory, identity, and the 
individual, “using this kind of source could be dangerous, not just in terms of 
misinterpreted data, but because of the impact it has on the lives” of respondents.144 
This thesis intends to explain the presence and significance of “distortion” in 
history and memory of Women Strike for Peace. Utilising this concept as an analytical 
framework allows further understanding of the identity of WSP activists through a 
study of the historical depictions they presented. But this does not suggest that 
WSPers consciously engaged in the duplicitous manipulation of their historical record, 
or that the histories they produced constitute polemics. Memory scholar and feminist 
writer Sue Campbell invoked the phrase “faithfulness to the past” to advance her idea 
of “good remembering,” suggesting that recollections should be held up to a standard 
of accuracy and integrity reflective of the “ethical responsibility” of rememberers.145 
But this study accepts that “memory distortion” is an unavoidable phenomenon, 
indicative of the many influences on the coding and transmission of recollections. 
Professor of Philosophy Eric Schwiztgebel has published numerous essays in recent 
years questioning the accuracy of individual reflection, with particular critiques of 
visual perception and introspection.146 He finds distortions of conscious experience to 
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be natural and inescapable and concludes that limits to a person’s explanative powers 
inherently restrict their ability to describe their experiences. Such phenomenon should 
be considered in evaluations of individuals’ perspectives on their past experience.147  
Historian Lisa Tetrault provides a persuasive analysis of distortion within 
group contexts, arguing that a particular version of events, “once dominant,” can serve 
to influence the recollections of individuals within a group until a cohesive “myth” 
develops to explain the past.148 However, she challenges the negative connotations of 
such a term, arguing that “myth in this context does not mean, as it does in popular 
use, a falsity. Rather, myth means a venerated and celebrated story used to give 
meaning to the world.”149 Cultural historian Michael Kammen further warns against 
exposing memory to value-based judgements. Some instances of discrepancy “are 
quite properly regarded with a cynical eye, and may be considered, for convenience, 
negative (i.e., self-serving) instances of memory distortion,” but, he contends, others 
may represent positive moves towards a “democratizing outcome” or the “necessary 
readjustment of value systems that are out of synch.” 150  Kammen finds that 
“description and explanation serve us in more satisfactory ways than cynicism about 
bad faith or evil intent on the part of dominant elites.”151  Observing WSP members as 
“social actors,” this thesis speaks to Jeffrey Olick’s work in attempting “to understand 
the ways in which, and reasons for which, images of the past change or remain the 
same.”152 Measuring the extent and form of these shifts sheds new insight into the 
identity of WSP activists and their place in contemporary social movements. 
 
The thesis consists of six chapters weaving the story of Women Strike for Peace into 
an examination of the construction of its history. The first two chapters look at the 
establishment of the organisation’s folklores as the group developed in its early years. 
Chapter one considers the group’s founding in 1961 and the way in which memory of 
the period depicts the actions of its original members. The chapter problematizes 
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existing understandings by placing WSP within the context of rising American 
concern with nuclear weapons during the 1950s. Although recollections of the period 
claim WSP formed on the initiative of politically inexperienced housewives and 
mothers, this chapter examines the activist backgrounds of those involved, the various 
precursors to WSP’s first demonstration, and their self-representation as unique critics 
of government policy.  Chapter two continues the story, focusing on the development 
of the organisation in the years immediately preceding its first demonstration. It pays 
particular attention to the folklores and myths, established in this early period, which 
informed depictions of the group in later years, such as its leaderless, structureless 
organisational format. With an overview of WSP’s 1962 encounter with the House 
Un-American Activities Committee and the ratification of the Partial Test Ban Treaty 
in 1963, the chapter shows the importance of this period to WSP’s historical 
depiction.  
Chapters three and four analyse WSP’s involvement in the anti-Vietnam War 
movement. Much discussion of this period reflects favourably on the organisation, but 
these two chapters demonstrate the complexity of the experience. Chapter three 
considers the diversity of experience felt by WSPers during the course of their anti-
war work, paying particular attention to the immolation of WSP activist Alice Herz 
and the furore surrounding WSP’s meeting with Vietnamese women in 1965. 
Historical accounts present a unified vision of Women Strike for Peace that suits the 
desired image of the group’s leadership. This chapter, however, demonstrates the 
potential for alternative narratives. Chapter four continues this analysis by progressing 
WSP’s story to the end of the 1960s and early 1970s, exploring the chagrin of activists 
as the Vietnam War continued. Despite the group’s best efforts to end the war, 
tensions built within the organisation, provoking widespread disaffection among 
activists. The stress of continued anti-war work caused friction between women, 
disputes between chapters, and conflict between regions as the loose organisational 
strategy employed by WSP caused myriad problems. In highlighting this aspect of the 
organisation’s history, this chapter queries current the reasons for existing 
understandings. 
The final two chapters examine the changing identity of WSP activists and the 
way in which historical understanding became informed by contemporary 
circumstances. Chapter five considers the contested relationship between Women 
Strike for Peace and feminism as it developed in the 1970s. As WSP started to 
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consider its past, it reframed its identity and experience through its encounters with 
the women’s liberation movement. Although WSP adopted an ambiguous stance on 
feminist campaign issues, this chapter sees activists’ fresh affirmation of Bella Abzug 
as indicative of the realignment in its own identity. The chapter also considers the 
nature of debate concerning the appropriate place of maternal identity in women’s 
organising. Chapter six then examines the group amidst the return of antinuclear 
activism in the 1980s. It shows that WSPers reflected on their past experiences with 
reference to the contemporary fortunes of the peace movement and their optimism 
towards future endeavours. Although they were unable to prevent WSP from 
diminishing as a group, this chapter demonstrates the ongoing commitment expressed 
by WSPers, even as their National Office closed in 1990. 
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1. “The Women Seemed to Have Emerged From Nowhere”: 
Origin Myths and the Roots of Women Strike for Peace 
 
On a warm September night in 1961, six women met in the Georgetown house of 
Dagmar Wilson, a self-described “mere housewife” and mother of three. 1  The few 
friends sat in Wilson’s comfortable living room and talked of atomic war. They were 
worried, indignant, and angry. Atmospheric nuclear testing had contaminated milk 
supplies, resulting in the accumulation of radioactive compounds in the bones of 
American children. The nuclear arms race threatened global destruction, simply because 
world leaders could not settle their differences through reasoned conversation. Worse, 
the peace movement’s passive response seemed woefully inadequate. The housewives 
assembled in Wilson’s house were not political activists, but they decided to make a 
bold, unpopular stand, calling on women to stage a nationwide, one day “strike for 
peace.”2 Contacting friends through “informal female networks, by word of mouth” and 
through “Christmas card” lists, the Washington women rallied support for their 
apolitical appeal to spare the world’s children from radioactive fallout and the fear of 
nuclear apocalypse. 3  They believed that mothers had a natural role to protect and 
nurture life and mobilised women who also felt a “special responsibility” to campaign 
for peace.4 The organisers downplayed any political motivations, levelling equal blame 
at the governments of both the US and USSR. On 1 November 1961, six weeks after the 
initial call for action, an estimated 50,000 housewives and mothers took to the streets in 
60 cities across the United States.  
So goes the established story of the founding of Women Strike for Peace, a tale 
that provided activists with a shared historical reference to frame the organisation’s 
character.5 In her work on the memory of the 1848 Seneca Falls convention on women’s 
rights, Lisa Tetrault explains that such origin stories “work to legitimate and unify the 
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messy contingencies of political struggle.”6 Additionally, organisational theorist David 
A. Whetten argues that the identity developed by a group often emerges from the 
“distinctive set of organizing principles authored by formative organizational leaders,” 
with the intentions of founding members proving crucial to the development of a unified 
group mentality.7 Because of its importance in crafting a distinguishable image and 
identity, the way in which activists retell founding stories offers an insight into how 
they imagine the organisation they work for.  
This is certainly true of Women Strike for Peace. Imbued throughout the 
founding tale of WSP are allusions to aspects that members took pride in identifying 
with.8  The story of WSP’s 1961 formation, from the “exploratory meeting” of 21 
September to the first public demonstration on 1 November, was often invoked in the 
organisation’s later years when activists felt the group needed to reaffirm its identity or 
boost its morale.9 The first meeting in Dagmar Wilson’s living room showed WSP 
activists as a lone voice speaking out against violence on behalf of the world’s children, 
acting solely on their maternal concerns and without prior political or activist 
experience. The 1 November strike established WSP’s propensity for spontaneous, 
radical acts of dissent in spite of a prevailing consensus that frowned upon their brand 
of activism. WSP’s founding story separated it from other groups and allowed activists 
to craft a vision of theirs as unique, unexpected, and without precedent. 
 By emphasising desirable aspects of the past, retellings of foundation stories 
often neglect details that conflict with an established narrative, becoming more “myth” 
than history.10 Tetrault argues “an origins story, once dominant, promotes the forgetting 
of struggles within the struggle, the debates and rivalries within the movement itself. 
Eventually, several competing narratives give way to a dominant collective memory, 
and having won, that story appears to tell itself, being self-evidently true.”11 This same 
distortion appeared in the recollections of WSP activists as they held to a version of 
events that masked the more complex context surrounding the organisation’s founding. 
Far from the apolitical body they claimed to represent, WSP’s founders possessed years 
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of experience leading peace, labour, and civil rights campaigns throughout the United 
States. Though identifying primarily as “housewives and mothers,” the cosmopolitan 
backgrounds of the first WSP members showed links to international pacifist networks 
and ongoing work in myriad social justice organisations, complicating the impression of 
WSP in its founding story. The version of events exalted by the group’s members, one 
which became established in historical works, therefore provides useful insight into the 
way in which activists framed their history to construct a particular narrative of their 
experience.12 By assessing the complex background to WSP’s founding, this chapter 
highlights several key problems in established understandings of the organisation’s 
beginnings. 
 
Women’s Antinuclear Protests Pre-1961 
In the second chapter of her profile of Women Strike for Peace, Amy Swerdlow 
chronicled the extensive efforts of women’s peace activists in the United States, placing 
WSP’s actions into a contextual history which, she claimed, activists had no prior 
knowledge of.13 “The WSPers,” she explained, “would have been astounded to learn 
that they were following in the steps of millions of their foremothers who had, for over 
a century, petitioned, lobbied, and demonstrated against America’s major wars and 
military interventions.” 14  Intriguingly, Swerdlow’s overview did not document the 
antinuclear activism conducted by women in the years immediately preceding WSP’s 
formation. Her narrative of the late 1950s described women’s return to domesticity in 
the face of “ridicule and calumny” from “promoters of the new family ideology.”15 
Though she noted that WSPers “had been concerned about the bomb for many years,” 
the former leader explained that they had “followed the advice of baby experts” such as 
Benjamin Spock and Jerome Frank who “counselled mothers of young children to forgo 
full-time employment outside the home.” 16  By discussing the “prelude” to Women 
Strike for Peace with reference to women’s domestic responsibility, Amy Swerdlow 
allowed her study to depict the group’s first action as “something absurd.” 17  The 
formation of WSP appears incongruous with the historical context in this account, 
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creating the impression that the organisation raised its moral opposition to nuclear 
weapons at a time of little public concern for the hazards of nuclear war. “The women 
seemed to have emerged from nowhere,” Swerdlow wrote.18 Her assessment reflected 
the attitudes of many activists involved in the group’s founding. Philadelphia WSPer 
Ethel Taylor believed that, given contemporary events and attitudes, WSP embarked on 
an “unpopular” protest.19   
The development of intercontinental ballistic missiles in the 1950s served to 
solidify traditional gendered notions of women’s domestic role. Nuclear arsenals 
threatened the continental United States in an unprecedented manner. The government 
responded with a civil defence program that called on the public to “prepare your home 
and your family against attack,” asserting that responsibility for defence rested 
“squarely on you.”20 “Family fallout shelters” became a crucial part of a “triple line of 
defence.” 21  As housewives, it fell on women to prepare the home for attack. The 
government warned that “unless you, a responsible American woman, take action you 
are gambling with the safety of your family, and your country.”22 Leaflets, such as 
“Grandma’s Pantry,” encouraged women to ensure they had sufficient stocks of food, 
water, and medical supplies in their homes, suggesting they make defence preparations 
a part of everyday chores.23 Defence figures warned that only a well-maintained home 
could provide adequate shelter from attack. Katherine Howard of the Federal Civil 
Defence Administration suggested that preparing the home for war was “merely a 
prudent extension” of women’s maternal responsibilities.24 Leo A. Hoegh, Director of 
the Office of Civil and Defence Mobilization, urged women to “recognize and foster 
civil defence action.”25 Several works have since noted the effect civil defence had on 
gender roles, with Elaine Tyler May’s influential Homeward Bound explaining that as 
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“experts called upon women to embrace domesticity in service to the nation” many 
responded in kind.26 
Contrary to their public image, the women who would form WSP did not 
subscribe to this notion of domesticity. Instead, they emerged as participants of an 
increasingly robust peace movement that began reclaiming its pre-war strength on the 
back of rising public fears over atmospheric nuclear testing. Although opposition to 
nuclear weapons remained somewhat muted following the bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, nuclear testing saw public qualms rise significantly in the middle of the 
1950s. The ill-fated 1954 Castle Bravo nuclear test showered radioactive fallout over 
the Pacific Ocean and caused the death of a Japanese fisherman. The test became a 
watershed for peace activists as they galvanised into a cohesive antinuclear movement. 
Twenty million people subsequently signed a petition calling for a nuclear test ban.27 
New peace organisations formed, such as SANE, the Committee for Nonviolent Action 
(CNVA), and the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND), while historic groups 
such as the War Resister’s League (WRL), the American Friends Service Committee 
(AFSC), and WILPF emerged from their post-war malaise to recruit new members.28 
By 1960 the annual Aldermaston Peace March in the UK saw 100,000 people 
participate, the Boston Globe reporting that “only the coronation in 1953 or VE Day in 
1945 saw greater crowds around Nelson’s Column.”29  
 Many organisations within the movement remained male-dominated, but women 
began to develop criticisms of nuclear weapons based on their own experiences. Laura 
McEnaney argues that the “same maternalist-domestic ideology” used by the 
government to encourage civil defence efforts allowed mothers to become politicised 
against war.30 Turning civil defence justifications on their head, women highlighted the 
hypocrisy of being asked to take responsibility for the protection of their children while 
arms build-ups threatened the existence of mankind. Evoking the maternal arguments of 
earlier women’s peace protests, they pointed out that radioactive fallout from weapons 
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tests, particularly compounds of Strontium-90 and Iodine-131, caused a 
disproportionate health risk for children as it contaminated milk supplies. The presence 
of middle-class women, dressed in coats, high-heels, and clutching handbags, became a 
common sight at peace demonstrations and vigils.31  
Pacifist arguments based on maternal concern appeared in the rhetoric of many 
women’s peace activists. In March 1959, Dorothy Hutchinson, the future leader of the 
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom in the United States, held a fast 
at the headquarters of the Atomic Energy Commission. She wrote a report of her 
experience, titling it “How a Mother spent Mother’s Day far from her children – for the 
sake of all children.”32 In July 1960, a group of Canadians formed Voice of Women 
(VOW) to oppose nuclear weapons “in the cause of a universal motherhood.”33 
Nowhere did women most publicly express their aversion to the nuclear age than 
during New York City’s annual “Operation Alert” civil defence drills. Protest occurred 
from the first drill in 1955, with famed Catholic pacifist Dorothy Day and the WRL 
each claiming credit for organising resistance. 34  In April 1959, Mary Sharmat and 
Janice Smith, unacquainted young mothers from the city, engaged in independent but 
simultaneous and identical protests against the drill. Leaving home with their children to 
“intentionally break the law,” Sharmat and Smith refused to take cover for the required 
15 minutes of the drill, explaining that they did not “believe” in civil defence and that 
they refused to raise their children “to go underground.” 35  The young mothers, 
respectably dressed and pushing baby strollers, received a positive reception. The 
following year, Sharmat and Smith united to organise more than 1,000 people to resist 
the drill, 500 “well-groomed mothers and children” among them. Sharmat recalled, “our 
skirts gave them courage. We loaned out extra babies to bachelors who had the 
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misfortune to be childless.”36 Jim Peck, a radical activist, described it as “the biggest 
civil disobedience peace action [ever] to take place in the United States.”37 
Awareness of this existing context of women’s maternal antinuclear protests 
complicates the perception that WSP was an “absurd,” “unpopular,” and unique 
demonstration. Sharmat and Smith’s Operation Alert protests in particular presaged 
Women Strike for Peace and displayed unmistakable similarities to the tactics, rhetoric, 
and image later appropriated by WSP’s founders. Foreshadowing WSP’s later concerns 
for a “respectable” public image, Sharmat described picking out her outfit for her 
demonstration, taking care to appear respectable and dignified so as to offset any 
potential criticism for her civil disobedience. A member of SANE, she recalled feeling 
frustrated with the lack of the group’s urgency as many members declined her invitation 
to join her protest.38 Sharmat called local newspapers to whip up publicity prior to her 
protest, finding the perfect method to convey her maternal fears by bringing her young 
son, Jimmy, with her. 39  Dee Garrison argued that “the women’s most brilliant 
innovation was their reliance on the image of protective motherhood to win public 
notice and support.”40 The similarities between the Operation Alert demonstrations and 
WSP even caused the FBI to comment on Sharmat’s possible influence on the group’s 
formation.41 Through the use of maternal rhetoric and image, the visible presence of 
children at the protests, and stress on making a non-political stand, Smith and Sharmat 
were able to “transform non-violent direct action, once the province of a small band of 
radicals, into an effective weapon of ridicule used by angry mothers to discredit the 
nuclear policies of the militarist state” some time prior to WSP’s first demonstration.42  
Acknowledging the involvement of future WSP activists in antinuclear 
campaigns prior to 1961 also complicates the perception that they possessed no political 
activist experience prior to the group’s foundation. Ethel Taylor, in her memoir We 
Made a Difference, wrote of her life as an apolitical housewife in the years preceding 
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her leading role in WSP.43 Dagmar Wilson claimed to have “never been in any way 
politically active before in my whole life.”44 But the women who would become WSP’s 
most influential participants were well-informed and experienced in political activism 
by 1961. Many became politicised as children. Amy Swerdlow and Ruth Pinkson, for 
example, proudly noted their “red diaper” childhood and the political education they 
received from their communist parents.45 Others developed an early sense of pacifism 
and social justice through their exposure to Jewish and Quaker religious communities.46 
Some women were pioneers for women’s rights, occupying leading positions in union 
and labour organisations during the depression.47 Having been involved in pacifist and 
social justice campaigns both pre and post-WWII, these women seamlessly redirected 
their efforts to pursue a nuclear weapons test ban. They frequently lobbied Congress 
over American militarism throughout the 1950s. A number occupied leadership 
positions in WILPF.48 Many of SANE’s local branches were formed by future WSP 
leaders who then served on the national board and executive committee. 49  Several 
worked for Adlai Stevenson’s presidential bid solely due to his opposition towards a test 
ban.50 Some attended the Oslo conference on nuclear disarmament in the summer before 
WSP was founded. 51  From biographies, histories, and the testimony of activists 
themselves, a picture emerges of the substantial work performed by WSP members in 
peace and disarmament activities in the years leading up to 1961. Far from emerging 
“from nowhere,” Women Strike for Peace marshalled the talents and energies of 
experienced women peace activists already involved in a vibrant US peace and 
disarmament movement. 
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The First Meeting 
Antinuclear protests became a frequent sight as tensions between the superpowers 
increased throughout 1961. In April, the Easter Walk for Peace saw 300 people march 
87 blocks through Manhattan, enduring rain and “slashing gusts” to deliver appeals for 
disarmament to the Soviet and United States missions to the United Nations.52 President 
Kennedy’s public exhortations for a “peace race” encouraged activists. Frances Herring 
recalled that his stance “gave us something positive to work on,” while others felt that 
the President’s famed “Sword of Damocles” speech to the UN that warned of the threat 
of nuclear arms “was frankly an appeal to the people; if you want us to stop, then stop 
us.”53 Historian Amy Schneidhorst notes that the presence of women on peace marches 
“rose substantially” throughout the year, until they comprised nearly half of all walkers 
in the Chicago area. This “high turn-out of women foreshadowed the women’s peace 
groups” that followed.54 When the USSR announced its intention to resume atmospheric 
nuclear testing after a three-year moratorium, women across the United States were 
primed to respond to an appeal for a peace “strike.” 
 The first “exploratory meeting” of WSP took place in Dagmar Wilson’s living 
room in September 1961 and the tale of the gathering quickly assumed a fundamental 
place in the group’s founding myth. WSPers across the country frequently invoked the 
story of six close friends, “mere housewives” from Washington, D.C. who, though 
unacquainted with peace activism, determined that “it was time for women to speak 
out.” 55  The myth perfectly encapsulated the image WSP wished to appropriate, 
affirming its constituency as a close group of wholesome mothers concerned only for 
their children’s wellbeing. The meeting’s modest setting juxtaposed the later success of 
Women Strike for Peace.56  
Amidst WSP’s founding emerged the legendary figure of Dagmar Wilson. Born 
in New York in January 1916, Wilson grew up in Europe. Her father, Cesar 
Searchinger, worked as a foreign correspondent for CBS radio based in Germany before 
moving to the UK, where Wilson attended a “progressive school” and followed her 
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classmates by running “toward dissent against traditional ways of doing things.”57 She 
developed an “upper-class British accent,” granting her an air of calm grace and 
respectability that proved helpful when she began speaking publicly on behalf of 
WSP.58 Wilson attended the Slade School of Fine Art in London before moving back to 
the United States with her husband, Christopher, just prior to World War II. First living 
on a Missouri farm, they moved to New York for work before finally settling in 
Washington, D.C. Christopher, though a trained child psychologist, found himself 
working for the British Embassy as a commercial attaché while Dagmar pursued a 
much-loved artistic career, first as a teacher and graphic artist, and then as an illustrator 
of children’s books. When she started WSP, she was a mother to three daughters, Sally, 
Clare, and Jessica. 
Her self-description as a “mere housewife” disguised Dagmar Wilson’s lifelong 
exposure to politics and pacifist ideas. Though not activists, Wilson’s parents and 
grandparents had direct involvement in the women’s suffrage movement. Betty Gram 
Swing, a militant American suffragist, was her mother’s best friend. 59  Dagmar’s 
concern for peace began in childhood and she later explained being brought up “as a 
pacifist.”60 Her father in particular proved an important influence on Wilson’s political 
sensibilities. Cesar Searchinger was a naturalised American citizen from Germany and 
possessed an impressive intellect. Mastering the English language within a year of his 
arrival in the United States, Searchinger worked as a journalist for the New York Post 
and authored a commended book that explored the practicalities of peace in Europe.61 
His work allowed Dagmar to encounter high-level political ideas from an early age and 
she reflected that she had often “heard journalists talk in her house.” 62  Cesar 
Searchinger’s weekly radio broadcasts for CBS, a forerunner to Edward R. Murrow’s 
show “Hear It Now,” presented intense and informative broadcasts intended to educate 
the American public on international news, politics, and culture. He often covered 
“political events” such as the visit of Mahatma Ghandi to London and allowed his 
daughter unique access to such occurrences. Ghandi’s visit in particular “made a deep 
impression” on a young Dagmar Wilson. As a 16-year-old, she recalled being impressed 
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with his “principles for peace.”63 Throughout her life she remained proud of an English 
essay she wrote about the occasion, “because I showed so much interest” in Ghandi’s 
pacifist ideas. Her husband’s job with the British Embassy ensured that she continued to 
have first-hand exposure to current international politics in her adult life.64  
Wilson’s claim that she lacked any activist experience also masked the extensive 
campaigning she engaged in prior to WSP’s founding.65 As her children entered school 
she became involved in the PTA, founding the Action Committee for School Libraries 
that, under her leadership, brought about the promotion of a library school program. 
Wilson also actively participated in the Children’s Book Guild, arranging a two-week 
book fair each year with the help of The Washington Post. She found herself in demand 
as a speaker and giver of “Chalk Talks” in local schools and neighbourhoods.66 Outside 
of education, Wilson became increasingly involved in political activism and worked for 
the campaign for “Home Rule” in D.C. before her pacifist beliefs directed her towards 
the antinuclear movement.67 As atmospheric nuclear testing became a public issue in the 
late 1950s, Wilson asserted her opinions in the national press. She wrote to The 
Washington Post in 1959 to express her concerns for the “disturbing” state of the debate 
over nuclear weapons testing.68 She joined SANE when the group founded in 1957 and, 
although she did not rise to a position of leadership, Wilson served as secretary for the 
local D.C. branch and took part in lobby initiatives.69   
The first stirrings of what would become Women Strike for Peace emerged 
through Wilson’s involvement in SANE. That group’s controversial efforts to expel 
communist sympathisers from its ranks alienated many of its members, including many 
future WSPers. It reaffirmed Wilson’s belief that the leadership of existing peace groups 
lacked the inclusivity and urgency she felt necessary in the current climate.70 In 1961 
she grouped together several of her female SANE colleagues and approached Executive 
Director Sanford Gottlieb to propose taking a more robust stand on fallout in milk, but 
Gottlieb felt reluctant to support the women’s concerns. Bertrand Russell’s arrest 
following a protest in London in September compounded the consternation already 
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provoked by the recent resumption of Russian weapons tests. Wilson felt that Russell’s 
act of civil disobedience seemed “an unnecessary thing for a man of his stature, his 
reputation, and his wisdom to have to do.” It made her “realize that we were in a 
desperate situation” and proved “the last straw.”71 She called a SANE director but, 
failing to encourage the organisation into making a show of support, she recalled 
pondering her frustrations by the phone. “I thought, I thought, I thought.”72 Wishing to 
deviate from the sluggish activities of other organisations, Wilson decided to gauge the 
level of interest in a one-off women’s demonstration by hosting a meeting at her house. 
 Accounts of the meeting often described the founders of WSP as six close 
friends, but the women who participated in the first meeting were not so well-
acquainted.73 In correspondence with Amy Swerdlow in 1981, Wilson revealed that, 
rather than using her “Christmas card list,” as claimed elsewhere, she received “all the 
names to call for the meeting” from her close friend and SANE colleague Margaret 
Russell, someone Wilson described as “much more politically active than I.”74 Russell 
sourced the majority of the meeting’s participants from SANE, including Folly Fodor 
and Mary Chandler, while asking others to contact any activist they felt could aid the 
cause. Folly Fodor sent a call out to Quakers in the Philadelphia area, culminating in the 
attendance of influential peace activist and leader of the AFSC Lawrence Scott. Scott, in 
turn, asked Jeanne Bagby to attend. Eleanor Garst responded to a specific invite from 
Russell.75  
Wilson confided in Swerdlow years later that, prior to the meeting, she had only 
met Margaret Russell, Folly Fodor, and Mary Chandler. 76  The remaining women 
connected solely through activist networks. Strengthening the view that Wilson 
intended to found WSP with experienced activists, the “exploratory meeting” also had 
Mary Sharmat in attendance, fresh from her much publicised efforts organising the 
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Operation Alert protests.77 Donna Allen, another influential member of SANE, was 
unable to participate that night, but having been asked to attend, she considered herself a 
founding member.78 Ten people attended the meeting in all, out of around 17 that were 
invited.79 But only six were ever referred to as founders; Dagmar Wilson, Margaret 
Russell, Eleanor Garst, Jeanne Bagby, Mary Chandler, and Folly Fodor.80  
The experience of those who attended the first meeting meant that WSP 
possessed substantial expertise from its outset. Most of the women belonged to “half a 
dozen of the usual organisations,” including WILPF, SANE, the League of Women 
Voters, and the United Nations Association.81 Originally from California, Folly Fodor 
joined SANE on arriving in D.C. when her husband began working for the US Labour 
Department. A professional artist, Fodor travelled extensively across Europe in her 
youth and had previously formed an “antinuclear mothers’ group” following the birth of 
her daughter in 1956.82 She was described as one of the more “politically oriented of the 
first group.”83 Mary Chandler also worked for SANE and, heavily pregnant at the time 
of WSP’s founding, utilised her leadership skills to become an international 
representative of the group over the next ten years.84 Jeanne Bagby had committed 
herself to various activist causes throughout her life. An “early hippie,” Bagby 
displayed her solidarity for civil rights causes by living in integrated areas, while also 
railing against “man’s threat to the natural environment” and the use of pesticides. Amy 
Swerdlow noted that Jeanne Bagby had long been “active in foreign policy dissent and 
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other social justice causes” prior to her involvement in WSP.85 She became “naturally” 
interested in nuclear disarmament and the issue of radiation.86  
Of the “six founders,” Margaret Russell and Eleanor Garst appeared the most 
politically active. Russell played an instrumental role in getting the organisation off the 
ground, utilising her contacts within activist networks to bring the first WSPers 
together. A Canadian national with an illustrious past as an academic researcher, Russell 
participated in the Halifax Co-Operative Society, promoting grassroots liberal 
democracy, before a “world tour” between 1936 and 1937 led her to adopt “an 
increasingly critical anti-war view of international affairs.” She married in her late 
forties before settling in Washington, D.C. She began serving on the local SANE 
executive soon after. In a detailed history of Margaret Russell, Ian McKay described her 
as “a seasoned political historian long fascinated with empire, democracy, and 
grassroots mobilization.” Contrasting the image that WSPers advanced in their origins 
myth, McKay claimed that Russell never succumbed to domesticity or the “ideology of 
motherism,” and never “wavered in her life-long reverence” of and public campaigning 
for liberal rights and freedoms. She became an integral organising figure for WSP, 
ultimately in charge “of all arrangements” for the group’s first march.87 
 Eleanor Garst, like Margaret Russell, brought a lifetime of political activist 
experience to Women Strike for Peace. “A pacifist at the age of ten,” Garst actively 
opposed World War II with her then husband Merritt. Following her divorce she 
undertook executive roles for many organisations, including the American Association 
for the United Nations, the United World Federalists, the International Centre, the Race 
Relations Council, and the National Conference of Christians and Jews. Garst also 
founded the Los Angeles branch of SANE before moving to D.C. and joining the 
branch there. She incessantly wrote letters to members of Congress and organisations 
such as the AEC throughout the 1950s, lamenting their inability to curb the arms race.88 
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As a self-educated woman, Eleanor Garst took pride in researching and producing her 
own pacifist and anti-draft materials and wrote articles for the Saturday Evening Post, 
the Reporter, and the Ladies’ Home Journal.89 She drafted the initial call that arose out 
of the September meeting and took credit for writing much of the “essential 
methodology” that influenced WSP’s stance. In fact, Garst sought the major credit for 
forming WSP. Having tried to start her own antinuclear protest action a month earlier, 
she claimed that she “was able to suggest to a handful of Washington women at Dagmar 
Wilson’s that it might be possible to stage a one-day protest action.”90 
 Minutes of the September meeting were not taken, but discussions led to the 
drafting of a letter that called for “every woman to join in a Women’s Strike for Peace – 
and to get her friends and neighbours to do likewise.”91 Sent to contacts throughout the 
US, the Washington founders concisely expressed the ideas motivating their one day 
“strike” while casting an image of themselves they felt would encourage interest in the 
action. The letter’s tenets became WSP’s founding image. It focused on individual 
responsibility by declaring “we’re not asking anyone to sign anything, join anything. 
Details in your town are up to you.” The appeal also humanised the Cold War and 
women’s ability to contribute to peace, saying that “every individual has learned 
techniques for resolving human differences. Can governments do less? Government is 
us.” Finally, WSP’s founders expressed their belief that “it is the special responsibility 
of women – who bear the children and nurture the race – to demand for their families a 
better future than sudden death.” They alluded to a traditional, stereotypical, and 
socially-acceptable image of women’s domestic role, invoking an identity of 
inexperienced housewives by claiming to be “appalled at our own audacity, for we’re 
just ordinary people, not experts.” 92 The call aimed to achieve the support of a broad 
base of women within the US and confirmed the image the Washington founders 
wished their action to assume. The call became a key part of WSP’s founding myth. Ian 
McKay described it as a “remarkable letter.”93 
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Regional Founding Stories 
The Washington organisers sent their appeal to known activists throughout the US. The 
backgrounds of those who received the letter demonstrate this. In New York, Ruth 
Gage-Colby, an internationally respected peace activist and accredited correspondent at 
the United Nations, received an invite, as did Valerie Delacorte, a wealthy 
philanthropist and civil defence opponent. Ethel Taylor, a leader of SANE and WILPF 
in Philadelphia, responded to the appeal while Edith Villastrigo, a friend of Dagmar 
Wilson’s in SANE, joined in Washington, D.C. Janet Neuman, a director of WILPF 
who assisted in the resettlement of Jewish German refugees during World War II, also 
contributed to the first few weeks of planning. 94  San Francisco Women for Peace 
founder Alice Hamburg described the initial formation of WSP using an interesting turn 
of phrase. She suggested that known activists “were asked to start a group” in their 
areas, contrasting the impression that the founders issued a generic call for 
participants.
95
 Some claimed that Wilson intended WSP to be an “outgrowth of SANE” 
that utilised the skills of women activists known to the founders.96 Even those who 
responded to WSP’s call as “housewives” acknowledged their existing commitments to 
community activist organisations such as the Emma Lazarus foundation.97  
Stories describing the founding of Women Strike for Peace often focus solely on 
events in the capital, but while the D.C. women’s influence naturally deserves attention, 
the Washington-centric narrative of WSP’s birth leaves no regional context for the 
interest the strike received nationally. Although WSP’s founding story suggests the 
D.C. women encouraged previously apolitical housewives to act, their appeal resonated 
most strongly among existing women’s peace networks. In fact, owing to their ongoing 
efforts, many local leaders had cause to claim that they had already “founded” local 
iterations of the organisation before it became a national phenomenon.98 Many across 
the country had already engaged in activities that later became the hallmark of Women 
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Strike for Peace.99 In Portland, OR, Carol Urner had already marshalled 200 women 
into a “non-organisation” that called on each individual to act as a “human dynamo.” By 
the time Dagmar Wilson called the first meeting together in Washington, D.C., Urner’s 
group met the governor of Oregon, telegraphed their senators, and wrote to Congress. 
Such was her influence that newspaper clippings of her success were passed around 
Wilson’s living room on 21 September. Her efforts left a glowing impression on 
Eleanor Garst in particular, who became enamoured with her style of grassroots 
organising. Even the name of Urner’s group, “Women for Peace,” suggests that it was a 
“precursor and a model” for Women Strike for Peace that simply became absorbed into 
the national actions sparked in Washington.100  
 A thriving environment of peace activism existed in all of the areas most 
responsive to WSP’s initial call. In San Francisco, Dr. Frances Herring received the 
“strike for peace” appeal. A stalwart member of WILPF, Herring had considerable 
influence among the peace movement in the Bay Area. After completing her PhD, she 
wrote a report in 1958 on “The Development and Control of the Nuclear Industry in 
California” for the Bureau of Public Administration in Davis.101 WILPF subsequently 
made Herring a leading spokesperson and she developed a close friendship with revered 
disarmament figures Linus and Ava Pauling. Her expertise earned her an invitation to 
the Conference of Sixty Scientists Against the Spread of Nuclear Weapons in Oslo, 
Norway, in 1961. In the summer prior to WSP’s formation, Frances Herring wrote to 
friends that a burgeoning “communication network” of women’s peace activists existed 
in San Francisco Bay that, she hoped, would soon coalesce into a formidable campaign 
group.102 The women Herring brought together to form the local WSP affiliate were not 
only experienced peace activists, but close friends. 103  Alice Hamburg and Hazel 
Grossman, also members of WILPF, first worked together to protest against the House 
Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) on the steps of the San Francisco City 
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Hall on “Black Friday,” 13 May 1960. 104  The protest foreshadowed WSP’s later 
encounters with HUAC. Madeline Duckles, a long-time member of the AFSC and 
another influential member of WILPF, joined them.105  
In Los Angeles, Mary Clarke and Kay Hardman utilised their activist experience 
to bring people together for WSP. 106  These women benefitted from an upsurge in 
grassroots liberal political activism that emerged in California during the 1950s, as 
highlighted by Jonathan Bell.107 Respondents to the strike appeal in Los Angeles could 
readily engage with an existing middle-class leftist element that “mirrored the growth of 
New Left activism in universities.”108  Such activists had already carried “scathing” 
attacks on American militarism, saw the Cold War “as a distraction,” and found popular 
support for “respect for cultural differences in foreign policy.”109 Rather than engaging 
inactive women in Los Angeles, the D.C. women simply interacted with these existing 
networks.110 
 The women who would become Chicago Women for Peace collaborated in 
various campaigns during the late 1950s, with the Hyde Park neighbourhood a frequent 
scene for peace marches. Shirley Lens, the area’s future leader, worked in WILPF and is 
described as a “publicly positioned” radical who, after controversially resisting the 
Broyles Loyalty Oath for the Chicago Teacher’s Union in 1955, courted the media’s 
attention. She made activist connections around the world, travelling with her husband 
and fellow labour and peace activist Sidney. Figures like Lillian Hayward and Mimi 
Harris also drew on their earlier endeavours to benefit WFP in Chicago. After receiving 
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the message from the Washington women, they ensured women in the city were well 
prepared for public actions.111 
 Several branches formed in the weeks following WSP’s 1 November strike, but 
also marshalled experienced activists. Seattle Women Act for Peace (SWAP) began on 
16 November to coincide with President Kennedy’s visit to the University of 
Washington-Seattle. Anci Koppel, SWAP’s leader, taught French in her native Vienna 
before moving to Seattle with her husband, businessman Charles Koppel. The 
depression “laid the foundation” for her interest in politics. She joined the peace 
movement before the Hiroshima bombing turned her onto nuclear issues.112 Thorun 
Robel introduced herself to activism at a pacifist demonstration against fascism before 
World War II, intervening in a struggle between a police officer and a fellow student. 
“On impulse,” Robel “whacked the policeman with her purse and was immediately 
arrested.” Both Koppel and Robel came under intense scrutiny during the McCarthy era 
for their Communist Party affiliations. Between them they possessed the skill and 
experience to ensure that SWAP became a staple of the Seattle peace scene well into the 
21st century. A short distance away, Mabel Proctor ensured that Tacoma Women for 
Peace also contributed to activities in Washington State.113 She supported WSP having 
been “actively engaged in peace groups for twenty three years,” mainly with the United 
World Federalists. She proudly stated being “one of the women who voted first the year 
women first had the right to vote.”114 
 It is, perhaps, little surprise that WSP’s appeal resonated most strongly in areas 
with close affiliation to the US nuclear weapons program. In San Francisco, WFP 
rallied those concerned with the nearby Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and 
the University of California-Berkeley, both of which conducted research for the 
military.115 In Washington State, the Hanford Nuclear Reactor and nuclear-equipped 
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Trident submarines stationed around Puget Sound brought the nuclear age close to 
home, while Chicago Women for Peace directed scorn at University of California for its 
involvement with the Manhattan Project.116 
By engaging with existing networks to build its initial membership WSP 
mirrored the early stages of many social activist groups, but acknowledging this in this 
case reveals an undervalued aspect of the group’s historical image.117 Highlighting the 
backgrounds to the founding of local branches does not necessarily dispel the notion 
that WSP mobilised previously inactive “housewives” around the country, yet it does 
suggest that the group’s founding myth paid insufficient attention to the groundswell of 
women’s peace activism throughout the United States. Additionally, a focus on events 
in Washington, D.C. overlooks the way in which activists recalled WSP’s founding with 
reference to their own branches. In San Antonio, for example, a group of women who 
joined WSP in 1970 acknowledged the beginnings of the national organisation, but also 
commemorated their own founding. “About fifty women gathered together to discuss 
the Indochina War and its destructive consequences,” they recalled, and “from this 
meeting sprang Women for Peace.”118  
 
Crafting an Image 
The first public appeals made by WSP described the group of women involved as 
inclusive, internationalist, and symbolic of all women, but the first WSPers represented 
a narrow cross section of US society. Every contributor to the first meeting could 
consider themselves affluent relative to the rest of the population and respondents 
around the country certainly came from the American upper-middle class. Many of the 
first WSPers achieved “sufficient security” financially to pursue full-time careers as 
anti-war activists, a common characteristic representative of the typical WSPer.119 The 
affluence of WSP activists resembled the backgrounds of women involved in other 
                                                                                                                                               
Labs, and the Founding of the Atomic West,” in The Atomic West, eds. Bruce Hevly and John W. 
Findlay (London: University of Washington Press, 1998), 119-135; Daniel Pope, “Antinuclear Activism 
in the Pacific Northwest: WPPSS and Its Enemies,” in The Atomic West, eds. Bruce Hevly and John W. 
Findlay (London: University of Washington Press, 1998), 236-254; Hamburg, Grass Roots, 172-174. 
116 Schneidhorst, Building a Just and Secure World, 2. 
117 Friedman and McAdam, “Collective Identity and Activism,” 161-163. 
118 “Example of Mailer Sent to Trudi Young from San Antonio Women for Peace, 1970,” SCPC WSP 
Archives, A3, Box 4, Branch File – Texas (1970). 
119 McKay, “Margaret Ells Russell,” 121. 
  
55 
  
women’s peace organisations, such as WILPF.120 Historian Melissa Klapper described 
the lives of women’s peace activists as more closely resembling “that of the executive 
director of a modern-day NGO” than of that “the simple middle-class housewife.”121 
Although publicly exhibiting a neutral attitude to politics, WSP’s first members 
harboured strong liberal values and traditionally voted for Democratic candidates. 
Several came from staunch communist or socialist backgrounds. Others, such as Folly 
Fodor and Ruth Pinkson, had previously organised for Progressive Party presidential 
candidate Henry Wallace in 1948. 122  Rarely, if ever, did WSP members express 
fondness for Republican Party figures.123 
Additionally, there was little diversity in terms of race and a predominantly 
white membership represented WSP throughout its life. Coretta Scott King consistently 
attended WSP events during the 1960s, but an inability to attract more women of colour 
caused significant problems.124 Members often recognised the difficulty they had in 
recruiting minority women. Nevertheless, a substantial number of WSP’s founding 
members were either first or second-generation immigrants from western or eastern 
Europe. Women Strike for Peace did not use religious allusions to frame its protest, but 
the majority of its members were influenced by the social justice and pacifist teachings 
of their Quaker and Jewish upbringings, something traditionally prevalent in women’s 
peace groups.125 
Later recollections and the material that emerged from the first meeting show 
that the participants fully understood the necessity to craft an image that would rouse 
the wider public. With the combined experience of their shared activist pasts, WSP’s 
founders possessed considerable political acumen. They were media-savvy and, aware 
of the need for a consumable public image, began crafting rhetoric and identifying 
tropes that would forever be associated with the organisation. Dagmar Wilson initially 
offered suggestions for actions under a banner of “women for peace,” but “everyone 
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groaned.” “What we need,” Eleanor Garst recalled commenting, “is something that will 
jar people out of their lethargy.”126 Public meetings and marches seemed too staid and 
failed to inspire. The idea of a strike, the action that became the hallmark of WSP, arose 
not from the founders themselves but from the AFSC’s Lawrence Scott. Heavily 
influenced by the Greensboro sit-ins of the previous year, Scott suggested that a “strike” 
may have some appeal without alienating the public. 127   Participants initially felt 
reluctant to advocate a strike, feeling that the term was “so negative.” But the meeting 
soon rallied behind the idea as attendees sensed the “dramatic impact and the media 
potential of such an action.”128  
Direct action tactics were a rare but growing feature of social activism in the 
period. In addition to the protests of civil rights activists, the newly-established 
Committee for Nonviolent Action also publicised the use of demonstrations and 
marches, marking the 12th anniversary of the Hiroshima bombing with a demonstration 
outside of the atomic testing grounds in Nevada. Such protests had a notable influence 
on WSP’s founding members. Swerdlow explained that the CNVA created “a model for 
direction action by ordinary citizens in opposition to nuclear testing that would be 
followed by WSP.”129 
The idea of holding a strike had no connotations for WSP’s critique of the arms 
race. Although some of the founders and many respondents had experience of labour 
organising during the Depression, the notion of a strike found favour purely because of 
its performative impact. It related solely to the idea that women could, for one day, 
demonstrate their importance by refusing to play their expected role in a society 
complicit in nuclear brinksmanship. Amy Swerdlow explained that there existed “a 
good deal of insensitivity to class differences and economic inequalities” from WSP’s 
leaders and argued that “class was totally overlooked by all of us.” 130  The strike 
intended to empower those who took part while highlighting the role of women in 
American society.   
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The call served to exaggerate the group’s maternal sensibilities in order to 
appeal to a mass constituency of American women and deflect any potential criticism of 
the group’s politics. Drafted by Garst, WSP’s appeal foregrounded the domestic role 
and maternal outlook of Women Strike for Peace, likening conflict between capitalism 
and communism to that experienced by “husbands and wives, parents and children.”131 
Activists certainly identified themselves as mothers, but many WSPers nevertheless 
“adopted a maternal or feminine image with a constituency in mind, whether to impress 
political leaders and traditional women or to create a collective identity as women.”132 
Testimony of several activists in their later years confirm this supposition, as they 
“hoped that our conventional attire would allow women, seeing us on television or 
reading about us in the news, to identify with us, despite the fact that we were engaged 
in actions that might seem a tad unorthodox.”133 Dagmar Wilson reflected that “we were 
educated, you know, we were literate,” and held down professional roles, but opted to 
speak “much more out of our everyday experiences” in order to evoke moral outrage at 
the threat to life.134  
WSP also attempted to craft a founding image that veiled activists’ links to 
existing peace groups. Its founders’ belief in the obsolescence of existing peace 
organisations provided motivation. By the late 1950s, some felt that the historic 
Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom had an “inability to attract 
younger women,” and, while admiring the commitment of its “grey-haired stalwarts,” 
many nevertheless saw WILPF as outdated, treating it “with mixed respect and 
amusement.”135 A similar distaste for SANE also manifested itself in WSP’s outlook. 
SANE appeared “unwilling to move in the direction its women members wished it to 
go,” while the purge of communist members that occurred in 1960 soured attitudes 
towards its leadership.136 People joining Women Strike for Peace in its first few weeks 
expressed a general mood of displeasure at the overly hierarchical, listless, outdated 
organisations they currently belonged to. 
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   Forming in direct response to the perceived inadequacies of peer organisations, 
the founders of WSP acknowledged the necessity to publicly separate the group from 
other existing campaigns. They recognised that it needed to appear new and dynamic if 
it hoped to exploit the inadequacies of other groups and encourage activists to join in 
their action. In a letter to SANE’s National Executive Homer Jack, Kay Hardman spoke 
of WSP’s belief that older groups were destined to fail. She claimed that SANE “may 
be in the tradition of the unfortunate groups, whose purpose was so politically limited, 
philosophically narrow and expediently-based that a change in the political balance of 
power in the world caused immediate death.”137 In comparison, Hardman emphasised 
the ways in which WSP considered itself unmatched, suggesting that there were “deeper 
divisions” between the two groups than those she outlined. During discussions at the 21 
September meeting, planners clearly wished to give themselves a unique presence. 
Eleanor Garst summarised a discussion that took place as planning reached its 
conclusion. “So far it doesn’t sound very dramatic, or very different from what the 
Friends an SANE and the WIL do. How can we get across that it is very different?”138 
The idea to call WSP’s 1 November activities a “strike for peace” arose from this desire, 
as did essential identifying features of the group, such as its non-hierarchical structure. 
  The crafting of WSP’s image is perhaps best exemplified by the manner in 
which Dagmar Wilson became the group’s figurehead. Wilson could certainly take 
credit for having initially agitated for WSP’s formation and her actions remain central to 
the history and memory of the group. Ethel Taylor called her “the mother of it all” and 
insisted that from the group’s inception, “Dagmar was our leader.”139 Frances Herring 
spoke of her “amazement” for the work Wilson did in bringing WSP together. 140 
Activists across the US identified chiefly with Wilson, venerated her opinion on the 
issues they faced, and sought to include her name on any literature or letters used in 
their campaigns. Her personal image and attitude perfectly framed the moderate, 
apolitical, maternal protest sought by the Washington founders. Although the 
organisation strongly distanced itself from any notion of hierarchy and governance in its 
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first decade of activity, Wilson was undoubtedly its leader. She herself later recognised 
becoming a “mythical” figure to others within WSP.141 
 Yet recollections of WSP’s formation neglect the process the founders went 
through to select an appropriate figure to head their protest. Initially reluctant to develop 
any leadership to govern the strike, the Washington women eventually buckled to the 
demands of media and potential members that “there should be a spokesman. Someone 
who’s colorful, good copy.”142 Dagmar Wilson’s consummate shyness originally ruled 
her out of leadership. She feared the possible “jail, loss of income, and ostracism” that 
such a position could bring. But, intriguingly, none of the other founders offered an 
image conducive to WSP’s stance. Folly Fodor’s feminism was too overt, Jeanne Bagby 
appeared too much of a “hippie,” and Margaret Russell was deemed to have too 
“masculine” an appearance.143 Eleanor Garst, an ideal candidate based on her political 
convictions and leadership potential, felt her status as an unmarried, twice-divorced 
woman in contemporary American society would detract from the group’s manifesto. 
Wilson appeared the most wholesome of the Washington founders and “came closest to 
fulfilling the late fifties/early sixties ideal of nuclear family wife and mother.”144 Garst 
called her “ideal: with a handsome husband, three pretty daughters, a house in the 
‘right’ area, Georgetown.” Wilson remained reluctant. She disliked the spotlight, 
confiding “I’m scared to death of having to speak.” The others reassured her that she 
had “something vital to say. You’re photogenic, with a good voice and manner. What 
more do you need?” “Confidence!” she retorted.145 After “some sleepless nights” and 
with an absence of a comparable alternative, Wilson decided, reluctantly, to accept the 
responsibility. Her “selection” as the face of WSP reinforces the notion that the group’s 
image was carefully crafted from its foundation and, therefore, complicates the 
established perspectives evident in the history and memory of the group.146 
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The First Strike 
WSP’s founders set the date of the strike as 1 November, giving themselves only six 
weeks to prepare. In other parts of the country women received letters in early October, 
leaving even less time to gather support and plan their activities. In D.C., organisers 
held an initial rally in a small community centre a week before their planned 
demonstration. In other parts of the country, women sent out swathes of 
correspondence, but they had little evidence to suggest their efforts had attracted 
substantial interest. Eleanor Garst wrote of the D.C. women’s “panic” over the 
“possibly weak response.”147 Several spoke of the many “sleepless nights” they endured 
in the lead up to the march, finally reconciling that “If I find myself out on the street 
alone on 1 November, I may be a fool – but at least I’ll be a fool trying.”148 The night 
before she took to the streets, Garst penned “an open letter to the world’s women.” In a 
final bid to publicise the march, she tied her children’s Halloween experience into the 
context of nuclear war. “Is this all I have to give my children and yours?” she asked, “a 
bit of sweets and a faint hope that their world will be intact tomorrow?”149 Fearing a 
negative reception to the next day’s demonstration, she signed off by saying “tomorrow 
I will walk with the women who Strike for Peace. It’s unladylike, undignified, 
unbecoming. So is radioactive death for the planet.”150 
 The organisers need not have shown such nerves, as thousands emerged the 
following day in support of the “Women’s Strike for Peace.” Many took part in 
demonstrations and marches, while others visited local government officials and spoke 
out in support of President Kennedy’s “peace race.” The news media endorsed the 
maternal image and domestic identity of participants, showing surprise at the apparent 
spontaneity of the event while reporting on the respectable, joyful, and overtly feminine 
activities. The Washington Post spoke of “some 500 school girls, Government workers, 
mothers and grandmothers together with a score of children, half a dozen men and a 
Collie named ‘Candy.’”151  Women pushing baby strollers cemented the perception that 
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WSP was an organisation of “folksy,” politically inexperienced mothers. 152  Many 
recollections speak to the occasion, rather than the actions involved, noting that women 
spent “their all on new hats and a fur coat, wanting so badly to impress the world.”153  
Delighted with the response, leading WSP figures immediately began spinning the day 
into a central part of the organisation’s folklore; the perfect display of the irreverent, 
respectable, and feminine critique of the nuclear arms race that came to epitomise 
Women Strike for Peace. 
 As with many of the details surrounding WSP’s first few months, the narrative 
describing the group’s first demonstration served to increase its reputation. For 
example, the number of those who marched was frequently inflated to boost WSP’s 
significance in historical productions.154 Initial reports struggled to gauge the number of 
people involved.  Even organisers of the day’s events exclaimed their astonishment with 
the turnout, telling their contacts that, “response everywhere far exceeded 
expectation.”155 Eventually WSPers settled on an oft-quoted figure; 50,000 women in 
60 cities, a statistic Amy Swerdlow used to frame her study.156  But WSPers often 
embellished this number in later recollections. A “highlights of WSP history” list from 
1980 claimed that “100,000 women from 60 cities came out of their kitchens and jobs to 
demand ‘END THE ARMS RACE – NOT THE HUMAN RACE,’ and WSP was 
born.” 157  In 1965 Dagmar Wilson claimed that, actually, “half a million mothers” 
poured into the streets for the marches.158 Still further escalation occurred in a 1997 
retrospective of WSP history, as Seattle Women Act for Peace claimed that the 
“national strike brought out one million women.”159  
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Embellishment of the turnout for the first demonstration was not incongruous 
with the group’s use of membership figures to inflate its successes. Though publicly 
claiming hundreds of thousands of active members, in private WSP often reversed the 
logic, saying WSPers “were only a few thousand in the peace movement” in order to 
make its influence on government appear all the more remarkable.160 Yet there is a 
suggestion that the figure of 50,000 was itself an overestimation of the strike’s turnout. 
Through her research, Swerdlow “tallied the highest numbers I can find reported by the 
strike organisers,” but “even with this most generous method of estimation,” she could 
only arrive at a figure “no higher than twelve thousand.”161 Intriguingly though, she 
consigned her true findings only to the footnotes of her work while referring to the total 
of 50,000 in her descriptions of the strike. Swerdlow explained, candidly, that “the 
number fifty thousand became part of the founding legend of WSP,” but she did not 
directly query the accuracy of this total.162 
WSPers’ believed that the success of their initial demonstration suggested that 
they had gathered the support of American housewives for an inherently good cause 
through their appeal and image. But, as social movement theorist Sidney Tarrow 
explains, the presence of a grievance alone is not sufficient to trigger collective 
action.163 The attitude of most observers served to highlight the skilful planning of the 
group’s experienced organisers. WSP’s centring of a moral argument against nuclear 
weapons testing through an emphasis on the protection of children turned the day’s 
actions into a “human interest story” and led many to “become immediately 
involved.”164 Its “third-camp stance,” denouncing both the US and the USSR, proved 
popular to those who wanted to tackle the existence of nuclear weapons, rather than 
advance a political agenda.165 WSP also shrewdly balanced its position on feminism by 
creating a female-only space for protest while publicly distancing itself from notions 
that it wished to upset the established social order.166 Finally, the group’s insistence that 
it did not wish to organise members, but instead provide “a vehicle for individual 
effort,” enticed many who had become disillusioned with “the dogma and discipline 
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required by sectarian groups.”167 Each of these tenets, central to WSP’s formation, arose 
from the deft political perception held by the group’s founding members. 
But the group’s evident similarity to other organisations and its place within a 
wider context of ongoing peace activism suggests that there was nothing particularly 
new about the 1 November strike for peace. WSP’s appeal for participatory democracy 
certainly preceded the same celebrated plea made by Students for a Democratic Society 
in 1962, but its call for spontaneous protest and decentralised organisation reflected the 
direct action tactics of contemporary groups such as the CNVA.168 Its campaign against 
nuclear weapons testing, and even the specifics of warnings over milk supplies and an 
appeal on behalf of American children, reflected similar campaigns produced by SANE 
in previous years. Likewise, suggestions that WSP developed a uniquely moderate, 
feminine, middle-class image must recognise the similar constituency and rhetoric 
professed by WILPF and SANE, two groups WSP desperately wished to distance itself 
from.169 As such there are further explanations for the particular support Women Strike 
for Peace received at this specific time. 
The useful contacts boasted by WSP’s experienced founders provided one 
particular advantage over other contemporaries.170 The involvement of figures like Janet 
Neuman and Donna Allen brought the eager support of journalists such as Art Hoppe of 
the San Francisco Chronicle, London Observer correspondent Joyce Eggington, and 
Guardian journalist Sophia Wyatt.171 Their positions allowed reports and editorials of 
the demonstrations to reach a large audience, providing WSP with much positive 
publicity. Frances Herring and Ruth Gage-Colby, meanwhile, informed government 
contacts around the world of WSP’s plans, including the British MP Anne Kerr and 
future Secretary General of the United Nations U Thant. Gage-Colby used her 
affiliations to deliver a speech to the United Nations in which she extolled the virtues of 
Women Strike for Peace. Embellishing the group’s influence somewhat, Gage-Colby 
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affirmed that she sought “to expand round the world the marvellous grass roots 
movement Women Strike for Peace begun by Dagmar Wilson of Washington and 
already spread to the major American cities and London, Paris, Moscow, Delhi and 
Tokyo to name but a few cities abroad.” 172  Frances Herring later spoke of her 
embarrassment at the way in which Gage-Colby reported on the organisation, “because 
it was so glowing that I felt it was very misrepresentative of our strength.” 173 
Acknowledging the connections boasted by early organisers suggests that WSP 
prospered because its founders were a uniquely talented and energetic group of activists 
possessing the skills, experience, and benefits necessary to succeed. To downplay their 
earlier contributions and describe only their professed image as apolitical housewives 
with a “folksy” appeal vastly undervalues the talents of WSP’s first activists.174 
A further explanation suggests that the march’s success rested simply on the 
unexpectedly fortuitous timing of the strike, a factor almost entirely out of the control of 
the day’s organisers. Circulating their appeal after the USSR had unilaterally broken the 
moratorium on weapons testing allowed WSP to benefit from a global context of 
increased international tension that earlier protests perhaps lacked. But further events 
that occurred in the weeks between the meeting on 21 September and the planned 1 
November strike gave additional relevance to WSP’s stand. The crisis over the Berlin 
Wall that began in the summer escalated considerably. Arguments over access to East 
Berlin in the final week of October 1961 led to a tense stand-off between American and 
Russian tanks.175 Newspapers continued to publish editorials on the crisis the day WSP 
marched.176 
Arguably the most important factor in the coverage afforded WSP was a Russian 
nuclear test that occurred just two days before the strike. On 30 October, the USSR 
tested the 50 megaton “Tsar Bomba.” Creating the largest man-made explosion in 
history, the test galvanised worldwide revulsion to nuclear weapons testing and 
provoked widespread support for a test ban. Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, a 
stalwart critic of nuclear weapons, expressed “grave concern” and reaffirmed his belief 
in a test ban, saying that “obviously some kind of formal agreement or treaty is 
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necessary to stop nuclear tests.” 177  The UK, the third party to ongoing treaty 
negotiations, offered its firm commitment to a test ban and denounced the explosion to 
the UN as “a crime against humanity.”178 Fears grew with the possibility that the test’s 
fallout could affect American citizens from Washington State to the Great Lakes. 179 
Public protest followed on 31 October. The day before WSP’s strike, hundreds took to 
the streets around the world to voice their opposition to nuclear testing.180 Protesters, 
SANE members among them, invoked the threat to children while picketing the Soviet 
Embassy in Washington, D.C.181 Children and expectant mothers were encouraged to 
attend marches in London.182 A protester threw a brick through a window of the Soviet 
Mission to the UN in New York, “painted with a skull and crossbones on one side, the 
legend ‘for my unborn’ on the side and ‘50 MG’ on its edge.”183 
The Tsar Bomba test, more than any other event, allowed WSP’s strike to be 
explained within the context of a surge in public and political opposition towards 
nuclear weapons testing, grounding the group’s actions in the protests that had occurred 
just the day before.184 The Washington Post reported that WSP “followed the pattern of 
previous outburst against the Soviet tests of the last two months.”185 The strike was not 
even the only reported incident of women’s peace protest on 1 November. Anne Stadler, 
executive secretary of the Platform of Peace from Seattle, reportedly “stole a march” on 
WSP by delivering a plea for the cessation of nuclear testing to the Russian Embassy 
before their demonstrations. Accompanied by SANE’s Sanford Gottlieb, Stadler even 
secured a meeting with Arthur Schlesinger, Jr, and utilised the same maternal rhetoric 
espoused by WSPers who marched later. 186  Demonstrating on 1 November, a date 
selected entirely arbitrarily by WSP’s Washington founders, proved unexpectedly 
fortuitous in galvanising public and media support for the group’s protest. 
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WSP’s Founding Myth and the Memory of Activists 
WSP’s famous image and identity clearly emerged from the tactical considerations of 
the group’s founding members, but efforts to maintain this image historically resulted in 
complications and confusions in the memory of activists. Allusions to members’ prior 
disengagement with political issues and the reduction of the contemporary context of 
peace activism faced particular problems. To make a nuanced critique of the arms race, 
WSP’s founders foregrounded the group’s identity with members’ maternal and 
domestic roles to argue that protection and nurturance of children required them to 
speak out against nuclear weapons. They felt that the image of “housewives and 
mothers” would create the impression that members were “inexperienced” in political 
activism, granting their protest legitimacy and authenticity while shielding WSPers 
from critics of their actions. But this identity did not necessarily exist in the way WSP’s 
founders claimed. As both Joanne Meyerowitz and Stephanie Coontz have observed, the 
perception that the 1950s heralded a strictly domestic and apolitical prescription for 
American housewives often arises from a misreading or nostalgic assessment of the 
period. 187  Melissa Klapper referred to the “simple middle-class housewife” as a 
“mythological creature.”188 
The two roles of “housewife and mother” and political activist are certainly not 
mutually exclusive. Maternal justifications inspired many social campaigns of the 20th 
century, particularly among the peace movement. However, WSPers sought to affirm 
the founding myth of Women Strike for Peace by separating the two identities, 
producing several contradictions within their own pronouncements. Even after leaving 
WSP, activists continued to claim that they were politically inexperienced before 
joining the organisation. In Ethel Taylor’s We Made a Difference she spoke of her life 
as a housewife uninvolved with political campaigns while simultaneously 
acknowledging her influential and energetic commitment to groups such as WILPF, 
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SANE, and the American Jewish Congress.189 Dagmar Wilson once described both her 
disinterest in politics and her lifelong commitment to pacifism within the same 
interview.190  
WSP’s attempts to distance itself from contemporary groups also fed into 
recollections. WSPers depicted themselves as a group of “daring dissenters,” somewhat 
lessening the significance of the existing peace movement and raising their involvement 
in “helping to create the climate of opinion” that resulted in international treaties.191 On 
the 20th anniversary of WSP’s first strike, Eleanor Garst further separated WSP’s 
protest from the activities of other contemporary groups. Of WSP activists, she wrote 
that “today, the tactics they chose seem routine; but in 1961 they were startling.”192 
Amy Swerdlow described the attitudes many WSPers expressed in the group’s 
formative period, claiming that “we saw ourselves as new.” 193  She frequently 
distinguished between WSP and groups that shared many ideological and historical 
traits, such as Students for a Democratic Society.194  
Attempts to reconcile the claims that WSPers were politically inexperienced 
with the evidence of their past activities caused notable problems in historical accounts 
of the organisation. Amy Swerdlow, for example, provided substantial background 
information of the Washington founders, noting their involvement in peace and social 
justice campaigns before the formation of WSP. But while acknowledging that “the 
women who founded WSP, appearances to the contrary, were not political neophytes,” 
Swerdlow also spoke to the organisation’s founding myths.195 Discussing the “prelude” 
to the group’s first strike, she claimed that “less than half of those who participated in 
WSP had already joined a peace or civil rights group.”196 She wrote that “none of the 
strike organizers and very few of the women who joined them” had familiarity with the 
peace movement’s history.197 This view reflected the adamant pronouncements of other 
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WSP members. The desire of WSPers to reinforce their group’s founding myths 
produced evident problems in the history and memory of the group’s formation.198 
One explanation for the simultaneous acknowledgment and dismissal of 
previous experience suggests that WSPers made a clear distinction between political 
activism and political awareness while recalling their peace work. Although involved in 
various endeavours, women depicted themselves as merely aware of issues prior to 
WSP, rather than active campaigners. Claiming that prior experience represented only 
awareness elevated the importance of Women Strike for Peace, as it suggested that it 
was the first organisation that excited women enough to become actively involved in 
peace work. Contemporaneously, it may have been the case that women were simply 
not sure what counted as political activism. Famed social and political activist Bella 
Abzug, an early participant in WSP, expressed frustrations that members in the early 
1960s seemed unable to accept that the work they did constituted activism.199  Yet even 
in later recollections there appeared some confusion. An interviewer in 1985 asked East 
Bay WFP activist Rose Dellamonica what the difference was between those that had an 
awareness of political issues and those that acted on their concerns, but she could not 
provide an answer.200 Amy Swerdlow too appeared hazy on the distinction. Speaking 
about her family, she asserted “none of my children are politically active,” while 
revealing that all her children had participated in antinuclear demonstrations or 
organised political groups.201  
It is unlikely that involvement in groups such as WILPF and SANE produced 
political awareness without making women politically active. Likewise, describing 
WSPers’ prior knowledge of peace issues as mere “awareness” severely undervalues 
their activities before joining Women Strike for Peace. Nevertheless, the decision to 
publicly state opposition to weapons testing through involvement in a mass protest 
appeared a significant and empowering one for many who became WSPers. Women 
Strike for Peace did not simply move women from a position of “awareness” to 
“activism,” but from arguably “safer” forms of protest, such as letter-writing and 
lobbying, to direct action. As Bert Klandermans observed in The Social Psychology of 
Protest, “to become a participant in movement activities requires more than being a 
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sympathizer.” Of the various levels of interest an individual can evince towards a 
campaign, the act of joining a demonstration is a significant one that many often retreat 
from. Whereas “signing a petition is so modest an activity,” to take part in WSP’s first 
strike was “more demanding” and “obviously” a “major step even among 
sympathizers.”202 WSP famously made efforts to ensure that its protests were “a first” 
for many who participated. Leaders saw it as a vehicle for those who wished to protest 
but had never felt comfortable to do so publicly.203 Some of the pronouncements of 
those willing to take part in the group’s first strike certainly intimated that to do so was 
a significant step.204 This transformation was significant for WSP members and the 
organisation’s role in the process therefore retained an understandably important place 
in the life stories of activists. 
 Another explanation suggests that activists simply lacked historical knowledge 
of the women’s peace movement. Throughout Women Strike for Peace, Amy Swerdlow 
not only suggested that substantial differences between WSP and other groups existed, 
but also claimed that activists themselves were oblivious to prior instances of women’s 
protest. She used this trope to suggest that members possessed no political activist 
experience, had not been influenced by other organisations, and, accordingly, that WSP 
alone had politicised those who joined. Other groups, therefore, had little influence. She 
provided several examples to support her claim, among them the suggestion that WSP’s 
use of “identical arguments” to earlier protesters was done unknowingly.205 Swerdlow 
concluded her assessment of this phenomenon by asserting that a “lack of knowledge 
about history” was a “handicap” that prevented WSPers from connecting with the long 
heritage of women’s peace activism.206 
 The claim that WSP lacked historical consciousness is intriguing as members, in 
fact, frequently invoked the history of women’s activism in their protests. Just prior to 
the HUAC hearings in 1962, 35 WSPers intended to place a wreath at the statues of 
pioneering women’s rights activists Lucretia Mott, Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and Susan 
B. Anthony. The wreath read “to the brave women who made America listen. We too 
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shall be heard” and attempted to “identify WSP symbolically with the women in 
America’s past who had been persecuted and reviled for their political militancy and 
who had triumphed.”207 At the second national conference in June 1963, WSPers made 
comparisons between themselves and the abolitionist “antislavery women” of the 19th 
century.208  In the same month, Ruth Gage-Colby wrote in the New World Review that 
"people seem to think that the Women Strike for Peace movement is something new 
under the sun.” Wishing to correct public perceptions, she wrote that “women from the 
beginning of time have hated war and longed for peace.”209  
Beyond this recognition of their place in history, many WSPers had direct 
experience of peace and social justice activism stretching back before World War II. A 
substantial amount of interest arose from women involved with WILPF, a group 
supposedly blessed with history and tradition in comparison to Women Strike for 
Peace.210 These women brought with them a keen awareness of women’s peace history. 
Several future WSP activists had actually been a part of the history Swerdlow claimed 
they were unaware of. The leading role Mary Sharmat played in WSP’s first few 
months complicates perceptions that WSP lacked awareness of earlier women’s peace 
efforts, while Dagmar Wilson often publicly acknowledged being influenced by earlier 
groups. In December 1961, she wrote to female members of the UK’s Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament, thanking them “for having started a movement which was 
largely responsible for the birth of the Women Strike for Peace here.”211 
 Swerdlow’s own lamenting of the group’s dismissal of peace history was 
perhaps more representative of her own personal sensibilities than an appraisal of most 
WSPer’s historical knowledge. Explaining WSP’s historical consciousness, she retold 
one instance of her “ignorance” that continued to cause her “shame and pain.”212 
Meeting revered WILPF activist Gertrude Baer in 1962, Swerdlow opined that she had 
not given her “the respect and admiration I have since come to feel for her important 
role in women’s peace history.” Initially dismissing Baer as “an opinionated old 
woman,” Swerdlow’s later studies enlightened her to such events as the 1915 
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International Congress of Women at the Hague and WILPF’s 1932 Geneva conference, 
in which Baer played a significant role. Coming to learn a wealth of history previously 
unknown to her, she grieved that WSP originally “regarded history as irrelevant.”213 
But, by speaking in such personal tones, Swerdlow appeared primarily to chastise 
herself for her own naivety. This contrition further emerged through her oral interview 
with Judith Porter Adams in 1985, during which she frequently asserted her belief that a 
“sense of history is very important” for activists.214 This certainly problematizes the 
separation WSPers expressed feeling from existing peace movements.  
 Yet a fuller understanding of WSP’s founding myth must acknowledge the 
modesty with which activists referred to their past, a feature of many recollections. 
Judith Porter Adams recognised that the people she interviewed often claimed that they 
“didn’t do that much” while recommending other participants who had more 
influence. 215  Amy Swerdlow also observed an absence of self-promotion in her 
interviews with former activists, noting that “the lack of personal aggrandizement and 
lack of opportunism is incredible.”216 Dagmar Wilson frequently received acclaim for 
the modesty and reticence with which she held her place in the group’s history.217 These 
attitudes suggest that individual experiences mattered less than the activities of the 
organisation as a whole. Women Strike for Peace was an instrumental part of its 
members’ lives, to the extent that that activism preceding 1961 held less relevance to 
their life stories than later campaigns. In recounting their past, therefore, WSPers 
claimed to have been comparatively inactive or apolitical to their later selves. The 
contemporary peace movement, in their view, was much improved after WSP 
organised, influencing how activists recalled the context of the group’s founding. 
Inaccuracies in historical accounts did not necessarily arise from conscious 
manipulation of the past, but were instead influenced by the affinity WSPers felt 
towards their group. The feeling that it had a significant impact, both on the peace 
movement and on their own lives, saw WSPers alter their recollections in a way that 
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inflated WSP’s significance, contributing to the perceptions displayed in the group’s 
founding myth. 
WSP’s founders claimed that their group embodied certain characteristics out of 
a desire to craft an image conducive to their protest. Through early pronouncements and 
calls for participants emerged a maternal image that downplayed the political and 
activist pasts of organisers and veiled their involvement with other groups in peace 
movement. These characteristics became instilled in a founding story whose 
significance for activists transcended the initial tactical considerations its founders 
addressed, becoming a founding myth that informed the identity of activists and framed 
their future recollections of Women Strike for Peace. WSP’s founding myth 
consequently served to mask several significant details of the group’s formation. 
Clearly, the group occupied a significant place in the life of its activists, empowering 
them to act on their concerns. But recollections intending to highlight the organisation’s 
importance neglect the context of WSP’s founding. A distinct group of experienced 
activists came together within WSP and, though certainly seeing themselves as 
housewives and mothers, their image nevertheless concealed their possession of vital 
skills that allowed their organisation to prosper. While the backgrounds of these women 
are more well-known now, contradictions in recollections caused considerable problems 
for the history and memory of Women Strike for Peace. These conflicts prefigured the 
disputes and troubles that WSP would experience throughout its life as activists 
attempted to stay true to the group’s founding values. 
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2. “Make Way, They're Coming!”: Nonorganization and the 
First Successes, 1961-1963 
 
The 1 November demonstrations brought overwhelming praise for Women Strike for 
Peace. News reporters exclaimed that “you couldn’t want better” than the goals sought 
by the group, while politicians began rallying to WSP’s cause.1 Officials, heeding the 
demands of the peace strikers, wrote to President Kennedy and praised the “outstanding 
women in this area” for their “sincerity, their dedication to this purpose.”2 WSP had 
inspired an array of activities. In Washington, D.C., they picketed the White House and 
the Russian Embassy; in Philadelphia, activists called their senators to a challenging 
question and answer session in a city courtroom; Chicago Women for Peace marched 
through the city; San Francisco strikers confronted elected officials; and hundreds 
visited the governor of California in Sacramento. Subsequent newsletters and 
correspondence expressed a desire to maintain the momentum sparked by the first 
demonstration’s mobilisation of activists. One participant in Los Angeles wrote to 
Margaret Russell to explain that they “want the Women's Strike for Peace to continue.”3 
In order to do so, it needed to progress from a one-day strike into a functioning 
organisation. 
 From its first march until the end of 1963, Women Strike for Peace achieved 
many of its objectives. Following the initial strike, WSPers organised another well-
received and highly-publicised demonstration in Washington, D.C. that drew thousands 
to the capital and received a public endorsement from President Kennedy. WSP flew 
peace activists to Geneva to confront test ban negotiators directly and irreverently faced 
down a potentially ruinous challenge from the House Un-American Activities 
Committee in 1962. The ratification of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in September 1963 
capped their efforts. The treaty not only validated the activists’ work, but allowed 
WSPers to extol the memory of their experiences with a narrative of success.  
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 But as WSPers attempted to instil the values of its one-off strike into a sustained 
organisational effort, they encountered numerous problems. The informal, 
uncoordinated organising strategy the group adopted did not function as smoothly as 
often claimed, while numerous grassroots voices called for a more rigorous structural 
framework to stymie the growth of an informal leadership clique. Demanding their 
autonomy, decentralised regional hubs began to develop contrasting attitudes to those of 
the national organisation and branches in other parts of the country. Although it 
remained united over its single-issue concern for disarmament, WSP left its position on 
specific policies unclear and failed to resolve confusion over its formal take on other 
social justice concerns. The sense that WSP activists embraced a common memory of 
the period can be problematized when considering the competing opinions that arose 
over these issues. Disagreements over the group’s self-proclaimed successes are 
particularly revealing. Established narratives describing the success of WSP’s encounter 
with HUAC and its influence on the passage of the Partial Test Ban Treaty can be 
augmented considerably by examining these conflicting recollections. 
 
“Organizing a ‘Nonorganization’” 
WSP’s founders had no intention to continue their activities beyond the 1 November 
strike, appearing reluctant to assume responsibility for the coordination of further 
actions.4 Planners had not considered what sort of an organisation would manifest in the 
strike’s aftermath. As an organiser of the first activities in San Francisco, Frances 
Herring recalled that the idea to develop the “Women’s Peace Strike” into an 
organisation emerged “almost as a side-effect” of the day. 5  The decentralised 
organisational system proved popular, delegating authority to local activists and 
allowing open participation without requiring people to register or commit to future 
actions. Sensing that they had developed momentum, participants wished to “continue 
on the same loosely-knit basis,” only “on a national scale.”6 Los Angeles members 
affirmed that “groups get so involved in tinkering with the machinery” they lose sight of 
their purpose. “Let us communicate and even coordinate,” they argued, “but let us never 
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‘corporate.’”7 Reacting to the hierarchies of SANE and WILPF that women perceived 
“as a roadblock” to action, they wished to distance and distinguish Women Strike for 
Peace from other groups.8 
 WSPers expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of attention paid by nuclear 
strategists to the voices of individual Americans and proclaimed the desirability of 
participatory democracy as a tool to include the public in the antinuclear debate. By 
advancing such a view in 1961, WSP preceded the same appeal made by SDS in the 
1962 Port Huron Statement. Its views, argues Estepa, “would have fit comfortably” 
within that text. 9  The group attempted to extend this belief into its manner of 
organising, adopting a non-hierarchical, consensus-based structure that valued 
individual attitudes. Amy Swerdlow referenced the comments of SDS member Micky 
Flacks, who believed that “WSP’s ‘unorganization’ format, developed in 1961 and 
1962, played a key role in shaping the later anti-war movement and the women’s 
liberation movement. ‘It was never given enough credit for this,’ she stated in a 1980 
interview.”10 
 Swerdlow observed that WSP grew “around the same time” as other anti-
hierarchical organisations, but explained that WSP was “exceptional.” While it “shared 
with SDS and SNCC the belief” in “a new participatory political format,” she contrasted 
Women Strike for Peace with those groups who “made much of their named and 
acclaimed leaders.”11 “The women of WSP,” Swerdlow argued, “unlike the young men 
in SDS, gloried in their ‘outsider’ standing.”12 Nevertheless, the group took its cues 
from existing civil rights organisations such as SNCC, which was founded a year 
earlier. WSPers responded to the successful use of direct actions tactics adopted by the 
Greensboro sit-in activists and were inspired by the rising presence of organisations 
advocating citizen participation. 13  In this sense, though members predominantly 
acquired experience through involvement with SANE and WILPF, WSP was informed 
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by the example of civil rights activists while engaging with New Left ideas of 
organising. 
Such was the disdain for hierarchical structure that women struggled to define 
exactly how WSP operated, refusing to describe themselves as members or as a part of 
an organisation.14 Instead, many described it as a movement.15 An attempt to publicise 
its composition as unique and desirable emerged in a commemorative journal to mark 
WSP’s 18th anniversary. “WSP is a grassroots movement,” the journal explained, “we 
are not an organisation.”16 Throughout her life, Dagmar Wilson maintained that her 
actions had sparked a movement, reasserting her view that WSP was a “peace 
movement activated by women” in a 1989 interview.17 Other leaders concurred.18 But 
women's peace historian Harriet Hyman Alonso criticised the use of this term. Rather 
than a movement itself, she asserted that WSP represented “one organisation” acting 
within “a long-lived movement whose roots reach back to the abolitionists.” 19  In 
subsequent years, the term “nonorganization” became a trademark term, deployed as a 
chapter title by Amy Swerdlow that discussed the group’s efforts to coordinate.20 The 
terminology remains problematic, but shows that WSP activists were reluctant to 
consider themselves as part of an organisation. 
In every case, members spoke assuredly and favourably about their unorganised 
efforts and mocked claims that WSP was coordinated.21 But such comments mask the 
basic structures that started to develop almost immediately after the 1 November strike. 
The maintenance of efforts beyond the first demonstration necessitated some 
coordination and, while appearing spontaneous, most of WSP’s activities arose from 
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meticulous, laborious, and collaborative planning efforts.22 The issue was made clear by 
Berkeley, Marin, San Francisco, and Oakland Women for Peace branches: 
While denying any formal organisation we are steadily and rapidly 
becoming interconnected not only in the public mind but concretely by 
systems of “key persons,” national newsletters, common demonstrations, 
etc. For us to continue to overlook the responsibilities of national 
organization is to build a dangerously precarious house of cards.23 
In the absence of national direction, local activists implemented their own conceptions 
of “nonorganization.”24  By 8 November, East Bay WFP had adopted a “minimum 
effective structure,” comprising a coordinating committee with representatives. 25 
Although it they did not adopt the plan, New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut 
branches cooperated to propose an area structure involving selected representatives and 
a Central Coordinating Committee.26 San Francisco adopted its own version.27 Research 
committees dedicated to issues such as disarmament, radiation, and political action 
became instrumental to WSP’s activities.28  
In the first few months, participants spoke out in favour of more organisation, 
not less. Some withdrew, believing that “as long as WSP refuses to consider itself an 
organisation, I don’t think there is much room for improvement.” 29  Others asked 
whether it was actually possible to resign from a group that had no membership. 
Complaints arose from indecisiveness, arbitrary decisions, and general confusion 
surrounding WSP’s functions.30 Coordinating committees took shape to help organisers 
“avoid the stress” reported by others, while East Bay WFP stated that their “loosely 
organized structure has often been difficult and frequently distressing.”31 While WSPers 
noted that “no mass defections” occurred as a result of organisational malaise, the 
prevailing view that WSP functioned as a nonorganization, and that its membership 
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readily bought into the idea of a structureless network, seems reliant on the voices of 
those who were comfortable with such a system, often key women. Those unhappy with 
nonorganization appear less represented.32 
 WSPers are often described as having disdain for leadership, with the group’s 
attitude often framed around the public quip that participants were “all leaders.”33 But, 
in the absence of formal hierarchy, an informal leadership clique assumed a rising level 
of influence in the weeks following 1 November. Dagmar Wilson’s stature grew in 
particular. With uncertainty surrounding her appropriate title, rather than her accepted 
status, she explained that: 
People like to call me leader. I regard it as more a term of endearment or, 
shall we say, an honorary title…I think we were all kind of groping for what 
to call me, largely because the press wanted an answer to this…we knew I 
wasn’t the president…But I think I better just assume the honorary title, 
although I have no special function.34 
The titles assumed by some activists, such as “chairman” or “coordinator” generally 
implied their duty as a point of communication, rather than describing the job performed 
or suggesting a position of power. For example, Blanche Posner's ostensible role as 
“Office Committee Chairman” did not entail any formal responsibility in that role.35 
Dagmar Wilson was the exception. Her modesty and shyness yielded an inherent dislike 
for the term “leader” and a reluctance to accept the importance of her role in WSP, but 
other members had no doubt about her status. Delegates gave her a standing ovation as 
the first national conference drew to a close.36 The public also recognised her as the 
leader. After she could not attend a scheduled function for the Peace Forum in early 
1962, WSP offered “an able substitute” in her place. The response offered a ringing 
endorsement of Wilson's stature, saying “frankly, we do not think there is a real 
substitute for you.”37 A cult of personality began to surround Wilson as activists and the 
public saw her as the embodiment of WSP. 
Historically, WSPers openly accepted direction from influential members. In 
many cases, younger, inexperienced women were content to allow the older, more 
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experienced members to coordinate activities. Most local bases recognised some women 
as the “leaders” in their area.38 Los Angeles WISP’s own literature referred to Mary 
Clarke as a “west coast leader of Women Strike for Peace,” while Shirley Lens took on 
a similar standing in Chicago. It is perhaps no surprise that women such as Mary 
Clarke, Madeline Duckles, Anci Koppel, Shirley Lens, and Ethel Taylor have since 
been labelled “key women.” They possessed exceptional activist experience and were 
looked upon by newcomers as icons of the peace movement.39 Indeed, the term “key 
women” frequently appears in descriptions of the group as a terminological substitute 
for “leader,” with Amy Swerdlow justifying its use by stating that it was “a WSP 
term.”40 Intriguingly, stated opposition to leadership arose from fears that an “invisible 
secret leadership” would make “secret decisions,” rather than indicating concerns over 
hierarchy itself. In this sense, WSPers actually offered indictments of the kind of 
informal leadership fostered by Women Strike for Peace.41 
The loose system of organising was effective in some respects. Decentralising 
authority provided more autonomy for local community groups and made it easy for 
women across the US to start affiliated branches in their own areas. This proved crucial 
for the growth of the organisation. Surprisingly, given that the impetus for the 1 
November strike came from women on the east coast, west coast branches provided 
more support. Of the 60 communities reported to have held demonstrations, 21 came 
from California.42 The day’s largest demonstration took place in Los Angeles.43 Groups 
set up in the San Francisco Bay Area developed a reputation as the best organised, 
adapting to WSP’s ideal for loose organisation and setting an example that other 
branches followed. 44  The dynamism and mystique of smaller local branches 
spontaneously forming around the country created interest. Many clamoured to join the 
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new “movement” and some of the most committed and reliable regional branches only 
formed in the weeks following the initial demonstrations.45 
Local activism had a ready appeal for potential WSP members. In the absence of 
a formal hierarchy of leadership, new members found that they could speak up within 
their communities about issues that concerned them.46 Branches had no need to source 
national statements and resolutions on local issues. Likewise, individuals could freely 
adopt an attitude to peace work that differed from their peers. Los Angeles WISP 
became an “influential, active, more radical chapter” than its counterparts.47  Seattle 
Women Act for Peace described its operations as having “complete autonomy” from 
any national commitment, saying it intended to “coordinate its efforts with national 
Women Strike for Peace,” rather than take direction from it. Some branches relied on 
the presence of community concern towards local nuclear-related issues in order to raise 
awareness for WSP’s national campaign. East Bay WFP, headquartered on the campus 
of University of California-Berkeley, raised frequent opposition to the institution’s 
complicity in weapons research. Other branches in the Bay Area used the proximity of 
the Livermore nuclear weapons facility and military plans to weaponise Angel Island to 
grow their group.48 In Seattle, SWAP built support for their opposition to the Bangor 
nuclear submarine port, denouncing the city’s status as the “front yard of the Trident 
Base.” 49  The organisation depended on such local community demonstrations to 
maintain its national visibility. The ability of local branches to remain autonomous and 
responsible for their own campaigns proved highly effective in this respect. 
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But local autonomy caused significant problems for national cohesion in WSP’s 
first few months. Although a founding premise held that loose connection between 
branches was desirable, some members felt separated from their peers in other parts of 
the country, and especially from the national body. Northwest Suburban Women for 
Peace referred to the main regional branch in Chicago as its “parent organisation,” with 
this branch in turn considering itself an “affiliate” of national Women Strike for Peace.50 
Seattle women emphasised their responsibility to peace efforts in the Pacific Northwest 
over national efforts. 51  Indeed, perhaps owing to geography, members of SWAP 
appeared to feel more loyalty towards their counterparts along the west coast.52 A sense 
of belonging to the national organisation did exist and members of Seattle Women Act 
for Peace were seen as equals, valued and admired for their dedication. However, in 
reciprocating that they felt “an integral part” of WSP, Seattle activists lamented that we 
are living far away from you.”53 
These pronouncements, correspondence, and decisions betrayed the sense of 
isolation and estrangement from the national organisation, manifested most clearly in 
branches’ early decision to divert from the national moniker.54 The use of the word 
“strike” notably separated east coast branches from their counterparts around the US. 
Branches in the east followed the example set by the Washington, D.C. founders and 
referred to themselves as “Women Strike for Peace,” but others, not wishing to confuse 
their peace protest with class struggle, felt allusions to a strike “too militant” for the 
image they wanted to express.55 Those in the Midwest dropped the word and identified 
simply as “Women for Peace.” Most branches in California also decided against the use 
of “strike.” The Seattle branch stood out among its peers, choosing to function as 
“Seattle Women Act for Peace.” The experience of San Francisco women perhaps best 
exemplifies internal debate over the name. On publicising their 1 November march, 
participants opted to call themselves “San Francisco Women Act Together for Peace.” 
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“San Francisco Women Acting for Peace” also adorned letterheads and press releases in 
the weeks that followed. Various adaptations of the name appeared over the next few 
years before the branch settled on “Women for Peace.” The name remained from 
1963.56 The national organisation itself flirted with a name change throughout 1962. Out 
of a desire to become an internationally recognised organisation, key women attempted 
to enter “Women's International Strike for Peace” into the group’s lexicon. Dagmar 
Wilson felt that acronym WISP “is a beautiful word, much better than WSP.” 57  
Although some, such as Los Angeles branch, continued to use the name by referring to 
itself as WISP and its members as WISPers, it never achieved general use and faded as 
a term shortly after 1962.  
Some WSP members dismissed any notion that differing names affected 
cohesion. Writing in 1998, Philadelphia founder and former national coordinator Ethel 
Taylor downplayed any tensions over the group’s title, asking “what’s in a name? We 
were all dedicated to the same cause.”58 For others, particularly those who had previous 
activist experience, “strike” took on deeper meaning. Ruth Gage Colby, well-respected 
as a pacifist leader by many WSP members prior to November 1961, recalled her 
attitude to the organisation on hearing of its existence: 
When I saw Dagmar Wilson's ad saying, “Women Strike for Peace” I said to 
myself, “This is different.” If the ad had said Women for Peace, I'd have 
said, “God bless the ladies,” and paid no further attention. But the word 
“strike” struck a chord with me.59  
The differences in branch names also created practical difficulties in coordination. 
SWAP, for example, needed to constantly remind the public that “Seattle Women Act 
for Peace is a branch of Women Strike for Peace.” Their business cards and policy 
statements had to make clear that they were affiliated organisations. In the absence of a 
national effort united under a common name, public confusion sometimes arose over 
coordination.60  
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Historically, the organisation continues to be referred to as “Women Strike for 
Peace,” despite the majority of branches dropping “strike” from their titles. Reference to 
the organisation as “Strike for Peace” on a national scale is, therefore, somewhat 
problematic. Amy Swerdlow’s work took on a national focus, but its title cemented a 
particular name of the organisation many felt uncomfortable with. Several pieces of 
national conference literature referred to the organisation as “Women Strike for Peace 
and Women for Peace,” suggesting that the organisation needed to accommodate the 
differing views of its members.61  While no overt animosity towards the name was 
apparent, attempts to change the national organisation’s title from “Women Strike for 
Peace” to “Women for Peace” continued through the mid-1980s.62 In the same way that 
labelling WSP an “organisation” and calling its activists “members” came with caveats, 
it is problematic to refer to the group exclusively as Women Strike for Peace.63 
Further evidence of regional variance appeared in the logos created by branches. 
Although an emblem identifying the national organisation existed, those across the 
country chose to create and display their own designs. The results showed huge 
variation. Chicago WFP generally went without a logo, simply printing its name on 
press releases and letterheads, but sometimes used a stylised logo depicting a mother 
holding a bag decorated with the branch name while cradling a sleeping child in her 
arms. 64  A similar image emerged from Philadelphia WSP. Members reproduced a 
drawing based on a sculpture by Ethel Taylor, depicting a mother, arms raised aloft, 
holding her child. It was used for letters and press releases. Seattle used three different 
emblems interchangeably; one depicting Seattle’s city skyline; another simpler design 
comprising the branch name with a peace dove and two hands – one black, one white – 
reaching up; a third simply shows four doves in unison.65 San Francisco WFP illustrated 
women and children on a march, with placards making out the name “Women for 
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Peace.”66  Across the water in East Bay, women used an entirely different logo, a 
swooping dove framing the faces of three women of different races.67 Los Angeles 
designed a simple blue circle with “WSP” stylistically wrapped around itself. The logos 
employed by local branches showed no connection to each other or to the national 
organisation and, when taken together, produced a somewhat confused public image. 
These geographical divisions also appeared in the recollections of former 
activists. Many made mention of their regional affiliations before explaining their 
belonging to a national organisation, making clear that they identified with their 
locality. Rose Dellamonica explained that she was a part of East Bay Women for Peace, 
which was simply “affiliated with WSP.” While discussing the history of her group in 
1992, Seattle branch leader Anci Koppel referred to WSP and SWAP as if two separate 
organisations.68  This complicates attempts to reconcile the narrative of the national 
organisation with the unique stories of local branches. Seattle Women Act for Peace had 
their first demonstration on 16 November when President Kennedy spoke at the 
centennial celebration of the University of Washington. This made for some confusion 
when describing the organisation's history. Anci Koppel had to explain that WSP 
“began on 1 November 1961,” while clarifying that the local iteration to which she 
belonged started two weeks later.69 San Antonio WFP, joining in 1970, offered a similar 
story, describing the founding of their local branch separately from the beginnings of 
the national organisation.70 
 
The First National Conference 
Women Strike for Peace followed its first demonstration with a number of effective 
protests in 1962, including a well-publicised march in Washington, D.C. and a 
celebrated trip to test ban negotiations in Geneva that considerably increased its 
                                                 
66 “10 October 1967,” SCPC WSP Archives, B2, Box 3, 2-67 San Francisco WFP Support National WSP 
Demonstration at Pentagon. 
67 “Dear Friends, 28 July 1979,” UCB WFP Archives, 15-33, WFP East Bay – Flyers, notes and 
Correspondence, 1970-1979. 
68 Dellamonica interview, 10 September 1985, ARS.0056; “Letter by Anci Koppel, 1992,” UWS SWAP 
Archives, 1-34, Speeches and Writings re WSP History, 1992, 1995, 2. 
69 “Historical Data, Issued June 1990, 19 July 1991,” UWS WSP Archives, 1-1, Historical Features; 
“Fond Memories of Ruth Pool – Anci Koppel,” UWS SWAP Archives, 1-37, Speeches and Writings – 
Misc, Sept 1982 – Mar 1990. 
70 “Example of Mailer Sent to Trudi Young from San Antonio Women for Peace, 1967,” SCPC WSP 
Archives, A3, Box 4, Branch File – Texas (1970). 
  
85 
  
stature.71 Yet organisational problems persisted.  By the summer, members across the 
country desired a national meeting to discuss various issues that had arisen in the 
previous eight months. Owing to the suspicion of formal structure, even the idea of a 
national conference sounded “so square” to Eleanor Garst. 72  Nevertheless, at the 
invitation of women in Ann Arbor, Michigan, 82 women from 12 states met on 9 June 
1962, for WSP’s first national conference. Many were meeting for the first time and 
exchanged tales of their various campaigns and organising methods. Some expressed 
shock at the experiences of others. Groups outside of Northern California could not 
believe that WSPers there had been subject to red-baiting attempts. Meanwhile, women 
from Philadelphia recounted being heckled by “some Birch [Society]-type characters.”73 
But conversations largely reinforced the sentiment that WSP had received a 
“remarkably good” response for its efforts. A report of the conference stated, “my 
advice to smart political types of every hue is ‘make way, they’re coming!’”74 While 
savouring the positive appraisals of WSP’s work, the conference intended to formalise 
and clarify various organisational and policy ambiguities. From the outset, participants 
realised that the conference itself required structure if any value were to emerge from 
it.75 
Key decisions relating to WSP’s organisation emerged from the first national 
conference. A proposed structure, drafted by Midwestern women, involved a national 
steering committee of 12 individuals selected from 12 areas across the country. These 
representatives would now be points of contact for their area, allowing the national 
organisation to maintain close contact and, to an extent, coordinate their efforts. If a 
branch had an idea for an activity it would be raised with WSPers across the country 
through this communication network. Individuals could then decide, based on their own 
enthusiasm for the project, whether to take part or avoid involvement and wish the 
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others “good luck.” 76  Elsa Knight Thompson, reporting on proceedings for San 
Francisco WFP, explained that the conference allowed WSP to take “the first faltering 
steps” towards becoming a national organisation. But many other problems were left 
unresolved. The ability of branches to involve themselves in whichever activity they 
deemed suitable provided the desired maximum level of local autonomy, but also 
created an amorphous body, one without a cohesive ideology or attitude towards 
important issues.  
WSP’s organisers believed that the absence of formal structure would prevent 
long discussions over organisational bureaucracy, but the first national conference took 
so much time to discuss aspects of structure that practical and ideological questions 
were left unanswered. A substantial majority wished to broaden the group’s boundaries 
and form close affiliations with international peace organisations, requiring WSP 
presence at every major international conference related to the issue of disarmament. 
But the absence of a leadership hierarchy or recognised national positions on issues led 
to questions of representation. Several people asked who “will represent the group and 
how they are to be selected, what limitations, if any, are to be placed on individuals, 
whether or not there is a clear policy regarding who pays travelling expenses in these 
instances.” 77  An especially pointed question emerged from Bay Area women who 
advised that “it was not clear how not being even a national organisation we are so 
certainly an international one.” 78  The debate did not reach a conclusion. Left 
unresolved, these uncertainties developed into significant problems by the end of the 
decade.  
 Another more pressing issue related to WSP’s support for the civil rights 
movement. Though many women worked tirelessly for civil rights before and during 
their time in Women Strike for Peace, the first national conference demonstrated the 
organisation’s reluctance to initiate protests for racial equality.79 During the opening 
session of the conference it emerged that four African-American women had been 
refused admittance to the conference. Participants learned that the women, part of the 
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Independent Negro Committee to Ban the Bomb and End Segregation, were prevented 
from taking part in a WSP march in Detroit due to their belief that the group should 
merge the two issues of racial equality and peace. The white members of Detroit WFP, 
in observance with the group’s desire not to fight “two battles at once,” banned the 
women’s “desegregation placards” on the grounds that they obscured WSP’s single-
issue appeal for nuclear disarmament.80 Due to her experiences of racism, one of the 
complainants exhorted to the conference that “if the next hundred years are going to be 
like the last, we don’t care whether there is peace or not” and implored WSP to 
recognise the urgency of civil rights campaigns. The statement hit Elsa Knight 
Thompson “like a physical blow.”81 The complaint “proved a divisive issue” as those on 
either side of the argument stood their ground.82 It was eventually agreed that while 
WSP welcomed “minority group individuals” into their ranks, its cause “should not be 
diluted or obscured by other objectives being stated.”83  Disarmament remained the 
group’s priority.  
The grievance did not exclusively stem from conflict with Detroit WFP, but 
followed a run-in with the national organisation. On advertising the trip to the Geneva 
Disarmament Convention in March 1962, New York WSPer Edith Ziefert sent out an 
advert stating that “local communities are encouraged to raise funds to send their own 
representatives.” The circular included a note urging participation and emphasised “that 
Women Strike for Peace is not a membership grouping.” The Independent Negro 
Committee to End Racism and Ban the Bomb reached out, wishing to “see the women’s 
peace movement strengthened and broadened” with the inclusion of their 
representatives. Their request was denied. WSP coordinators did not wish to send more 
than 50 women in the delegation and, allegedly, “didn’t want to ‘overbalance’ the group 
with Negroes.” The Committee implored Dagmar Wilson to allow more representatives 
to attend, even under separate cover. However, though WSP explicitly wished to 
represent an open and inclusive movement of women, the limit of 50 remained in place. 
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The group demonstrated an unwillingness to “dilute” their campaign by including an 
appeal to civil rights in their plea, even tacitly.84  
The national conference attempted to placate these grievances. After lengthy 
discussions, it seated the Detroit women and issued a national policy statement that gave 
WSP’s support for the civil rights movement. But the statement did not allow members 
to march for civil rights under the banner of “Women Strike for Peace.” The issue was 
not so much about race as whether WSP should expand its campaign to advocate more 
causes than just peace. “Most women” wanted WSP to remain a single-issue 
organisation and the national body did not begin to marry issues of racism, poverty, and 
militarism until later in the decade.85 Yet dissatisfaction with this stance led several 
local branches to adopt their own, more robust declarations.86 Regions started to display 
differing levels of concern for civil rights causes. East Bay WFP became a reliable ally 
of civil rights activists in Oakland while Los Angeles women, expressing “grave 
concern over the situation in Birmingham, Alabama,” issued a decisive statement in 
May 1963 that called on “all women working for peace to dedicate themselves to the 
struggle of the Negro people for freedom.”87 Barbara Bick, an editor of Memo, recalled 
WSPers helping out in various campaigns for racial equality, particularly in San 
Francisco. She said that Washington, D.C. WSP “participated in every level of the Poor 
People’s Campaign,” except for “decision making at the top.”88 The branch worked 
“officially” with the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) in the area.89 Individuals also 
displayed varying attitudes towards civil rights activism. While Barbara Deming, a 
feminist-pacifist leader and writer, “served as a prod to the WSP conscience” on the 
issue, Dagmar Wilson remained insistent that “WSP remain a single-issue movement.”90 
WSP’s response to the Detroit women compounded the image of the group as a 
fundamentally white community and foreshadowed continuing problems of cultivating 
an inclusive, diverse membership. Coretta Scott King represented Women Strike for 
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Peace on a number of campaigns and women of colour, though “few in number,” 
nevertheless displayed as much commitment and influence in the group as their 
grassroots peers.91 But having worked fastidiously for civil rights issues before joining 
WSP, Ethel Taylor often found it difficult to attract African American women as they 
were more concerned with tackling violence in their own neighbourhoods.92 Dagmar 
Wilson offered a similar appraisal, acknowledging the unique hardships faced by 
mothers in the African-American community while noting that “we hardly speak a 
common language.”93  
The problems WSP faced echoed similar difficulties endemic within the peace 
and civil rights movements.94 Nevertheless, the issue of race rarely appeared in the 
recollections of WSP activists beyond an explanation of the group’s ineffective efforts 
to recruit women of colour. Members seldom reflected on WSP’s unclear attitude 
towards civil rights activism, how this stance fostered division and disagreement, and 
how it affected the group’s place in the wider movement. WSP’s attempts to remain a 
single-issue organisation governed its public stance on several issues and even when it 
adopted a broader critique of violence in American society towards the end of the 
decade it never directly tackled the issue of racial equality. This, naturally, affects 
considerations of the group’s place within the New Left. Amy Swerdlow perceptively 
observed that WSP activists “rejected any concept or tactic they thought to be too 
radical to be understood by the so-called average woman,” and believed that “they were 
not violating their moral principles” by doing so.95 But WSP’s attitude towards racial 
equality highlights the multifaceted nature of the group and the divisive consequences 
of its reluctance to move beyond a single-issue focus on disarmament. 
In the aftermath of its 1962 national conference, WSP adopted a national policy 
document that sought to pull together its disparate parts. A “Statement of Principles,” 
also known as the “Ann Arbor Statement,” superseded the various policy documents 
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local branches had drafted for themselves.96 It underlined the notion that WSP did not 
have strict organisational requirements, cherishing “the right” and accepting “the 
responsibility of the individual in a democratic society to influence the course of 
government.” 97  Arguably the most important outcome of the conference was the 
declaration that WSP was “open to all women.” Much deliberation considered its 
phrasing. Northern California women, seemingly the only group subjected to red-
baiting, wanted a stance that embraced all political persuasions, but the strongest 
argument emerged in a statement from Los Angeles members. “We do not question one 
another about our religious beliefs or other matters of personal conscience. How can we 
justify political interrogation? What difference does it make?”98 Attendees eventually 
became confident that “all meant all,” and cemented their position in a second line that 
read “we are women of all races, creeds and political persuasions.”99 The Ann Arbor 
Statement reflected WSP’s general attitudes without offering guidance on specific 
issues. Importantly, the stance assured that a purge of suspected communist members 
would never take place. 
 
Anticommunism and the HUAC Hearings 
Government scrutiny and red-baiting provided a strong test to WSP’s inclusive 
conference position in the months following its adoption. Members of Women Strike 
for Peace caught the attention of intelligence agencies towards the end of 1961, but the 
FBI had information on organisers and coordinators dating back to the 1940s. Wishing 
to determine the level of communist influence over the new organisation, reports noted 
the earlier communist affiliations of several founding members. While the CIA only 
sporadically scrutinised Women Strike for Peace, the FBI, in contrast, gathered 49 
volumes of reports over the next ten years.100 
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Surveillance began before WSP’s first demonstration and agents started 
submitting information ranging from bank account details to the license plates of 
participants. 101  The fact that women had “allegedly entertained guests that spoke 
Russian, sang Russian songs and did Russian dances” seemed relevant.102 Information 
on family members also appeared in records. The FBI declared knowledge that Blanche 
Posner's son, Richard, “graduated from Harvard Law School in June 1962, and is 
presently employed as a law clerk for US Supreme Court Justice William Bremnan.”103 
Disturbingly for WSP members, informants infiltrated meetings of the group's 
leadership. Comparison of FBI files and WSP’s Steering Committee meeting minutes 
confirms the presence of an informant at a 22 February 1967 gathering of core 
activists.104  
Although many WSPers had previous and ongoing affiliations with the CPUSA, 
communism never influenced the direction of the organisation and links established by 
the FBI ranged in severity from ominous to feverish.105  Some reports appeared sinister. 
One suggested that Communist Party members had posed as a non-existent Baltimore 
branch of Women Strike for Peace “as a cover for their activities” in the area.106 Some 
reports embellished their findings in order to heighten connections. A report on Los 
Angeles leader Mary Clarke asserted that her decision to leave the Communist Party in 
1955 “was a difficult one for her to make,” a judgment that contrasted other accounts of 
her withdrawal.107 Some attempts were even more tenuous, sometimes linking WSP to a 
communist front through several degrees of separation. A report on Los Angeles WISP 
in 1962 raised suspicions about the high quality imprint of their literature. “This 
material,” the report advised, “did not originate from a ‘grass roots’ effort on behalf of 
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peace but rather suggests the possibility of large foreign national interest possibly Soviet 
in origin.”108 
Ultimately, FBI agents reported finding little evidence to suggest infiltration by 
communist figures. Concluding their investigations at the beginning of 1963, they 
recommended ceasing surveillance of Women Strike for Peace. In fact, agents explained 
that the CPUSA actively implored its members to avoid interfering with WSP’s 
activities. 109  However, the Bureau directed field agents to continue surveillance, 
justifying its decision by claiming that the “past and present CP members in positions of 
control and influence” warranted further examination. 110  Disregarding the 
recommendations of its local offices, the FBI continued its investigation. Records show 
surveillance of WSP continued until at least 1970.111 
Rather than dwelling on the impudence of surveillance agencies, WSPers instead 
used the experience as an opportunity to demonstrate their irreverence towards the 
authorities. With typical humour, they insisted that the threat of being reported for their 
actions largely unfazed them and mocked the manner in which agents conducted 
themselves. A skit, written and performed by members of SWAP, poked fun at the 
authorities, suggesting that a “formal invitation” be sent to the FBI for the group’s next 
meeting as “they’ll come anyway.”112 Far from hiding what they were doing, activists 
sought to publicly declare their views as much as possible. A clergyman once 
confronted Esther Newill and, taking issue with her stance, claimed, “I'm going to tell 
people what you're doing.” Newill shot back, “Good! That's what I'm trying to do! I 
want people to know about our activities!” Much of this humour derived from WSP’s 
view that, if the authorities wished to find out what the group believed, all they had to 
do was “attend our marches and read our literature!”113 
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Nevertheless, suspicion that some WSPers were not who they claimed to be bred 
paranoia. A 24-hour vigil in the early 1970s required that two activists always occupied 
a position in front of the White House. Ethel Taylor recalled her stint and explained that 
she shared time with a member she did not necessarily trust, explaining that “my partner 
was a woman some of us suspected of being a government agent.”114 Suspicions were 
largely kept silent by the decree in the Statement of Principles that prevented the 
questioning of fellow WSPers about their political backgrounds. Eleanor Garst, drafting 
her history of Women Strike for Peace in 1968, explained that “sometimes two WSP’s 
would wonder whether another was actually a member of the FBI or CIA – or even a 
double agent in the best spy tradition. But this was speculation, not to be repeated nor 
allowed to influence relationships with any woman who would work for peace.”115 Yet 
Taylor conceded in her memoir that she felt disturbed by the level of infiltration shown 
in FBI documents. She wrote that her “breath caught in my throat” while reading 
simple, “even innocuous” accounts in her file. Some reports detailed events she attended 
and, worryingly, she “had known everybody at that meeting. Or thought I did. I still do 
not know who the informant was.”116 
The Ann Arbor conference made it clear that political interrogation of members 
would not occur within WSP and former activists took pride in extolling the group's 
disdain for questioning political sensibilities. 117  Yet FBI records reveal substantial 
differences in the attitudes of members from different branches as activists interpreted 
the national position in their own way. Californian groups generally took a relaxed 
approach. The FBI noted the assessment of Southern California activist Esther Jackson 
that, where political affiliation rested, “we don't ask. We never ask. If there are 
communists, they haven't taken over.”118 New York groups took the same stance. But 
the agency felt it had an ally in Chicago’s Shirley Lens. The “guiding force” behind 
WFP efforts in the city received a glowing endorsement: 
Because of her personality and anti-communist stand, [Lens] has prevented 
the Communist Party from becoming effective in the Chicago area. 
Lens…has appeared to be spending more time in trying to keep CP 
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members out of the group than in working for the objective of the group, 
which is peace.119 
In her expansive study of activism in the Chicago area, Amy Schneidhorst notes the 
presence of the “anti-Stalinist” Lens within “a group of procommunist politically 
minded WSP women.” The Chicago leader, wife of well-known labour and social 
justice activist Sidney Lens, had considerable disagreements with her fellow members 
as a result.120 Ruth Dear, a similarly influential figure during Chicago WFP’s formative 
period, fell out with Lens and left the group in autumn 1963 due to their constant 
political conflicts.121 The differing response to WSP’s appeal for inclusivity points to a 
more fragmented constituency within the organisation than often claimed. 
 The group found itself subject to another, more public government investigation 
towards the end of 1962. In December, just weeks after WSP celebrated its first 
anniversary, 14 members of the US peace movement received subpoenas from the 
House Un-American Activities Committee. Several members of WSP, including 
Dagmar Wilson, were among them.122 The hearing intended to expose the extent of 
communist infiltration in the peace movement generally, but Women Strike for Peace 
was the main focus. What followed became a central part of the group’s folklore. Over 
three days of hearings from 11 to 13 December, individual WSP members politely 
mocked and ridiculed representatives of the committee who had intended to score a soft 
victory. The witnesses’ performance at the hearings, reproduced in the media by gleeful 
news reporters, cemented the group's position as a force of respectable, polite, witty 
mothers. Some remarks became legendary among WSP members and the portrayal of 
the group as unorganised and open to all stayed in the memory of activists. 
 WSPers had encountered HUAC before, albeit in different circumstances. Alice 
Hamburg and Hazel Grossman’s first campaign together saw them protest against the 
Committee in San Francisco.123 Anci Koppel, Thorun Robel, and Ruth Pinkson endured 
investigations into their husbands during the 1950s.124 Members were abundantly aware 
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that, even if the hearings could not present satisfactory evidence linking WSP to the 
Communist Party, the accusation alone could taint the organisation and result in its 
downfall. WSPers knew of SANE’s earlier experience. In 1960, Senator Thomas Dodd, 
chair of the Senate Internal Security Committee, charged that communists had 
infiltrated the organisation. Though no evidence ever arose to support this claim, 
SANE’s leadership panicked and embarked on a purge, demoralising members and 
causing significant damage to the organisation.125 The incident proved instrumental to 
the formation of WSP.  
 The subpoenas presented the first test of WSP’s Statement of Principles and 
challenged activists’ to prove their commitment to the organisation’s inclusive stance. 
They responded with a united show of support. The group affirmed that the hearings 
represented an attack on the whole peace movement. Aware that HUAC intended to 
“smear and frighten” WSP’s membership, activists went on the offensive. In a show of 
defiance, around 100 women contacted the Chairman of HUAC, Francis Walter, asking 
him to subpoena them as well.126 California WSPer Carrie Yoffe Taylor symbolised 
WSP’s siege mentality. “If Dagmar Wilson is a communist,” she wrote, “so am I.” 
Taylor addressed her letter to Walter, President Kennedy, and Representative John W. 
McCormack, but sent a copy to Dagmar Wilson with a handwritten message. “I’m 
sending you this rather blurry fourth carbon because I want you to know that you’re not 
alone.”127 Other peace organisations rallied around WSP. Although some had personally 
experienced a HUAC investigation before, the subpoenaed members embraced their 
upcoming showdown.  
The hearings came to symbolise the irreverent approach WSP activists took 
towards their peace work as witnesses ridiculed the lines of inquiry designed to stoke 
suspicion. Blanche Posner could not help but laugh at an accusation that she had worn 
“a coloured paper daisy” to identify herself as a member of Women Strike for Peace.128 
She apologised for her “giggled” reply, explaining that “it sounds like such a far cry 
from communism it is impossible not to be amused.” In one instance the committee 
produced ominous evidence that Ruth Meyers had signed a Communist Party 
nominating position while living in Brooklyn. “Are you the Ruth Meyers who executed 
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that petition?” inquired Counsel Nittle. Myers duly informed the hearings that it was not 
her, joking that her husband “could never get me to move to Brooklyn.” Her response to 
the mistaken identity drew raucous laughter from the gallery. Compounding the 
committee’s embarrassment, Meyers continued, “perhaps, sir, I shouldn’t have accepted 
that subpoena if there are so many people by the name of Ruth Meyers.”129 Even the 
women’s attorneys indulged in the occasion, lightly ribbing the Committee for its 
calamitous performance.130 The confident display delighted those who came to see the 
hearings. Blanche Posner reportedly lectured “the committee members as though they 
were recalcitrant boys at DeWitt Clinton High School in the Bronx, where she had 
taught.”131 Dagmar Wilson’s appearance drew particular praise from journalists. She 
treated Nittle “exactly as if he were a rather trying dinner partner.” 132  Indeed, the 
ripostes of those on the stand, mocking yet entirely well-mannered, left Subcommittee 
Chairman Clyde Doyle exasperated. Wilson later explained that the accused simply 
“ridiculed away” the charges against them.133 
Though acknowledging their trepidation in facing the committee, subpoenaed 
WSPers were actually rather pleased that they had an opportunity to speak publicly 
about their work.134 “A couple of hours with HUAC,” Wilson remarked, “was worth 
years of psychotherapy. Instead of punching pillows I was able to unravel the 
misconceptions, to put things in their place.”135 The experience allowed WSPers to 
clarify their attitudes towards structure and organisation. Ruth Meyers downplayed the 
group’s rigidity by elucidating that “Women Strike for Peace has no membership.” She 
added, “if I have gone to other communities, it has never been as a representative for 
anything except a point of view, and my own point of view.”136 Iris Freed’s testimony 
also affirmed the “fluid” nature of WSP’s structure. Counsel Nittle struggled to 
understand, asking “if a group has no organisation and has no members, how in the 
world does it function?” Freed’s reply became renowned. “It is quite remarkable. 
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Sometimes I wonder myself.”137 Connecticut activist Anne Mackenzie captured many 
women’s beliefs. Accepting that a Central Coordinating Committee existed, Mackenzie 
informed Alfred Nittle that it was “something that you have given great stature to and 
made it sound almost as important as a congressional committee. In Connecticut, we 
don’t take it very seriously. Perhaps we should.”138 Lyla Hoffman attempted to explain 
that her influence in WSP did not mean that she had an appointed position, nor that 
policy was directed to women from an executive.139 In testimony, the WSPers claimed 
that the organisational structure existing on paper did not occur in practice. Repeated 
references to the HUAC hearings in literature, speeches, and in memory after the event 
further served to reinforce these strongly held perceptions of WSP’s functions and 
ideology. 
The hearings also provided an opportunity for WSP members to present the 
image of their organisation to the nation’s public. They took the chance with aplomb, 
embodying “the WSP image of outraged moral motherhood.”140 Most women described 
themselves as “housewives,” in some cases marrying their two beloved identities: 
“housewife…and peaceworker.”141 While defiant, witnesses remained utterly polite and 
courteous in their response to questioning. Miriam Chesman, the last witness on the 
second day of the hearings, perfectly channelled the image of demure motherhood to 
highlight the questionable legitimacy of the committee. Donald Bruce, frustrated with 
Chesman’s testimony, found himself chastised after pressing her for clarity in her 
responses. “You know, I haven’t much experience with this sort of thing and you will 
have to be patient with me.”142 Dagmar Wilson offered pacifying tones and attempted to 
remove the fervour from the Committee’s questioning. She offered conciliation towards 
Nittle while explaining he had made his supporting evidence “sound terribly 
dramatic.”143 
Reports during and following the hearings suggested a unanimous victory for 
WSP, but later attempts to qualify and question the success of the encounter emerged 
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from several sources.144 Stephen Whitfield and Walter Goodman, for example, argued 
that HUAC was already weakened and in decline by the time WSPers confronted the 
committee. Goodman expressed particular distaste for some aspects of their 
performance.145 In typically modest tones Dagmar Wilson suggested that the committee 
treated WSP with “gloved hands…we were ever lucky.” She inferred that the group 
might have come off worse had the hearings taken place earlier, during more fervent 
communist hysteria.146  
Amy Swerdlow disagreed. She acknowledged that “cold war hysteria had abated 
somewhat,” but insisted that HUAC still represented “the awesome power of an agency 
of the state.” It could still ruin lives. 147  Eric Bentley, a theatre critic turning his 
attentions to the history of the Committee, contended that Women Strike for Peace had 
dealt such a blow that it could be referred to as “the fall of HUAC’s bastille.”148 WSP’s 
triumph became a centrepiece of members’ recollections in later years. Some described 
it as “our greatest achievement.”149  The memory of the affair embodied everything 
activists wished to promote about their group, such as the respectability of its members, 
the moral authority of its stance, and its irreverence towards authority. Swerdlow’s 
article, “Ladies’ Day at the Capitol,” evocatively reproduced the atmosphere and 
emotions of the hearings using personal observations from the hearing room.150 Her 
article displays the entire episode as a community experience, depicting the response of 
WSP members nationwide. It expressed the humour of the occasion while painting 
Women Strike for Peace as a plucky underdog, striking a blow against an archaic and 
sinister government committee.151 The HUAC hearing’s significance to former activists 
provides a unique place to examine the various tropes evident in recollections of 
members. 
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WSP received a “shot in the arm” as a result of members’ performances against 
HUAC, but the rhetoric employed by women to face down their accusers did not 
entirely satisfy. The hearings raised some questions surrounding WSP’s attitude towards 
its core issues. Of the ten WSPers who took the stand, only Lyla Hoffman and Dagmar 
Wilson openly embraced the concept of open membership endorsed at June’s national 
conference. Others, when questioned, readily fell back on their Fifth Amendment rights. 
Blanche Posner invoked the constitutional privilege 45 times. Elsie Neidenberg, the 
fourth WSP activist to take the stand, invoked her Fifth Amendment rights 23 times to 
avoid answering any questions beyond her personal details. In total, seven WSP 
witnesses used the Fifth Amendment 142 times over the three days to avoid discussing 
subjects.152 While the thrust of questioning from the committee revolved around the 
group’s mysterious organisational functions, the readiness of witnesses to refuse to 
answer on core issues caused some concern. Some in New York expressed annoyance in 
closed meetings. They felt the witnesses “should not have acted as though Women's 
Strike for Peace had something to hide,” particularly after the Ann Arbor conference 
had decreed the group's attitude towards political affiliations.153 
WSP’s resolve to remain an inclusive organisation, while appearing noble, 
resulted in a fractured and ambiguous identity. This was neatly summarised by WSP 
member and feminist activist Barbara Deming, who expressed her apprehensions over 
the HUAC encounter in a public “Letter to WISP.”154 Written in the months following 
the hearings, Deming emphatically determined the heightened strength of WSP, 
declaring that “a move intended to make us doubt ourselves and each other served in 
fact to sharpen our sense of why we are acting and to bind us more closely together.” 
However, she expressed concern over “whether or not the stance we take is clear.”155 
Deming especially questioned the group’s attitude towards unilateral disarmament. In 
an earlier meeting with Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., members of WSP scoffed at the 
suggestion that they supported such a position. Deming wished to test this stance: 
Suppose an attack upon us by the Soviet Union…would we be in favour of 
retaliation? To spell it out: would we at that point be in favour of 
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slaughtering children? It is hard for me to imagine any woman in our 
movement…giving any answer but “No.” Yet if that is our answer, then we 
are unilateralists. 
Deming questioned the strength of WSP’s opposition and, citing the Ann Arbor 
Statement, asked if a more accurate reflection of the group’s attitude was that “we take a 
resolute stand” but that the government could “count us as temporarily willing, if it just 
can't be helped.”156 The reluctance to clarify the specifics of its position troubled WSP 
throughout its existence, whether it concerned its stance on civil disobedience, pacifism, 
or the efficacy of arms control treaties.157 Some argued the benefits of such ambiguity 
towards peace work far outweighed the necessity for cohesion. In contrast, Barbara 
Deming suggested that, by failing to define its positions, WSP had become a confused 
organisation. 
 Deming's article succinctly captured the crux of WSP’s organisational tensions. 
The HUAC hearing provided the group with a notable success and remains a revered 
event in the history and memory of WSP. But practical questions that emerged in its 
aftermath demonstrated the fractured and uncertain identity that Women Strike for 
Peace had developed while also highlighting the differing views activists took towards 
their organisation.158 Open to all, the group allowed women to enter freely and discover 
a community of like-minded activists. Key women attempted to keep WSP as inclusive 
as possible to attract the largest number of participants. Cohesion of its disparate parts 
grew from a common purpose and, although campaigns varied, the overall goal of 
nuclear disarmament provided a unifying cause. Assessing its first years, Dagmar 
Wilson observed that WSP “started with a rather simple issue. That is, to say a single-
minded issue.” 159  But as the group entered 1963, the general goals of peace and 
disarmament gave way to conflicts over specifics. Activists grew concerned at the 
willingness of the HUAC testifiers to fall back on the Fifth Amendment, rather than 
confidently declaring their political position. Questions were raised over whether a 
partial test ban treaty could satisfy WSP’s aims, or whether the group needed to demand 
a comprehensive agreement. Grassroots members had doubts over representation and 
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wondered whether their local autonomy prevented women from representing the whole 
organisation without querying their stance with other branches first. At the same time, 
they asked whether allowing individual autonomy prevented WSP from having a 
consistent doctrine. WSP’s experience points to a noted contradiction in social 
movement activism – that by remaining as inclusive as possible, organisations harbour 
many competing attitudes and “behavioural prescriptions,” ultimately fostering conflict 
and actually limiting the appeal to “potential participants.”160  
 
The Partial Test Ban Treaty 
In the summer of 1963 WSPers looked back on a two-year period of successful 
activism. A picket of the White House in January 1962 brought the approval of 
President Kennedy, who publicly acknowledged that their message had been 
“received.”161 In March, 50 representatives of the women's peace movement arrived in 
Geneva to voice their concerns to the Conference of the Seventeen-Nation Committee 
on Disarmament. Dagmar Wilson confronted US diplomat Arthur Dean and the Soviet 
UN Security Council representative Valerian Zorin “like a schoolmistress.” Women 
embarked on silent marches and vigils, “which was quite an achievement for us 
chatterboxes,” Wilson said. 162  Later that year, they organised an exchange with 
counterparts in the Soviet women's peace movement and continued to build 
relationships with peace organisations around the globe. Members formed a productive 
partnership with the British MP and disarmament proponent Anne Kerr, inviting her to 
stage a picket in front of the White House to coincide with talks between President 
Kennedy and British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan.163 In August, groups around 
the country commemorated the bombing of Hiroshima. A documentary, narrated by San 
Francisco WFP’s Frances Herring, gave a month-by-month account of all activity 
undertaken in the area, highlighting the on-going attempts of activists to raise public 
awareness and lobby their elected representatives.164 
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Campaigning provided WSPers with much experience, not least in dealing with 
the media. From the initial demonstrations on 1 November, the group could count on the 
approval and support of various local journalists. San Francisco news reporter Art 
Hoppe became an admirer, as did Russell Baker from the New York Times. Mary 
McGrory consistently wrote articles praising WSP’s resistance to patriarchal authority. 
Activism became a lesson in image management. Members took care to present 
themselves appropriately, dressing themselves in an image they felt could secure the 
most support. They attended to their media profile at all times, recognising the need to 
keep themselves in the public eye. Eleanor Garst particularly noted the necessity. 
Following a demonstration in front of the White House in April 1962, she observed that 
“WSP’s were surprised to find that after being big news for five months, they were now, 
to the Associated Press and The Washington Post, ‘some women who picketed.’ They 
felt like Cinderella when the clock struck 12 – back to the kitchen!”165 
 Following months of fraught deliberations, the US Congress finally ratified the 
Partial Test Ban Treaty in September 1963, banning nuclear weapons tests in the 
atmosphere, outer space, and underwater. WSP felt its efforts entitled members to 
celebrate the achievement. Ethel Taylor wrote to the Philadelphia Inquirer to express 
“that self-congratulations are in order for everyone who worked to build up the climate 
of opinion that helped to make the Nuclear Test Ban possible. She claimed that “many 
senators have, in fact, referred to the influence of the ‘Mother's Vote’ as a factor in 
shaping their decision to vote for the treaty.”166 Dagmar Wilson was certain that the 
treaty marked a milestone for the organisation.167 WSP activists felt assured of their 
impact on proceedings, but remained realistic about the agreement itself. Testing could, 
after all, continue underground with few impediments. Amy Swerdlow and Miriam 
Kelber, the editors of the Women Strike for Peace Newsletter, told readers to remain 
vigilant towards weapons testing. The treaty simply meant “a change of locale for the 
arms race, rather than a major reversal. It also means a continuing threat of radioactive 
contamination.” 
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Despite the confidence of its members, the impact WSP had on the outcome of 
test ban negotiations remains contentious. In Domestic Society and International 
Cooperation, nuclear historian Jeffrey Knopf argues that the impetus for a test ban did 
not come from the signatories of the treaty itself, but from India, Japan, and the vocal 
pressure of peace activists. The test ban movement, he contends, changed the 
atmosphere within which negotiations were conducted, arguing that activism was 
important “simply because it existed.”168 But this claim requires examination. Though 
generally praising the intentions of activists, much historical opinion actually repudiates 
the influence of public opinion on negotiations. Robert Kleidman credits the test ban 
movement with raising public awareness of fallout and the perils of radiation, but argues 
that “substantive achievements proved modest.”169 Lawrence Wittner suggested that the 
fate of the test ban campaign rested squarely on the fortunes of international politics. He 
observed that “historians, at least, have been less impressed with the influence of 
internal dynamics than with the impact of world events.”170  
 Much of the historiography of the test ban negotiations considers the role of key 
governmental figures and, specifically, influential characters in the Kennedy 
Administration including Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., 
Jerome Weisner, and Glenn T. Seaborg. Contrary to depictions in the memory of WSP 
activists that theirs was an “unpopular protest,” many diplomats supported efforts 
towards a test ban. 171  Praise also extends to the efforts of Kennedy's predecessors 
President Eisenhower and President Truman, as well as instrumental disarmament 
advisors Harold Stassen, Bernard Baruch, Dean Acheson, and David Lilienthal. Nikita 
Khrushchev has also garnered significant credit for his manoeuvres towards a test ban. 
According to Vyacheslav Molotov, Khrushchev “literally dragged” the USSR to 
agreement of the treaty. Glenn Seaborg noted that the Russian Premier “became 
increasingly a responsible world leader” after the Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962. 
David Tal, a historian of US disarmament policy, argues that Khrushchev's prerogative 
to sign the Partial Test Ban Treaty concerned the timing of the offer, rather than the 
terms of the treaty. As such, focus surrounds the international context and national 
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security considerations, with circumstances simply becoming favourable for a ban by 
mid-1963. “Agreement was possible,” Tal contends, “only when the time was ripe.”172 
The personal contribution of President Kennedy often receives considerable 
praise. Kennedy advocated for a nuclear test ban while a senator, believing an 
agreement to be a useful precursor for a broader conversation on disarmament. He 
possessed a strong conviction that the fallout from atmospheric tests caused undue 
harm. Discussing a recent test with his science advisor, Kennedy held a poignant 
exchange: 
“What happened to the radioactive fallout?” the president asked. “It was 
washed out of the clouds by the rain,” his adviser answered. Kennedy 
looked out of the window. “You mean, it's in the rain out there?” “Yes,” 
replied Weisner, who would remember: “He looked out the window, looked 
very sad, and didn't say a word for several minutes.”173 
Though the president received criticism for emboldening the Soviet Union to break the 
existing moratorium on tests, he remained stubbornly reluctant to reciprocate, wishing 
to demonstrate his commitment to a ban. Even when deciding to resume US testing 
Kennedy initially intended to exclude atmospheric trials.174 His speech to the American 
University on 10 June 1963 is heralded as the defining moment in negotiations towards 
a test ban. The speech, calling for renewed efforts towards peace and disarmament, 
received plaudits in the USSR. On 2 July, Khrushchev reciprocated with a speech in 
which, “for the first time,” he publicly approved of an agreement.175  Following an 
“endgame negotiation” in Moscow, the parties signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty on 5 
August, just two months after Kennedy's ground-breaking speech. The signing of the 
treaty “became the crowning achievement of Kennedy's brief time in office.” 176 
Theodore Sorensen, special counsel to the president, wrote that “no other 
accomplishment in the White House gave Kennedy greater satisfaction.” 177  Glenn 
Seaborg went further. Had Kennedy served a second term in office, Seaborg writes, he 
would have made improved relations with Russia his principal concern. “It is logical,” 
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believed Seaborg, “that a comprehensive test ban would have been the centrepiece of 
his efforts.”178 
When historians assess the significance of peace activists to the treaty’s passage 
it is generally based on the perceived diplomatic influence wielded. In this sense, the 
most influential peace organisation in the period was the one WSP members left behind. 
Between 1961 and 1963, the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy proved highly 
effective in encouraging test ban negotiations. While demonstrations and publicity 
campaigns attempted to win over the public, only SANE leader Norman Cousins can 
claim to have personally and directly intervened in the deliberations themselves. He had 
become a prominent and celebrated disarmament advocate following the atomic 
bombing of Japan and editorialised for the Saturday Review that the advent of nuclear 
weapons necessitated the creation of a world government. Cousins worked throughout 
the 1950s on various causes, aiding the victims of the Hiroshima bombings and 
supporting the political endeavours of Adlai Stevenson and Indian Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru before helping to establish SANE in 1957. The USSR thought 
favourably of the disarmament activist. In early 1963, he was asked by Dean Rusk to 
meet with Premier Khrushchev. That April, Cousins met with the Russian Premier and 
advised him that Kennedy “was acting in good faith and genuinely wanted” a test ban 
treaty.179 
Norman Cousins’ persuasive performance paid dividends. Khrushchev felt 
betrayed over the reneging of prior agreements, but Cousins convinced him that earlier 
disputes constituted “an honest misunderstanding” and that the USSR could trust 
President Kennedy. The premier relented, but informed Cousins that “the next move” 
needed to be made by his American counterpart. Returning home, the SANE leader 
advised Kennedy to take a “breathtaking new approach” towards ending the Cold War, 
proposing that he make “the most important single speech” of his presidency at the 
American University on 10 June. Cousin’s wrote the initial draft of the widely heralded 
speech and proved the catalyst for that summer's successful negotiations. SANE 
maintained pressure on Congress to ratify the treaty and, possessing Cousins’ deeper 
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understanding of the debate, adapted its approach to target key officials.180 Cousins 
worked feverishly behind the scenes and formed the Citizens Committee for a Nuclear 
Test Ban in order to stimulate ratification in the US Senate. His unrelenting efforts paid 
off. The treaty was signed by a vote of 80-19, “the largest vote in favour of arms 
control” since 1922.181 
Cousins received widespread praise from the US government. Glenn Seaborg 
announced that the meeting with Khrushchev “helped to make history.” 182  Arthur 
Schlesinger, Jr. suggested that the idea for a breakthrough speech would not have 
emerged from State Department. Kennedy sent Cousins his personal appreciation while 
claiming that “your initiative with the group was essential.”183  As a symbol of his 
personal gratitude, Kennedy presented Cousins with one of the original signed copies of 
the treaty. 184  Cousins’ important role in the test ban negotiations has also been 
recognised historically. Lawrence Wittner wrote that the president trusted SANE’s 
leader with “extraordinary tasks – things usually left to seasoned diplomats” and 
suggested that his historical example had broader implications. “Cousins’ importance in 
securing this treaty,” Wittner argued, “should serve as a reminder that although 
diplomats are crucial to the negotiation of treaties, citizen activism can also play a 
significant role in initiating them and bringing them to fruition.” Notably, the political 
influence wielded by Cousins was actually magnified by his position as a social 
movement leader.185 
Women Strike for Peace did not wield as much diplomatic influence as other 
comparable groups. While WSPers received praise for their position as political 
“outsiders,” a key goal of their test ban activities was to persuade influential 
government officials.186 The group organised an “uninterrupted stream” of consultations 
with various congressional representatives, scientific bodies, government agencies and 
presidential advisers during the test ban campaign, but never managed to meet with 
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President Kennedy directly. 187  The Women's International League for Peace and 
Freedom arguably had more access to government figures. Dorothy Hutchinson, 
President of the US section of WILPF, met with President Kennedy in May 1962. A 
report of the 20 minute discussion explained that “the president's attitude toward the 
group was friendly and gracious. His comments were candid, and the delegation felt the 
discussion was fruitful.” 188  Hutchinson's meeting with the president suggests that 
WILPF possessed more influence over policymakers than those in WSP. Despite 
numerous requests, WSP members never met personally with any president except 
Jimmy Carter. Historian Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones notes that, in judging WSP’s 
effectiveness, “one must allow” for the group’s inability “to gain access to the policy-
making inner circle.”189 
 
Claiming Success 
WSP claimed that its success lay in bringing “even-handed common sense” to the test 
ban debate. 190  Members credited themselves with having affected public opinion 
through moral appeals and a basic desire to spare the lives of children. But this strategy 
was not unique to WSP. Previous involvement with SANE led activists to adopt similar 
strategies and rhetorical traits while in WSP. Several comparisons can be made between 
the two group’s campaigns. SANE made radioactive fallout and ensuing health hazards 
a priority campaign issue before WSP formed. An advert featuring famed paediatrician 
Dr. Spock made the public aware that “Dr. Spock is worried” about the effects nuclear 
weapons testing was having on the nation's children. This advert, though advancing a 
paternal rather than maternal concern for children, nevertheless saw echoes in the 
subsequent campaigns and rhetoric of Women Strike for Peace. 191  The committee 
publicised the presence of Strontium-90 in American milk supplies in an identical 
manner to WSP. Posters assigned toxic imagery to prominently displayed milk bottles. 
Additionally, WSP’s claim to represent a uniquely respectable face of the peace 
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movement also mirrored SANE’s public image. WSP, while claiming to represent all 
mothers around the world, appealed to a base of white, affluent, middle-class, women. 
SANE had adopted the image of respectable, elitist members of society with its 
founding in 1957.192 Likewise many other peace activists and organisations recognised 
that appearing moderate and approachable would allow the public to voluntarily accept 
their rhetoric without antagonism.193 
Furthermore contention surrounds the efficacy of moral appeals in marshalling 
public support for political treaties. WSPers hailed their ability to employ morally 
loaded rhetoric during their demonstrations, but many felt repulsed by this attitude 
towards the delicately balanced negotiations. President Dwight Eisenhower, for 
example, “regretted” the necessary rhetorical exercises, believing the issue to be so 
dangerous and complex that this manner of public debate could “distort” the subject. 
Robert A. Divine noted that Eisenhower preferred to make the debate factual in its 
entirety. He also argued that Adlai Stevenson’s 1956 presidential bid, in which he made 
testing a moral, public matter, disgusted Eisenhower, ironically inhibiting an “opportune 
moment” to press for a test ban in the autumn of that year.194 Even figures publicly 
opposed to the test ban felt that moral judgements clouded the issue. Hans Bethe, a 
leader of the post-war scientists’ movement against the nuclear arms race, “objected to 
the emotional appeal and moralistic tone” of some antinuclear campaigns.195 
WSPers also claimed that their ability to provoke public support for a test ban 
and their persistence in raising the awareness of radiation hazards influenced the 
campaign. But public opinion had, at best, a complex and inconsistent effect on the 
fortunes of test ban negotiations. On the outpouring of public support that followed the 
August signing of the treaty, President Kennedy opined that he would have more 
adamantly pursued terms for a comprehensive test ban had he known the depth of 
popular approval.196 It was, however, constantly reiterated that “only military aspects be 
considered” when deliberating the resumption of atmospheric testing. 197  The US 
government simply required that public opinion support it in any direction it took. 
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Though a known proponent of the test ban, WSP actually received calls from the 
government asking them to support the president's wish to resume testing in April 
1962.198  
 WSP’s ability to mould public opinion is equally uncertain. Members engaged in 
much enthusiastic campaigning and caught the public eye extensively throughout 1962 
and 1963. Media reporting consistently approved of the group's efforts. Yet polling data 
for the period suggests that WSP had little effect on attitudes. Public sentiments towards 
a weapons test ban varied hugely throughout the late 1950s and early 1960s. Eugene 
Rosi, in an extensive study of public attitudes, showed that “numerous and wide 
fluctuations of opinion occurred.” 199  Generally, shifts in opinion followed either 
governmental actions or Cold War events. Tensions over the Berlin Wall in mid-1961, 
followed by the Soviet resumption of tests, resulted in widespread support for a new 
round of government testing. On Kennedy's renewed efforts towards a test ban in 1963 
opinion shifted so that a majority approved a Partial Test Ban Treaty by August. Rosi 
also observed that, even when educated on the dangers of fallout, concerns over 
radiation did not govern people’s attitudes towards a test ban. Security concerns, foreign 
policy issues, and the guidance of both government and nongovernmental experts 
shaped opinion. “No panic over fallout was registered. Security concerns apparently 
outweighed humanitarian concerns…A large majority of the populace therefore seemed 
willing to take the risks involved in continuing American tests rather than cease them 
without an agreement.”200 The main thrust of WSP’s campaign – certainly the rhetoric 
used – did not appear to affect the results of Rosi's study. 
WSPers relied on a number of pronouncements to endorse their test ban 
activities and make their case as influential actors. The organisation did receive credit 
from journalistic figures such as I. F. Stone. UN Security General U Thant also received 
Dagmar Wilson, Helen Frumin, and Lorraine Gordon to thank them for their group’s 
efforts. 201  Other famous statements in support of WSP are more contentious. In a 
statement widely referenced by Amy Swerdlow, Dagmar Wilson, and many other 
leading WSPers, Kennedy's Science Advisor Jerome Weisner reportedly gave “the 
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major credit for moving Kennedy, not to arms controllers inside the government, but to 
Women Strike for Peace, SANE, and Linus Pauling.”202 But this quote did not come 
directly from Weisner. It originally appeared in a 1970 Science article discussing the 
role of universities in weapons research. Andrew Hamilton's piece did not quote 
Weisner, nor did it consider the history of the test ban movement in any depth.203 
Likewise the pronouncement from Kennedy that he had seen WSP’s march and 
“considered their message received” was prompted by a press conference in which he 
was asked directly about the demonstration. Madeline Duckles claimed that Kennedy 
wrote a letter on the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty “saying that it was largely to 
the women's credit that that was passed.” But these statements, cited as evidence of 
impact by WSP activists, were neither directly attributed to their source, nor offered 
without prompting.  
In order to fully extrapolate WSPers’ belief in their success, an assessment of the 
group’s effectiveness must consider other aspects. Though historical opinion contends 
that WSP had a limited influence on the outcome of the treaty itself, the nature of 
activists’ claims suggests that they did not necessarily determine success in substantive 
achievements, but in the development of an identity and community within which 
women could organise. Joining WSP was a transformative experience. Amy Swerdlow 
recalled her attitude when speaking of her confrontation with Valerian Zorin in Geneva: 
I remember that particular confrontation with a representative of Soviet 
power as one of the most significant moments of my life, not because I 
influenced Zorin – I certainly did not – but because in speaking truth to 
power, I experienced a moment of freedom from my own feelings of 
powerlessness as a woman and a citizen.204 
The organisation’s ability to provide its members with a sense of worth was far more 
significant than the treaty itself. WSPers discuss the development of the group’s 
“nonorganization,” the inclusion of participants, and its irreverent encounters with 
authority as equally significant to the passing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty. Imbuing 
recollections with these events was not just a rhetorical trait, but a cultural practice. It 
informed the identity of members. As such, the signing of the treaty allowed WSPers to 
frame their accounts of the period with a substantive success, but the treaty alone does 
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not explain why activists considered their group significant. Assessments of WSP’s 
success must, therefore, consider the experience of involvement in the organisation.  
Commitment to WSP was exemplified by the manner in which the group 
continued in the aftermath of the Partial Test Ban Treaty. Much criticism of the 1963 
treaty considers its adverse impact on the antinuclear movement, as it placated popular 
demand for a ban on atmospheric testing while allowing underground testing and arms 
build-ups to continue unabated. The antinuclear movement was “deprived of its chosen 
issue” before its goals had been achieved.205 Wittner claims that “much of the public 
and part of the movement soon believed – as SANE's Homer Jack later complained – 
‘that peace broke out with the test ban!’” Paul Boyer too cites the ratification of the 
treaty as the start of a period of “apathy” among antinuclear organisations who felt they 
had achieved their aims.206 He wrote that “the sudden fading of the nuclear-weapons 
issue after September 1963, whether as an activist cause, a cultural motif, or the topic of 
public discourse, is striking indeed.”207  
WSPers reflected positively on the first two years of their organisation’s life, 
with some justification. It had grown from a one-day action into a fully-fledged member 
of the peace movement, mobilising women around the country, organising campaigns, 
and securing considerable successes. Incidents such as the HUAC hearings became key 
points of reference as members understood themselves within a context of 
“nonorganization,” open membership, and irreverent action. Attitudes towards the test 
ban campaign and WSP’s role in its passing further served to instil activists with a 
shared memory. But analysis of this period demonstrates some problems with existing 
attitudes towards the group's history. Myriad problems emerged out of WSP’s complex 
organisational setup, causing notable strains among women who offered differing views 
of the perfect “nonorganization.” Regional tensions and local autonomy caused further 
division, producing difficulties for those who have considered WSP’s history, memory, 
and identity as nationally cohesive. While still cited as the group’s most successful 
period, analysis of contemporary opinion and competing views shows that WSP’s 
HUAC performance and involvement in the test ban movement remains contentious. 
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Most importantly, the established image of Women Strike for Peace meant that any 
incidents that did not conform to the perception of WSP as a cohesive yet unorganised 
group of respectable, irreverent mothers, were reduced in historical relevance. Owing to 
the ambiguous nature of WSP’s stance, actions of members that were deemed to be at 
odds with the desired image of the organisation occurred with more frequency as the 
organisation continued beyond its initial intent.  
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3. “A Not So Funny Thing”: Alice Herz, the Jakarta Meeting, 
and the Anti-Vietnam War Movement, 1963-1967 
 
It is, perhaps, a historical irony that on the day Women Strike for Peace first publicly 
protested, deliberations within the Kennedy administration created the conditions that 
would occupy WSPers for the next 12 years. On 1 November 1961, General Maxwell 
Taylor advised the dispatch of US marines to support the government of South Vietnam. 
Acknowledging the various risks of such a move, Taylor emphasised that “there can be 
no action so convincing of US seriousness of purpose.” The Taylor-Rostow report 
affirmed that “a bare token, however, will not suffice; it must have a significant value,” 
and recommended a substantial increase in American military presence.1 The report set 
in motion the inexorable creep of US involvement in Vietnam, culminating in a 
controversial and unpopular conflict that sparked the most significant anti-war protests 
in American history.  
As it became aware of American military intervention in South East Asia, 
Women Strike for Peace diverted its antinuclear efforts towards what became a long, 
arduous, and fractious period of anti-war protest. Involvement in the anti-war movement 
secured WSP’s positive historical legacy. Tom Wells spoke highly of the busy and 
“dogged” WSPers “in perpetual motion against the war.” 2  WSP is simultaneously 
praised for the promptness of its public opposition. DeBenedetti and Chatfield noted 
WSP’s protests occurred even before the “scattered” group of anti-war protesters 
coalesced into a “movement” against the Vietnam War. Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald 
Sullivan agree.3 WSPers themselves reflected fondly on their experiences. Participation 
in the anti-war movement offered a huge source of pride for members who pointed out 
their responsibility for a number of large demonstrations and unprecedented feats. 4 
WSPers were the first to demonstrate at the Pentagon, the first to oppose the use of 
napalm, and the first members of the peace movement to travel to Hanoi during the war. 
Yet the experience of activists during the Vietnam War was not universally 
shared and individual attitudes towards WSP’s anti-war activities in the mid-to-late 
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1960s perfectly demonstrated the layers that existed within the organisation. Though 
producing a uniform historical narrative, experiences of the period varied among 
women in the organisation and established narratives of WSP’s activities in the period 
do not represent the numbers that took issue with the development of the organisation’s 
stance. The work and attitudes of key women differed substantially from casual 
activists. Grassroots members were sometimes forced to accept the choices made by 
leading figures, complicating descriptions that suggest WSP allowed individual 
conscience and made decisions by consensus. Some struggled to accept the rationale of 
those who decided to depart from the group’s traditional image of respectability and its 
disdain for civil disobedience. 5  Often, the manner with which certain incidents are 
revered or downplayed in the memory of Women Strike for Peace depends on how well 
the event conforms to the group’s respectable, “ordinary” image. But this is not always 
the case, particularly during the Vietnam War. In some instances the more radical acts 
are, curiously, emphasised in the narrative of WSP’s protests. Memory of the period is, 
therefore, problematic. To provide a comprehensive overview of Women Strike for 
Peace in this period the history of the group must take into account the varying 
experience of its members. 
 
“Early” Concern 
With the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, public concern towards nuclear 
weapons began to fade. 6  Though Women Strike for Peace continued its energetic 
protests against the NATO Multilateral Fleet, it struggled to remain relevant, a problem 
afflicting many of those who had so vigorously opposed nuclear weapons testing.7 
Sensing that the group had more work to do, Dagmar Wilson wrote to her fellow 
activists in late 1964 to urge their continued participation. 8  Yet even WSP’s de facto 
leader began to scale back her activities. Her secretary described Wilson as “temporarily 
‘retired’ from the WSP scene.”9 A regional meeting held between eastern branches and 
Los Angeles WSP discussed the organisation’s continuing relevance. Participants 
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addressed “sluggish participation” and noted on record that many members expressed 
“general tired feelings.”10 Not all branches experienced such malaise, however.  While 
New York and Philadelphia endured “contracted” operations as a result of a lack of 
finance, Los Angeles was “continuing well.”11 Nevertheless, Women Strike for Peace 
lacked the ability to sustain public interest in its original campaign. 
A running joke among WSP members held that “a not-so-funny thing happened 
on the way to disarmament…Vietnam.” It became the working title of Ethel Taylor’s 
memoir and was eventually used as the heading for a chapter on WSP's Vietnam War 
activism in Swerdlow's Women Strike for Peace.12 The quip encapsulated the perceived 
attitude of most in Women Strike for Peace that the war was an unwanted distraction 
from their antinuclear activities. “We were sidetracked,” Ethel Taylor declared “even 
though we knew that while the war was going on, the nuclear arms race would continue, 
we had to make a choice on what issue we would deal with immediately.”13 But rather 
than causing a distraction, opposition to the Vietnam War instilled the peace movement 
with renewed vigour and took WSP to new heights. Former members universally 
pointed to their opposition of the Vietnam War as a site of hugely successful and 
rewarding work. Historians of WSP, including Swerdlow, Estepa, Schneidhorst, and 
Alonso also provide positive synopses of the organisation’s activities among the anti-
war movement. WSP certainly achieved a great deal in the period, marching on the 
Pentagon and the White House, boycotting and blockading companies manufacturing 
war materials, and engaging in draft resistance initiatives. Activists served an important 
role as visible and respected participants within coalitions, with Women Strike for 
Peace in demand for its ability to “produce bodies” for marches.14 Dagmar Wilson 
boasted that WSP had upped its membership to 500,000, while other organisations 
spoke glowingly of their cooperation with Women Strike for Peace.15 Opposition to the 
Vietnam War ultimately became the group’s most important campaign. Speaking to the 
1965 national conference, Barbara Bick believed that the three years’ experience 
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opposing nuclear weapons “has been, in a sense, a training school preparing our women 
for the present national crisis.”16   
Individual WSPers had publicly agitated against American involvement in 
Indochina since the signing of the Geneva Accords in 1954, albeit not as representatives 
of Women Strike for Peace.17 Still, the actions of local branches in California allowed 
the organisation to assume an historical legacy as one of the first critics of the war.18 
Even as a test ban treaty continued to elude negotiators in March 1963, a state-wide 
California conference warned that tensions in Vietnam were at an “extremely critical 
phase,” urging members “now is the time to mobilize.”19 In October 1963, Peninsula 
Women for Peace made a statement saying that “as American women we are shocked 
and ashamed that our government is supporting militarily and financially the regime 
which is perpetrating these atrocities.”20 By the end of the year San Francisco WFP 
denounced Madame Nhu, the de facto First Lady of South Vietnam.  Members called 
for the “withdrawal of all US aid to the Diem Government” and expressed their 
“shame” that American participation had exacerbated “terrible events.”21 Wilson later 
took pride in these actions, asserting that her group’s members “were the first people to 
take to the streets protesting the Vietnam War.”22  
Given general understandings that vigorous opposition to the Vietnam War 
began in 1965, some WSPers certainly protested early.23 But activities in California did 
not represent the opinion of huge numbers of WSP activists. Esther Newill argued that 
women on the east coast in particular seemed stubbornly reluctant to broach opposition 
to the Vietnam War for several years. She claimed that a “culture of silence” pervaded 
discussion in New York and that she felt “almost gagged” from voicing her opposition 
in the city. Newill actually accused WSP’s leaders of shouting down early suggestions 
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to oppose the war. 24  Though offering a rather conspiratorial assessment of WSP’s 
leadership, Newill’s explanation is supported by evidence from the period. Margaret 
Russell, displaying solidarity with those in the region having travelled extensively 
around Asia in her youth, used her skills as an archivist to produce a “comprehensive 
information kit, heavy with citations of the Congressional Record and newspaper 
sources, about the war.”25 She wished to circulate the information throughout WSP in 
order to galvanise early opposition to American involvement in South East Asia. But the 
kit drew scorn from members reluctant to address the issue at that stage. In October 
1963, influential Portland WSPer Carol Urner wished to “dissent strongly” from 
Russell’s proposal, feeling both that it would show WSP as a partisan organisation and 
that further discussion needed to take place before the group decided on its policy.26 
Key women exercised caution. Often more politicised than they let on, they did not wish 
to commit to protesting the war until they felt the “typical American housewife” 
exhibited awareness of the issue.27  
Women Strike for Peace did not issue a national policy statement outlining its 
opposition to the Vietnam War until October 1965, seven months after the start of 
Operation Rolling Thunder, over a year following the Gulf of Tonkin incident and a full 
two years since WSP activists first began protesting against American presence in the 
region. 28  This was despite motions at earlier national conferences that urged the 
organisation to adopt a position on Vietnam.29 In claiming that their organisation was an 
early opponent of the war, WSPers appropriated the efforts of a handful of activists to 
describe the whole, discounting the substantial resistance that emerged from key women 
opposed to taking such a decision so early. 
 
The Immolation of Alice Herz 
It took the startling action of one member to bring WSP’s focus squarely on the 
Vietnam War. On 16 March 1965, Alice Herz was making copies of a protest flier using 
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the equipment at Wayne State University, where she used to teach. A founding member 
of Detroit Women for Peace, Herz had expressed concern over military involvement in 
Vietnam for some time. Leaving the building she realised that she had left the original 
copy of her flier on the copier machine. She panicked, fearing that the flier would be 
discovered, that someone would alert the authorities, and that her planned protest would 
be interrupted by the police before she could act on it. Herz left the university campus 
and made her way through Detroit, eventually stopping outside of Federal’s Department 
Store on the corner of Oakman and Grand River. She doused herself with flammable 
cleaning fluid and, at around 9pm, set herself afire. To passing motorist the fire 
appeared to have come from the front of the store but, realising that someone was in the 
midst of the scorching flames, several people leapt from their cars, tearing off their 
jackets and covering the body in an attempt to put out the fire. Unaware of her 
intentions to die, Richard Boddy, Stephen Burke and his two sons had only temporarily 
spared the protester’s life. After ten days in hospital she died from her burns. Alice Herz 
became the first American to martyr herself in protest of the Vietnam War.30 
Born in Hamburg on 25 May 1882, Alice Herz was an archetypal peace activist. 
She became involved in the peace movement in her native Germany at a young age and 
joined the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom in 1916, just a year 
after it formed. Tragedy struck in her family life when both her husband, Paul, a 
chemical engineering PhD, and her son, Konrad, died in the space of a week in 1928. 
She never remarried and raised Helga, her only daughter, alone. Gifted with exceptional 
intellect and engaged with politics and pacifism, Herz foresaw the dangers of National 
Socialism as Hitler came to power in the early 1930s. She fled to France in 1933 after 
Helga enrolled for study at the University of Grenoble. It proved a relief for Herz who, 
though not practicing the faith, had a Jewish heritage. After the invasion of France in 
1940, both Alice and Helga Herz found themselves in an internment camp for German 
nationals. The experience instilled a sense of social justice in both Alice and her 
daughter, while witnessing World War Two at first hand strengthened their commitment 
to pacifism. They arrived in the United States in 1942 and settled in Detroit in January 
1943.31 
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Alice Herz demonstrated a passion for teaching and education throughout her 
life. After her son became blind, she taught herself braille in order to better his 
education and her communication with him. She became so proficient that, following 
her son’s early death in 1928, Herz decided to teach other children how to read and 
speak in braille. “That was the kind of woman she was,” explained a colleague.32 On 
arriving in the United States, Herz began teaching German at Wayne State University in 
Detroit. Her proficiency in language was further evidenced by her fluency in Esperanto, 
the artificially constructed auxiliary language designed to boost international 
understanding between different cultures. Internationalism was a particularly important 
part of her life.33 While in the United States Herz wrote freelance articles for German, 
Swiss, and American publications, and maintained correspondence with peace workers 
across the globe.34 Well-wishers from all over the world celebrated her 80th birthday and 
150 people attended a party in her honour. Herz herself was reluctant to attend, feeling 
“too busy for parties” because of her activist commitments. 35  Her friendship with 
Japanese pacifist and Hosei University Professor Shingo Shibata is particularly 
noteworthy. Their correspondence stretched over 12 years and, although never meeting 
in person, Prof. Shibata edited and published a collection of letters and documents on 
her death, fittingly titled Phoenix.36 
Herz’s lifelong commitment to pacifism saw her engage in activities for both 
SANE and WILPF in the years prior to WSP’s formation. She also expressed equal 
concern for the Civil Rights movement and forced her way into Cobo Hall in 1963 to 
hear Martin Luther King, Jr. deliver an early version of his “I Have a Dream” speech.37 
Her ceaseless campaigning yielded a sizeable file with the Detroit police department’s 
“Subversive Squad.” A sergeant described her commitment in favourable terms: 
I’ve seen her around for years…she was just a pacifist. You know, always 
out on the march whenever someone – anyone – was demonstrating against 
war. She was what I’d call a go-er. I don’t think she ever missed a meeting 
of any of those peace organisations.38 
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Although her status as a social activist was well known to the authorities, Herz was 
never arrested for her work.39 
Her experience in community organising made Alice Herz well-placed to 
become a founding member of Detroit Women for Peace. She took a great deal of pride 
in the newly established organisation, writing to Prof. Shibata that “we have organized a 
Women’s Peace Campaign. November 1st was our start and we had a response beyond 
expectation.”40 Later news clippings depicted her meeting the Mayor with her daughter. 
An annotated photograph of the experience sent to Shibata explained that she was, “on 
the right side, the smallest person.”41 Herz delighted in the freshness WSP provided for 
the peace movement, contrasting it to WILPF by declaring that it had, “cleared the way 
towards genuine peace. We cannot go back to the old, damaging way.” 42  She was 
present at many early rallies and national conferences, appeared invariably on the 
attendance lists for committee meetings, and served as a contact point for Detroit WFP. 
A letter sent to Washington, D.C. WSP just a year prior to her death affirmed Herz’s 
enthusiasm for the organisation. She proclaimed her excitement for WSP’s future, 
saying “how I regret not to be 28 years old, but 82!”43 Though juggling commitments 
with myriad other organisations, Herz emphasised that “no more peace group seems to 
me more indispensable than WSP.”44 
 The flier copied by Herz before her death was her suicide note, drafted in the 
days prior to the immolation to explain her motives. She addressed her note to U Thant 
and the United Nations while calling for the public to “awake and take action,” pointing 
out that ultimate responsibility for the Vietnam War rested with American citizens: 
With the help of THE COLLOSAL LIE your President, Harry S. Truman, 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, J.F. Kennedy, and Lyndon B. Johnson, have 
deceived and misguided you…you have allowed your lawmakers in 
Congress to appropriate billions of dollars for an Arsenal of 
Destruction…Yours is the responsibility to decide.45 
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The note encapsulated the central tenets of WSP’s Statement of Principles, calling for 
United Nations assistance and the direct involvement of the public to end American 
militarism. Displaying her own sense of internationalism, she claimed solidarity with 
the Vietnamese people through her immolation, making herself heard by choosing “the 
flaming death of the Buddhists.” A letter to her daughter implored that she “did this not 
out of despair, but out of hope for mankind.”46 
But the shock value of such an evocative act of martyrdom primarily sought to 
move the US government. As Johnson urged Congress to adopt the 1965 Voting Rights 
Act, the build-up of the American military presence in South East Asia quietly 
continued. On 2 March 1965, just two weeks prior to Herz’s immolation, the Operation 
Rolling Thunder bombing campaign began in earnest. Taylor Branch argues, Herz 
“could not believe that an American President who so eloquently endorsed the cause of 
Selma since then could withstand a jolting appeal to stop an incipient war.”47  
 Surprisingly, the immolation and death of Alice Herz elicited a muted response 
from the media and public. Although reporting to a national audience, newspapers gave 
brief and factual summaries of the incident and the possible motivations of the 
participant. Her actions warranted no editorials or long, meaningful discussions of 
American policy.48 Herz’s colleagues bemoaned the meagre reaction. WILPF activist 
Mary Phillips lamented that “comparatively few people will know of her sacrifice” and 
criticised Chicago’s American for “using only 1 column inch to report the death.”49 On 
the eighth anniversary of her death, Herz’s close friend and fellow WSPer Lucy 
Haessler ruminated that “at the time, and especially in retrospect as well, I am afraid 
that it did not have the impact Alice hoped for.” The executor of the first immolation in 
the western world “sank invisibly among freakish news squibs.”50  
In so fiercely exhibiting her attitude towards the war, the nature of Herz’s action 
arguably allowed her stance to be dismissed as people questioned the mental state of the 
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deceased. Though never publicly expressed, journalists in private appeared to believe 
that Herz had been motivated by mental illness. While researching a well-received 
article on Herz’s martyrdom, the journalist Hayes B. Jacobs reflected on the varying 
attitudes of his colleagues towards the incident. “‘I’m sure you’ll find she was a 
nut’…‘Senile dementia, undoubtedly’…‘at least temporarily deranged.’” He felt 
compelled to ask Helga Herz about her mother’s mental state. 51  Friends fervently 
defend Alice Herz against such charges. Speaking at her memorial, Ruth Gage-Colby 
maintained that “in an insane society, Alice sought to make a completely sane 
testimony” and that she “was not a fanatic, nor a propagandist, but a sincere and 
intelligent lady.”52 The pastor of the first Unitarian Universalist Church, of which Herz 
was a member, avowed that “this is not the work of a crackpot.”53 
Women Strike for Peace responded in an equally problematic manner. Privately, 
the immediate reaction was one of profound shock and sadness. Family and friends had 
no prior indication of her plans to martyr herself. Visiting on 15 March, Lucy Haessler 
found Herz “in a state of great agitation, saying she could not be interrupted, she had a 
big piece of work to do that she must finish.” Haessler assumed it involved a piece of 
writing and “so was not worried” by her being “preoccupied.”54 Helga Herz, despite 
sharing a house with her mother, only became aware of the incident after hearing the 
news from WSP colleagues. Members of Women Strike for Peace were deeply moved 
and sympathies arrived immediately. Inundated with gifts, Detroit WFP urged well-
wishers to instead divert their money to the creation of a care fund for Alice’s 
recovery.55 WSPers nationwide voiced their admiration and support, Los Angeles WISP 
sending a message to Herz while she was in hospital stating that her “courage and love 
of humanity is engraved in our hearts.”56 Other peace groups mirrored the reaction. 
Mary Phillips from WILPF explained that her group “were all deeply moved by this 
supreme sacrifice by this great woman.”57  
 In contrast, WSP’s public response showed efforts to distance the organisation 
from Herz’s actions. Though sympathetic, the group struggled to reconcile the inherent 
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violence of her immolation with their desired stance as moderate American housewives. 
Detroit WFP issued a statement emphasising that they considered Herz’s immolation to 
be the act of an “individual.” The press release even included some paraphrasing of 
Herz’s statement, altering the wording of the suicide note to make her death appear 
“illuminating,” rather than the more violent “flaming” that Herz herself described.58 
While Detroit WFP carried placards reflecting that “Alice Herz is With Us” on a 20 
March demonstration, founder Lillian Lerman publicly stated that it was “difficult to 
understand how she could have done this.”59 While the group set up a care fund in the 
hope of raising money to treat Herz in the aftermath of her immolation, requests that 
Memo publish a dedicated memorial issue to Herz did not succeed.60 Lucy Haessler, a 
close friend and fellow member of Detroit WFP, hoped that a fellow WSPer would 
underwrite the publication of a biography, but nothing materialised.61  
The immolation of another American peace activist concerned with the war 
subsequently overshadowed Alice Herz’s death. Eight months later, on 2 November, 
Norman Morrison drove from his house in Baltimore to Arlington. Carrying his 1-year-
old daughter, Emily, he wandered around the outside of the Pentagon for around 45 
minutes, before finally settling in a spot by a retaining wall on the South-East side of the 
building. The Quaker seminarian poured a jug of kerosene on himself and set himself 
ablaze. Flames shot nine feet into the air. Although witnesses could not agree whether 
he had set his daughter down before or during his immolation, Emily was miraculously 
unhurt. Bystanders attempted to beat the flames down, suffering severe burns in the 
process, but Morrison died two minutes after an ambulance arrived at the scene. His 
widow received a letter from her husband the following day, mailed during the drive to 
Arlington. Morrison asked for forgiveness, but claimed that American bombing in 
Vietnam compelled him to act.62 
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The press was replete with stories of Norman Morrison in the days following his 
death. His young family became the subject of newspaper reports as photos of his wife 
and young children adorned human interest stories that appeared in the immediate 
aftermath. Curiosity in Morrison’s life abounded. In-depth editorials questioned his 
actions and discussed the US presence in Vietnam. 63  The immolation seemed to 
influence further acts. When 22-year-old Roger LaPorte set fire to himself outside the 
Dag Hammarskjold Library of the UN Plaza in New York one week later, immolation 
appeared to be a temporary craze among the peace movement and the American public 
generally.64 Police requested asbestos gloves and fire-fighting equipment out of fear that 
immolations would become a frequent protest action.65 News stories mentioned cases of 
people attempting immolations throughout the country. 66  The apparent influence 
achieved by Norman Morrison’s death stood in sharp contrast to the indifference that 
followed the immolation of Alice Herz just eight months prior.  
A number of reasons offer themselves to explain the disparity in attention and 
the gender of Herz and Morrison certainly deserves consideration. As a women’s peace 
protester there appear to have been residual societal expectations on the way Herz 
should have conducted her activism. Dorothy Day, a well-respected peace activist, 
denounced acts of immolation under the tenets of nonviolent protest. To Day, 
nonviolence should “be an essentially undramatic affair,” avoiding any attempt at “self-
publication” by appealing to the “prosaic and ordinary” lives of most members of the 
public.67 Women’s peace activists, wishing to appeal to moderates through respectable 
protest, certainly appeared to have had more scrutiny of the particular manner of their 
protests. Penelope Adams Moon, for example, framed her study of the expectations on 
women’s peace activists with an introduction focusing on the reaction to Alice Herz’s 
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death.68 Whether this had a discernible effect on the reporting of Herz’s death is less 
clear. With the availability of only a small amount of media reports that discussed the 
immolation, Tiffany Hamelin Cabrera accepts that “one can only speculate” whether 
differing responses emerged for reasons of gender. 69  Cheyney Ryan rightfully 
acknowledged the context of sexism faced by women in the peace movement, but 
argued that it is not fully explanative of the differing responses to Herz and Morrison’s 
deaths.70 
The age and family lives of Herz and Morrison appear a more determining factor 
in media responses to their deaths. Herz was a widowed 82-year-old with an adult 
daughter. Norman Morrison in contrast, was only 31, a young father who had left 
behind a young family. The story of his death presented an added hook that a baby, 
present at the event, now faced growing up without a father. With a photogenic widow 
and three small children, the media followed the family as they attended Morrison’s 
memorial, and stories about Emily Morrison continued into her adulthood. 71  While 
Morrison’s immolation resulted in the publication of innumerable photographs of his 
family, images of Alice Herz and her daughter remain difficult to find. No follow up 
stories emerged asking how her family and friends considered her actions, and certainly 
not in the same manner that many of Morrison’s friends were offered the chance to 
voice their opinion.72  
The timing of Herz’s action may also have been too premature to warrant the 
substantial news coverage afforded Morrison’s later death. On the day of Herz’s 
immolation, 16 March 1965, the US had only just started military action in Vietnam in 
earnest, with Operation Rolling Thunder beginning on 2 March. Public opposition to 
military policy in South East Asia had not yet coalesced into general anti-war sentiment. 
Intervention increased massively over the summer, with numbers rising from 23,300 
“advisers” in early 1965, to 81,400 troops in July, with 184,300 stationed in Vietnam by 
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December. 73  In November the news media brought multiple stories of innocent 
casualties involved in American bombing raids. It was one such story, reported in I.F. 
Stone’s Weekly that drove Morrison to commit his act.74 News reports suggest that 
sentiment was not wholly in favour of Morrison’s action, with protest against the war 
still considered undesirable to many in the United States. But public knowledge of the 
war appeared more prevalent at the time of Morrison’s death in November 1965 than it 
had been when Alice Herz committed her immolation in March. The media, therefore, 
had a context within which it could frame Morrison’s act that had not existed 
previously. 
Arguably the most influential factor rests with the location of each act of protest. 
Alice Herz had originally intended to commit her immolation on the campus of Wayne 
State University on 18 March in an attempt to rouse student interest in politics and the 
Vietnam War. After accidentally leaving her protest note she panicked and instead 
chose to commit her act outside an inauspicious department store later that day.75 There 
was little connection between the message of her protest and the location she committed 
her act. This differs significantly from the death of Norman Morrison. While Alice Herz 
may have attempted to bring the war home, Morrison brought it to the door of the US 
military. It quickly emerged that the immolation occurred directly outside the office 
window of Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara. While not witnessing the event 
itself, McNamara saw the following commotion of ambulances, paramedics, and 
shocked bystanders. Anne Morrison Welsh, Norman’s widow, later downplayed the 
idea that her husband had known where McNamara’s office was, calling it 
“synchronicity or coincidence.”76 But the event had a profound impact on the Secretary 
of Defence. In a 1995 book McNamara claimed Morrison’s death “was a tragedy not 
only for his family but also for me,” writing that, by “bottling up” his emotions in the 
aftermath, “the episode created tension at home.” 77  Offered the chance for further 
reflection in the documentary The Fog of War, McNamara spoke emotively about 
Morrison’s death, but he declined to answer further questions on the topic when pressed 
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about the impact it had on his own family.78 In an extensive study of the Secretary of 
Defence, Paul Hendricksen claimed that Morrison’s death sparked the “shattering” of 
McNamara, hereafter altering his attitude towards the Vietnam War. 79  His later 
recollections of the incident indicated that the trauma weighed heavy on his conscience 
and he would proudly cite the fact that Anne Morrison Welsh had offered him her 
personal forgiveness for her husband’s death.80 
Given the circumstances of each act of immolation it seems understandable that 
Norman Morrison’s protest elicited more contemporary interest, but none of these 
factors provide a particularly satisfying explanation for the lack of historical interest in 
Alice Herz. Hendrickson noted that immolation in the United States achieved such 
interest due to its performance outside of the cultural context of Buddhism in Asia. 
Justifying the attention Norman Morrison’s death received, he suggested that, “this 
burning seemed vastly different. For one thing, it occurred in our own civilization.”81 
Yet this does not explain why Alice Herz, as the first such American martyr, remains 
relatively hidden. Cheyney Ryan poignantly assessed his own thoughts on the issue, 
finding that “though surprising, my ignorance is apparently not exceptional.” Ryan 
spoke of the apparent “invisibility” of Alice Herz in historical works, declaring it both 
“perplexing” and “disturbing” that she did not receive the same attention provided to 
Norman Morrison.82 Recognition of Herz’s life and death is certainly increasing. The 
German government, under an initiative to honour those affected by the rise of National 
Socialism in the country, named a park in Berlin “Alice Herz Platz” in 2003 in 
recognition of her lifelong pacifist activism. But historical works, even those working 
chronologically, allow Morrison’s death to receive lengthy discussions first before an 
acknowledgement is made that “a Detroit Quaker had taken her life” some months 
earlier.83 
Considering the circumstances and mixed reactions to Herz’s death by historians 
and the media, it may be unfair to specifically highlight WSP’s problematic response. 
WILPF, another organisation that benefitted from Herz’s involvement, also struggled to 
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deal with the event and “backed away” from memorialising her death. 84   But the 
scarcity of reference to Alice Herz within the history and memory of Women Strike for 
Peace is particularly perplexing given the multitude of benefits her immolation provided 
for the group. The manner of her death played a huge role in heightening WSP’s 
international reputation, something sought after for many years. Women’s peace 
organisations from around the world declared their support of Women Strike for Peace 
and “hundreds of thousands” identified with the group “in Africa, Asia, East and West 
Europe.”85 One organisation declared that WSPers were “the conscience of America.”86 
Organisations in Asia seemed especially touched. Owing to her lengthy correspondence 
with Shingo Shibata, the immolation and death of Alice Herz caught the attention of 
many women’s groups in Japan. The New Japan Women’s Association, speaking “as 
wives and as mothers,” declared their “firm determination” to stand “in cooperation 
with members of Women Strike for Peace.” They had read of Herz’s exploits in their 
newsletter and wished to share their condolences with her daughter.87  
Most significantly, Herz’s death brought substantial support from the public of 
Vietnam. Choosing to act in solidarity with Buddhist monks in the country, Herz’s 
immolation lost nothing in translation. She became a revered and legendary figure, 
particularly in North Vietnam. To honour her deed the country held a silent vigil 
following the reports of her death. Schoolchildren composed poems in her memory 
while others wrote and sang songs detailing her lifelong commitment to peace. The 
government renamed a street “Rue Herz” in the heart of Hanoi.88 The reverence shown 
towards Herz yielded a dedicated memorial to her life and death in the Ho Chi Minh 
Revolutionary Museum, her photo displayed within a candle-lit shrine to her memory. 
Some of this response may perhaps reflect the opportunism and endeavour of the North 
Vietnamese government to secure a propaganda victory over the United States. Ho Chi 
Minh claimed the “support of the US people” in an interview with British journalist 
Felix Greene, citing the sacrifice of those who had “set fire to themselves in protest 
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against United States’ acts.”89 Nevertheless, Alice Herz and, by extension, the group 
associated with her, was held in high esteem by North Vietnamese citizens. Her actions 
allowed Women Strike for Peace to undertake one of the most daring and effective 
activities in the group’s history. 
 
The Jakarta Meeting 
In May 1965, the Soviet Union held a celebration marking the 20th anniversary of the 
end of the Second World War in Europe. Prominent New York WSPer Lorraine Gordon 
and Southern California Coordinator and Los Angeles WISP leader Mary Clarke 
attended the celebration as invited guests. Clarke recalled that “the Soviet Women’s 
Committee designated Women Strike for Peace as ‘peace heroines’” and deliberately 
selected the two WSPers to be representatives of the whole group. 90  However, an 
ulterior motive pervaded their acceptance of the invitation. Women Strike for Peace had 
tried to acquire contact with peace groups working out of North and South Vietnam for 
some time. Spying an opportunity while in Russia, Clarke and Gordon sought out the 
newly established embassy for the National Liberation Front in an attempt to secure 
permission to travel to Hanoi.  
After a two hour meeting with embassy officials, the NLF mission remained 
“sceptical” of the women’s intentions and reluctant to accept passage into North 
Vietnam. Lorraine Gordon believed that the WSPers’ appearance as “middle-class 
American women” and “mothers” eventually won over the officials, but WSP’s 
association with Alice Herz brought substantial influence.91 A week following the initial 
meeting, embassy staff informed the two WSPers that a group of women in North 
Vietnam had offered to sponsor their trip. They were reportedly “delighted and excited 
over the proposal” of meeting with Women Strike for Peace members and a contingent 
flew to Moscow to meet with Clarke and Gordon before inviting them to travel 
immediately to Hanoi for further discussions. Mary Clarke later relayed that the North 
Vietnamese women “were aware of the WISP woman in Michigan who had set herself 
on fire.”92 Mary Hershberger argues that the fact that “Herz had belonged to the same 
organisation that these women came from prompted a warm response from the 
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Vietnamese.”93 On arriving in Hanoi a dozen women, bearing flowers, met Mary Clarke 
and Lorraine Gordon and the two experienced V.I.P. treatment throughout their stay.94 
The trip to Hanoi became one of the most significant acts undertaken by WSPers 
during its history and activists reflected on it with pride. Clarke and Gordon 
demonstrated unique daring and courage in their expedition. Aware that traveling to 
Hanoi during wartime risked government suspicion, they did not inform their friends, 
WSP colleagues, or even their families of their trip. But their unprecedented journey 
saw them witness first-hand the consequences of US bombing raids in North Vietnam. 
The personal experience of the war elevated their awareness of the issue, granted them 
legitimacy in their views towards the war, and galvanised their opposition to the 
American government. Clarke and Gordon spent time with amputees, orphaned 
children, and victims of bombings and met with North Vietnamese Prime Minister 
Pham Van Dong. The scale of the achievement is perhaps best represented by the 
attempts made by others to claim the prize of being the “first” to Hanoi. Michael 
Myerson of the United States Peace Council, for example, proudly stated that he “was a 
member of the first group of Americans to visit North Vietnam during the war” in 
August 1965.95 While Myerson was mistaken, it demonstrates the reverence held to the 
feat by members of the peace movement. Conversely, it proves that some of WSP’s 
achievements remained unknown during the group’s lifetime. 
Meeting with peace groups in North Vietnam, Clarke and Gordon were able to 
plan a subsequent, larger conference for July 1965. With the help of Pham Van Dong, 
Women Strike for Peace intended to meet with women’s peace activists from North and 
South Vietnam in Jakarta, Indonesia, a neutral location accessible to all involved. 
Having kept their exploits entirely secret from WSPers, Dagmar Wilson broke “the 
most incredible news!”96 Urging the hasty approval of the meeting, Wilson implored 
that members “send as much as you can, and more, immediately. Spread the word.” 
Such excitement abounded among key women. The Washington, D.C. Steering 
Committee expressed their support, noting that many outside of WSP had “expressed 
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great enthusiasm” for the project.97 Mary Clarke passionately endorsed the meeting to 
her fellow WSPers in California.  
The reaction from grassroots members was less favourable. Women Strike for 
Peace had encountered risks from foreign adventures before. As early as 1962 the group 
met with peace activists from the Soviet Union and travelled to Moscow as part of their 
anti-nuclear efforts. Those excursions, while precarious, had always been lawful. Travel 
to Hanoi was not, and news of two members going to Vietnam without consulting the 
rest of the group caused consternation. Grassroot activists expressed concern over the 
legality of the proposed meeting. Mary Hershberger explains that “it went far, perhaps 
too far, some felt, beyond the heretofore daring travel to Moscow. The image of 
American citizens traveling to Vietnam…called up a mixture of cultural and political 
taboos that included treason.”98 Members found their reservations shared by Francis 
McNamara, staff director for HUAC, who felt the trip violated the Logan Act. Lyndon 
Johnson too expressed concern to Walt Rostow, his Special Assistant for National 
Security Affairs. 99  Amy Swerdlow acknowledged that “hesitations” emerged, 
suggesting that a number of women felt WSP’s credibility as an “independent peace 
group” would be jeopardised as it moved into “the pro-Communist camp.”100 Members 
felt that the selection of representatives should be given prudent thought. Some felt the 
feat of meeting personally with representatives of North Vietnam and the NLF 
surpassed the abilities of their own organisation. They suggested that people outside of 
WSP with “greater access to our government” should be given the opportunity to 
travel.101 
The main source of concern for WSP activists arose from the planning of the 
meeting. Key women enthusiastically supported the trip and pressed for the rapid 
consent of branches, leading others to feel “rushed” into making a decision.102 The lack 
of consultation, the secretive nature of Clarke and Gordon’s initial trip, and the pursuit 
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of quick decisions drew derision. Many grassroots members voiced their disgust with 
what they perceived to be a catastrophic failure in the group’s decision making process. 
Ann Arbor Women for Peace posed numerous questions to WSP’s Central Coordinating 
Committee, exclaiming their disappointment at “the absence of realistic planning.”103 
Some prominent figures added their voices to these concerns. Madeleine Duckles from 
East Bay WFP recalled that the hurried decision meant that the Jakarta Meeting “did not 
represent” the number of members WSP “would like to have represented.”104 Ethel 
Taylor, “frankly,” felt “no enthusiasm” for the project.105 Carolyn Marks noted a “split 
feeling” among members of WSP’s National Steering Committee and claimed that she 
did not feel “at all empowered to push it with the way the ladies feel.”106 An open letter 
from Queens, NY, concisely depicted the mood: 
It is too bad that out of so momentous an opportunity…a breakdown of 
communication has come about. In the short but proud history of WSP no 
previous project has demanded more careful examination, more objective 
questioning among ourselves…immediately there was an act of short-
sighted expediency which denigrated one of WSP aims and thus sapped our 
strength.107 
Without the explicit consensus of members the meeting would “represent WSP as a 
nadir of effective representation.” In a damning denouncement of WSP’s leadership, the 
letter signed off by declaring that “this action…was imposed rather than decided.”108 
Women Strike for Peace had not achieved the consensus emphasised as the cornerstone 
of its organisation.  
Despite calls urging its postponement, key figures pressed ahead with plans for 
the Jakarta Meeting seemingly unperturbed, though regional splits began to emerge.109 
Approval of the trip came quickly and broadly from members in California. With a 
sense of separation and autonomy from national and east coast WSP, west coast groups 
felt more confident in participants’ abilities to represent and speak only for themselves, 
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not the organisation.110 They did not feel troubled by the pace of planning. Chicago 
Women for Peace, in contrast, held particular reservations over the selection of 
candidates. Activists “felt that the nomination process was not democratic” and concern 
grew that WSP would only be represented by coastal groups. Sentiment was that 
“precious funds were used to hold international meetings for a select few.”111 Even 
within the branch the meeting raised disagreements. The selection of Shirley Lens to 
travel was only ever “tentative.” With access to her own funds, Lens was not dependent 
on the group’s fund-raising initiatives, allowing her the freedom to take part in activities 
otherwise off limits to other members. Her selection rankled Chicago WFPers, with 
colleagues reportedly calling her “‘arrogant’ and ‘not representative’ of their 
organisation.”112 The Jakarta Meeting, according to one member, “tore a big hole” in the 
group.113 
Of equal note is the manner in which these concerns were snubbed and 
subsequently quashed by WSP’s key women. Dissatisfaction with the planning for 
Jakarta emerged from grassroots figures across the United States. At the 1965 national 
conference in October, Alice Hamburg, a founding member of East Bay WFP dismissed 
members’ grievances as “bickering” and “nit picking.” Despite Hamburg 
acknowledging the disregard shown towards WSP’s core concepts by leading figures, 
she wished to “soft-pedal” any difference of opinion: 
So the delegations were not chosen democratically; the majority did not 
have a chance to express itself on the project in general…some chosen were 
not grounded in WSP history and philosophy…nothing much was lost…we 
have no time for this.114 
Despite this attitude, a Steering Committee meeting on 2 December 1965 reiterated that 
“consensus means general agreement…all those who operate outside this framework do 
so as an individual and not in the name of WSP.”115 The manner with which decisions 
had been taken and criticism suppressed demonstrates an instance in which consensus 
had been almost entirely overlooked. 
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 The Jakarta Meeting, from the initial engagement by Mary Clarke and Lorraine 
Gordon in Moscow through to the selection of women to embark on the trip, presents an 
opportunity to assess the inner-workings of WSP. The affair demonstrates that decisions 
for large-scale and public activities were often made by key women without adequate 
consultation with grassroots members. When concerns were raised, as they were 
substantially throughout mid-1965, the higher echelons of the organisation still moved 
on with their plans. Descriptions of Women Strike for Peace often state that women 
could choose not to engage in activities they were not comfortable with. The Jakarta 
Meeting, however, did not allow individual WSP members to take their own position. It 
contrasts the traditional perception of Women Strike for Peace. 
 Despite receiving only tentative backing, the Jakarta Meeting is remembered as 
an overwhelming success.116 Indeed, the meeting produced many benefits for WSP. 
Though categorically denying that the event represented a conference, WSP members 
indulged in a diplomatic display with their Vietnamese peers. The Jakarta Meeting 
produced similar opportunities to the 1962 trip to the Geneva disarmament conference 
which allowed Women Strike for Peace to engage in a limited form of citizen 
diplomacy.117 Having already established contact with North Vietnam Premier Pham 
Van Dong, WSP members met with Nguyen Thi Binh while in Jakarta, a member of the 
National Liberation Front and later the Foreign Minister of the Provisional 
Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam. She became a chief 
negotiator during the 1973 Paris Peace Accords and maintained contact with Women 
Strike for Peace for many years. 118  Several other participants became government 
officials.119 While Mary Hershberger argues that WSP made clear that they did not 
represent “typical” American public opinion, Jessica M. Frazier suggests that the group 
made the most of their new acquaintances.120 Frazier contends that WSP wished to act 
as “liaisons between the US government and North Vietnamese and NLF officials,” 
while claiming that they had “access to North Vietnamese and NLF officials whom the 
US government was ignoring.”121  
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The fractures caused by the Jakarta Meeting remained evident in the memory of 
the affair. Mary Clarke and Lorraine Gordon are often held to account for acting outside 
of WSP’s organisational framework by initiating contact with the women from North 
Vietnam. Amy Swerdlow wrote that Clarke and Gordon “decided, on their own 
initiative” to seek out the Vietnamese representatives. Describing both as “experts in 
public relations,” Swerdlow discerned that Clarke and Gordon did not wish to 
“implicate WSP in a meeting that it had not endorsed.”122 Mary Hershberger claims that 
the trip represented an unofficial undertaking absent of any directive from Women 
Strike for Peace, believing that “it was not an official WSP trip: it had come entirely at 
their personal initiative in Moscow.”123 While not necessarily apportioning blame to the 
WSPers, this narrative attempted to distance the organisation and, more importantly, the 
leaders of Women Strike for Peace, from the perceived wrongdoing of two individual 
activists. 
 This account differs markedly from the story as told by Clarke and Gordon. 
Both recall that they were pushed by key women in WSP to secure a meeting with the 
North Vietnamese before they left for Moscow. In her memoir, Alive at the Village 
Vanguard, Gordon recalls that a group of key women sensed an opportunity. Already 
having contacted a group of North Vietnamese peace activists, Women Strike for Peace 
wished Gordon and Clarke to try their luck, “let’s stretch this visit a little further, we all 
now said. Let’s see Mary and Lorraine can get to North Vietnam.” Mary Clarke 
supported Gordon’s perception, claiming that “before we left the States, we had been 
asked by Women Strike for Peace to make contact with the Vietnamese in Moscow in 
order to make arrangements for a conference.”124 
Significantly for the history of Women Strike for Peace, Amy Swerdlow's 
opposition to the trip led to some severe disagreements with her WSP colleagues. Of the 
affair Swerdlow recalled feeling that the meeting would be “isolating,” “not necessary,” 
and that since “the trip was about meeting women from the National Liberation Front,” 
she “wasn’t sure that that needed to be done.”125 Additionally she felt that travel to 
Indonesia was an “expensive thing” and disagreed with the manner that decisions had 
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been made.126 Her disapproval brought her into conflict with key planners. She claimed 
that Mary Clarke “for years was angry with me.” The differing responses to the “Jakarta 
Problem” had an impact on Swerdlow’s research, bad blood hindering her ability to 
interview some women about their involvement with WSP.127 Nevertheless, in Women 
Strike for Peace, the meeting with North Vietnamese women’s activists is used to 
demonstrate WSP’s ability to build trusting relationships with women around the world. 
It became a key part of the group’s successful story. 
 
Successes, Civil Disobedience, and Varied Experiences 
On their return from the meeting, the Jakarta delegates embarked on extensive speaking 
tours, relaying their experiences to colleges, church organisations, and various other 
groups. Although US officials remained reluctant to meet and thereby endorse the 
excursion, the WSPers spoke in the British House of Commons as they made their way 
back from Indonesia. They became legitimate spokespeople for Vietnamese culture and 
with valid reason. Not only had they met Vietnamese women personally, but each 
delegate had invested considerable time in learning the history of the country and the 
ongoing conflict. Consequently, they grew in self-confidence. Women Strike for Peace 
emerged from Jakarta with internal divisions, but was embraced as a credible group 
within the peace movement. According to Frances Herring, a consistent supporter of the 
meeting, “the outreach of this Jakarta trip is greater than any previous project of Women 
Strike for Peace.”128 
Having established relationships with the peace activists there, WSP cultivated 
their transnational ties and made further trips to North Vietnam during the war. In 1968 
representatives of each group held a mock peace conference in Paris to discuss how best 
to end the war.129 Vietnamese women also toured Canada at the invitation of Women 
Strike for Peace, while Jakarta delegates remained in close contact with Nguyen Thi 
Binh for many years.130 WSP ran two notable operations with the help of their North 
Vietnamese colleagues. The Committee of Liaison, a joint effort arising from a 1969 
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trip taken by Cora Weiss and Ethel Taylor, established a link between American POWs 
and their families in the United States and received much support from the relatives of 
servicemen in Vietnam131 The Committee of Responsibility (COR) brought the victims 
of napalm attacks from Vietnam to the US for medical treatment and functioned in close 
cooperation with west coast WSP activists. Madeline Duckles, the Northern California 
Chair of the Committee, “met every one of those children” off the plane at Travis Air 
Force Base. Many children, orphaned by the war, were fostered and adopted by families 
in the United States with COR’s help. Documentary evidence of those injured by the 
war allowed Duckles to educate schoolchildren and church groups about the American 
military mission under the auspices of raising awareness of the committee.132  
Women peace protesters certainly encountered difficulties during the Vietnam 
War. Female activists faced chauvinism from many quarters at the time. Mary King and 
Casey Hayden’s 1964 Sex and Caste Memo rose awareness of the “assumed 
subordination” of women in SNCC experienced through their personal relationships 
with male activists. 133  In Personal Politics, Sara Evans drew a link between the 
oppression of women in peace and social justice organisations and the rise of the 
women’s liberation movement in the late 1960s.134 Barrie Thorne’s exposition of the 
draft resistance movement labelled draft work “the point of ultimate indignity” due to 
rampant sexism experienced by New Left women.135 Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones asserts that 
“no critique of the war attained the status of a universal article of faith among American 
Women,” suggesting that women did not manage to form a cohesive mass in their 
efforts to protest the war.136 But the Jakarta meeting allowed Women Strike for Peace to 
act internationally as women and mothers and demonstrate the validity and efficacy of 
their stance. Lorraine Gordon believed that WSP had shown “the world that women are 
capable of meeting together in spite of their countries killing each other…women can 
do what no governments can do.”137  
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As members grew in confidence, Women Strike for Peace began asserting itself 
within the broader United States peace movement, adopting a unique, feminine, and 
maternal position on the war. A “Piece de Resistance” cookbook emerged from Los 
Angeles WISP, advancing their pacifist agenda to their desired audience of housewives 
and mothers.138 In the midst of their activism members maintained their image. Cora 
Weiss for New York WSP offered “Paper Hats for Peace” for a march on the Selective 
Service Headquarters in 1967 with an advert that read “a lady just can’t be without. 
Vinylized, so it’s shiny like the fashions say, chic enough to suit the tastes and needs of 
women on the go.”139 Women Strike for Peace often attempted to commandeer national 
holidays as well, calling on the public to send Mother’s Day cards to the White House 
urging that “this mother’s day we ask one gift – just send our sons home.”140 
Consumer boycotts also provided a fruitful outlet for WSP. The boycotting of 
household goods such as Saran Wrap and Wonder Bread, products developed by 
corporations that also supplied military equipment, allowed activists to connect the war 
to the money spent on groceries. Without women’s purchasing power, WSP argued, the 
war could not continue. WFP in San Francisco and East Bay developed a particularly 
effective campaign against Dow Chemical. 141  Consumer boycotts were a natural 
expansion of earlier campaigns against the selling of “War Toys,” and fed into 
criticisms of the creeping militarisation of American society generally. Not all of WSP’s 
industry boycotts were received favourably, as the companies targeted, including 
several small stores, often felt aggrieved at being singled-out.142 But consumer boycotts 
served a number of purposes. The campaigns allowed WSP to appeal to their preferred 
demographic, hurt the profits and public image of companies involved in producing 
material for war, and demonstrate that middle-class American housewives could 
effectively exercise their political agency to participate in public affairs. 
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WSP’s involvement in draft resistance efforts proved the most successful of its 
sustained campaigns during the Vietnam War. Draft work seemed a perfect fit for 
WSPers. Amy Swerdlow claimed that WSP’s role in the resistance to the draft 
exemplified “women’s age-old ability to carve out political space and power for 
themselves in a man’s world by acting in the service of others.”143 In essence, WSPers 
accepted that their role was to provide support for draft resisters, but reconciled the 
potential marginalisation of this work by framing the issue through a maternal lens, 
adopting a seemingly natural position of protection and support in opposition to 
selective service.144 Andrea Estepa writes in great depth about WSP’s role as part of the 
draft resistance movement, arguing that it could offer an alternative for women who 
wanted to work towards draft resistance without accepting a marginal role. She writes 
that “while many of their activities were ‘supportive’ in nature, the women’s peace 
groups were autonomous and set their own agenda.” Much of this is owed to their 
identity as mothers.145 
WSPers had a nuanced and insightful understanding of the Selective Service 
System. In attempting to share the culpability of draft resisters, WSP’s National 
Consultative Committee drafted the “Women’s Statement of Conscience” in 1967. 
Developed “at the same time and in the same political context” as a similar resolution 
by SDS, Swerdlow contended that “WSP avoided anything that smacked of left 
ideology” and contrasted with the SDS resolution that was “at least five times as 
long…more ideological, radical, and combative.” 146  WSP’s statement appeared to 
advanced a moral argument, rather than a political one, and summarised the range of 
attitudes held by mothers against the war. It argued, that “as Americans,” their children 
had been “taught respect for the rights of others and to stand up for their belief in 
justice. They now refuse to violate these principles.” Expressing their outrage “as 
mothers, sisters, sweethearts, wives,” Women Strike for Peace affirmed its “moral 
responsibility to assist these brave young men,” fully aware of any legal risks involved 
in such a stance.147 Others exhibited clear knowledge of the racial and class overtones of 
the draft. Los Angeles WISP activist Valerie Sissons observed that those who escaped 
service “would be replaced by a poor or minority youth,” while Berkeley and Oakland 
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WFP published a pamphlet explaining that “the draftee for Vietnam is ‘young, often 
working-class, often black.’”148 
By 1967, Women Strike for Peace considered itself a significant part of the anti-
draft movement. On the west coast, branches from Los Angeles to Seattle engaged in 
draft work and attempted to create “cross-fertilization” of their campaigns to create 
nationally coordinated actions.149 New York, Boston, and Chicago area activists also 
found themselves in fortuitous locations given the groundswell of draft resisters 
working for Chicago Area Draft Resistance (CADRE) and the Boston Draft Resistance 
Group (BDRG). Chelsea and South Bronx operations gained “footholds within the 
communities” of New York and took over responsibility “for the leg work, secretarial 
work and fund raising that is involved” in the Long Island Draft Information and 
Counselling Service. 150  When Palo Alto mother Evelyn Whitehorn made a legal 
challenge against the draft, Aubrey Grossman, the husband of San Francisco WFPer 
Hazel Grossman, represented her.151 
 Counselling provided the main source of work. New York groups organised 
several “End the Draft Caravans” to educate those who could potentially serve. The 
operation was carried out with much prudence. Volunteer counsellors were reminded 
that their purpose was not to politicise or encourage resistance, only to inform men of 
their rights under draft law. In this sense, WSP offered a moderate attitude to draft 
work. New York groups’ warned members that: 
As you give out the literature, please remember that you must not say 
anything which can be construed as advice on draft dodging but you can 
encourage boys to explore their feelings about war, to seek more 
information about Vietnam, and to think more about their eventual role in 
relation to war and the Draft.152 
Amy Swerdlow suggested that WSP members counselled as many as “100,000 men 
across class and race lines.”153 Although some experienced harsh reactions form police 
and, in some instances, members indulged in acts of civil disobedience, Women Strike 
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for Peace generally confined itself to activities its members were more comfortable 
with.  
The experience of Women Strike for Peace within the draft resistance movement 
differs substantially from the general belief that draft work was, for women, the point of 
“ultimate indignity.”154 Far from feeling subjugated or repressed within the movement, 
WSPers developed a strong sense of pride in the support they offered. Draft resisters in 
turn welcomed the aid and support. But the position of Women Strike for Peace within 
the draft resistance movement differed from other women in substantial ways. Although 
the 1967 Statement of Conscience attempted to state complicity with draft resisters, 
Women Strike for Peace accepted that it provided support for resisters and members 
made conscious attempts to separate themselves from their younger peers. WSPers 
engaged with draft work specifically as “mothers,” rather than as “women.” The 
generational connotations of this stance should not be undervalued. During the 
December 1967, “End the Draft Week” WSP specifically asked its members to 
“participate as fully as possible in the ‘adult’ actions.” 155  Contributing as mothers 
allowed Women Strike for Peace to avoid many of the sexist overtones experienced by 
other women in the draft movement. Swerdlow notes that, on being described as 
“beautiful” by resisters, WSP members felt “little overt sexual vanity.” 156  WSP’s 
support was “typically parental” and something entirely different to the aid offered by 
other activists.157 This aspect of WSP’s history develops the perceptions offered by 
Michael Foley and Ellen DuBois who suggest that women could indeed find space for 
themselves within some aspects of anti-draft work.158 
 WSP’s role as a support and supplementary part of the draft resistance 
movement led some to marginalise the efforts of WSPers, but even in a supportive 
capacity WSP’s impact extended beyond its initial contribution. 159  The unfailing 
support provided by WSPers allowed draft resisters to indulge in more radical acts 
where previously they could not rely on the support of their family and friends.160 
WSP’s attitude as “movement parents” provided much needed political credibility for 
                                                 
154 Thorne, “Women in the Draft Resistance Movement,” 180. 
155 “Letter from Irma Zigas to End the Draft Steering Committee, 10 November 1967,” SCPC WSP 
Archives, ACC 92A-113, Box 3, End the Draft Week 12-4-9-67. 
156 Swerdlow, Women Strike for Peace, 161. 
157 Ibid, 162. 
158 Foley, Confronting the War Machine, 178-184. 
159 Dellamonica interview, 10 September 1985, ARS.0056. 
160 Foley, Confronting the War Machine, 163. 
  
142 
  
the peace movement generally.161 Arguing against the perception that a “generational 
conflict” emerged between younger and older elements of the peace movement, 
Schneidhorst suggests that a “symbiotic” relationship existed, with the supportive 
community provided by Women Strike for Peace allowing younger, radical activists to 
take more risks.162 WSPers often provided blankets and meals for protesters who were 
out all night and offered financial and moral support to those facing court cases and 
prison sentences.163 Whether or not others saw them in a supplemental capacity, WSP 
women provided all they could, felt themselves an integral part of the movement, and 
believed wholeheartedly that they had contributed to ending the war. By providing 
parental encouragement and cooperation Women Strike for Peace also carved out a 
satisfying space for itself.164 
Testament to their influence in the anti-war movement, various WSP activists 
experienced harassment and threats from ardent pro-war figures. East Bay WFPer 
Madeline Duckles received a threat from the Minutemen, telling her she had “the sight 
of a rifle” on “the back of your neck.”165  In July 1968, Los Angeles WISP found their 
office “practically destroyed” after members of Americans for Counter-Revolutionary 
Action broke in overnight.166 The intruders vandalised much of the office equipment, 
stole files and “peace jewellery,” and left death threats for WSPers including Dagmar 
Wilson, Mary Clarke, and Gail Eaby.167 New York WSP found itself on the receiving 
end of a similar “invasion” in June 1970, after Young Americans for Freedom (YAF) 
occupied its office. 168  Six men forcefully took over the Broadway office, defaced 
posters, and commandeered the phones to inform callers that they had “liberated 
Women Strike for Peace to protest WSP’s opposition to the Vietnam War.”  The 
invading members of YAF gave up their siege after a “tongue lashing from Bella 
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Abzug,” but the incident alarmed WSP members.169 A statement after the incident noted 
that the “damage caused by the YAF invasion has aggravated the NY office’s already 
grave financial problems,” and exacerbated deep dissatisfaction with the seemingly 
apathetic response of the police.170  
The reasoning for the action deserves note. YAF declared that there was “not 
anything personal” in their occupation of New York WSP’s office, but that they wished 
to speak out to “leftists” in the movement generally. A statement directed to WSP by 
YAF activists said that “maybe it isn’t you particular folks, but most of your side 
stubbornly and obnoxiously refuses to recognise that there is indeed another side to the 
story.”171 Those involved saw Women Strike for Peace as valid representatives of the 
movement. The targeting of New York WSP suggests two things. First, that some 
figures felt that Women Strike for Peace characterised a leftist organisation. This is in 
spite of the group’s exhaustive attempts to appear inclusive, neutral, and single-issue. 
Second, the YAF invaders deemed New York WSP as symbolic of Women Strike for 
Peace nationally, despite the differences in politics and activities evidenced by branches 
throughout the country. The nuance and complexity of the organisation was, therefore, 
not apparent to the public. 
Throughout its activity to 1967, Women Strike for Peace attempted to maintain its 
founding image of respectability and moderate protest, largely eschewing any recourse 
to engage in acts of civil disobedience or protest that could end in arrest. This also 
provided practical benefits for women who remained the principal guardians for their 
children. Lillian Hayward explained that her husband “would not have been able to 
handle the family without me,” while Cora Weiss also expressed reluctance to engage in 
acts that could lead her to serving jail time.172 Even in instances that WSP provided 
babysitters and caregivers for mothers who found themselves in jail, WSPers remained 
opposed to acts of radicalism. 173  In her analysis of the group, Amy Schneidhorst 
explains that “even in supportive families, traditional gender roles that prescribed 
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women care for the children and home insured that these women must limit their 
activities to lawful dissent.”174 
This image of respectability permeated historical descriptions of Women Strike 
for Peace within the anti-war movement. Cora Weiss believed that WSP “played an 
‘extremely important’ role in building the broad coalitions against the war, ‘because we 
were the reasonable voice.’”175 But as activists became more firm in their criticism of 
the Vietnam War during 1967, they began advocating increasingly radical actions. Two 
of the most celebrated demonstrations organised by Women Strike for Peace present a 
more radical image of the organisation. In February 1967, WSP became the first peace 
group to demonstrate in front of the Pentagon. Thousands of women became involved 
in vigorous protest, forcing those inside to hastily close and lock the doors to those 
outside.176 Unperturbed by this new development, women at the front of the crowd took 
off their heels and used them to bang against the closed doors.177 The scene became 
renowned, the image burned into the group’s history. Nancy Zaroulis and Gerald 
Sullivan suggested it was “such unladylike behaviour, unheard of in 1967 when women 
were supposed to be seen but not heard.”178 Similarly passionate scenes overtook a 
WSP demonstration outside of the White House in September 1967. Having been 
refused permission to protest on the site outside, members were involved in scuffles 
with police. The press took multiple photographs of angry protesters and women being 
thrown to the ground, reporting under headlines described the “bloody melee.”179 
Such actions were symptomatic of the rising radical sentiments of some WSPers 
in this period. A few doubted the possibility of compromising with the US government 
and suggested that the current American system could not be acceded to and had to be 
replaced. In a discussion with other activists, grassroots WSPer Judy Sugar voiced her 
disgust with contemporary political systems: 
The idea of working with the Congress, I think the Congress represents the 
establishment. I think the establishment is war-like. So I think to go and ask 
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Congress to do something is a waste of time. I think if you want to deal with 
Congress it has to be demanding. And I think we can’t compromise.180 
Responding to a suggestion that WSP form a women’s political party, National Office 
secretary Sally Bortz scoffed that “if you form a political party you are acknowledging 
what I think is a phony belief – that the system works,” adding that a party would make 
“this so-called democratic society legitimate and it is not.”181 Meanwhile, SWAP leader 
Anci Koppel voiced her support of civil disobedience. Extolling the aggressive actions 
of those who demonstrated at the Pentagon, she wrote to Jo Friedman, “WE HAVE TO 
THREATEN those that are responsible in the government – practically, physically 
threaten them. For this reason we here (SWAP) strongly feel that a civil disobedience is 
badly needed.”182 In a statement in 1968 she advocated tax resistance, stating she felt 
“guilty of aiding and abetting a genocidal war” through paying her taxes. “I see myself 
hurling napalm bombs on children, women, and the aged,” she wrote, while observing 
that regular forms of dissent “are met with tear gas, mace, and clubbing.” 183 Even 
Dagmar Wilson appeared to call for a domestic revolution.184 Historian Andrea Estepa 
considered the sense that Women Strike for Peace became a more radicalised group 
during the course of the Vietnam War, using instances of tax resistance and aggressive 
demonstrations to argue that WSPers were more inclined to engage in subversive, anti-
governmental campaigns.185 
These historical incidents create problems for the notion that Women Strike for 
Peace strictly offered a “respectable” alternative within the peace movement. There is a 
clear difficulty in reconciling Alice Herz’s immolation with a “respectable stance,” for 
example. Likewise the rejection of government authority evidenced by the Jakarta 
Meeting and trips to North Vietnam seems incongruous to a narrative emphasising 
WSP’s moderate approach. Some of the group’s most celebrated protests involved acts 
of civil disobedience. Sit-ins and street performances resulted in the arrest of WSPers, 
some of whom, such as the 1973 “Washington Sixteen,” became revered figures after 
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their jail time.186 Amy Swerdlow remembered growing more militant, recalling that “we 
got involved in civil disobedience, in sitting down in Congress and in front of trains 
carrying napalm. We chained ourselves to the White House, blocked ships, lay down on 
the street pretending to be dead Vietnamese.”187 
 Yet, in terms of constructing an appropriate history and memory of the period, to 
suggest that WSP uniformly embraced civil disobedience and a more radical outlook 
does not consider the views of many activists who felt deep displeasure with the 
direction the organisation appeared to take. While Estepa evocatively writes of Women 
Strike for Peace “taking the white gloves off” in this period, she recognises that the 
Pentagon demonstration and “specifically the action of shutting the Pentagon doors 
created a split in attitudes from WSP members between those who saw it as something 
to be proud of (‘we scared them!’), and those who felt it had irrevocably damaged their 
image.”188 Steering Committee meetings were taken up by evaluations of the Pentagon 
demonstration, with many seeing it “negatively” as “too unorderly.”189 Others suggested 
that “if the aim was to draw in more women, that kind of behaviour would not do it,” 
and that “it had alienated their neighbours.” 190  The WSPers’ complaints appeared 
prescient as newspapers recorded a loss of support for the marchers as a result of their 
“conduct.”191 
For every perceived act of radicalism there can be found dissenting voices and 
appeals to maintain a respectable front. A substantial number of activists remained 
reluctant to get arrested or engage in civil disobedience. Despite the group having 
embarked on multiple trips to North Vietnam, many grassroots WSPers continued to 
balk at the prospect of draft card burnings.192 At a WSP meeting held at Chevy Chase 
Library in Washington D.C., Folly Fodor became disturbed that “someone there early 
had turned the [American] flag upside down. The librarian was much upset and we must 
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see that nothing else is done wrong, or we could not use the library again.”193 Speaking 
to a national conference Lyla Hoffman explained the role of Women Strike for Peace: 
The role of WSP must be aimed at leading the millions of worried women 
and mothers…they will not follow us into demonstrations with students, nor 
into police vans. They will not join us in lying across railroad tracks. It is 
therefore our responsibility to devise new actions for suitable, ordinary, 
apolitical, ladylike, worried mothers.194 
Respectability remained a central tenet of the organisation for many, particularly among 
the grassroots. The initial attraction of Women Strike for Peace rested in its appeal to 
moderate American housewives. Wavering from this stance caused dismay for many. 
Following the signing of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963, Women Strike for 
Peace successfully transitioned from a close-knit, single-issue nuclear disarmament 
group to an energetic and industrious anti-war organisation acting across the United 
States and internationally. Its subsequent opposition to the Vietnam War renewed the 
energies of activists, further publicised the group’s stance, and became a significant 
feature of the group’s historical legacy. But experiences of the anti-war movement were 
neither ubiquitous nor constant. WSP did not adequately acknowledge the varying 
attitudes of individuals towards the activities it engaged in and the memory that 
surrounds figures such as Alice Herz illustrates the difficulty in producing a history of 
Women Strike for Peace that uniformly describes the image and actions of all its 
members. Likewise, the experience of WSP activists differed depending on whether a 
member was a “key woman” or a grassroots figure. Regions in particular felt huge 
disparities in their experiences. Questions abounded over the decision-making process 
and whether WSP could truly stick to its respectable, moderate stance. The history of 
WSP’s anti-Vietnam War activism, though often used to emphasise its tenets of 
respectability, individual action, and loose coordination, shows a far more varied 
experience.  
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4. “A Falling Off of Interest”: The Silence of WSP’s Decline, 
1965-1973. 
 
In October 1968, 40 members of Washington D.C. Women Strike for Peace met to 
discuss various tensions afflicting their organisation.1 Though members from outside 
D.C. did not attend, the participants of the Washington Retreat reflected sentiments 
expressed by activists throughout the country. WSPers began raising concerns over the 
practical functions of the organisation with more frequency after the Jakarta Meeting, 
recounting heated arguments and disputes between members while fearing for the 
group’s strength. Many started to question fundamental aspects of the organisation’s 
character. Some felt that WSP should represent a “multi-issue group” tackling “poverty, 
racism, war,” but others longed for a return to the single-issue campaign against nuclear 
weapons that grounded the group’s exhilarating early years. Still others questioned, “are 
we a militant group, are we a political group, are we an emotional group?”2 Such 
introspection caused high-profile figures to consider closing the organisation. Folly 
Fodor observed that “it would be a shame to close shop. But I don’t think that because 
we have a mimeograph and a few reams of paper and an office that that’s a reason to 
continue either.”3 Speaking in sombre tones, Dagmar Wilson displayed her own jaded 
feelings. Just two months later, she quietly gave up her leadership position and, though 
still identifying with WSP, withdrew from active participation in its affairs. 
The Washington Retreat was not a national meeting, but its significance 
mirrored SNCC’s 1964 Waveland Retreat in its indication of the strained state of the 
organisation and its ranging discussions of identity.4 Women Strike for Peace began to 
decline almost in unison with other social activist groups, albeit for different reasons.5 
However, while the fractures and discord of WSP’s peers, such as SNCC and SDS, 
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became defining aspects of their histories, the decline of Women Strike for Peace 
remains curiously absent from the history and memory of the group. Such is the belief 
in WSP’s strength at this time that most assessments claim that the group only lost its 
raison d’etre with the end of the Vietnam War. This suggests that, without the presence 
of a significant campaign to rail against, Women Strike for Peace could not rouse 
interest as it faded from prominence in the early 1970s.6 This chapter contests that 
notion. It shows that, starting in 1965, engagement with the anti-war movement actually 
exacerbated the inexorable decline experienced by WSP. Wilson’s 1968 exit followed 
several years of increasing unrest, disharmony, and unbearable stress as the 
organisation’s informal structure buckled under the demanding obligations of the anti-
Vietnam War movement. Numerous internal organisational problems cultivated a loss 
of enthusiasm and frequent disagreements among women, heightening geographical 
tensions, jealousies, and crucially, estrangement between grassroots activists and 
women in leadership positions. 
The silence over this aspect of WSP’s past tellingly highlights the way in which 
the memory of activists has produced a particular narrative that masks events that 
conflict with the image of WSP as a successful, harmonious group. WSPers did not 
discuss the fatigue, unrest, and tensions that afflicted the organisation, instead praising 
the nonorganizational framework that aggravated these problems. As Harriet Alonso’s 
analysis of conflict between local and national WILPF activists shows, assessing the 
nature of WSP’s decline provides vital insight into interpersonal dynamics and the 
attitudes of members towards their group.7 Given the absence of history relating to 
WSP’s late-1960s decline and discord, examining this period further illuminates how 
certain voices are undervalued in established narratives of the period. 
 
“The Decline of the Demonstration” 
The decline of Women Strike for Peace appears entirely consistent with the problems 
faced by social movement organisations towards the end of the 1960s. Peace activists 
grew frustrated with their inability to end the war in Vietnam, while deteriorating race 
relations also troubled civil rights groups. Radicalism became prevalent and the 
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willingness to engage in violent protest and civil disobedience caused fractures and 
breakups within many established organisations. The Black Panther Party emerged as 
SNCC deteriorated following its earlier highs, while the painful split endured by 
Students for a Democratic Society at its 1968 national conference produced the Weather 
Underground and future coordinators of the 1969 “Days of Rage.” Protests at the 1968 
Democratic National Convention erupted in violence and a brutal response from the 
Chicago police, with events later referred to as a “police riot.” But still the war 
continued. The presidency of Richard Nixon, elected ostensibly with the notion that he 
would implement his “secret plan” for peace in Vietnam, caused further anguish 
following his decision to secretly expand bombing into neighbouring Cambodia. The 
public’s trust in government eroded considerably as the Vietnam War continued.8 When 
the 1973 Paris Peace Accords eventually concluded US intervention, activists appeared 
disillusioned, weary, and in search of alternative forms of personal fulfilment. 9 
Journalists reported on dwindling turn outs and a lack of interest in marches and 
protests. Commentators observed “the decline of the demonstration.”10 
For Women Strike for Peace, its frustrated efforts to end the war in Vietnam 
presented a stark contrast to the positive endeavours it had previously engaged in. The 
passage of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963 seemed to endorse the group, proving to 
activists that they possessed the skills, commitment, and power to effect real change in 
American politics and society. Members looked forward to more victories, hoping that 
“bringing out our government’s wrongs on one issue would open Pandora’s Box on the 
many social and economic ills that troubled our nation.”11 They believed that they could 
rouse public support for disarmament initiatives, but also that they exercised substantial 
influence over politicians and elected officials, both within the United States and 
internationally.12 However, the scene changed markedly towards the end of the decade. 
Amy Swerdlow noted the change in mood, remarking that “in the beginning, Women 
Strike for Peace tried to cast itself as supporters of President Kennedy’s Peace Race. 
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Now, we were in opposition.”13  Members felt especially sensitive to the perceived 
betrayal of President Johnson’s 1964 election campaign pledges. Some saw Johnson’s 
promises of peace as the realisation of the organisation’s goals and his subsequent 
escalation of the Vietnam War led WSPers to feel personally deceived for having 
supported the president’s candidacy.14 Having believed his earlier promises, Dagmar 
Wilson asked the president “what are we to believe today?”15 Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones 
argues that the Johnson administration appeared particularly dismissive of women’s 
peace protesters.16 The shutting of the Pentagon’s doors to WSP’s 1967 demonstration 
provided a stark visual metaphor for the government’s rejection of the group’s pleas, 
while the image of WSPers beaten by police in front of the White House made for 
shocking news headlines.17  
 Some activists, like Donna Allen, became jaded with WSP’s inability to set the 
agenda. Having campaigned vigorously for Women Strike for Peace since its founding, 
Allen began to realise the “long process to change opinion” involved. Her initial belief 
that “it was only necessary to bring certain facts to the attention of those making 
decisions” faded.18 Sensing that WSP’s anti-war work was ineffectual, Bernice Steele 
stated in 1968 that she had “given up hope that our Administration is going to change 
because we ask them to.”19 Grassroots WSPers began to feel that “a gathering of 100 
women outside the White House gates would be just another frustrating and impotent 
experience.” Others claimed that “they were tired of writing letters.”20  A statement 
presented to WSP’s 1968 national conference from Betty Lankford and Ede Hallinan 
summarised the feelings of many, noting that “moods of frustration and defeatism 
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permeated many sections of WSP.”21 Some started to express their resentment at the 
lack of public will. Aline Berman said she had “given up on the middle class,” believing 
“they are too stupid” to appeal to.22  Even branches that had only recently become 
involved in Women Strike for Peace found “it terribly difficult” to maintain their 
enthusiasm. San Antonio Women for Peace, formed in 1970, wrote to the National 
Office explaining that “our approach is to try to educate the public to the issues 
involved in the war. In San Antonio, Texas, this is a real challenge, as the receptive 
and/or alert minds are few and far between.”23  
 Growing social unrest, witnessed throughout the United States and harrowingly 
exemplified by brutal police tactics towards protesters at the 1968 Democratic National 
Convention, forced WSP to adopt a broader view on social injustice. A statement on 
“Crisis in American Cities” affirmed that “our foreign policies are an extension of our 
domestic policies.” As such WSP resolved to organise in opposition to “repressive ‘anti-
riot,’ anti-labour, anti-peace legislation.”24 But the scale of the task led members to feel 
overwhelmed. Dagmar Wilson reflected that “we are always sort of stopping the tide, 
we can’t get on with changing the conditions that produce the situations what we’re 
always up against.” 25  Jean Pfeiffer of Missoula Women for Peace described the 
difficulties of working as a smaller, isolated group in Montana. She explained that “it’s 
really hard to know where to put your energies,” as the larger issue of justice “has to do 
with corporate problems and race problems, lots of human rights activities, as well as 
international peace.”26 
WSPers became increasingly involved in separate campaigns outside of their 
group, ultimately devoting more and more time to the activities of other organisations. 
Swerdlow recalled that other groups “always wanted the bodies that Women Strike for 
Peace could produce. We could send 2,000 people to New York on a train to any of the 
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demonstrations.”27 Branches also contributed to their own local coalition groups. SWAP 
and East Bay Women for Peace were particularly enthusiastic about engaging in 
activities with “the new women’s coalition to fight poverty, war, and repression.”28 
Rochester WSP raised money for the initiatives of resistance groups, local anti-war 
candidates, and the Catonsville Nine.”29 WFP in San Francisco worked closely with 
Coretta Scott King and the SCLC “to effectively support the Poor People’s 
Campaign.”30 Meanwhile, key women moved between various organisations. Dagmar 
Wilson often spoke at rallies organised by SANE and SDS. Cora Weiss notably co-
chaired the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, helping 
orchestrate its huge “Moratorium” demonstrations in Washington in October and 
November 1969.31 
 Though satisfying WSPers’ varying concerns, extensive involvement in the 
work of other groups caused activists to devote less time to Women Strike for Peace and 
ultimately scattered the group’s energies. Henrietta Levine from Rochester WSP 
recognised that “our local problem is that during the past year and particularly around 
the elections, WSP forces were dissipated.” 32  In October 1968, Edith Villastrigo 
remarked that “we haven’t played a role as Women Strike for Peace for almost a year, I 
think. We’ve just been supporting – running to this group, that group.”33 The presence 
of larger, seemingly more effective, organisations substantially weakened the group. 
Large numbers of volunteers directed their energies to the Mobilization Committee, 
while the costs of keeping WSP involved in larger efforts seemed unequal compared to 
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the burdens placed on its partners. Coalition work further weakened it.34 Speaking of a 
demonstration in New York, one anonymous WSPer said that “while the Mobilization 
Committee had a surplus, WSP was broke.” 35  The National Office found that the 
group’s members “raise money for every cause but WSP.”36 Generally, it seemed to key 
women that “we certainly weren’t part of the leadership anymore.”37 
Coalition work did not just mean involvement in causes removed from the 
organisation’s founding purpose, but collaboration with groups of people not typically 
representative of WSP’s desired image. Amy Swerdlow noted that she harboured more 
cynicism towards the anti-war movement than she had towards the test ban movement. 
“Those young men in SDS,” she explained, were not like “that wonderful group of 
people” she encountered during the test ban campaign.38 Tom Hayden and Jerry Rubin, 
for their part, felt equally disdainful towards Women Strike for Peace members.39 
“We’re going to be around a lot longer than Amy Swerdlow,” Hayden reportedly 
remarked, “and we don’t have to listen to what she has to say.“40 
Internal correspondence shows that the issues facing WSP coalesced to leave 
women experiencing a crisis of identity. As rising doubt in the group’s abilities 
coincided with the broadening scope of social protest in the United States and 
involvement in vast coalitions, activists felt their organisation had lost its unique place 
within the peace movement. Without such a position they lacked an identifiable role, 
breeding disunity among the membership. New York WSPers Betty Lankford and Ede 
Hallinan wrote a statement opining that “when WSP was first started, its goals were 
clear.” Now, however, “a great diversity of opinion” existed within the group. 41 
Involvement in broad coalitions led some to feel that WSP had become “engulfed” by 
other groups and campaigns unrepresentative of the group’s values and beliefs. In 
attempting to tackle different issues, they argued, “our own message has been 
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weakened,” leading to “a lack of continuing identity as Women Strike for Peace.”42 Roz 
Buchalter and Shirley Margolin, another two activists from New York, hoped to 
provoke a national conversation by considering the stakes. “Unless we can talk out the 
problems of who we are, where we are, and where we go from here,” they wrote, 
“certainly more of our numbers will fall away.”43  
Such attitudes dominated discussion at the 1968 Washington Retreat. Ella Tulin 
called for the organisation to reclaim a defined role and to establish “our own goal of 
what we really are,” but when Joanne Fairley, another participant, attempted to define 
one particular concern, the group quickly found itself “back to many issues.” Folly 
Fodor offered a broad campaign against “violence” in all its forms that would 
encapsulate WSPers varying endeavours; from the consumer boycott of military 
contractors Dow Chemical, to the “Feed the Cities” social justice and poverty 
campaigns. Such an expansive attitude, however, did not elicit favour from women who 
longed for a manageable and well-defined cause. Fairley gave the practical reason of not 
having “gobs of time” to devote to WSP.44 The most important reservation clouding the 
thoughts of activists was that Women Strike for Peace had lost its standing within the 
anti-war movement. Lacking a single-issue explaining what Women Strike for Peace 
stood for, WSPers felt unable to move forward with the organisation’s campaigns.45 
 
Fatigue and the “Retirement” of Dagmar Wilson 
Many women found that they simply could not continue to dedicate any more time to 
their peace activities.  Anti-war activism required formidable dedication to cope with its 
rigorous demands. Amy Swerdlow explained in a 1987 interview that work “was so 
consuming; it took so much of your life.”46 Though leaders lauded WSP’s ability to 
awaken previously apolitical women, grassroots figures found themselves unable to 
remain committed for long periods.  As early as 1965 they began explaining to local 
organisers that they could not “continue to work” as intensely as they would have liked. 
                                                 
42 “Letter from Roz Buchalter and Shirley Margolin to NY CCC and North Shore Women for Peace, 22 
October 1968,” SCPC WSP Archives, A3, Box 11, 1968 Oct-Dec. 
43 Ibid. 
44 “Washington WSP ‘Retreat’ Meeting at Folly Fodor’s, Saturday, 5 October 1968,” SCPC WSP 
Archives, A1, Box 2, Washington WSP Retreat – October 5 1968. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Swerdlow interview, 25 September 1987, ARS.0056. 
  
157 
  
“This is a simple fact of life,” explained Hedy Turkenkopf. 47  Mary Chandler, a 
founding member in Washington D.C., returned “exhausted” from a trip to Moscow and 
claimed that “she was going to have to resign.”48 Branches languished as affiliates could 
not attend meetings. In November 1965, two members of WSP in Long Beach, 
California, noted that their group “had not met in months” as their main organiser kept 
reneging on promises to call a meeting.49 Towards the end of the decade attendances to 
national conferences decreased from the group’s earlier peaks. A report from the 1969 
conference suggested that its low turnout represented “a trend in WSP.”50 
  Much of the pressure did not necessarily arise from a decline in loyalty, but 
simply from the demands of private lives. Though WSPers had tactically accentuated 
their domestic identity in order to gain support for their protests, the strategy did not 
embellish their devotion towards their families. Domestic responsibilities inevitably had 
an impact on some members’ involvement in peace work. After several years of 
boundless commitment to WSP activity, many felt compelled to devote more time to 
their families. Responding to a mailer in April 1968, Olga Penn of Detroit Women for 
Peace gave an honest assessment of her branch’s situation. “We have more or less fallen 
apart,” she wrote, “Naomi is in a hospital with angina and I am rather shackled to a guy 
who has had 3 coronaries and has to be driven to and fro. My time is limited.”51 She 
reassured her remaining WSP activists that her group would continue to “try our best, 
whatever you decide to do” and made a monetary contribution while promising that 
more would follow. 52  A blunt resignation came from Lynda Barrett, who left 
“chagrined” in order to travel to Europe with her husband for an “open-ended period of 
time to vacation and live.” Barrett nevertheless professed her love for the peace 
movement, adding that her experience within WSP had “been the most meaningful” of 
her life. 53  Vicki King, for some time an integral and undervalued part of WSP’s 
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function as Secretary in the National Office, resigned from her position in 1970 as her 
husband’s responsibilities in graduate school required them to move away from 
Washington D.C.54 
The experience of WSP activists was certainly not unique. In discussing the 
challenge women faced in juggling “activism with expected gender roles in their 
families and communities,” Amy Schneidhorst recognises that this was not strictly “a 
woman’s problem.” She notes the affirmations provided by David Dellinger as he 
discussed the difficulties he faced in trying to limit his “activist duties” for the sake of 
his family. 55  What is intriguing in the case of Women Strike for Peace is that its 
activists later downplayed these instances in their recollections. Amy Swerdlow 
believed that “no families were torn apart that I know of,” while others spoke of the 
unwavering support their families provided them.56 But there were notable examples of 
relationships suffering as women experienced family tensions. Offering a 1964 
conference report in absentia, founding member Folly Fodor explained that the two 
weeks spent away from home campaigning on behalf of WSP in Europe had caused 
some friction between her and her husband. “It’s been made quite clear,” she wrote, 
“that I am to be the wife and mother for at least a couple of weeks.”57 An FBI report 
suggested that Barbara Bick’s involvement in the peace movement had provoked 
“marital problems” as she felt her husband had become unsupportive of her efforts.58 
She explained to WSP that she could not devote such long hours staffing WSP’s 
National Office without receiving a wage to compensate her time.59 Unfortunately, her 
strenuous activities ultimately resulted in a marital separation.  
 Dagmar Wilson became especially affected by her role as leader. Her modesty 
and reluctance to seek attention perhaps made her ill-suited to coping with the publicity, 
                                                 
54 “To NCC re: My Resignation, 14 April 1970,” SCPC WSP Archives, A1, Box 1, National Consultative 
Committee Minutes and Memos – 1965-July 1970. 
55 Schneidhorst, “‘Little Old Ladies and Dangerous Women’,” 385; David T. Dellinger, From Yale to Jail: 
The Life Story of a Moral Dissenter (New York: Pantheon Books, 1993).  
56 Taylor, We Made a Difference, xvii, 150; Swerdlow interview, 25 September 1987, ARS.0056; Wilson 
interview, 15 April 1989, ARS.0056. 
57 “Lobby Report from Folly Fodor,” SCPC WSP Archives, A1, Box 3, National Conference – 1964, 
Winnetka IL. 
58 “WSP IS-C, 10/19/66,” AU WSP Archives, Box 19, FOIA FBI Files - 100-39566 Vol. 15 (1). 
59 “Memo from Washington Steering Committee, MEMO Committee, National Office Committee to 
National Consultative Committee, 23 June 1966,” SCPC WSP Archives, A1, Box 1, National 
Consultative Committee Minutes and Memos – 1965-July 1970; “WSP IS-C, 10/19/66,” AU WSP 
Archives, Box 19, FOIA FBI Files - 100-39566 Vol. 15 (1). 
  
159 
  
eminence, and seemingly endless responsibilities afforded her position.60 But her status 
as the figurehead of Women Strike for Peace thrust her, reluctantly, towards national 
celebrity. Faced with such commitments on her time Wilson struggled to sustain her 
zeal. She recalled that her closest co-workers “saw that I could not handle the ‘office’ 
work of WSP.”61 Her household became an unofficial clearing house as those receiving 
WSP literature without a return address opted to send it to Wilson personally. 62 
Apprehensions about making speeches intensified her severe anxieties over public 
speaking, as she later opined that the act “takes a tremendous lot out of me. I can’t do as 
many as I would like, because I can’t be sure of being good that many times.”63 Even in 
later life Wilson reflected “feeling quite unqualified for the work” she performed.64 
Her withdrawal at the end of 1968 appeared quite sudden. Only that April she 
had returned from a highly publicised trip to Hanoi with other WSP members.65 But her 
troubles had been building privately for some time. In 1966, WSP’s leader gave a 
revealing interview to a local newspaper, the Washington Post Potomac, in which she 
decried the toll Women Strike for Peace had taken on the lives of her family. Wilson 
appeared nostalgic, reflecting on the days before there was a Women Strike for Peace as 
a time of quiet in her family. “We used to have a very smoothly running household,” 
she said. “It was very relaxed. Now it’s hit or miss all the time. Our standard of living 
has gone down.”66 Wilson became aggrieved with the financial losses incurred by her 
inability to work.67 Years later her attitude remained unchanged. In 1989 she recalled 
that her role in Women Strike for Peace was “hard on the family, no question about it.” 
Though her children had reacted to their mother’s activism with “initial excitement,” 
her various commitments ultimately proved “very disruptive” and took her “out of the 
                                                 
60 “Letter from Leona Grant to Dagmar Wilson, 10 December 1964,” SHSW WSP Archives, MSS 433, 2-
7, Correspondence of Dagmar Wilson 1961-1964; “Eleanor Garst: Chapter 1, Who Are These 
Women?” SHSW WSP Archives, M83-327, Working Papers for Ch 1, 2, WSP Formation, Test Ban 
Efforts, 12-13. 
61 “Corrections for Amy,” SCPC WSP Archives, ACC 2013-050, Box 17, Draft Chapters 1-5 = Amy 
Swerdlow’s Dissertation with Dagmar’s Biographical Corrections, 1981. 
62 “Letter from Dr. Isidore Zifferstein to Dagmar Wilson, 15 June 1967,” SCPC WSP Archives, A3, Box 
4, Washington, D.C., 1966-1969. 
63 Dudman, “Dagmar Wilson: Striking for Peace.”  
64 “Corrections for Amy,” SCPC WSP Archives, ACC 2013-050, Box 17, Draft Chapters 1-5 = Amy 
Swerdlow’s Dissertation with Dagmar’s Biographical Corrections, 1981. 
65 “Lady Pacifist Visits Hanoi Women,” Boston Globe, 13 April 1968, 3. 
66 “Dagmar Wilson: Striking for Peace,” SHSW WSP Archives, MSS 433, 2-11, Biographical Data on 
Dagmar Wilson. 
67 “Corrections for Amy,” SCPC WSP Archives, ACC 2013-050, Box 17, Draft Chapters 1-5 = Amy 
Swerdlow’s Dissertation with Dagmar’s Biographical Corrections, 1981. 
  
160 
  
family.”68 She cared deeply about the impact and embarrassment her status as a vocal 
critique of the American government had on her husband’s role in the British Embassy. 
She recalled that his superior made veiled threats following WSP’s first march, with 
Christopher Wilson unfailingly defending his wife’s actions. The Commercial 
Counsellor retorted, in an “unprofessional and out of line” manner, that “Christopher 
would have a hard time finding another job at his age.”69 Even acquaintances fell under 
scrutiny. Following WSP’s 1962 trip to the Soviet Union, security officers went so far 
as to “pursue enquiries” with Wilson’s “friends in England” over possible connections 
to subversive groups.70  
The Washington Post Potomac interview provided a further revelation that 
contorts established understandings of Dagmar Wilson. It was certainly no secret that 
Wilson felt unwilling to prolong her status as WSP’s leader, as she had publicly 
expressed the hope that she could “stop being head of this” within a month of the 
group’s first march.71 The 1966 interview, however, allowed Wilson to speak frankly 
and personally about her leadership and she took the opportunity to express her 
resentment at finding herself in a position of leadership. She felt that she had been 
forced to assume responsibility for the group as no one else seemed willing to “afford 
the risk” of “jail, loss of income, and ostracism.”72 She asserted that she “would like to 
take my place in the ranks, but I’ve been propelled into the position of spokesman for 
the peace ladies.” Wilson expressed a feeling of injustice that, while plenty of other 
devoted women contributed just as much to WSP, “there is no substitute for the one 
person that people want to see and talk to.”  She recognised her unique importance to 
the public image of Women Strike for Peace, acknowledging others felt it “a 
catastrophe” if she could not attend an event to represent WSP.73 Tellingly, she let her 
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measured demeanour slip briefly, explaining that “unfortunately – no, not unfortunately, 
but just the way things happened – I am the one the people want to see.”74  
While the demands of WSP consumed her private life, her exposure as 
figurehead of the group exacerbated Wilson’s sense of aggravation. Having successfully 
faced down a HUAC investigation in 1962, she found herself subpoenaed again in 1964 
along with fellow WSPer Donna Allen, and Russ Nixon, general manager of the 
National Guardian. The trio warranted HUAC’s suspicions for lobbying the 
government to provide a visa to Prof. Kaoru Yasi, a Japanese professor, pacifist, and 
opponent of nuclear weapons who had won the Lenin Peace Prize in 1958.75 Refusing to 
testify unless the committee dropped its insistence on holding closed hearings, Wilson 
and her co-defendants were convicted of contempt of court and given suspended jail 
sentences.76 Though WSPers rallied behind a “Defenders of Three Against HUAC” 
campaign, the case brought renewed disruption for Dagmar Wilson.77  It interrupted 
attempts to revive her professional career and led her to feel that “any satisfaction of 
martyrdom has been far outweighed by inconvenience, wasted time and personal 
outrage.”78 
WSP’s leader sought to better her situation towards the end of 1968. At the 
Washington Retreat she raised the prospect of her stepping down from the role, 
suggesting that WSP adopt a system of elected national leadership. If elected to one-
year terms, she figured, perhaps others would eventually carry “as much weight as if she 
were the mythical Dagmar Wilson.”79 But others continued to see her as an essential 
presence. They looked to her for advice, direction, and new ideas while, unfortunately 
for Wilson, nominating her as WSP’s representative to other causes.80 Throughout the 
Washington Retreat her ideas elicited enthusiastic responses from the other attendees. 
Yet her proposal for elected leadership, a suggestion would have lessened the demands 
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on her time, drew a less favourable response from those still fearful of implementing a 
more regimented organisational structure.81 
At the 1968 national conference, held just a month later, Wilson gave her 
clearest indication yet that she would leave the organisation. The leader’s keynote had 
become a much-anticipated feature of national conferences, often exuding optimism and 
enthusiasm towards the group’s exploits. Wilson’s speech to the Winnetka delegation, 
reflecting her current mood, marked a drastic departure from the joyful tones of earlier 
conferences.82 From the outset she candidly explained her struggle to remain upbeat 
about the group’s fortunes. “You know, the ‘keynote speech’ business,” she started, 
“it’s supposed to be inspirational – and it has certain ingredients always, you know, you 
want to make everybody feel good.” But owing to the plethora of problems facing WSP, 
Wilson confessed that “this year, quite honestly, it is different.” She “couldn’t somehow 
make up the kind of keynote speech” to motivate the group and reflect positively about 
the future.83  
The keynote developed into a digressive and disjointed appraisal of Women 
Strike for Peace as its leader acknowledged that multiple causes deserved the group’s 
attention, intimated at the broadening of WSP’s platform, and demanded that activists 
become more disciplined and committed in their peace work. But Wilson’s discussion 
of her state of mind betrayed her own exhaustion. She admitting being plagued by stress 
and told the audience that “I’m using SO damned much of my energy – and I’ve GOT 
to see more resulting from that expenditure of my energy, otherwise I simply cannot go 
on this kind of way.” She emphasised “the kind of tension and anxiety” she faced on a 
daily basis and declared that “I can’t keep this up for another twenty years if that’s as 
long as I’m going to live.”84 Wilson used her speech to level an ultimatum at those in 
attendance. Either they had to redouble their efforts and achieve some significant 
progress, “or I’ve got to drop this for my hobby! And go back to something else that’s 
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small enough for me to be able to live with.”85  The conduct of fellow members served 
to exacerbate her distress. Towards the end of her keynote, Dagmar Wilson spoke 
plainly towards the WSP membership: 
I really have to make a confession here today. The way we’ve been doing 
things, which has been so marvellous, and such a relief, is now to me 
becoming exactly the opposite – and it’s a terrible drain, and I know that 
I’m not going to be able to go on in this way.86 
Wilson signed off with a further disheartening mark. “You can give your all if you 
really believe and have confidence in its effect. But you can’t give your all for 
something that isn’t producing really very much.”87 The speech ultimately became akin 
to a letter of resignation. By November 1968, Wilson had asked others to replace her 
for pre-arranged engagements.88 While remaining a part of Women Strike for Peace, the 
“mother” of the group quietly withdrew from active participation, with undisclosed 
“personal reasons” cited.89 Evidently she became unable to “be very active these days,” 
with “her great vigour and abilities” seemingly worn after so long as head of Women 
Strike for Peace.90 
 The circumstances surrounding Wilson’s departure from the leadership of 
Women Strike for Peace reveal the pressures facing WSP activists at this time, however 
it remains a curiously overlooked facet of the group’s history. Dagmar Wilson remains 
inseparable from the history of WSP, even though her tenure as leader covered only 
seven of the 29 years the organisation was active. Acknowledgement of her pained 
departure is absent from the history and memory of Women Strike for Peace. The 
decision to withdraw from the organisation evidently arose from deeply personal issues 
and the reluctance of fellow WSPers to disclose further details of her departure perhaps 
owes more to the respect afforded their friend and colleague than a concerted effort to 
remain silent over the group’s decline while professing its successes. Nevertheless, it is 
revealing that the broader pressures on Women Strike for Peace activists that led to its 
fading stature are rarely discussed.  
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Fractured Unity and Regional Representation 
WSP’s declining fortunes not only stemmed from increasing fatigue among its 
membership, but also from frictions caused by its loose structure. “Nonorganization” 
was certainly one of the most revered aspects of the group and remains a central 
identifying feature of WSP among commentators. Founding member Jeanne Bagby 
asserted that it was “the lifeblood of the movement,” while Amy Swerdlow devoted a 
chapter of her book to describing the system.91 The lack of formal structure, she argued, 
allowed women to demonstrate their latent ability to work together for a joint purpose. 
Several other WSPers agreed. Kay Hardman declared that WSP’s approach to 
organising “is an advance in inter-human relations.”92 WSPers sought acclaim for their 
leaderless operations and felt that their positive example set the precedent for later 
organisations among the women’s liberation movement.93 Generally, the perspectives 
on relationships within WSP correlate with Deborah Tannen’s investigation into 
memory transmission. WSPers’ recollections clearly suggest a wish to foreground 
community as “the source of power” in their activities.94 “While WSP never used the 
words ‘beloved community,’ as SNCC did,” Swerdlow asserted, “a constant source of 
energy and empowerment was the community of women working together.”95 
 Leading figures recognised that their recourse to informal structure caused some 
failings, but downplayed any tensions, choosing to parody difficult circumstances. 
National Secretary Sally Bortz revelled in the chaos it created, while Seattle Women 
Act for Peace wrote a skit that depicted, in jest, the conflicts that arose from a lack of 
coordination.96 While Amy Swerdlow acknowledged that some disagreements emerged 
between women, she generally focused on the attitudes of leading figures within these 
arguments, claiming that they did not cause “mass defections” and did not appear to 
have a lasting effect on Women Strike for Peace.97  
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The established trend of downplaying these instances presents a deeper issue 
with regards to historical representation. While narratives project a sense of unanimity 
among the membership, many activists felt undervalued and suppressed. West coast 
groups felt unrepresented and dominated by eastern women. Grassroots activists felt 
unrepresented and subjugated by key women. The central problem emerges that 
couching the membership of Women Strike for Peace under one heading does not 
explain exactly which activists or groups are being referred to and undervalues the 
experiences of those whose voices remain uncovered. In both a geographic and 
hierarchical sense, observing the splits that developed in national unity shows that more 
nuance is needed when discussing WSP activists and their position with relation to the 
national organisation. 
Nonorganization saw Women Strike for Peace ill-equipped to deal with the 
sustained efforts necessary to uphold its functions. Primarily, WSP struggled to attract 
new membership. Spontaneous protests, while attractive to those who could not commit 
to prolonged planning processes, meant WSP could not advertise future protests with 
enough time to attract potential members.98 When interested parties wished to join WSP 
branches in their area, National Office staff could not be sure if any existed.99 Central 
coordinators seemed unable to verify how many members, or even branches, operated 
under the auspices of Women Strike for Peace. In 1966 the National Office could only 
confirm that “there are 70 known WSP groups throughout the country.”100 Additionally, 
WSP’s lack of formal structure allowed members to feel no responsibility for financial 
upkeep. Printing costs, postage, and mailing proved a burden, particularly for regular 
issues of Memo, while office space and staff also raised operating costs.101 With no 
official membership or dues and no obligation for branches to pay retainers, WSP could 
not rely on a guaranteed influx of money to keep itself afloat. Instead, it remained 
“totally dependent upon contributions from individuals and groups.”102 The National 
Office consistently recorded massive debts, issuing emergency appeals for cash with 
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increasing frequency towards the latter half of the 1960s and often claiming to be 
“within weeks” of closing if it failed to receive quick funds.103 
Over the course of the decade, the absence of central coordination allowed local 
branches to drift apart. By the time it confronted the Vietnam War, Women Strike for 
Peace represented groups with radically divergent approaches. Andrea Estepa noted that 
East Bay WFP co-sponsored some community initiatives with the Black Panther Party 
in Oakland and raised money for its Free Breakfast for Children program, whereas New 
York WSPers seemed “very prissy and too peaceful and uninteresting.”104 Differing 
local experiences with national organisations saw branches take alternative views on 
collaborative projects. Southern California WSP seemed willing to form an alliance 
with Students for a Democratic Society in 1965, whereas Washington WSPers felt 
reluctant to associate with a group so willing to engage in civil disobedience. 105 
Simultaneously, branches in California opposed east coast members’ desire to 
collaborate with the CNVA. San Francisco WFP advised that they did not “have a great 
deal of confidence in the CNVA-West, which is of course our only direct experience 
with them.”106 Women on the east coast largely kept WSP separate from other groups, 
but San Francisco activists formed the Women’s Peace Office in San Francisco with the 
local WILPF branch, sharing an office and enjoying a positive working relationship to 
coordinate various efforts in the area.107 In Los Angeles, by contrast, Mary Clarke “was 
very anti-WILPF. She didn’t like the women down there.”108  WSPers in Rochester 
developed a famously abrasive attitude towards other local groups, while their 
relationship with journalists sometimes embarrassed other WSP women. In fact 
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affiliated member Mary Grooms wrote to Amy Swerdlow to suggest that it may be 
“much better for them to create their own separate identity here,” since “they want to 
operate in quite a different fashion.”109 
 Branch estrangement brought with it splits and heated disagreements, even 
among those with a shared sense of isolation form the national body. Anci Koppel, of 
Seattle Women Act for Peace, had long-running issues with Mabel S. Proctor, the leader 
of Tacoma Women for Peace, situated just a few miles away. In 1967, after Koppel had 
advocated threatening physical harm towards elected officials, Proctor publicly voiced 
her differences.110 The dispute became just one of a string of quarrels that emerged 
between Koppel and Proctor.111 In planning a visit from Dagmar Wilson, SWAP and 
Tacoma WFP developed objectively minor differences over planning. Seattle women 
wanted a banner displayed at the airport on Wilson’s arrival, whereas Tacoma planned a 
quiet, low-key affair. 112  Koppel and Proctor’s clashing personalities escalated the 
disagreement until it became a public spat. SWAP’s leader accused her Tacoma 
counterpart of being jealous of her branch’s stature and suggested that Tacoma WFP 
should leave WSP over the incident. 113  Eventually Koppel apologised for “the 
happenings between Mabel and myself,” saying she was “truly sorry for my 
undiplomatic behaviour” and promising to keep her “pushy nature” in mind in future 
interactions. 114  SWAP and Tacoma WFP continued to hold grievances against one 
another.115 
 Internal correspondence shows that activists were not always as close as is often 
suggested. In taking umbrage with Rochester WSP’s vicious treatment of the press, 
Mary Grooms found that local WSPers “made it pretty clear that they don’t consider me 
a WSPer,” saying that “there are a few peace people in this town that, evidently, would 
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like to murder me.”116 Nonorganization also struggled to overcome the vast geographic 
distances between branches. Ethel Taylor dismissed the notion of regional differences 
with a clever quip, but East Bay Women for Peace spoke of their alienation from the 
national body, confessing that “we are distant in feeling as well as fact.” 117  Alice 
Hamburg wrote to Amy Swerdlow in support of her research efforts in 1985, but the 
hugely influential San Francisco WFPer felt it necessary to remind the former Memo 
editor who she was. Hamburg explained that the two had met at a past conference and 
that she “also drove you across the bridge to Berkeley some years ago.”118 
 Attempts to cast a national narrative of Women Strike for Peace struggle to 
depict the sense of ambivalence local activists had towards national unity. Some 
branches resolutely committed to the upkeep of the national body, with Los Angeles 
WISP making regular contributions of up to $100 per month to the National Office.119 
But their attitude did not reflect that of the majority of branches situated away from 
WSP’s north east hub. San Francisco WFP, for example, “felt for the longest time that 
they did not need” a National Office. In 1970, office secretary Vicki King expressed 
exasperation at the lack of local responses to a national meeting agenda.120 Much of this 
ambivalence arose as local activists felt increasingly undervalued by national leaders. 
Even in the immediate aftermath of WSP’s founding a meeting noted that “local people 
haven’t been kept informed enough as to memos and proposals for national action.”121 
The trend worsened throughout the decade. Although a member of WSP’s National 
Coordinating Committee, Anci Koppel often felt left out of the decision-making process 
due to a lack of timely and appropriate updates from her east coast counterparts.122 The 
issue became a rare point of accord between her and Mabel Proctor, as they considered 
that “communication from the National to its branches or groups has been woefully 
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neglected, especially with the groups outside of the east coast.”123 In fact, by the time of 
her departure from WSP, several women in smaller branches did not even know what 
Dagmar Wilson looked like, nor had they met other key women who seemed to run the 
organisation.124 
 The local branch of WSP in Washington D.C. elicited some envy as it enjoyed 
privileges not accessible to other branches. Though separate from the national structure, 
a greater level of responsibility fell on the shoulders of branch staff in the nation’s 
capital as those in other parts of the country expected them to carry out suggested 
campaigns.125  To exploit the Jakarta Meeting in 1965, for example, Southern California 
WSP members suggested that WSPers in the capital set up meetings “with Senators and 
Congressmen who have shown concern about our policy in Vietnam.” Without 
acknowledging D.C.’s own workload, the California women felt it reasonable to expect 
WSPers in the capital to arrange meetings with “Senators Morse, Gruening, Church, 
McGovern; Congressmen George E. Brown.” 126  But additional responsibility also 
afforded D.C. WSPers unexpected influence over national affairs. Regional figures 
recognised that “D.C. women are in effect national leaders as well as local activists.” In 
November 1968, Aline Berman expressed her fears that members working in the D.C. 
local office could “wield considerable influence” over national decisions, while, the 
year prior, National Office secretary Lynda Barrett faced questions over blurred lines of 
authority and the local branch’s significance. “We wonder just what the special 
significance of the Washington Steering Committee is,” asked Maryland WSPer Daryl 
Stewart. “Is it also a national steering committee? Where does the Washington Steering 
Committee end and the national structure of WSP begin?”127 
Activists located in the north east of the United States typically enjoyed more 
influence than those located elsewhere. In the immediate aftermath of WSP’s formation 
the Washington women exercised significant authority over the rest of the organisation, 
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implementing several of their ideas without consulting the rest of the group’s 
members. 128  A strategy used by counselmen in the 1962 HUAC hearing saw the 
committee argue that women in New York essentially governed Women Strike for 
Peace, producing evidence to support their argument. 129  Former Riverdale WSPer 
Esther Newill corroborated a number of these claims. She suggested that women in 
New York and on the east coast in general attempted to sabotage debates involving 
large groups of grassroots WSPers in favour of their own proposals.130 Amy Swerdlow 
also acknowledged that WSP’s structure fostered regional tensions, observing that those 
in the Midwest “who thought of themselves as ‘more grass roots’” resented coastal 
power blocks, while California WSPers felt that the “Northeast was favoured in 
decision-making.”131  
Regional divisions developed unimpeded throughout WSP’s early years, to such 
an extent that its national body could no longer purport to offer adequate representation 
for its national constituency by the middle of the 1960s.  WSP took pride in staging 
national demonstrations, but that was undermined somewhat when observing that 
several of its most high profile campaigns suffered from a lack of regional 
representation. The famed 1967 Pentagon protest comprised women “mostly from 
Philadelphia and New York,” as did the White House confrontation later that year.132  
WSPers on the west coast felt unable to travel the distance necessary to take part in 
some of the organisation’s most public national actions. In January 1968, WSP co-
organised the highly publicised Jeanette Rankin Brigade (JRB) demonstration in the 
nation’s capital. The organisation collaborated with several other women’s peace 
groups, welfare activists, and Jeanette Rankin, the first woman elected to the US 
Congress and the only member of congress to vote against American entry into both 
World War I and World War II.133 The demonstration drew national support for its 
attempts to build “a new broad-based women’s anti-war coalition,” but several WSP 
branches felt unable to participate. On hearing of WSP’s plans, SWAP wrote to 
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coordinators informing them that “we cannot mobilize thousands or hundreds to go to 
D.C.” 134  In some instances WSP branches felt more comfortable organising 
demonstrations that remained exclusive to their own area. At a Mother’s Day protest in 
Greenwich Village in May 1969, NY WSP distributed leaflets citing the names of 
soldiers who had recently died in combat. The protest gained some visibility and 
managed to attract support from several celebrities. The branch, however, limited the 
action so that leaflets only named deceased soldiers from the Greater New York area.135 
 An inability to include adequate regional representation also plagued planning 
meetings, crucially affecting WSP’s operations and creating a decision-making process 
skewed in favour of those in the east.136  Most national conferences and committee 
meetings took place in the east, leading Anci Koppel to lament the prohibitive costs of 
travel for those in the west. “If our next National is held in Chicago,” she reasoned, “the 
Westcoast women will have to spend approximately $300 for air transportation.”137 East 
Bay WFP noted that the representation it did manage to provide to national meetings 
did not adequately reflect the group’s work:  
EBWFP has, because of the expense, tended to be unrepresented at these 
meetings, or has sent representatives who were going to be in the area 
anyway. This has often meant representation by otherwise relatively 
inactive members or members who were more active in other groups – 
which didn’t really increase our closeness with National.138 
East Bay WFPer Vivian Raineri observed that “those who can afford to go are the ones 
who go, which leaves out new voices, new opinions, new strength. And it is essentially 
the same women who go year after year.”139 National Secretary Barbara Bick criticised 
the lack of national representation.140  She suggested, along with Anci Koppel, that 
members share the financial burden of conference attendance, with every attendee 
paying the same amount to build up a travel fund for “other women, i.e. from the 
South.” But such a system met with resistance from those “larger, more affluent urban 
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groups” who had convenient access to meetings.141 In fact, New York WSPers believed 
that “in terms of their leadership and capability,” their branches were “entitled to more” 
representatives than other areas.142 
  Despite WSP’s key organisers recognising the detrimental impact of a lack of 
regional representation, nowhere did eastern dominance exert itself more openly than in 
the planning for national conferences. Though conference planning intended to rotate 
host cities in order to achieve “broad national representation,” in practice eastern and 
Midwestern cities tended to share responsibility for hosting. 143  New York WSPers 
frequently attempted to exercise authority by stubbornly vocalising their “preference” 
for conference locations in neighbouring areas and north eastern cities.144 WSP branches 
in California, Oregon, and Washington State boasted large followings, but only two of 
the 14 national conferences held between 1962 and 1975 took place on the west coast; 
in San Francisco in 1965; and Santa Barbara in 1975.145  Even these few instances 
brought derision from eastern women.  
The decision to hold the 1965 conference in San Francisco resulted in debacle. 
Though San Francisco’s hosting was a nationally agreed consensus-decision, key 
women in the east began voicing their opposition as soon as the 1964 conference 
adjourned. Even in national meetings eastern leaders “keep expressing the wish that the 
conference” would be held somewhere other than “all the way out west.” San Francisco 
activists received no formal indication of any misgivings and worked feverishly 
throughout the year to confirm arrangements, book venues, and develop interest 
“throughout the state.”146 Just a month before the start of the conference, D.C., New 
York, and Philadelphia representatives held a regional conference to discuss the event. 
The attendees voiced concern over the cost of travel, realising that “not more than one 
                                                 
141 “Letter from Anci Koppel to NCC, 27 September 1968,” SCPC WSP Archives, A1, Box 1, National 
Consultative Committee Meeting Minutes and Memos – 1965-July 1970; “Letter from Barbara Bick to 
WSP National Steering Committee and Contact List, 30 September 1968,” UCB WFP Archives, 5-54, 
WSP National Conference, St Louis, 1968; “Newsletter Item from East Bay WFP REL NCC Meetings 
and WSP Members Groups, 6 July 1970,” SCPC WSP Archives, A3, Box 5, About National 
Coordinating Committee Meetings 1968-1970. 
142 “Memo from Henrietta Levine to Barbara Bick and Lynda Barrett, 15 December 1967,” SCPC WSP 
Archives, A3, Box 5, About National Coordinating Committee Meetings 1968-1970. 
143 “Minutes of Planning Meeting for 1966 National Conference,” SCPC WSP Archives, A1, Box 3, 
National Conference – 1966, Chicago IL.  
144 “Letter from Harriet M. Avery to Barbara Bick, 28 December 1967,” SCPC WSP Archives, A3, Box 
5, About National Coordinating Committee Meetings 1968-1970. 
145 One in Michigan (1962), six in Illinois (1963, 1964, 1966, 1968, 1971, 1973), one in Washington D.C. 
(1967), one in Pennsylvania (1969), one in Wisconsin (1970), and two in New York (1974, 1975), 
SCPC WSP Archives, A1, Box 3. 
146 “Special – Please Note, 9/1965,” SCPC WSP Archives, B2, Box 1, 1961-date 50 Oak St. 
  
173 
  
or two people from each area were willing to put up the money for the trip.”147 
Unresponsive to the same pleas made by western women, the eastern women worried 
that “important policy and action commitments” would arise with “such inadequate 
representation from areas that give a great deal of strength to the movement.”148 They 
worried that conference proposals would therefore lack legitimacy and raised “concern 
that groups would not feel a commitment to policies and actions so arrived at.”149  
Without conferring with any other WSP activists, the eastern regional 
conference contacted Chicago Women for Peace and asked them to host the national 
conference instead. When Chicago agreed, San Francisco received word that they had 
been stripped of responsibility for hosting. Bay Area women reacted with incredulity to 
the actions of the key women on the east coast. That same night they held their own 
regional meeting. East Bay and San Francisco WFP activists agreed that they “could not 
accept such a summary decision by just 3 groups, affecting months of anticipation and 
just approximately 5 weeks before the planned date.” They issued an “emergency” poll 
to determine the attitudes of WSPers from across the country. West coast activists 
maintained that they had paid substantial costs to travel “to three previous national 
conferences,” and countered eastern claims of adequate representation with their own 
reservations about national representation at the potential Chicago conference. Sensing 
that eastern women undervalued their input, they argued that they “also have 
contributions to make to the movement even if they do not represent as many people as 
the states east of the Mississippi.”150 
 The attempted usurpation of national consensus caused irreparable damage to 
relationships between women in the east and west. San Francisco eventually pressed 
ahead with the 1965 conference with substantial national support, running a productive 
event in which Women Strike for Peace formally adopted its national position paper in 
opposition to the Vietnam War. But Bay Area activists harboured “resentment” at both 
the time and “manner” of the proposed change.151 Writing to support the Californian 
point of view, Mabel Proctor argued that the proposed change “would cause any group 
to hesitate about taking on a future National Conference job, lest the same thing happen 
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again.”152 She further observed that actions of those in the north east would “reduce the 
unity we have gained nationally.”153 
Problems of conference planning did not improve and a subsequent national 
conference in 1968 again saw eastern refusal to travel large distances hampering 
arrangements. In August, Barbara Bick began liaising with members of WSP’s National 
Coordinating Committee (NCC) to make arrangements. The committee expressed its 
intentions to focus on national representation, due to their observation that previous 
conferences had lacked such attendance. “We must not let fragmentation develop,” it 
affirmed. “This would be a negative contrast to our previous cohesion which did make 
an impact and did attract women to our movement.”154 Kay Johnson offered to plan the 
event in Denver, Colorado, which had, in previous years, been “frequently suggested as 
a good middle of the country location.”155 NCC members responded with “complete 
agreement” in favour of Denver. Eight prominent women from across the country 
concurred, among them Ethel Taylor from Philadelphia, Mary Clarke in Los Angeles, 
Anci Koppel in Seattle, and Jean Shulman from New York. 156  However, while 
clarifying the consensus, Barbara Bick “heard via the grapevine that there was some 
negative feeling about Denver from some New York women.”157 Cora Weiss said “it’s 
too far and too soon and too expensive” to attend, while others in New York felt that 
“they won’t be able to get many to Denver” either. 158  Favour for the conference 
suddenly cooled. Two weeks after confirming Denver as the host city, Barbara Bick 
confirmed the NCC’s reversal of the “complete agreement” it had previously confirmed, 
explaining that “the WSP national conference will have to be postponed due to the 
inability of the NCC to achieve consensus.”159 Delegates from D.C., Philadelphia, and 
New York met again to discuss the “political situation” that surrounded the 
arrangements and confirmed that members of Chicago and North Shore Women for 
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Peace would once more host the conference in Illinois. Disputes over national 
conference planning add much to our understanding of the internal power dynamics and 
relationships between WSPers in different parts of the country, but it is additionally 
intriguing that these episodes are absent from the recollections of WSP activists and 
from the history of the organisation. 
 
The Leadership of Key Women 
Nonorganization allowed the growth of an “entrenched leadership clique” that, by the 
end of the decade, tended to act on behalf of Women Strike for Peace without 
consulting the broader membership. 160  Unilaterally committing WSP to a coalition 
activity, Donna Allen maintained she had acted “in keeping with the national WSP 
directive” established at earlier conferences. She further explained that she did not 
“need the re-approval of policies.”161 Detroit WFP offered Allen a simple but vitriolic 
response; “we’re disgusted.”162 But WSP’s operations did not improve. A 1969 retreat 
attacked some WSPers’ sense of entitlement to “attend coalition meetings and commit 
WSP to actions without first consulting” other members. 163  By 1970 this power 
dynamic started to impact WSP’s ability to recruit new activists. Younger members 
spoke of “an ‘elitist’ group” that made them feel “excluded” from decision-making.164 
In a damning assessment of the organisation’s inclusiveness, newcomer Didi Halkin 
said “it was difficult for many of us to think of ourselves as part of a national 
movement,” claiming that key women had not “progressed beyond the ‘coffee Klatch’ 
syndrome.”165  
 WSP’s operations became problematic due to a fundamental contradiction its 
attitude towards demonstrations, specifically the conflict between WSPers’ reverence of 
spontaneous action and the necessity to make decisions by consensus. The spontaneity 
with which Women Strike for Peace embarked on their early demonstrations 
                                                 
160 Swerdlow, Women Strike for Peace, 75. 
161 “Letter from Donna Allen to Women Strike for Peace, 15 November 1965,” SCPC WSP Archives, A3, 
Box 10, 1965 Sept-Dec. 
162 “Letter from Lynda Stein to the National Consultative Committee, 1965,” SCPC WSP Archives, A1, 
Box 1, National Consultative Committee Minutes and Memos – 1965-July 1970.  
163 “WSP Retreat, 27 September 1969,” SCPC WSP Archives, A1, Box 1, Minutes of Steering Committee 
– 1965-1970. 
164 “Letter from Didi Halkin to Trudi Young, 7 May 1971,” SCPC WSP Archives, A3, Box 13, 1971 Apr-
Dec. 
165 Ibid. 
  
176 
  
contributed to the organisation’s enviable reputation within the US peace movement. 
The Vietnam War heightened the urgency of protest and obliged women to respond 
quickly to crises as they emerged.166 But the breakdown of group unity during the 
course of the war meant that spontaneous decisions could not assume the formerly 
reliable consensus of members. Following the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia 
in August 1968, several key women rushed to produce a statement endorsed by Women 
Strike for Peace, but recognised that “we just couldn’t reach everybody” in time to 
guarantee that the statement represented a consensus view.167 In other cases, women felt 
such urgency to act that they decided to speak on behalf of their groups, often just 
presuming other women’s opinions. Responding to a proposal to hold a demonstration 
in South Vietnam, Mary Clarke explained “there isn’t time to consult with some of the 
gals here in person, but I would say that our women would probably give approval.” 
She gave an emphatic “YES” to the controversial plan on her group’s behalf.168 
 Although key women are often referred to as the defining presence within 
Women Strike for Peace, their decisions increasingly contrasted with the wishes of 
grassroots activists as unity eroded.169 After its 1961 demonstration Blanche Posner said 
that WSP did not need organisation as “we believe in the same thing.”170 In 1968, by 
contrast, National Secretary Sally Bortz noted that “what happens,” in the National 
Office “is that people call in and say ‘who the hell gave her permission to go ahead and 
do this or that or the other?’” 171  Lynda Stein observed that individuals ostensibly 
“acting in the name of WSP” were failing to provide appropriate representation, while 
New York WSPers cautioned that, without the maintenance of efficient communication, 
“our ‘leaders’ and our WSP groups will be marching to different music.” 172  In its 
defence, the national body found itself in a difficult position. Even when acting 
cautiously and choosing not to offer an official stance, it received criticism. In late 1965 
the National Office chose not to sponsor a march and offered a typically decentralised 
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response that directed activists to participate as individuals if they wished. Miriam 
Levin and Lena Pikser, having attended the march, argued that the large groundswell of 
support should have allowed WSP to formally sponsor it. They claimed its decision “did 
not reflect the desires of about 40 women who did march,” subsequently questioning 
why WSP had chosen to distance itself from the action. If its National Office could not 
appropriately gauge the sentiment of its activists, they asked, “what purpose does the 
WSP serve?”173 
 Qualms with WSP’s leaders grew as activists became increasingly jaded with 
the way in which leadership appeared off-limits to those without the time and money 
necessary to perform such functions. As Andrea Estepa observed, “women who had to 
work or could not afford to pay for childcare were less available to participate in WSP 
activities.”174 Tacoma Women for Peace suggested that national conferences and other 
consultative meetings “should be held in the summer so that teachers and those 
vacationing might be able to attend.”175 Chicago’s Shirley Lens, running Women for 
Peace around a full time teaching job, was in accord with such sentiments. Feeling 
dominated by established figures and without the freedoms that would allow them to 
become a part of the leadership, many grassroots figures felt compelled to depart from 
WSP. Amy Swerdlow recognised this trend: 
So many women dropped out in terms of not being able to assume 
leadership roles, or women would be active at one point in their lives and 
then say, “OK, I have to go home now.” I’ve done that myself. I couldn’t go 
to some actions of some meetings that I had been at a month before and I 
just couldn’t keep doing that.176 
This highlights an inherent difficulty in providing grassroots representation in the 
history and memory of Women Strike for Peace. Running an organisation staffed 
almost exclusively by volunteers, WSPers needed the financial and monetary resources 
necessary to maintain involvement. Those who possessed money and time therefore 
found they could attend more planning meetings than others without such assets, having 
more opportunity to voice their opinion and confer on crucial decisions affecting the 
operation of WSP. Vermont activist Virginia Naeve observed, “this made it less likely 
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that poor and working-class women could join in events on an equal footing.” Naeve 
even described the “aloofness” of her more affluent WSP peers to such issues.177  
These problems led to a public spat between Washington D.C. WSPers Aline 
Berman and Barbara Bick. Berman fiercely criticised what she perceived to be the 
“undue influence” enjoyed by some simply due to their ability to commit more time to 
their peace work. She raised her concerns to the National Consultative Committee in 
November 1968: 
Theoretically speaking, an employee makes no policy decisions or even 
major decisions on administrative procedures. In practice, however, any one 
person who works five days a week in our office wields considerable 
influence by virtue of that fact and can easily squelch the opinions of the 
opposition or dominate operations as a whole.178 
Berman called for a reorganising and formalising of authority, especially in the capital. 
She noted that the waning commitment of activists exacerbated the problem, as a 
smaller presence of regular members offered insufficient challenges to domineering 
members imposing their ideas on the organisation. 
 Berman framed her complaint as a “study of issues” and did not wish her 
concerns to become a “hassle over personalities.”179 However, she received a prickly 
response from National Secretary Barbara Bick who wrote of her “immense 
unhappiness and tremendous emotional turmoil” to the NCC. She felt the document, 
“which is purely and simply directed at me,” had distorted the picture of local WSP 
operations, making charges that “are almost unbelievable, especially coming from one 
of us.” 180  Bick passionately countered Berman’s claims, claiming that while the 
complainant had “set herself up as an expert on office reorganisation, she has had 
almost no experience doing local or national work and has obviously much less 
knowledge about what goes on” than the subject of her complaint. The National 
Consultative Committee evidently rejected Aline Berman’s claims, but, in the months 
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that followed, Bick felt her position as a paid member of staff had become untenable. 
She resigned as National Secretary.181 
 The fracturing of leadership and unity arising from the failures inherent in 
WSP’s nonorganization was not unique among contemporary activist organisations. 
Subsequent women’s liberation groups especially had to negotiate similar problems 
arising from their emphasis on leaderless operations. Jo Freeman identified the 
“Tyranny of Structureless” that afflicted feminist organisations using similar 
methods.182 “Contrary to what we would like to believe,” she wrote, “there is no such 
thing as a structureless group. Any group of people of whatever nature that comes 
together for any length of time for any purpose will inevitably structure itself in some 
fashion.”183 Without referencing WSP directly, Freeman observed many of the traits 
that had come to govern the group’s operation, notably the development of “elitism,” 
the admiration and influence of particular figure, and, most presciently, the “impotence” 
that emerges when conflicts inevitably arise.184 Carol Hanisch also wrote from her own 
experience about the “struggles over leadership” that developed in women’s liberation 
groups, as well as the impracticality of consensus decision-making processes.185 The 
phenomenon was not just limited to feminist organisations. Michael Foley considered 
the “tyranny of informality” that yielded to a “charisma-based” form of leadership 
governing power dynamics among draft resistance groups in the 1960s.186 
But it is also apparent that a similar dynamic existed in the production of WSP’s 
history and memory. Though several oral history projects document the experiences of 
women’s peace activists, these have, through necessity, dealt particularly with the 
memories and recollections of leading and prominent women. Understanding that WSP 
never developed an official membership list and that activists’ commitment to the 
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organisation varied, former figures amongst the grassroots of WSP remain notoriously 
difficult to find.187 Amy Swerdlow acknowledged this during her research, providing a 
motivation for her to cite the names of as many women as she could. 188  Still, 
established depictions of Women Strike for Peace display the actions and attitudes of 
key women as representative of the majority of activists. Examining the points of 
disagreement found throughout internal correspondence shows the problems of this 
approach. 
 
The Tenure of Trudi Young 
Throughout its existence Women Strike for Peace employed the talents of volunteers to 
serve as the organisation’s national secretary. Several women served in this role in the 
years after the 1961 strike, including Dagmar Wilson (with various assistants), Kay 
Johnson, Lynda Stein/Barrett, Barbara Bick, Sally Bortz, and Vicki King. In fact, WSP 
held serious discussions in 1963 about elevating Eleanor Garst into a position of official 
national leadership, but members’ insistence that they remain an organisation of 
autonomous individuals shelved such plans.189 Acting as a central communication point, 
the national secretary often experienced huge responsibility with little actual authority, 
often receiving ire from activists without much support for their work or subsequent 
solutions. Giving up the role in 1964, Kay Johnson offered a somewhat sarcastic 
advertisement for a successor: 
She will need to do everything – know WSP, type well, including stencils, 
operate machinery (mimeograph and folding machines), photocopier, meet 
people, compose letters, reports, etc., file, be an editor, keep track of 
money, pay bills, etc., keep mailing lists, devise and improve methods for 
doing things, get along with people and organize the work of a non-
organisation, work under pressure and not develop an ulcer, have an 
understanding family. Any applicants?190 
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 After years of avoiding the issue, key women finally felt that myriad problems 
besetting Women Strike for Peace could be solved with formal leadership and, in May 
1970, agreed to appoint a formal National Coordinator to act as “an organizer for the 
National Office.”191  The committee wanted the new staff member to address three 
specific, yet ambitious tasks; to set up and coordinate demonstrations; to form a 
program to organise new groups and attract new members; and finally, to address the 
functions of WSP’s national structure, its relations to local groups, and how it interacted 
with the various regional bases of WSP support.192 The decision signalled the intent to 
move the organisation from its previously informal mode of operation and to “develop a 
strong National Office which can represent WSP thinking, organise WSP groups, and 
coordinate WSP activities.”193 One month later, Trudi Young joined Women Strike for 
Peace as its first official National Coordinator. 
 At 28 years old, Young was much younger than many of the WSP leadership, 
nevertheless she was considered an experienced, talented, and respected figure within 
the anti-war movement.194 She directed the High School Regional Project for the AFSC, 
held acclaim as the first women draft counsellor and trainer to work for the Central 
Committee of Conscientious Objectors, and worked as national coordinator for the New 
Mobe in D.C. Young “was one of the prime movers” behind the March Against Death 
on 15 November 1970. Her husband, Ron, directed youth programs for the Fellowship 
of Reconciliation.195  
Young set about her task with much enthusiasm, professing her love for Women 
Strike for Peace and her optimism for the organisation’s future.196 She saw her priorities 
as reaffirming the sense of “community” that many felt had long since vanished and 
establishing a consistent flow of money from local offices to fund national actions.197 
This, Young hoped, would bring some unity to the organisation and foster stronger 
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“national/chapter relationships.”198  To demonstrate her affinity for the organisation, the 
new National Coordinator travelled to North Vietnam as a representative of WSP and 
visited west coast activists towards the end of 1970. It endeared her to leading figures in 
California and Washington State who threw their support behind Young’s initiatives.199 
 Despite her diligent efforts, Trudi Young saw her tenure as national coordinator 
beset by ambivalence. Her calls to receive more frequent financial donations from local 
branches actually saw them scale back their funding. Sacramento Women for Peace 
reduced its traditional $100 annual contribution, feeling “that a $50 contribution is a 
more realistic goal.”200 Young sometimes worked without pay while exhorting to the 
NCC that “we are broke. Flat broke.” 201  She became more despondent as the 
momentum created at the 1970 national conference in Milwaukee dissipated when 
delegates returned to their branches.202 “It’s very frustrating to sit in the National Office, 
charged with enthusiasm and excitement,” she wrote members in December, “and yet to 
have no money or support.” 203  The NCC responded with a series of “emergency 
meetings” involving Amy Swerdlow, Cora Weiss, Ethel Taylor, Jean Shulman, and 
Dorothy Forman, but offered no practical solutions or determined support for the work 
Young conducted.204 She sent a caustic memo to NCC members on 15 March 1971, 
summarising the change in her attitude towards WSP. “It hasn’t got better. I should not, 
cannot, will not be alone in facing the crises, making the decisions and hearing the 
complaints and praises. I need your help.”205 
 Though ambivalence exasperated Trudi Young, the hostility displayed by some 
leading figures appeared spiteful. The NCC decided to move the location of its National 
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Office from D.C. to New York in 1970 in order to physically demonstrate the separation 
of the D.C. branch from the organisation’s national apparatus.206 Tacoma WFPer Mabel 
Proctor saw it simply as serving to suit the new National Coordinator’s situation. She 
wrote a fierce letter to Young, stating “if, after nine years, we have seemingly thrown 
away” the advantages of having a headquarters in the capital “because somebody lived 
in New York, it makes no sense to me.”207 Proctor continued her diatribe, highlighting 
her many years of experience while railing against the newcomer’s attempts to bring 
some coordination to Women Strike for Peace. Young, ever polite, explained her 
position, motivations, and aims while suggesting the two meet in person at the 
forthcoming national conference to talk in more depth.208 Unmoved by the coordinator’s 
overtures, Proctor criticised Young’s use of the word “organisation” to describe WSP 
while denouncing the suggestion that elderly Tacoma activists use valuable funds to 
travel to Milwaukee.209 Meanwhile, Shirley Lens attacked Young for leaving a Chicago 
regional meeting prematurely. Though Young had forewarned the Chicago leader of her 
obligation to return to New York before the conference ended, Lens voiced her 
displeasure that her branch had paid for Young’s flight, only for her to depart early.210 
She wrote “it is not very inspirational when our National Coordinator leaves us when 
she considers that there was not enough enthusiasm to keep her in Chicago.”211 Young 
apologised and praised Chicago’s efforts, but Lens, clearly annoyed at what she 
perceived as the national coordinator’s lack of commitment, provided a sardonic 
postscript to her letter to emphasise her own dedication.212 She noted that she had not 
written her response on WFP letterhead as “I just don’t have time at home. This written 
on my lunch hour at work.”213 
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 Receiving little support from WSP’s key women, activists on the east coast, or 
local branches around the country, Trudi Young confided in her friends that she wished 
to resign. “I sure don’t want to take that step,” she wrote Los Angeles WISPer Jean 
Kovner, “but if people really want a National Office they must be serious about 
maintaining it.”214 Her private correspondence with women on the west coast found 
Young speaking candidly, explaining her endurance of “shitty-difficult days of 
dilemma.”215  The beleaguered coordinator found support as west coast women attacked 
the apathy of east coast leaders. Kovner hoped that Young’s threat “shakes up the other 
areas which have been neglectful.” She added that she hoped “the gals” on the NCC 
“will react.” “I hope they will, because we need you.”216 In Seattle, Anci Koppel, a 
stalwart supporter of Young’s, thoroughly supported her complaints, stressing that “the 
women in the East have let you down.” Koppel felt that “if you want to resign it may 
scare their pants off – it should and maybe this would bring them to their wits end and 
to action.”217 
 Less than a year after assuming the leadership of Women Strike for Peace, Trudi 
Young resigned. Declining to inform the upper echelons of WSP of her decision, she 
instead forwarded her announcement directly to 70 branches and left to join Clergy and 
Laymen Concerned About Vietnam as co-director, remaining an active contributor to 
anti-war campaigns.218 Young’s resignation letter summarised the dynamics at play in 
Women Strike for Peace at this time, offering a damning verdict of her time as National 
Coordinator and of the personalities running the organisation: 
The inter-personal harassment around every decision is devastating. I get 
daily calls about my immaturity, lack of organisation, political 
misjudgement. I get long analyses about so and so’s background and 
emotional instability and therefore “don’t take her seriously.” The personal 
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fighting and interplay take too much of my energy and time and I feel they 
indicate a basic lack of trust and a basic breakdown in group process.219 
The announcement acknowledged the identity crisis afflicting WSPers and claimed it 
unfortunate that women felt it “harder to continue to relate to all levels of women.” But 
the source of Young’s “disillusion” rested squarely in the trust issues that existed 
among WSP members. She lamented the weight of “emotional hassles necessary to 
work in WSP” caused by “lack of trust, personal ego involvement, failure to organise 
the many new women.”220  Young opined that the infighting between leading WSP 
figures led to the organisation “losing many of the ‘new’ women we’ve involved. At 
least twenty women have left WSP.”221 
Young’s resignation badly damaged the reputation of Women Strike for Peace. 
Leading figures initially tried to keep knowledge of her departure from grassroots 
activists. When the membership at large finally became aware of her departure, key 
women suffered criticisms. Wendy Brienes wrote that “none of us at the local level 
were informed of the fact that Trudi Young, a woman with whom many of us have 
worked in the past, had tendered her resignation.” Her departure became likened to the 
recent “purging” of popular Chemical and Biological Weapons Clearing House 
Committee Chairman Dorothy Forman following disagreements with other committee 
members. Brienes wrote that she could no longer “continue to associate myself with a 
group of women whose leaders stoop to such levels.”222 Didi Halkin, a dependable 
supporter of Young’s, felt that “personal animosities and petty jealousies were allowed 
to come before the general welfare of the group.”223 
Perhaps the most significant consequence of the National Coordinator’s 
departure came through the shift in attitude towards formal coordination. The fiery 
nature of Young’s departure occasioned a re-evaluation of the entire structure by 
national leaders. They recognised “serious failure” in the way Women Strike for Peace 
coordinated its efforts, particularly among key women. “The experience of the year 
shows that the NCC failed almost completely to follow through in giving leadership and 
guidance to the coordinator and must take primary responsibility for the weaknesses 
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that prevailed.”224 The group had “not been as effective” as it needed to be.225 After 
several years of inexorable decline, members began to seriously consider the necessity 
of greater communication and central coordination for the first time. Bernice Crane 
observed that “the national office is an important bond to all the areas. The areas do 
look to national for leadership.”226 As a result of Young’s criticisms the organisation 
fundamentally changed as it entered the 1970s. It appointed two full time staff to assist 
in the functions of the National Office. While that remained in New York, members 
decided to create a Legislative Office in Washington, D.C. specifically to oversee 
demonstration and lobby efforts in the capital. The NCC also conceded that it needed to 
consider its own position and the benefits of acting as a National Steering 
Committee. 227  In particular, the role of National Coordinator took on a greater 
importance. By popular demand, Philadelphia founder Ethel Taylor came to occupy the 
position of “National Coordinator and Spokeswoman.” Though Trudi Young had 
preceded her, Taylor’s popularity and stature within WSP allowed her to assume a 
legacy as WSP’s first official leader. She served for nearly 20 years, until WSP closed 
its D.C. office in 1990. 
Young’s tenure as national coordinator remains an undocumented aspect of 
WSP’s history, but her experience illuminates the personal relationships and power 
dynamics that governed the group in this period. Her presence is entirely absent in 
Women Strike for Peace, despite Swerdlow’s participation in the NCC, the Liaison 
Committee, and the series of emergency meetings called to discuss Young’s complaints. 
Likewise, despite her position as the first National Coordinator of an organisation 
historically depicted as one without structure, Trudi Young appears in none of the oral 
history interviews provided by former members. Yet her resignation letter encapsulated 
the sentiments of many women within the organisation in the late 1960s. Written by 
someone with 11 months involvement at the top of Women Strike for Peace, the letter, 
along with the myriad pieces of correspondence between Young and other members, 
provides an illuminating insight into the distressing state of the organisation at this time.  
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WSPers saw in the consensus-oriented organising strategies of later women’s 
liberation groups the influence of their own non-organisational strategies, but the well-
publicised failings of such formats by feminist organisations must, therefore, also be 
juxtaposed with WSP’s own struggles, which were unmistakeably evident in this 
period. The importance of this aspect of the past was raised in an interview by 
influential San Francisco WFP activist Frances Herring. While compiling archival 
records, she spoke of finding “a disturbing letter written by Carol Urner of Portland.” 
Herring noted that she was recording the letter “for the history, because I think it’s 
important to see what my answer to her was.” Urner’s grievances suggested that “things 
were getting out of hand and that people were making decisions for a whole group and 
that they didn’t like those decisions.” Recognising the negative image such a letter 
produced, Herring nevertheless contended that “it was an interesting piece to pull out of 
the files to see part of the history of things that we struggled with.”228  
Women Strike for Peace formed an effective and visible part of the Vietnam 
anti-war movement, receiving plaudits from many of its coalition partners, praise from 
historians of the period, and drawing positive reflections from its former activists. But 
an entirely different narrative can be drawn that fills an important gap in historiography 
relating to WSP - specifically, how and why the group declined towards the end of the 
1960s. A focus on disputes and unrest does not show Women Strike for Peace in a 
particularly flattering light, but it does highlight that significant silences exist in 
memory relating to the group. Giving succour to these silent voices places WSP into the 
context of increasing lassitude among contemporary activist groups generally. 
Recognition of this not only demonstrates the burdens on women’s peace activists but 
serves to inform the currently unexplained phenomenon that made the group, to all 
appearances enjoying substantial successes, to suddenly vanish from public 
consciousness in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The downplaying of geographical 
tensions remains a curious feature of the history and memory of Women Strike for 
Peace and clearly complicates perceptions of its cohesion. West coast women developed 
an entirely different attitude towards the national organisation than their east coast 
counterparts, arising, somewhat understandably, from their sense of ill-treatment at the 
hands of WSPers who wished to assert their authority over the rest of the group. The 
ubiquity of personality clashes, jealousies, and trust issues that grew among women, 
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especially exacerbated as the leadership and grassroots activists became increasingly 
estranged throughout the 1960s, is another historically undervalued factor that 
contributed to WSP’s decline. Existing narratives often reduce the presence of figures, 
such as Aline Berman and Trudi Young, who endured an altogether more negative 
experience. In the absence of their recollections, highlighting the internal 
correspondence and overlooked episodes displaying the chagrin of activists shows the 
anguish WSPers endured during this time. 
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5. “Basically Feminist”: A Seventies Revival and Changing 
Historical Perceptions, 1970-1980 
 
Assessing the condition of the peace movement following the end of the Vietnam War, 
historian Andrea Estepa offered a reflection on Women Strike for Peace.  “Over the 
course of the 1960s WSP had achieved something remarkable: it had survived.”1 But 
just barely. As the war drew to a close, the group risked becoming irrelevant. It had lost 
public influence, fostered disharmony among its declining membership, and lacked an 
identifiable cause. But the 1970s brought opportunities for renewal. Philadelphia 
founder Ethel Taylor became the group’s first official national leader and instilled unity, 
if not coordination, into the fractious national operation. Rising antinuclear concern 
among the public allowed WSP to return to the disarmament stand that marked its early 
successes and the organisation set about steadily rebuilding its influence and relevance 
within the peace movement.  
 While taking comfort in the familiarity of disarmament activism, the rise of the 
women’s liberation movement forced WSPers to address their group’s identity and its 
relationship to feminism. Confronted with pointed radical critiques of motherhood and 
domesticity, the group questioned the efficacy of the maternal identity that had 
previously informed its protests. Key women sensed an opportunity to recruit members, 
but recognised that Women Strike for Peace needed to make subtle changes to its 
traditional image in order to appeal to the new constituency of politicised women. It 
began to lower its emphasis on maternal rhetoric, speaking to “sisters” in the United 
States, and secured a notable presence at the 1977 National Women’s Conference. 
When speaking of their group, members invoked their place at the forefront of the 
“women’s movement” and claimed to have harboured feminist resolve since the 
founding of Women Strike for Peace. Intriguingly, they altered their historical 
perspectives to place the organisation squarely in the context of contemporary feminist 
fervour. Bella Abzug, a previously intolerable presence to many WSPers, became 
revered and achieved a central place in historical depictions of the group. Nevertheless, 
changes to the public and private identity of WSP did not necessary entail a 
commitment to feminist activism. While several key activists exhibited clear concern 
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for women’s equality and reproductive rights, Women Strike for Peace adopted an 
ambiguous attitude towards feminist activism.  
 While little historical analysis of Women Strike for Peace extends beyond its 
experience in the anti-Vietnam War movement, the group’s transition during the 1970s 
significantly influenced how activists came to see their group in its entirety. 
Examinations of WSP’s involvement in the Test Ban and anti-war movements account 
for less than half of its history, but the 1970s became a crucial decade for the group’s 
identity and historical image. The debates over motherhood, essentialism, and equality 
within feminism that occurred at this time continued to affect how Women Strike for 
Peace was perceived. Importantly, it is the context of this period that informed Amy 
Swerdlow’s history of the organisation.2 While the extent of WSP’s prioritisation of 
feminist issues remains contested, the context of those debates informed the historical 
image of the group. By recognising this period in the organisation’s history, this chapter 
shows how contemporary circumstances affected the identity of WSP activists and 
informed historical depictions of Women Strike for Peace, and, in doing so, fills a 
significant gap in historiography of the group. 
 
Ethel Taylor and WSP’s Antinuclear Revival 
While still grappling with myriad internal tensions at the start of the 1970s, members of 
Women Strike for Peace continued to rail against the Vietnam War. Activists conducted 
“sit-ins” in congressional offices, chained themselves to the gates of the White House, 
and formed a “ring” of women around the Capitol Building in 1972.3  100 women 
extended WSP’s consumer boycott operations to perform a “die-in” outside the 
headquarters of the International Telephone and Telegraph Company (ITT), identifying 
as “a dead Vietnamese” or “a dead Cambodian” to highlight the company’s complicity 
in weapons manufacturing.4 WSP resented President Nixon for both his handling of the 
war and his attitude towards protesters. Harrowing displays of violence, notably the 
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Kent State shootings, repulsed members. 5  They campaigned for the president’s 
impeachment, denouncing his maintenance of the conflict, the spiralling costs involved, 
and the expansion of the war into Cambodia.6 Bella Abzug used her new position within 
the United States Congress to table such a motion.7 Though in disarray internally, the 
Vietnam War provided enough focus to keep WSP functioning in the short term. 
WSPers celebrated the war’s end, but their organisation faced an uncertain 
future. With branches “on the brink of breaking up,” many travelled to the 1972 national 
conference “looking for a saving program,” but returned disappointed that “they did not 
find” one. 8  The strain of prolonged anti-war work took its toll on the group’s 
membership, as both grassroots activists and key women decided to reduce their 
commitments.9  A number of branches affiliated with WSP decided to break away, with 
Rochester WSP and Missoula Women for Peace opting to join WILPF.10 Members 
bemoaned the absence of Dagmar Wilson in particular. Though never formally 
designated as a national leader, Wilson’s presence served as a “cohesive force,” uniting 
the whole organisation.11 Without her leadership, the fractures within Women Strike for 
Peace worsened.  
Key women recognised the need for decisive change and, in 1974, looked to 
install a new national leader. They turned to the skills and dependable presence of 
another founding member, Philadelphia leader Ethel Taylor. Respected and well-liked 
by WSPers across the country, Taylor commanded substantial influential. She presided 
over many organisational meetings and delivered keynote addresses to national 
conferences throughout the 1960s. When WSP moved its national office from New 
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York to Philadelphia in 1973, she acted as an unofficial national coordinator. Her efforts 
impressed many. Jean Shulman, a prominent WSP activist from New York City, 
proposed to branches that Taylor “be formally recognized” as the organisation’s 
“National Spokeswoman.” The proposal asserted that WSP needed an official leader 
and that Taylor could accrue the kind of universal admiration previously afforded 
Dagmar Wilson.12 In July 1974, she assumed the title of “National Women Strike for 
Peace Spokeswoman and Coordinator.”13 Ethel Taylor led Women Strike for Peace for 
over 15 years, until the national office closed in 1990. 
 The new leader inherited an unenviable task. Though acknowledging that WSP 
was “badly in need of reinvigoration and cohesive leadership,” Jean Shulman worried 
that the coronation of a new national leader could stimulate dissent.14 In order to rebuild 
the organisation, Taylor would first need to win over members who, while admiring her 
personal qualities, questioned the practicalities of her new role. West coast groups in 
particular expressed misgivings. Seattle activists acknowledged the need to address 
WSP’s disorder, but requested clarification over whether an official leader would 
adversely affect local autonomy and consensus decision-making. 15  Berkeley groups 
asked whether the appointment of a national spokeswoman would set a damaging 
precedent. If Ethel Taylor did not receive a salary, Madeline Duckles mused, would a 
subsequent leader “be expected to function at her own expense? Do we then become a 
‘rich women’s organisation’?” 16  Acknowledging her “sleazy response,” Duckles 
ultimately endorsed Ethel Taylor “if it’s not going to cost us anything.” Accruing 
sufficient endorsement from WSP’s grassroots, Jean Shulman dryly congratulated 
Taylor. She recommended “a good, well deserved rest” before she tackled “the ‘battle’ 
ahead. Lots of luck!”17  
Taylor earnestly set about rejuvenating Women Strike for Peace. She 
immediately embarked on a trip to see west coast activists out of concern that “we were 
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becoming two separate groups” and hoped to restore accord between branches.18 The 
trip offered an opportunity for activists to air their grievances. Many expressed isolation 
from the national organisation and activists on the east coast and Seattle members 
criticised the National Office. Taimi Halonen spoke “for a lot of others” by highlighting 
her group’s alienation from other branches and demanded improvements in national 
communication.19 But Taylor, in turn, “was quite vocal” about the lack of response to 
national proposals forthcoming from regional bases. The meeting allowed members to 
clear the air and come to an understanding about the group’s future conduct. Taylor’s 
visit ended so positively that SWAP offered to host the next national conference.20 
Similar points received attention in Berkeley as women argued that they had “gotten 
very little benefit from the national office,” despite their reliability in providing monthly 
financial contributions.21 But emphasis was placed on the redemption of harmonious 
relationships. Taylor saw “women I had been writing to but never met” and spent time 
with some “whom I hadn’t seen for years.” Cohesion quickly returned. Publishing a 
report of her trip, Taylor expressed that her “love affair” with WSP had grown deeper. 
“Flying across the country I was very conscious of the tremendous distance which 
separates us,” she wrote. But, after meeting “with all of our sisters,” she declared that “it 
is only physical distance which separates us – we are as close together as if we lived 
next door.”22 
 With the interest of members slowly renewing, Women Strike for Peace moved 
to consider its purpose. Ten years since the Partial Test Ban Treaty had deprived it of its 
founding cause, the 1973 Paris Peace Accords seemed to render irrelevant the group’s 
anti-Vietnam War stance. Further marches drew only “puzzled” looks from ambivalent 
bystanders who, “ever since peace was ‘declared’,” appeared “willing to believe it 
actually exists.”23 WSPer Norma Spector recognised that peace activists appeared to be 
“floundering,” as if “walking on our knees.”24 WSP continued to display concern for the 
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people of South East Asia and warned against providing further military aid to South 
Vietnam in 1975. But “in view of the changed situation,” members planned for the 
future.25 Taylor addressed a National Consultative Committee meeting in December 
1973, explaining succinctly that “we cannot keep chanting ‘Out Now’ when as far as the 
American people are concerned we are out now.”26  
The group’s dilemma reflected that of its contemporaries. Ron Young of the 
AFSC recalled that members looked inward at the close of the war, asking, “OK, now 
what do we do?”27 But with WSPers feeling that the Vietnam War distracted them from 
their original intentions, a return to a campaign for nuclear disarmament made sense.28 
Ethel Taylor wrote to activists to celebrate the end of the Vietnam War and immediately 
called for a return to the nuclear issue. “WSP involvement in the war from the early 
years took us away from what we had organised for – an END TO THE ARMS RACE-
NOT THE HUMAN RACE. Now we must get back to it.” 29  She reminded WSP 
activists that the nuclear arms race had accelerated throughout the Vietnam War. The 
1974 national conference subsequently made disarmament a “chief priority.”30 
 Reviving public concern for disarmament, however, faced a number of 
difficulties at this time. First, commitment within the once vibrant antinuclear 
movement had dissipated considerably as a result of the Vietnam War. Lawrence S. 
Wittner observed that formerly imposing organisations such as SANE had “dwindled 
into tiny, marginal groups,” while the Canadian Voice of Women, a group that formed 
in 1960 and had close links to Women Strike for Peace, dropped the subject of nuclear 
arms from its agenda. 31 Second, the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 
1972 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) presented at least the illusion of 
political progress on disarmament. Détente between the US and the USSR also made 
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nuclear war appear less likely and calmed public fears. Third, public concern at this 
time fell squarely on domestic issues related to the economy and energy crises.32 The 
1973 Yom Kippur war and subsequent embargo of OPEC oil shipments increased 
petroleum prices by 400 percent. President Nixon argued that these issues represented 
“very real threats to the quality of life.”33  
With its strength depleted, WSP recognised that it was unable to get 
disarmament back onto the public agenda or make the subject “more accessible to the 
average person on a personal level.”34 Activists felt that even the term “disarmament” 
had become “an impersonal concept,” an old word that “doesn’t register with the impact 
it used to.”35 Concluding a long examination into the subject, New York WSPer Shirley 
Margolin observed that while the organisation agreed “on Nuclear Disarmament as a 
chief priority” it disagreed on “how to publicize and implement it.”36  
Fortuitously, WSP’s struggles to reassert its antinuclear priorities dovetailed 
with an upsurge of public concern for the environment. Environmentalism had a long 
history of adherents in the United States, traditionally manifesting itself as 
“conservation” or “preservation” of the American landscape, but growing slowly into a 
movement against pollution during the 1960s.37 Following a series of disasters in 1969, 
including the Santa Barbara channel oil spill and a large fire on the polluted Cuyahoga 
River in Cleveland, environmentalism became the zeitgeist of the early 1970s. 38 
Journalists highlighted Los Angeles smog reports and the slow “death” of the Great 
Lakes while “Earth Day,” celebrated on 22 April 1970, brought together millions of 
concerned Americans as governmental figures from both parties clamoured to voice 
their support.39  President Nixon, though personally unmoved by any environmental 
issues unrelated to the conservation of national parks, felt compelled to act. His 1970 
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State of the Union address included no less than 36 separate environmental initiatives, 
including the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).40  
Scrutiny quickly fell on the nuclear energy industry as concerns over pollution 
fed the resurgence of the antinuclear movement. Government validation of nuclear 
energy stood in opposition to rising consternation over plant safety and various 
broadcasts and publications in 1974 highlighted the lax attitude of energy companies to 
such issues.41 Exposed to these antinuclear concerns, environmentalists became anxious 
over nuclear weapons and started to develop interest in the peace movement.42 For 
many new activists, protest against nuclear energy served to breed cynicism towards 
nuclear weapons and American militarism as a whole. Disarmament activist Prof. Frank 
Von Hippel recalled that, while he had existing concerns towards nuclear weapons, he 
did not became a disarmament activist until he “became involved” in opposing nuclear 
energy.43  
Though it had never tackled environmental issues directly, WSP’s campaign 
against nuclear weapons historically displayed ecological awareness. Environmental 
historian Adam Rome describes Women Strike for Peace as a necessary part of 1960s 
environmental activism and argues that “the immediate goal” of WSP’s campaign for 
disarmament actually rested with the environmental effects of nuclear fallout.44 Some 
WSPers conceded that their efforts against nuclear testing put them “in the forefront of 
the ecological fight.”45 San Francisco and East Bay WFP had continual involvement in 
the “Save Angel Island Campaign” that opposed military and commercialised activities 
in San Francisco Bay while urging the preservation of Angel Island’s “primitively 
attractive environment.”46 SWAP attacked the 1971 Amchitka Island nuclear weapons 
test by citing the AEC’s own admission that it would detrimentally impact local 
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wildlife.47 Several individuals, including Shirley Lens, Nadine Vesel, Jeanne Bagby, 
and Bella Abzug, advocated environmental causes throughout their lives.48  Dagmar 
Wilson became co-chairman of the Environmental Conservation Committee in her 
hometown of Loudoun County after leaving WSP and was involved with the Goose 
Creek Historic Preservation Society of Lincoln. Her later artwork expressed her 
concerns for the rural United States.49 
WSPers saw the opportunity to regain relevance by attracting environmentalists 
to its group. Having flirted with environmentalism in earlier campaigns, the 
organisation felt well-placed to capitalise on the public’s renewed interest in the subject. 
Helpfully for WSP, maternal and moral protest tactics served antinuclear protests well. 
With power companies directing public relations initiatives towards families and 
parents, protesters utilised their maternal image to voice their opposition to nuclear 
energy.50 Reflecting WSP’s earlier manipulation of civil defence rhetoric, Pacific Gas & 
Electric chose not to attack its opposition and “barely deigned to discredit them.” The 
protesters, in turn, cogently challenged professional engineers supporting the plant.51 A 
fellow male activist asserted that he “wouldn’t want to be on the other side” against the 
protesters. 52  In his work on antinuclear activism in California, Thomas Raymond 
Wellock notes that maternal protesters broadened the appeal of the antinuclear 
movement by expanding its critique to include moral questions.53  
Subtle changes emerged in the rhetoric of WSP campaigns that began to 
emphasise the ecological effects of nuclear weapons while criticising the nuclear 
industry generally. 54 Various celebrated environmentalists, including Dr. Barry 
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Commoner and Dr. Helen Caldicott, attended benefit functions held by the 
organisation.55  WSPers even began criticising other groups that did not include an 
environmental critique in their protests. San Francisco WFP activist Hazel Grossman 
wrote to the National Centre to Slash Military Spending in April 1976, to praise their 
“People’s Peace Budget.” She voiced only one criticism, that “there is no mention in 
your peace budget of the word, ‘environment.’”56  
Concern for the environment, however, did not lead WSP to fundamentally alter 
its principles. Nuclear disarmament remained its priority.57 Instead, the organisation 
shrewdly capitalised on public concern to advance its own campaign. In 1970, Mary 
Clarke warned against becoming preoccupied with the “popular bandwagon and making 
ecology our main thrust.” She advised that WSP use and coordinate “other movements,” 
but reminded activists that peace was “our thing.” 58  This attitude manifested itself 
throughout WSP’s pronouncements in the 1970s. Voicing concern over the Hanford 
nuclear power plant in Washington State, Anci Koppel hoped a debate would mention 
that “80% of the Hanford nuclear output goes to the military.”59 Chicago WFP made 
clear their attitude to the Calendar Editor of Chicago Magazine, confirming that its 
main concern “is to educate and mobilize the public to protest our massive military 
budget.”60 Shirley Lens asked for support from the environmental Audubon Society but 
stressed that WSP’s attitude towards environmentalism simply restated its earlier 
critiques of the arms race “within the expansionist nuclear context.” 61  While the 
proliferation of nuclear power elicited criticism, the possibility that “the arms race 
might plunge us into a limited nuclear war” remained the priority.62  
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 A return to its disarmament focus allowed Women Strike for Peace to regain 
some of its earlier influence and relevance. Mary Clarke excitedly wrote to the absent 
Dagmar Wilson to inform her of “a revival” in fortunes.63 President Carter, elected on a 
pledge to pursue nuclear disarmament, personally endorsed the group for their 
continuing efforts and certainly appeared more approachable and accepting of the 
group’s views than his predecessors.64 Although WSP developed a more critical view of 
the president as his term continued, Carter’s receptiveness of the group was appreciated. 
Following years of unsuccessful attempts to meet with policymakers, a delegation of 
WSP members finally had the opportunity to enter the Oval Office and convene with 
defence representatives face to face. The President’s pursuit of the group’s support for 
future arms limitation initiatives gave credence to the idea that Women Strike for Peace 
had regained an influential status as spokespeople for the disarmament movement.65  
Examination of this period shows how WSP managed to transition from its anti-
Vietnam War protests to focus on disarmament activism once more. Importantly, 
WSP’s attitude towards the environmental movement points to the malleability of the 
organisation’s identity. With its strength depleted, WSPers acknowledged their inability 
to cultivate public interest in their campaign for disarmament, a weakness that 
hampered its activism until the organisation’s denouement in 1990. But as the 
environmental movement rose, the organisation made subtle changes to its image and 
rhetoric to capitalise on the upsurge of public interest in nuclear issues. Though this 
period elicits few references in the recollections of WSP members, it reinforces the 
notion that activists adapted their image to suit the contemporary social and political 
climate.  
 
Women Strike for Peace and Radical Feminism 
The 1970s saw WSP reassert itself as a disarmament group, but the rise of the women’s 
liberation movement in the same period led members to reconsider the way in which 
their organisation expressed its feminine identity. WSPers were aware of John F. 
Kennedy’s 1963 Presidential Commission on the Status of Women and had links to the 
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1966 founding of the National Organisation of Women (NOW). But it was not until 
WSP’s involvement with the Jeanette Rankin Brigade (JRB) in 1968 that the group 
became aware of radical feminist agitation.66 On 15 January, a women’s peace march, 
largely organised by Women Strike for Peace, drew thousands to Washington, D.C. to 
protest the continuing war in Vietnam. Working in conjunction with Jeanette Rankin, 
famed for her pacifism and as the first woman to serve in Congress, the JRB took four 
months of planning. A broad coalition of women “clad in black” demonstrated in the 
capital before convening for a “Congress of Women” to discuss the brutality of war, the 
neglect of domestic human needs, and future plans for the mobilisation of women 
towards peace efforts.67 
Taking issue with what it perceived as the Brigade’s reliance on maternal 
identity, the feminist group New York Radical Women (NYRW) confronted 
participants at the event’s congress.68 Arguing that peace activists had “condoned and 
even enforced the gender hierarchy in which men made war and women wept,” they 
staged a mock burial of “traditional womanhood,” using a dummy “complete with 
feminine getup,” such as “blank face” and “blonde curls.”69 Though Amy Swerdlow 
argued that the petition produced by the JRB “was free of maternal rhetoric,” Shulamith 
Firestone launched a public critique of the women’s peace movement.70  She wrote that 
the anti-war protesters came as “tearful and passive reactors,” rather than as political 
agents.71 Although making a broader attack on “the cultural icon of the stay-at-home 
mom,” Women Strike for Peace was, as key organiser of the march, the focal point for 
feminist ire.72  Ros Baxandall, present at the time, recalled several NYRW members 
arguing with Women Strike for Peace over the “proper relationship” between women’s 
liberation and the peace movement.73 Activists listened to “an incoherent rant against 
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WSP” that seemed “bizarre, insulting, threatening, and strangely unsettling.”74  It was 
the first exposure to radical, second-wave feminist thought for many activists and 
profoundly affected the group. Many in WSP considered themselves as “radical,” but 
found, to their surprise, that they were now rejected by the younger activists of the 
NYRW.75 Amy Swerdlow later noted the event’s importance in sparking her initial 
interest in women’s history.76  
The confrontation with radical feminists at the Jeanette Rankin Brigade was not 
the first time WSP had been criticised for its maternal image.77 Indeed, its stance had a 
direct impact on the rise of radical feminism. The National Conference for New Politics, 
held in Chicago in June 1967, brought many influential participants of the New Left 
together with the purpose of nominating Martin Luther King and Benjamin Spock onto 
a third-party presidential ticket. 78  A number of WSP activists were present at the 
conference. 79  Delegates separated into myriad workshops to compose potential 
resolutions, with a women’s workshop comprising future radical feminists Jo Freeman 
and Shulamith Firestone. But the proposals made by the women’s workshop were 
rejected by the conference chair. He claimed that he had already accepted a resolution 
on women’s issues and that another one could not be submitted. This resolution, 
Freeman recalled, “had come from Women Strike for Peace, whose distinguished 
representatives had not attended our workshop.” 80  The proposal did not address 
grievances related to women’s equality, asking only that that women work to secure 
peace. Attempts to unify the two resolutions found WSP representatives standing firm, 
refusing to compromise and accepting only two of the workshop’s points. Freeman and 
Firestone were furious, feeling betrayed by the WSPers who seemed to overtly reject 
women’s equality by prioritising peace issues. The incident brought Women Strike for 
Peace into direct conflict with radical feminism’s most vociferous activists and the 
group’s dependence on an image of staid domesticity further “fuelled antagonism.” 
WSP’s version of events remains difficult to assess as documents relating to their 
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involvement show little insight.81 But the National Conference for New Politics became 
“the last straw” and “the genesis” for the radical feminist movement. 82  Firestone 
subsequently set out to orchestrate opposition to WSP at the Jeanette Rankin Brigade 
demonstration.  
WSP appeared an obvious focus for early second wave feminists who saw 
motherhood as the source of male oppression and “a target for transformation and re-
evaluation.”83 Its public appeal to domesticity and tactical use of staid feminine images 
in its protests brought derision from many second-wave feminists who only saw the 
group’s public face. During the Vietnam War, WSPers frequently exercised their 
agency as mothers. They once proclaimed that the “average woman” did not lobby or 
picket, but that “the average woman does worry.”84 To many radical feminists, WSPers 
embodied the domestic oppression they sought to destroy. 
Women’s peace protesters in general drew scorn for their “misplaced 
priorities.”85 The 1968 Jeanette Rankin Brigade counter-demonstration, for example, 
opposed “all efforts to organize women around anything other than the oppression of 
women.” 86 Other criticisms in the early 1970s took direct issue with WSPer's anti-war 
protest. A Toronto conference between North American women’s peace activists and 
delegates from Vietnam also drew criticism. Organisers of the 1971 event called it a 
“women’s liberation conference,” but others questioned this claim, noting that 
“women’s liberation was barely addressed.” Using the conference as an example, critics 
decried attempts to “turn the independent women’s movement into an adjunct to the 
anti-war and anti-imperialist movements.” 87  The publication of the radical feminist 
Fourth World Manifesto codified this critique. According to Judy Tzu-Chun Wu, the 
manifesto claimed that “women who remained committed to anti-war activism could be 
interpreted as having false consciousness.” Any women neglecting women’s liberation 
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in favour of anti-war appeals “constituted ‘dupes’ and ‘tools’ of the male Left.”88 Trudi 
Young, WSP’s National Coordinator in 1971, also criticised the organisation’s handling 
of the conference, noting its “failure to organize the many new women who came turned 
on and left turned off to WSP.”89 
From its first demonstration, Women Strike for Peace had in fact distanced itself 
from any notions that it wished to tackle gender inequality. Members had explicitly 
stated that once they had achieved their aim of ceasing nuclear weapons testing they 
would happily return to their “pots-and-pans and PTAs and all the duties and pleasures 
that we have since neglected.”90 While railing against the prevailing “male logic” that 
had established nuclear brinksmanship, they assured their audience that “we are not 
striking against our husbands. It is my guess that we will make the soup that they will 
ladle out to the children on Wednesday.”91 Historian Andrea Estepa notes that a critique 
of a “male military establishment” was only “implied” in this early period and never 
explicitly advanced as a plank within their campaigns.92 
Nevertheless, to suggest that WSP did not support efforts towards women’s 
liberation seems somewhat unfair and risks casting WSP as monolithic in its identity as 
a maternal peace organisation. As sociologist Jo Reger observed in the National 
Organisation of Women (NOW), conceptions of motherhood were not uniform in 
WSP.93 While some saw it as a social status experienced by all women, others drew on 
their own circumstances as the parents and carers of children. To base criticism of the 
group’s attitude to women’s liberation based solely on its image neglects the political 
intellect of many of the group’s leading figures. Feminist thought did exist within 
Women Strike for Peace, even if only among a few influential individuals such as 
Donna Allen, Barbara Deming, Shirley Lens, and Bella Abzug. The “rhetorical 
descriptions of maternalist protesters” advanced by the group’s critics did not 
“accurately” reflect the WSPers who “rejected the idea that housework and childcare 
required all their time and money.”94  Likewise, to emphasise the connections WSP 
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made between “motherhood, nonviolence, and mediation” overlooks the “constant 
construction and reconstruction” of womanhood activists engaged in to keep their 
protest relevant.95  Ethel Taylor reflected in 1987, for example, that having observed the 
militarist foreign policy attitudes of Jeane Kirkpatrick and Margaret Thatcher she 
questioned her previously strong belief in the inherent peacefulness of women.96  
Members’ downplaying of their feminist attitudes occurred out of a desire to 
maintain focus on their campaign against nuclear weapons and was not indicative of 
opposition to women’s advancement. Similarly, critiques underestimated the 
empowering effect of peace activism felt by those involved. From its outset, Women 
Strike for Peace endeavoured to connect individuals to create a community of like-
minded women who could feel comfortable discussing their political outlook. WSPers 
praised their group’s efforts to this end. Women involved with WSP in Bergen County, 
New Jersey, evoked the sentiments of many of their peers when they declared that the 
most rewarding part of their experience was “having discovered one another.”97 Within 
these safe environments, WSPers, for the first time, discussed their outlook, exchanged 
ideas, and grew an awareness of their political constituency and agency. In many cases 
they claimed that an appeal to housewives did not simply empower them to take part in 
a demonstration or add their name to a mailing list, but encouraged them to develop 
their skills and further their lives. Swerdlow spoke for many when she promoted the 
“the sense of personal empowerment” developed by members of WSP as well as the 
“transformations in consciousness” that took place.98 Some key women determined that 
demonstrations organised by Women Strike for Peace had to capture women who had 
never acted politically before. An event “wasn’t successful if it wasn’t a first for lots of 
people,” Cora Weiss stated.99 By the criteria of radical feminist group Redstockings 
these meetings constituted “consciousness-raising” events, with the “honest 
communicating among women” that occurred serving as a “revolutionary act.”100 
The group provided an environment in which participants could demonstrate and 
develop latent talents otherwise ignored in male-dominated organisations. Andrea 
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Estepa notes the significance of Donna Allen’s experience to argue this point. An 
accomplished economist, Allen often felt her skills had been overlooked by media 
organisations and potential employers. “In WSP, on the other hand, her unique expertise 
made her a sought after writer and speaker.”101 Frances Herring saw that, “through 
participation in the WSP movement” women who had previously identified only as 
housewives “found to their surprise” that they had numerous applicable talents.102 In 
this sense, though not advancing a particularly overt message of women’s liberation, 
Women Strike for Peace provided an empowering environment, even just for its own 
members. 
Many advocate that the end result of female empowerment and political action 
justifies the perceptively “safe” referral to traditional gender identity often seen in 
women’s political activist groups. Velma García-Gorena wrote that Mexican antinuclear 
group “Madres Veracruzanas” adopted an essentialist maternal image in order to 
symbolise its “disdain for Mexican politics in general and for authoritarianism in 
particular.” Their identity maintained the image that they were “above politics,” but was 
not “one-dimensional.”103 In terms echoing the role played by Women Strike for Peace, 
García-Gorena demonstrates that those involved in Madres Veracruzanas initially 
“lacked confidence in the public sphere,” but following their involvement in the group, 
“they think nothing of confronting top government officials” and became spokespeople 
for their cause.”104 Madres de Plaza de Mayo in Argentina also demonstrates this effect. 
Bearing witness to the “forced disappearance” of their children during the country’s 
“Dirty War,” the “legitimacy” of the Madres’ maternal appeal “allowed at least 
symbolic refuge” from potential repression of their protest.  María del Carmen Feijoó 
argues that a practical redefinition of the private and public sphere emerged from the 
Madres’ style of protest, producing a “new feminist paradigm” that sustained “the need 
for a feminine perspective” in a world of masculine politics.105 
 Women’s peace groups in the United States have also shown the virtues of 
advancing maternal identity. Several historians of WILPF argue that the group’s 
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organisational structure “remained feminist,” even during periods that it neglected the 
issue of women’s rights.  Members recalled the “palpable” sense of sisterhood they 
experienced through their work. Even before the advent of second-wave feminism.106 
Historically, WILPF adopted maternal image as a staging point for making more 
pointed societal critiques. That trend continues today. Contemporary peace group 
Raging Grannies adopt the character of “maternal caring grannies” to undermine 
“assumptions about gender and age by playing with stereotypes and normative ideals.” 
Maternal image is used to create an initial public space for women to act. Activists then 
“intentionally manipulate” observers’ stereotypes. Traditional concepts of femininity 
are, therefore, “performed.”107 
By advancing maternal traits and rhetoric into foreign policy discourse, WSP 
can be considered to have offered a feminist critique of international relations. Jo Anne 
Tickner, for example, argues that Hans Morgenthau’s “six principles of political realism” 
exhibit “a masculine bias.” Observing that his conceptions of international power “have 
significantly framed the way in which the majority of international relations scholars 
and practitioners in the West have thought about international politics,” Tickner 
explains that Morgenthau’s assumptions “are partial.” They “privilege masculinity” 
while failing to account for other dynamics in international relations, such as 
collaboration, that Tickner views as more feminine.108 Carol Cohn, a scholar of gender 
in global politics, conflict, and security, observes a similar gender-bias in the language 
of international relations discourse.109  Though explicitly disavowing any attempt on 
their part to disrupt the “established” order, WSPers’ criticisms of male military leaders 
and their plea for a more cooperative foreign policy outlook advocated an alternative, 
arguably more feminine, approach to international diplomacy. 110  In this sense, they 
offered a feminist analysis of international politics. 
The radical feminist critique of motherhood, though voluble, did not last. By 
1973, proponents of “cultural feminism” began proclaiming that differences did indeed 
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exist between men and women, emphasising that patriarchal culture had undervalued 
“women’s experiential history of preserving, rather than destroying the race.” This 
outlook granted a reprieve for WSP’s projection of maternal feminine identity. 111 
Published in 1974, Jane Alpert's Mother Right redeemed motherhood and claimed that it 
could empower women. Arguing against the “negative valuation of femininity,” she 
attempted to embrace the biological differences between men and women and believed 
that the “resumption of matriarchy” could save the planet. Barbara Deming, who often 
encouraged ideological debate within WSP, argued that Shulamith Firestone’s critique 
undervalued “the capacity to bear and nurture children,” as it gave women a “spiritual 
advantage, rather than a disadvantage.”112  
Nevertheless, WSP could not help but take on board some of the criticisms 
levelled at it by the radical feminist movement. WSPer Evelyn Alloy reported that her 
encounters with women’s liberationists had extended “the boundaries of my thinking 
and understanding.” 113  Despite increasing defence of motherhood within cultural 
feminist circles, WSP began de-emphasizing its maternal identity in campaign 
literature. Members urged supporters to act as “women” rather than as “mothers.” An 
International Women’s Day march in 1975 urged that “women must strike” and 
“women must say.” 114  Pam Block, a WSP intern during the 1980s, noted this 
phenomenon in her article “Motherhood in WSP 1961-1973.” According to Block, the 
image of motherhood became a less successful tactical tool with the passage of time. 
She felt that Women Strike for Peace appropriately dropped their maternal emphasis as 
American women started to see themselves as more than just mothers.115  
Comparisons between the group’s earlier campaigns and its later rhetoric show 
the significance of this change. Activists lowered the emphasis on maternal and moral 
arguments, instead challenging the size of the military budget while advocating the 
diversion of funds to solve domestic problems. Several WSP activists had already 
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conducted research into “economic conversion” during the 1960s, but the disparity 
between military and domestic expenditure only became a key issue after the group 
encountered the women’s liberation movement.116 Los Angeles WISP started to profess 
that Ruth Sivard’s work on “World Military and Social Expenditure” was the “kind of 
material” that it should use to inform its disarmament campaign.”117 East Bay Women 
for Peace appealed directly to President Ford for the diversion of funds. They asked for 
the cancellation of the controversial B1-Bomber program, noting that the $11.4 billion 
cost, “would bring most poor Americans above the poverty line.” 118  In a peculiar 
instance, Anci Koppel of SWAP actually consented to the presence of an existing 
nuclear fleet in Seattle, so long as the government scrapped future investment in a new 
fleet of Trident nuclear submarines. Koppel wrote to President Carter highlighting the 
potential $30 billion cost while arguing that the base there already had Poseidon 
submarines “which can do the same job as Trident by refurbishing them.”119 
 
The National Women’s Conference 
Much as it had done with the environmental movement, WSP saw the women’s 
liberation movement as an opportunity to attract new members and tried to capitalise on 
the rising numbers of newly politicised American women. A planning committee held 
prior to the 1970 national conference suggested that WSP attract delegates from outside 
the organisation, making the event “along the lines of a women’s conference” instead of 
a “strictly WSP conference.”120 But consensus still held that WSP should not devote its 
energy towards the women’s liberation movement. While attempting to reach “many 
new women,” the conference would specifically try to attract women from the peace 
movement and adopt an agenda that attempted “to define direction for Women’s Strike, 
not a wide open women’s conference.”121 As the movement grew in size, the appeal of 
direct engagement with feminist activists began to increase. Bella Abzug urged WSPers 
to become involved, arguing that the “heightened consciousness of millions of women 
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provides a highly favourable environment in which WSP can operate.”122 Along with 
then National Coordinator Rita Handman, Abzug pressed women to obtain a more open 
attitude towards women’s liberation. After all, “our goal is a broad-based movement of 
women.”123 
Although attempting to recruit new members, WSP rarely tackled issues of 
sexism and gender inequality directly. 124  If individuals supported issues “such as 
reproductive rights, the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), and women’s rights,” they 
“generally depended” on other groups to tackle them.125 Instead, Women Strike for 
Peace argued that “peace is a woman’s issue,” and attempted to mobilise the new 
generation of women’s liberation activists to consider issues of peace and disarmament 
on a par with their campaign for women’s equality. WSP’s involvement with 
International Women’s Year (IWY) and the subsequent 1977 National Women’s 
Conference provides an insightful example of this. 
The 1977 National Women’s Conference, also known as the Houston 
Conference, arose out of IWY, which subsequently became the UN Decade of Women. 
The UN hosted a conference in Mexico City to promote global gender equality as part 
of its 1975 IWY activities, with delegates attending from all over the world. In the US, a 
National Commission on the Observance of International Women’s Year, set up by 
President Ford, produced a 400 page document with 115 recommended government 
initiatives arising from the conference. While the commission drafted its report, 
Congresswoman Bella Abzug sponsored a bill to expand the remit of the National 
Commission to include a series of state conventions culminating in a National Women’s 
Conference. Succeeding Ford, President Carter reconstituted the National Commission 
in early 1977 with tutelage from his Assistant for Public Liaison Midge Costanza, an 
outspoken feminist. The new Commission adopted a more feminist approach and Abzug 
assumed the leadership as presiding officer, with Commissioners including Gloria 
Steinem, Ruth Abram, and Jean O’Leary. The conference itself took place over four 
days in November 1977, with 20,000 women descending on Houston. Speeches, 
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roundtables and discussion meetings resulted in The Spirit of Houston, a 26-plank 
national plan of action. 126  Little federal legislation resulted from the conference’s 
recommendations. Doreen J. Mattingly and Jessica L. Nare claim that “perhaps the most 
significant impact” of the occasion was “in consciousness raising and networking.”127 
 Women Strike for Peace achieved significant representation among events for 
the IWY. Bella Abzug became a globally revered feminist icon following a well-
received speech to the conference in Mexico City.128 Hazel Grossman travelled to East 
Berlin in August 1975 and contributed to the World Congress for IWY as a 
representative of San Francisco WFP. She managed to persuade the US Preparatory 
Committee to accept Women for Peace as a formal part of the committee.129  Amy 
Swerdlow also served among the US delegation.130 National Coordinator Ethel Taylor 
was appointed as a commissioner and, with Mary Clarke, Martha Baker, and Edith 
Villastrigo adding to the contingent, Women Strike for Peace had a noteworthy 
presence at the 1977 National Women’s Conference. 131  Other peace activists also 
provided valuable contributions to the conference. WILPF member Dorothy Haener 
served as a Commissioner in the same capacity as Ethel Taylor.132 But WSP activists 
felt the involvement of their representatives validated their work specifically. Much was 
made of the fact that Jimmy Carter personally endorsed Taylor’s appointment, with San 
Francisco WFP informing its contacts that “President Carter recognized us when he 
appointed Ethel Taylor, National Coordinator of Women for Peace, to the US 
Committee of International Women’s Year.”133 
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 The event itself unashamedly endorsed the goals of the women’s liberation 
movement. The conference opened with the arrival of runners carrying a torch from 
Seneca Falls to Houston, linking the 1977 conference to the historic 1848 convention on 
women’s rights. Betty Friedan’s announcement that she supported the Sexual 
Preference resolution – “the civil-rights-for lesbians plank” – threw aside her previously 
famous opposition “to aligning feminism with ‘the lavender menace.’”134 The ERA also 
emerged as a top priority for the National Commission.135  The conference adopted a 
resolution supporting the amendment’s ratification with a huge majority and Lindsy 
Van Gelder later depicted the carnival atmosphere she found herself in, recalling “we 
conga-danced in the aisles” for the issue.136 Many other feminist concerns were also 
addressed by the conference, including abortion rights, domestic abuse, poverty, and 
national healthcare.137 Dominic Sandbrook and Bruce Shulman both argue that the 1977 
women’s conference marked “the crest of the feminist wave.”138 
 Concerns over nuclear disarmament and issues related to war and peace did not 
constitute a priority for the 1977 conference, despite the theme of “peace” being 
endorsed by the 1975 Mexico City Conference.139 A session on peace and disarmament 
involving Congresswomen Pat Schroeder and disarmament activist Randall Forsberg 
only took place in an ad hoc format.140 Its resolution in the National Plan of Action 
appeared within a broader section discussing women in foreign policy, international 
development, and human rights.141 Some doubted whether the resolution “indicated a 
pledge of continued support for peace,” noting the fact that, out of a delegation of over 
20,000, only 2,500 signed an anti-Neutron Bomb petition.142 
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The WSP activists involved in IWY nevertheless decided to devote their 
energies towards advocating the minor resolutions on peace and disarmament, rather 
than the principal drive for federal legislation towards women’s equality. Beginning in 
1974 Women Strike for Peace expressed its intent to raise “the consciousness of women 
to the disarmament issue,” rather than adopt feminist causes themselves. 143  The 
organisation made a “Women’s Plea for Survival” its theme for International Women’s 
Year and launched the campaign in 1975 by claiming it was WSP’s contribution to the 
fight for women’s equality and development.144 Writing in her 1998 memoir, Ethel 
Taylor recalled that she “had not actually been involved, except peripherally, in the 
women’s movement” prior to working for the National Women’s Conference. But her 
belief that peace should occupy an important place in the International Women’s Year 
program encouraged her participation. She devoted her energies towards making peace 
“a woman’s issue.”145 To this extent, WSP activists prioritised their concern for peace 
over other issues at the National Women’s Conference.   
WSP’s experience with IWY reflected its general activities within the women’s 
liberation movement, in which the group focused on peace issues. Amy Swerdlow noted 
that WSP’s primary motive in joining the Women’s Strike for Equality in 1970, for 
example, “was to add to the women’s rights agenda a call for the immediate withdrawal 
of all US forces from Southeast Asia.”146 Key women wished to encourage those in the 
women’s liberation movement to prioritise antimilitarist efforts. In a 1975 op-ed to the 
New York Times, Ethel Taylor and Sandy Kravitz wrote that “it is exciting to see 
women emerging as a force” within the United States. But, they argued, if International 
Women’s Year was to be successful, “it must signal the beginning of the total 
involvement of women” in the campaign for peace and disarmament. 147  The 
International Decade of Women was “the time to start” protesting.148 WSP, within an 
environment of feminist campaigning for women’s equality, maintained that its purpose 
was to agitate for peace and disarmament. 
                                                 
143 “Suggested Agenda for October 4, 5, and 6,” UCB WSP Archives, 7-2, Office Files – National, 1974. 
144 “Minutes – East Coast WSP Conference, 24 January 1975,” SCPC WSP Archives, A1, Box 3, 
Regional Conferences; “Women’s Plea for Survival,” SCPC WSP Archives, ACC 96A-040, Box 2, 
International Women’s Year Coalition 1975. 
145 Taylor, We Made a Difference, 111. 
146 Swerdlow, Women Strike for Peace, 242. 
147 “Message to American Women – International Women’s Year – 1975,” SCPC WSP Archives, ACC 
96A-040, Box 2, International Women’s Year Coalition 1975. 
148 “A Message to Ms./Miss/Mrs. Everywoman,” AU WSP Archives, Box 17, Women and Peace, 1967-
1971, 1977-1994. 
  
213 
  
Attendance at the National Women’s Conference could suggest at least tacit 
approval for a particular and identifiable stance on women’s rights. The conference, for 
example, advanced a concept of women’s equality that directly contrasted the particular 
brand of conservative “anti-feminism” advanced by Phyllis Schlafly. Schlafly had 
opposed the ERA since the early 1970s. She founded the conservative, pro-family 
interest group Eagle Forum in 1972, launched a national campaign in opposition to the 
ERA, and subsequently gained a reputation as the “sweetheart of the silent majority.” 
Schlafly believed that the ERA would eradicate the protective legislation and 
exemptions that many women relied upon by stripping away gender-specific initiatives. 
She felt that women enjoyed a privileged position in American society and that the 
feminist movement sought to destroy it. She publicly disparaged the National Women’s 
Conference Commission as “a front for radicals and lesbians.” When the IWY received 
a $5 million federal appropriation for its series of conferences, Schlafly felt that the 
government had directly funded the campaign for the ERA. She encouraged 
conservative pro-family and anti-ERA activists to disrupt the state conventions that 
were drafting resolutions and electing delegates for the 1977 national conference. While 
having only a marginal effect on the conference, Schlafly’s efforts ensured that a 
substantial amount of anti-ERA campaigners were present as delegates in Houston. She 
also organised the Pro-Family Rally to be held in direct opposition to the conference 
itself, attracting some 20,000 participants to the Astro Arena in Houston to denounce 
the “lesbianism” and the “misfits and perverts” of the IWY they saw meeting on the 
other side of the city.149 
 In this sense, WSP’s association with IWY would at least position it in 
opposition to the vitriolic conservative feminism of Phyllis Schlafly. Presence at a 
conference supporting abortion rights, public acceptance of lesbianism, and the 
ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment implied support for those measures, at least 
in the eyes of the public. 150  Ethel Taylor’s position as a commissioner for the 
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conference made WSP’s connection even more explicit. Yet it remains somewhat 
reductive to claim that all in attendance of the conference unanimously agreed with its 
views. Contrary to the criticisms of Phyllis Schlafly, the National Women’s Conference 
did not become an anti-family rally. Many of the resolutions sought assistance for 
homemakers and widows.151 There were a significant minority among the conference 
delegates who disagreed with aspects of the ERA and some pro-family delegates 
actually turned their back on the podium during the vote on gay rights. Federal 
advocacy of abortion also caused some friction.152 Acknowledging WSP’s apparently 
conservative attitudes concerning traditional gender roles and protection of their 
families, the support of key women towards issues such as abortion and gay rights may 
not have reflected the attitude of all activists. 
 That a number of respected feminist voices acted within Women Strike for 
Peace is evident. Judy Lerner started as a WSP activist in Westchester County before 
serving as an influential member of the National Women’s Political Caucus (NWPC), 
founding the Women of Westchester (WOW) in 1978, and chairing the New York 
affiliate of the Continuing Committee of the National Women’s Conference at the 
appointment of Jimmy Carter.153 Donna Allen helped found Women Strike for Peace 
after being involved in the League of Women Voters during the 1950s. She became one 
of the most revered feminist voices in the United States. Allen had an instrumental role 
in the famous Miss American Pageant protests in 1968, driving several activists to the 
event in Atlantic City after they found they had no way of transporting themselves.154 
She later founded the Women’s Institute for Freedom of the Press in 1972 and was 
heavily involved in the Women’s Political Caucus, NOW, and the National Women’s 
Party. 155  Though involved in Women Strike for Peace, Barbara Deming did not 
subscribe to the group’s maternalist doctrine. She wrote many articles engaging with 
radical feminist ideas before founding “The Money for Women Fund” that offered 
grants to aspiring feminist writers. Amy Swerdlow too became heavily involved in the 
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women’s liberation movement. She convinced WSP to become involved with the 1970 
Women’s Strike for Equality and first raised the prospect of the group’s involvement in 
International Women’s Year. In her role as Associate Director of Women’s Studies at 
Sarah Lawrence, she introduced a resolution for women’s studies at the National 
Women’s Conference and became instrumental in founding Women’s History 
Month.156 
 Yet assessments of WSP’s feminist compulsions cannot rely on a handful of 
individuals to suggest the group’s general opinion on matters relating to women’s 
liberation. Andrea Estepa, for example, highlights that Bella Abzug, Donna Allen, and 
Shirley Lens “made the organisation more appealing” to potential newcomers from the 
feminist movement. But she also notes that these three women in particular “stood 
apart” from the rest of the organisation and “seemed like outliers among the founding 
generation of WSPers” because of their attitude towards women’s equality.157 Likewise 
WSP’s presence at feminist events often arose from the initiative of particular 
individuals, rather than signifying official endorsement.158 
In the absence of formal statements clarifying the group’s stance on issues 
relating to women’s liberation and sexuality, WSP’s official attitude remains unclear. 
Several individuals did offer their own views on specific subjects while representing 
WSP. Dagmar Wilson, for example, hailed the development of birth control.159 Nadine 
Vesel wrote that Chicago WFP “certainly” supported the ERA. 160   Bella Abzug’s 
crusade for abortion rights, gay rights, and economic equality were well known.161 
However, formal statements offering guidance on key issues did not emerge from either 
local branches or the National Office. Considering the visibility of grassroots social 
justice campaigns, for example, the gay rights movement in San Francisco in the 1970s, 
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references to such causes from branch staff are notable by their absence. 162  Little 
evidence emerges to suggest that members held in-depth discussions on the core aims of 
the women’s liberation movement in committee meetings or at national conferences. 
The unpredictability of support offered for the ERA from other women’s peace groups 
means that it is not certain that sympathetic views would have been held by all WSP 
activists. 163  With only a handful of comments coming from individual activists, it 
remains difficult to judge the stance Women Strike for Peace took towards the divisive 
goals of the women’s liberation movement.  
 
A Feminist History? 
The presence of a robust feminist movement evidently made Women Strike for Peace 
alter its image and rhetoric, if not its goals. Such a shift in identity occurred for many 
women, particularly those in the New Left, who attempted to retain “credentials as both 
a woman and a radical.”164 Even the feminist movement itself experienced significant 
changes in its ideology.165 But the most profound impact for WSPers came in the way 
they began to see themselves in relation to the history of American women. Interest in 
women’s history grew steadily in the 1970s, thanks largely to the work of Gerda Lerner, 
Professor of History at Sarah Lawrence College in New York. Lerner’s 1969 article, 
“New Approaches to the Study of Women in American History,” drew attention to the 
neglect of women that existed in history of the United States. She called for a 
reconsideration of the concept of historical “contribution” that would account for the 
heretofore neglected role of women. With her articles sparking passionate discussion 
among feminist scholars, Lerner founded the first graduate program in women’s history 
with Joan Kelly in 1972. With Molly MacGregor, she ensured that the honouring of 
National Women’s History Month became an annual event in the United States.166 
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The rising interest in women’s history coincided with blossoming nostalgia 
among WSP activists. As the group reached its tenth anniversary, it published a special 
commemorative issue of Memo to celebrate its history. Replete with testimonials from 
members, colleagues, and other peace organisations, the commemorative issue had the 
intention of “looking back on the 60s to succeed in the 70s.” While “not blowing our 
own horn,” it publicised WSP’s various successful endeavours. The issue reinforced 
folklore of the group. Frances Herring reflected on the group’s founding, describing 
“how long ago and far away it seems – that day when…more than 100,000 women” 
emerged for the first strike for peace.167 Amy Swerdlow wrote the issue’s introduction 
and emphasised the transition experienced by women from WSP’s unassuming 
founding through to current events. “We’ve come a long way baby,” she wrote, “but we 
have a long, long way to go!”168 
 The commemorative issue set a precedent for future plenary speeches, meetings, 
and conferences to ruminate on WSP’s past. Mary Clarke’s address to the 1972 national 
conference in Santa Barbara became notable. She offered a “moving” history of WSP, 
highlighting “its policies and achievements.”  Attendees, enamoured with the contents 
of the speech, duplicated the transcript for others to read.169 Whereas keynote addresses 
of past conferences dealt with the contemporary situation of WSP among the peace 
movement, plenaries based on honouring the organisation’s past became a key feature 
of future national conferences. Ethel Taylor summarised her perceptions on WSP 
history at the 1973 national conference, suggesting that current activists use past 
experience to inform their efforts.170 Members staged reunions with former colleagues 
to reminisce and reflect on their shared history. 171  WSPers began to construct a 
collective memory of Women Strike for Peace, based primarily on the recollections of 
key women. These discussions of history not only reinforced particular perceptions of 
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WSP’s past but allowed contemporary activists to develop their own sense of purpose 
from shared memories of the group.172 
 Comments on the organisation’s history arose at a fragile time for Women Strike 
for Peace as it tried to reunite its membership following the disharmony and disarray of 
previous years. Speakers therefore attempted to derive significance and meaning from 
past events, highlighting the need for cohesion and urging activists to reflect positively 
on their history in order to inform their present identity. Mary Clarke explicitly sought 
to rediscover WSP’s character from its memory of the past, explaining in her 1972 
speech that “the reason I’ve gone into our past is: How can we know who we are until 
we know who we’ve been?”173 Recollections coalesced around the virtues of WSP’s 
organisational practices, valuing the group’s particular method of protest. The 1970 
commemorative journal had key women offer their reminiscences on specific 
campaigns that WSP had organised. These instances became known as the high points 
in WSP’s history, frequently referred to in future reflections as evidence of the group’s 
successful past. As newcomers to the group had little knowledge of its history prior to 
joining, their perception of the organisation’s past became reliant on the impressions 
that lifelong activists gave them.174 Depictions in the early 1970s created a vivid and 
robust folklore that had a significant impact on the way members of Women Strike for 
Peace would later recall their history. 
Importantly, the context of feminist activism, women’s liberation, and interest in 
women’s history informed these recollections. Despite WSP’s fractious history with 
feminism, a narrative emerged suggesting that the organisation had long served at the 
forefront of the movement for women’s liberation. Mary Clarke’s proclaimed that, the 
organisation had been part of the women’s movement from its outset.175 Others spread 
this version of events. Sarah Diamondstein of Westchester Women for Peace wrote to 
the New York Times in January 1978 to inform the public that WSP did not “have to 
turn out energies to the women’s movement” following the end of the Vietnam War. 
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“We were already in the women’s movement.” 176  By 1979 this narrative became 
codified in WSP’s history. The 18th anniversary journal, producing a commentary on the 
group’s activities between 1961 and 1979, declared that, despite its “white glove” 
image, a “fiercely” feminist rhetoric and outlook had always pervaded Women Strike 
for Peace.177  
The retrospective assessment of Bella Abzug’s role in WSP provides an 
illuminating example of these changing perspectives. Abzug had fervent feminist 
compulsions throughout her life, once jesting that her “parents had the foresight to give 
birth to me in the year women got the vote.”178 Her mother said of her daughter that she 
was a feminist from the day she was born. As a child, Abzug’s concern for social justice 
and women’s liberation displayed itself in the speeches she made in front of her father’s 
butcher shop.179 Having been forbidden from reciting the mourning prayer after her 
father’s death, a tradition usually reserved for males, she defiantly attended her 
synagogue every day for a year to recite the prayer anyway.180 Abzug graduated from 
Columbia Law School, where she edited the Columbia Law Review, to specialise in 
civil liberties, civil rights, and labour laws within her own practice. Noticing that union 
officials ignored her on account of her sex, she began wearing wide-brimmed hats to 
ensure she would attract attention, something that became a trademark for the rest of her 
life.181 As a young attorney, Abzug involved herself in the defence of Willie McGee, a 
black man from Mississippi accused of raping a white woman with whom he had a 
consensual relationship. The case became a cause célèbre. Though McGee was 
ultimately executed, Abzug’s defence raised a considerable challenge to conventional 
understandings of Jim Crow sexual politics. According to gender scholar Leandra 
Zarnow, Abzug positioned herself as a “Left feminist” at a time most historians assume 
feminism did not exist.
182
 Amy Swerdlow wrote that she “was a feminist long before 
the second wave emerged in the 1960s.”183 
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Abzug enthusiastically joined WSP on seeing the demonstrations occur in New 
York on 1 November 1961, with the issue of nuclear proliferation coming as “an 
explosion in my mind.”184 But many of her new colleagues immediately took a disliking 
to her. Norman Mailer once said of Abzug’s voice that she could “boil the fat off a 
taxicab driver’s neck,” and her loud tones and feisty put downs contrasted the generally 
staid and quiet membership of WSP on a fundamental, personal level.185 Swerdlow 
recalled, “she was always yelling at us, and no one paid attention. They couldn’t stand 
her.” 186  WSP activists felt that Abzug did not embody the “correct” image the 
organisation wished to project. She was aware of this criticism. “They often said, ‘Don’t 
let her speak, because she represents something different than what we’re trying to 
portray.’ I was not reflective of the typical Women-Strike-for-Peacer.” Although Abzug 
had two young children in 1961, famed feminist writer Gloria Steinem alleged that 
Women Strike for Peace told her “she couldn’t represent them because she wasn’t 
motherly enough.” 187  Additionally, WSP’s arduous attempts to secure decisions by 
consensus were complicated further by Bella Abzug’s “self-absorbed sense, not just that 
she was right, but that there could be no other conceivable way of seeing matters.”188 
When she won elected office in 1970, Claire Reed recalled that many “kind of liked the 
idea she’s getting out of Women Strike. We don’t have to handle her anymore.”189 The 
frequent disputes between Cora Weiss and Bella Abzug became something of an 
ongoing soap opera within WSP circles. 190  For her part, Abzug levelled her own 
criticisms at WSPers. She described WSP meetings as “frankly, crazy,” and suspected 
that some of the women had pretended “to know less about politics than they actually 
did,” feigning innocence to avoid having to voice their opinion.191  
 Much of the animosity towards Abzug stemmed from the strong feminist fervour 
she exhibited at a time WSP members only reluctantly broached the topic and she 
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recalled having difficulties because “I was a feminist. They were not.” 192  Abzug 
disliked the dependence Women Strike for Peace placed on moral appeals for peace, 
while WSPers, in turn, disliked Abzug’s willingness to become involved in the “dirty” 
world of mainstream politics. Her political fervour put her in an entirely separate 
“faction” from the majority of women who had joined Women Strike for Peace out of 
“moralistic persuasions.”193 But a central part of Abzug’s plea called for WSPers to 
recognise their voice and exercise their political agency. She wanted women to “know 
what you’re talking about. You have to learn what it is.” She advised that “it’s okay to 
show your emotion and come in as a mother and as a woman to say this is going to hurt 
my children, but it’s not good enough.” This attitude brought suspicion from Dagmar 
Wilson, who was “always a little leery” of Abzug.194 The fact that Abzug had come to 
WSP having become “accustomed to the concept of billable hours” exacerbated her 
frustrations with the group. “I made inroads into my earning capacity,” she recalled, “I 
spent all my extracurricular time as a volunteer like anybody else, but for me it was a 
sacrifice.”195Andrea Estepa believes that Abzug “felt her time was more valuable” than 
that of other WSPers. She exhibited notable animosity towards Women Strike for Peace 
because of her treatment and remained critical 20 years later.196 
Outside of WSP, Bella Abzug became a revered public figure and a forceful, 
respected proponent of women’s liberation.197 She toiled for the ERA throughout the 
1960s, demanded women’s equality in all areas of public and political life, and 
remained in the public eye through involvement in events such as the National 
Conference for New Politics.198 By the time she sought office in 1970, Abzug could 
count on the broad public support of her district’s voters. Barbara Streisand, just 
emerging as a celebrity figure in New York, appealed for votes on Abzug’s behalf, 
saying she was “happy to call Bella my friend and to work for her.”199 As the first major 
electoral figure to canvas for their votes, the gay community became particularly 
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enamoured with her campaign.200 Feminist figures too sided with the candidate in an 
attempt to put a supportive figure into Congress. Her campaign slogan embodied her 
attitude and signalled her intentions; “This woman’s place is in the house, the House of 
Representatives.”201 
Her energy did not wane once elected. On her first day in office she tabled a 
resolution calling for the end of the Vietnam War. She was the first to call for the 
impeachment of President Nixon in 1972.202 She introduced the first gay rights bill to 
Congress in May 1974.203 Abzug unfailingly made pointed remarks towards her male 
political peers. She derided Congress for its “impotence,” remarking that “it’s always a 
shock, I’m sure, to wake up one day and find out your impotent."204 But even within 
Congress she earned the respect of her peers. US News and World Report took a poll of 
Congressional Representatives in 1972 and found Abzug to be the third most influential 
member.205 As the presiding officer for the National Commission on the Observance of 
International Women’s Year, Abzug garnered a warm and enthusiastic reception from 
women from around the world. The tribune of the IWY conference in Mexico City, 
1975, concluded with a glowing testimonial: 
You would have to have been sitting in on two weeks of tribune sessions to 
understand the warm and enthusiastic reception given to Mrs. Abzug on 
Tuesday…Gandhi felt that he had to run in order to keep up with his people, 
because he was their leader. We, the audience, were made to feel that we, 
too, were ahead of our leaders and that they had best run to catch up with us. 
Mrs. Abzug added to that feeling.206 
Writing on her death in 1998, Myra Macpherson of The Washington Post claimed that 
Bella Abzug’s work for the women’s movement would prove her “major legacy.”207 
Former vice presidential candidate Geraldine Ferraro put this legacy in evocative terms. 
“She didn’t knock lightly on the door. She didn’t even push it open or batter it down. 
She took it off the hinges forever!”208 
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Women Strike for Peace did not endure a uniquely difficult relationship with 
Bella Abzug. She experienced personality clashes with colleagues throughout her 
life.209 Despite personally selecting her to chair the governmental National Advisory 
Committee of Women in 1977, President Carter fired Abzug in 1979 for being too vocal 
a critic of his record on women’s rights.210 WSP’s relationship with her, nevertheless, 
remains intriguing. As Bella Abzug’s political stock started to rise, Women Strike for 
Peace began to claim her as one of their own. Disregarding their previous misgivings, 
WSPers across the country rallied to campaign for her election in 1970.211 Activist 
Claire Reed noted the ease with which she could encourage support, recalling that 
“raising money for Bella was not that hard.”212 On her election Women Strike for Peace 
celebrated, declaring that, finally, they had “our own woman on the hill.” A press 
release further claimed that the election validated WSP itself, declaring that Abzug’s 
victory was “also an affirmation of the WSP program.”213 Bella Abzug quickly became 
a revered member. Her growing public stature correlated with the rising admiration of 
WSPers. Having previously struggled to encourage the organisation to listen to her, 
Abzug began delivering plenary speeches to WSP national conferences and, on 
occasions she could not attend meetings, delegates read statements she sent in absentia 
to gatherings that valued her comments.214 In 1974, Women Strike for Peace made 
Abzug their “Woman of the Year.”215 
 Intriguingly, the memory of Bella Abzug’s involvement in Women Strike for 
Peace also began to change as a result of her rising public profile. Historical appraisals 
started to make more favourable assessments of her relationship with Women Strike for 
Peace in the period prior to her election. Depictions highlighted her role as “National 
Legislative Chairwoman of WSP” or her ten year service as “Political Action Director,” 
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ignoring some WSPers’ prior aversion to Abzug and the role she had.216 Commentators 
used Abzug’s activities in the 1970s to prove that WSP had not “faded away” at the end 
of the Vietnam War.217 Testimonials referred to her as a founder of Women Strike for 
Peace, in which she assumed a comparable level of stature to Dagmar Wilson for her 
influence in constructing the organisation. Even archival collections relating to WSP 
describe the group with reference to Abzug’s influence.218 The reverence with which 
Abzug was held following her election to Congress in 1970 juxtaposes her 1960s 
experience. Whereas Women Strike for Peace received much favourable media 
coverage during the 1960s, Bella Abzug rarely featured in these stories until 1969.219 
Alan Levy, author of a comprehensive political history of Abzug’s life, notes the 
“fatigued shakes of the head” that punctuate the memories of most WSP activists who 
encountered her.220 Gloria Steinem made a particularly revealing comment, claiming 
that WSP’s disdain for Bella Abzug actually “encouraged her feminism.”221 
The reappraisal of Abzug arose, according to Amy Swerdlow, directly out of the 
impact of the women’s liberation movement on WSP’s sensibilities. Recognising that 
Abzug “did not fit the WSP ‘mother and housewife’ image,” Swerdlow wrote, “it was 
not until the second-wave of feminism legitimised self-assertive professional women” 
that Abzug became “recognized and admired” by WSP activists.222 The reassessment of 
Bella Abzug’s history within Women Strike for Peace exemplifies the changing attitude 
the group took towards feminism and women’s liberation. Whereas earlier protest 
looked upon forceful voices for women’s equality with an air of fear and suspicion, by 
the 1970s WSP activists were more open to the cause. By permeating the history of 
Women Strike for Peace with allusions to an ever-present desire for women’s liberation, 
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WSP activists made subtle changes to their expressed identity that placed them among 
the popular rise of feminism, despite the organisation itself advancing an ambiguous 
stance towards feminist campaigns. 
The nature of motherhood and domesticity remained a contentious issue for 
feminist scholars throughout the 1980s. A 1980 edited collection discussing the 
“Politics of Housework” opened with Ellen Malos’ emphatic assertion that “there will 
be no true liberation of women until we get rid of the assumption that it will always be 
women who do housework and look after children.” 223  An influential article by 
Redstockings member Pat Mainardi, originally published in 1970, continued to provoke 
debate over power dynamics between men and women within relationships.224 Others, 
such as race and gender theorist bell hooks, offered nuanced defences of maternal 
identity by arguing that “many black women were saying, ‘We want to have more time 
to share with family, we want to leave the world of alienated work.’”225 
The use of maternal image by women’s peace groups became a locus for these 
debates. Simone de Beauvoir, famed for her 1949 treatise The Second Sex, echoed Betty 
Friedan’s earlier criticisms of Women Strike by Peace by declaring in 1983 that 
“women should desire peace as human beings, not as women.”226 Micaela di Leonardo 
presented a cogent evaluation of the phenomena in a 1985 article. According to di 
Leonardo, organisations that evoke the image of the “Moral Mother” preclude any 
possibility for critical discussion over the relationship between gender and militarism.227 
She offered a ranging critique of maternal peace protest, arguing that it prevents women 
from having to “become feminists,” privileges a specifically heterosexual image of 
womanhood, and serves as a poor organising tool for continued activism that is 
particularly vulnerable to “empirically based counterarguments.”228 Others came to the 
defence of the identity of motherhood. Expanding on an earlier article, Sara Ruddick’s 
1989 book Maternal Thinking constructed a general account of “maternal practice” 
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based on her own experiences as a mother.229 Ruddick defended the connection between 
maternalism and peaceful beliefs by arguing that the goals of motherhood in the form of 
“preservative love,” fostering children’s emotional growth, and developing 
“socialization for acceptance,” informed political attitudes.230 
The context of these debates informed much of the work of Amy Swerdlow. 
Writing in the 1970s and 1980s, Swerdlow felt compelled to provide a robust defence of 
WSP’s maternal rhetoric with criticism in mind. She concluded her authoritative study 
of the organisation by stating that her evaluation of WSP was situated “in current 
debates among feminist scholars and activists regarding the relationship of traditional 
female culture to radical social change and to feminism,” and was “in the spirit of WSP 
as it was transformed in the early 1970s.” She asserted that “the question WSP asks of 
women’s history is, can an organisation that builds on traditional female culture, even 
when effective in achieving some reforms, actually contribute to world peace if, in 
stressing mothers’ role and rights, it reinforces female marginality?”231 On publishing 
her history, Swerdlow believed that WSPers challenged “the gendered division of labor 
and power in the political culture of the Left as well as the Right.” But she also argued 
that activists possessed “little awareness of their contributions to sex-role stereotyping 
and female oppression.” Likewise activists “were not aware in their early years that they 
were fighting a battle of the sexes.”232 WSP’s feminism was tangible, if unintentional.  
Yet Swerdlow's opinion altered over time. Writing a research report for her 
initial study of Women Strike for Peace in 1973 she contended that WSP “was basically 
a feminist movement, though many of its present day leaders would deny this.”233 
Having completed her MA at Sarah Lawrence, she contributed a more emphatic opinion 
to WSP’s 18th anniversary commemorative journal six years later, claiming that “WSP 
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policy throughout” the 1960s was “fiercely autonomist and feminist.”234 Writing her 
history of WSP during the 1980s, she provided more nuance. A 1989 article, “‘Pure 
Milk, Not Poison’,” suggested that Women Strike for Peace had “accepted for itself a 
secondary, supportive, helping, and enabling role” among anti-war protesters, rather 
than engaging with attitudes towards women’s liberation. But, she argued, “there was 
more of an antimale element in WSP than one would have expected,” and some 
harboured “anger at men.”235 While advertising the publication of her book towards the 
end of 1993 Swerdlow advanced a moderate depiction of WSP activists. “We were 
middle-class housewives working from Christmas card lists and church rosters…we 
were the lady next door, we were concerned about our children, not political power.”236 
Her changing attitude reflected the continued challenge of describing WSP’s feminist 
outlook with reference to the changing status of American motherhood. It also shows 
the difficulty of reconciling WSP’s ambiguous stance towards women’s liberation with 
some activists’ perceptions that they were, and always had been, feminist agitators.  
Identifying as a feminist by no means obligated an individual to “participate in 
forms of collective action intended to realize equal rights for women.”237 Yet it remains 
unclear whether WSP activists saw themselves as feminists or not. Ethel Taylor, for 
example, offered a clear assessment in her 1998 memoir. “In retrospect,” she wrote, “we 
were the harbingers of the women’s liberation movement. Our discussions were 
certainly consciousness-raising.”238 This attitude was evocatively summarised by former 
member Naomi Goodman in 1994. She recalled, “there was a song at one of the later 
WSP gatherings which included words to the effect that we joined to help peace and 
found ourselves in the process. This has certainly been true.” 239  Dagmar Wilson 
disagreed. She proudly identified herself as a feminist, evoked her family’s close ties to 
suffrage activism, and declared that she would have taken part in the first-wave of 
women’s activism in the United States.240  But she had a different perception of Women 
Strike for Peace. In 1989 she asserted that Women Strike for Peace was a “peace 
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movement activated by women, not a women’s movement, and there’s a difference in 
that.” Though affirming that WSP emerged out of ideas linked to women’s liberation, 
she declared that, “we were not a feminist movement. We were simply women working 
for the good of humanity, and I still feel as though that is the best way for women to 
go.”241  
The prevailing discourse on Women Strike for Peace emphasises the group’s 
involvement with the test ban campaign and activities among the anti-Vietnam War 
movement. As such it is rare to find historical discussions of WSP’s activities beyond 
the early 1970s. In some notable aspects this skews the historical depiction of Women 
Strike for Peace. For example, although Ethel Taylor served as the organisation’s 
official National Coordinator for over 15 years, only Dagmar Wilson is referred to as its 
leader. Crucially, many of the historical perceptions associated with Women Strike for 
Peace only emerged within the context of 1970s political fervour. WSP’s reassertion of 
disarmament activism reversed its earlier status as a faded and irrelevant protest group 
and curtailed potential historical narratives depicting the organisation as a failure. 
History of WSP’s experience in the 1960s is written with the knowledge that the group 
emerged from the end of the Vietnam War and secured future successes. Likewise the 
emergence of the women’s liberation movement influenced an examination of WSP’s 
identity as members questioned their role in debates over feminism and began shaping 
their recollections to suit the contemporary political climate. All of these factors, 
emerging only in the 1970s, bled into the consciousness and memory of WSP activists 
and served to inform later perceptions of Women Strike for Peace.  
The 1970s holds crucial relevance for the work of Amy Swerdlow. Not only did 
her evaluation of WSP emerge “in the spirit of WSP as it was transformed in the early 
1970s,” but in the context of the organisation’s attempts to construct a relevant 
historical narrative in the face of concerted attacks from feminist activists. 242  The 
dialogue between the two issues of maternalism and feminism has informed a lot of 
writing on the history of the organisation. Indeed, since most history of Women Strike 
for Peace relies on the work of Amy Swerdlow, it follows that most historical 
perceptions of the group have been borne out of arguments surrounding this debate. 
However, while the group is referred to for the maternal stance it adopted in the 1960s, 
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WSP’s activism beyond the end of the Vietnam War became less informed by 
motherhood. In fact the move away from a maternal position towards a more nuanced 
and pragmatic argument is arguably what allowed Women Strike for Peace to maintain 
historical credibility.243 This change, occurring only after the end of the Vietnam War, 
certainly helped Women Strike for Peace to manoeuvre itself into a position of 
relevance within the antinuclear and environmental movements. WSP’s search for 
renewal in the 1970s holds valuable insight into the construction of the group’s history. 
As the organisation entered the 1980s, further historical events served to shape the 
group’s perception of itself. 
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6. “We Made a Difference”: The Return of the Peace 
Movement and WSP’s Historical Legacy, 1980-1990 
 
In a 1987 interview for the Women’s Peace Oral History Project, Judith Porter Adams 
asked New York WSPer Ruth Pinkson whether she thought the causes she had devoted 
her life to would ever be resolved. The activist appeared downhearted, answering that, 
“having been involved for so many years, all my life, since being a kid and seeing so 
many things happen, I don’t think we’ll see that much change.”1 Yet Pinkson's attitude 
was not entirely pessimistic. Women Strike for Peace, she said, could draw many 
positives from the general public’s attitude towards war and nuclear weapons in the 
1980s. The WSPer suggested that the sentiments WSP had so vigorously advocated in 
earlier decades now appeared to be common sense. She saw “tremendous support” for 
non-interventionist and antinuclear policies, arguing that it was “tremendous progress” 
from earlier public attitudes.  Looking towards the future, Pinkson observed that, 
although “things move slowly…it will be a better world for my grandchildren than I had 
inherited.” She concluded that “so many things are heartening.”2 
Although its activities in the previous decade saw the organisation’s fortunes 
improve, Women Strike for Peace could not develop committed membership beyond 
that of its leadership as it entered the 1980s. Heightened Cold War tensions arising from 
the sabre-rattling of the Reagan administration sparked renewed efforts by the US peace 
movement to campaign for disarmament. WSP attempted to capitalise on the upsurge of 
activism, developing several initiatives that aimed to attract members. But its inability 
to modernise made WSP appear irrelevant. Instead, potential participants turned to 
newer women’s peace organisations and more professional alternatives. Failing to 
attract younger activists, WSP’s aging leadership accepted that it could not continue. 
The organisation closed its national headquarters in 1990. 
 As WSP’s 30-year campaign against nuclear weapons came to a close, activists 
hoped that future generations would learn of its contribution to the peace movement and 
eagerly supported initiatives tasked with recording the history of the organisation. 
WSPers seemed in little doubt of their historical relevance. Although the period was 
marked by a “Second Cold War” and heightened tensions between the US and the 
                                                 
1 Pinkson interview, October 1987, ARS.0056. 
2 Ibid. 
  
232 
  
USSR, commentators sought to dispel myths surrounding America’s nuclear weapons 
policy and the public seemed more alert to the hazards of nuclear war. Meanwhile, a 
new generation of women’s peace activists embarked on their first protests, influenced 
by the noble examples set by their predecessors. These developments validated WSP’s 
long struggle. The increasing prevalence of pacifist sensibilities among the public gave 
WSPers the opportunity to commemorate their legacy. Emboldened by the current 
mood, they positively reflected on their past. Even as their organisation declined they 
remained confident that they “made a difference.”3 Much as the cultural upheavals of 
the 1970s provided a context with which activists understood their own identities, the 
growing pervasiveness of disarmament attitudes in the 1980s informed how WSPers 
interpreted their success.  
 
The Election of Reagan and Evaluating the Past 
President Carter’s 1976 election pledge to pursue disarmament and human rights as 
foreign policy initiatives encouraged WSP activists who, though not necessarily 
considering Carter a “hero,” felt that “his comprehensive view of the nuclear energy and 
nuclear weaponry issue is very close to our own.” They realistically acknowledged the 
fragility of his electoral promises, but appreciated that “at least he’s scared.”4  The 
president’s start encouraged the group. Carter scrapped the development of the B-1 
bomber and the neutron bomb in his first two years. He also brokered the momentous 
Camp David Accords peace agreement between Egypt and Israel and energetically 
pursued another round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) with the USSR.5 
James Patterson, in his acclaimed work of the period, noted that the “heartening” 
diplomatic victories secured by the president arose from his “Wilsonian internationalist 
and idealist” approach to foreign affairs.6 
 These early achievements, however, were later overshadowed. Carter’s 
persistent admonishment of the Soviet Union’s human rights record cooled Premier 
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Brezhnev’s tolerance of détente. The USSR responded by developing the next 
generation of SS-20 missiles, capable of striking any target in Western Europe. The 
move rekindled Cold War tensions.7 Meanwhile, the Carter administration’s inability to 
curtail “stagflation” and alleviate the continuing energy crisis cultivated a sense of the 
president’s incompetence. 8  An address urging the American public to pro-actively 
address its “crisis of confidence” made many people feel that the president was 
“blaming them for the nation’s problems,” and became disparagingly referred to as his 
“malaise speech.” By subsequently calling for the resignations of many of his top aides 
in response to the economic crisis, Carter appeared to have lost control of his 
administration.9  
The rising conservative consensus which had developed amidst the political and 
social upheavals of the 1970s gained ground as dissatisfaction with President Carter 
increased. The apparent failure of liberal political values and the “inept” federal 
government contrasted conservative ideas that advocated a “revival of an old American 
mythology about the self-made man.”10 Conservative commentators appealed to “the 
frustrations of the age - the failure of government to assure economic stability, to 
provide social justice, to fulfil a sense of national purpose.”11 “Most of all,” Americans 
felt that government efforts to revive the economy “would curtail opportunity.” 12 
Meanwhile, hawkish interest groups, such as the Committee on the Present Danger 
(CPD), capitalised on the perceived weakness of Carter’s government to exert a 
growing influence on foreign policy discourse. The CPD was founded by Paul Nitze, an 
architect of US Cold War foreign policy since the 1950s, and, though a relatively small 
group, it boasted many “former participants” of the US policymaking elite. Members of 
the CPD had never accepted détente with the USSR and grew concerned with what they 
saw as America’s “strategic disadvantage” and a “drift in US security policy.”13 The 
organisation worried that “the American public was either unaware or too complacent 
about this trend,” and published deliberately pessimistic alternatives to the CIA’s 
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assessments of Soviet military capabilities in order to rouse anti-communist opinion.14  
Several anti-Soviet “Cold War Democrats” similarly turned against the Carter 
administration. Eugene Rostow, former Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs 
under Lyndon Johnson, chaired the CPD and also served as head of Democrats for 
Reagan.15 Jeane Kirkpatrick, who had previously worked for the election campaigns of 
Hubert Humphrey, also joined the CPD to express her anti-totalitarian views. 
Washington Senator Henry Jackson, a well-known Democratic hawk famed for 
accumulating huge defence contracts for his state, frequently spoke against the 
president’s SALT II negotiations.16  
 Carter responded to calls for a more combative foreign policy stance and, in 
view of the upcoming presidential election, “felt obliged to stiffen America’s Cold War 
posture.”17 The president sanctioned the full development of the MX missile, “the most 
expensive weapons system ever conceived,” and approved a previously vetoed nuclear 
aircraft carrier.18  Reacting to hawkish demands for raised defence spending, Carter 
resolved to increase the military budget by five percent in each of the next five years, 
two percent more than the figure suggested by his Republican opponent.19 Pointedly, in 
July 1980, he signed the bellicose Presidential Decision Directive 59. The national 
security initiative represented a marked shift in the administration’s attitude towards 
nuclear war, showing its willingness to engage in a limited but “protracted” exchange. 
Crucially, it granted the US military first-strike capability.20  Paul Warnke, the former 
head of the Atomic Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), denounced it as 
“apocalyptic nonsense.”21 Several commentators observe that the policies later adopted 
by the Reagan Administration, though seemingly more hawkish, were simply a 
corollary to these Carter initiatives. CIA director Stansfield Turner suggested that they 
“laid the whole foundation for Reagan’s expansion of nuclear weapons, and war-
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fighting, and war-winning capabilities.” By 1980, James Patterson explained, Carter 
“was a hawk.”22 
The administration’s “eleventh-hour cold war policies” did little to stymie 
criticisms of Carter’s “half-hearted” efforts to change course.23 Although the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan and the Islamic Revolution in Iran towards the end of 1979 
“justified” Carter’s growing militancy in foreign policy, the drawn out saga of the Iran 
hostage crisis exacerbated his problems.24 Unable to secure the release of 52 American 
diplomats and citizens following 444 days of diplomatic wrangling, the calamitous 
failure of the Eagle Claw rescue mission concluded a ruinous affair. Paul Kengor, a 
scholar of American conservativism, wrote that the denouement of the hostage crisis 
“was not just another humiliation in a long line of US embarrassments; it was a 
microcosm of the stagnation and low morale that America faced. More than just an 
aborted rescue mission, this was a cry not just for a new leader but for a new 
paradigm.”25  
The steady hardening of Carter’s stance left WSP feeling betrayed and the 
militarism of his later years in office alarmed the group. 26  It criticised the 
administration’s increased defence spending and reduced domestic budget. 27  Anci 
Koppel denounced the president’s motivations as “downright immoral.” 28  Others 
accused him of “nuclear insanity,” while the National Office released a statement in late 
1979 declaring that he should not be returned to office at the following year’s 
presidential elections.29 WSP remained divided over whether it should approve SALT 
II, an agreement for arms limitations that nevertheless allowed weapons production to 
continue for several years. Though some saw it as a “first step” towards disarmament, 
several others, including National Coordinator Ethel Taylor, felt that SALT II served to 
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endorse and codify the arms race.30 Responding to the invasion of Afghanistan, WSP 
criticised both the Soviet military intervention and Carter’s apparent “over-reaction” to 
events.31 But as it bemoaned the President’s militarism, the group acknowledged it 
could not offer any alternative solutions to the ongoing crises. Following the 1979 
Iranian revolution and ensuing hostage crisis, the group offered a “Long Overdue 
Apology to the Iranian People” for decades of American intervention. But WSP also 
understood that “even the many Americans who have resented our government’s 
solicitousness for the shah now feel trapped into ‘getting tough’ with Iran in order to 
vent feelings of helpless outrage.” It admitted that “we have no ready solution to this 
impasse.”32 Dissatisfied with the choices on offer in the 1980 presidential election, the 
organisation withheld support for the president and refused to endorse any alternative 
candidate.  
Having exploited the “social and cultural alienation…the economic 
dislocations…and anger over the decline of US global power,” the ascendency of the 
New Right culminated in the landslide election of their presidential candidate, Ronald 
Reagan.33 The result alarmed WSP. Previously dispirited, it immediately assumed a 
sense of urgency. Two days after Carter’s defeat, members put aside their reservations 
to SALT II and threw their weight behind it. Taylor sent a telegram to the outgoing 
president urging him to “act now” to pass the treaty while he still could.34  Others 
implored defeated Senators to “use the remaining months of their term to achieve 
ratification” of the agreement.35 The organisation admonished the openly militaristic 
attitudes of the new administration, foreseeing a “dangerous confrontational period” 
with the USSR that threatened nuclear holocaust. “Frankly,” declared Taylor, “we are 
scared.”36 So began a long period of agitation against the Reagan administration. 
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The president’s hawkish foreign policy rhetoric dovetailed with his desire to 
restore public confidence. Believing that pessimistic attitudes towards the recent past 
harmed the United States, he called for the public to “recapture our dreams, our pride in 
ourselves and our country” and “bring about a spiritual revival in America.”37 Reagan 
determined that volatile attitudes towards the 1960s inhibited such a revival and 
resolved to dispel any lingering doubts over the period’s legacy. As a presidential 
candidate, he controversially declared that the Vietnam War represented “in truth, a 
noble cause” at the Chicago Veterans of Foreign Wars convention in August 1980.38 
Although this self-penned rhetorical flourish delighted the veterans present, it received a 
mixed reaction elsewhere. In the Boston Globe, Mary McGrory attacked Reagan for his 
choice of words, claiming that it revived the “poisonous enmity” of the war years. She 
claimed that he wanted to “rehabilitate” the legacy of the war in order to fight another 
one.39 
Yet Reagan’s attempts to re-evaluate the country’s 1960s experience attracted 
support from large segments of the public who similarly continued to reflect on the 
recent past. Responses to the proposed design for the Vietnam Veterans Memorial 
symbolised public divisions over the appropriate legacy of the Vietnam War. 40 
Described by historian John Bodnar as “more an expression of grief and sorrow than a 
celebration of national unity,” many felt the memorial represented the “political war 
waged here at home” rather than the sacrifice of Vietnam Veterans who deserved a 
more fitting tribute to their patriotism.41 Journalists Rowland Evans and Robert Novak 
noted that Reagan’s view of the period was widely shared by large segments of the 
American public.42 Phillip Jenkins writes that, for many, conditions in the 1980s “were 
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bad, it seemed, because sixties values had let them get so bad.”43 While some accounts 
cite the decade as a period of “Great Reconciliation” between 1960s liberalism and 
growing conservative attitudes, divisions remained throughout the 1980s, especially 
among past social movement activists. 44  Todd Gitlin and Tom Hayden, former 
presidents of Students for a Democratic Society, eulogised the 1960s for having opened 
up political and cultural space.45 In contrast, Peter Collier and David Horowitz, former 
co-editors of the radical magazine Ramparts, rejected the New Left and “shouted good 
riddance to The Destructive Generation.”46 
Amidst this period of public self-reflection, Women Strike for Peace looked to 
record its own history. Although Eleanor Garst’s earlier attempts did not move beyond 
her first drafts, the initiative of Amy Swerdlow saw a renewal in WSPers’ interest in 
their history as a narrative explaining the group’s past began to emerge.47 Swerdlow's 
involvement in WSP began with the founding of New York Women Strike for Peace in 
1961 and she remained an influential national figure throughout her time in the group.48 
Her influence and stature within the organisation led her to editing the national Memo 
from 1970 to 1973. However, WSP’s 1968 confrontation with radical feminists at the 
Jeanette Rankin Brigade demonstration profoundly affected her political outlook. With 
the feminist movement on the rise, Swerdlow became enamoured with women’s history 
and feminist thinking and expressed regret at her own lack of historical awareness. In 
1972, she enrolled at Sarah Lawrence College on the pioneering MA program in 
women’s history and studied under the guidance of celebrated women’s historian Gerda 
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Lerner.49 Women Strike for Peace became the topic of Swerdlow's MA dissertation, her 
PhD thesis, and continued to guide her research throughout her academic life.50 
 A surge in publications addressing the social movements of the 1960s spurred 
increased concern in how WSP would be represented historically. Swerdlow raised her 
own anxieties in a letter to WSPers. She felt that existing historical depictions of the 
organisation, even supposed “tributes,” misrepresented what she described as “WSP’s 
complex role and its significance in the peace and women’s movements.” Swerdlow 
highlighted recent pieces by Mary McGrory and Dave Dellinger as particularly 
troublesome.51 Adding to her consternation was the fear that these types of work “will 
shape the memory and the consciousness of the next generations.” WSP could not, 
Swerdlow wrote, afford to be forgotten, nor have its activities “distorted” by historians. 
She made her purpose clear. “There is no doubt that we, in WSP, made history…now I 
think we must write it.”52  Activists from around the country responded to Swerdlow's 
message by sending local branch records and offering their own recollections on past 
events.  Her letter marked the beginning of a process that, in 1993, culminated in the 
publication of Women Strike for Peace. 
 Swerdlow's efforts signified only one of several historical initiatives that 
activists engaged with during the 1980s. Having developed a close relationship with 
WSP following the 1965 Jakarta meeting, the Vietnamese Women’s Association 
requested information to supplement a book and museum exhibition about the Vietnam 
War. WSPers set out to compile “posters, articles, photos” and various other materials.53 
Requests also came from “historical societies, universities and people engaged in Peace 
and Conflict Studies.” Such requests raised concerns that no written record of the 
organisation’s activities existed. Observing that their archival materials were in a 
“terrible disorder,” WSPers resolved to arrange their records and build an accurate and 
concise history of their experiences.54 A project developed out of the Palo Alto branch 
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of the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom also sought to record the 
personal testimony of women’s peace activists. Under the leadership of WILPF branch 
member and Stanford University teacher Judith Porter Adams, the Women’s Peace Oral 
History Project conducted oral interviews with WILPF and WSP activists in the San 
Francisco Bay Area. The initiative soon expanded to become a ten-year long nationwide 
venture, involving 256 recordings of over 90 members of the women’s peace 
movement.55  
 The eagerness of women to have their stories put on record ensured that 
initiatives involved many WSPers.56 Understanding that capturing their history required 
materials from an array of past and present activists, leaders urged members to get in 
touch. In a 1984 newsletter, they implored “if you have flyers, newsletters or other 
mementos of the sixties and early seventies, please contact our office. We will need lots 
of help!”57 Interviewees for the Women’s Peace Oral History Project reflected modestly 
on their own involvement and often recommended that the project also contact other 
figures for their version of events. 58  Throughout her writing, Swerdlow made a 
conscious effort to “recognize the contributions of as many women as possible.”59 She 
asked WSPers to complete questionnaires to inform her research, making clear her 
belief that “the WSP story is not mine, but ours. Just as we worked together to make our 
history, I think we have to work together to write it.”60  
 Although attempting to produce a broad and accurate account of the past, 
projects nevertheless developed limitations, as past and present leaders assumed 
responsibility for their output. Swerdlow often asked key figures to revise her work 
prior to its publication.61  Dagmar Wilson had a particularly privileged position in this 
respect. While working on her PhD thesis, the contents of which would later make up 
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Women Strike for Peace, Swerdlow sent every chapter and other large extracts of her 
work to Wilson for feedback. 62  The academic requested “frank and honest” 
assessments. Wilson obliged, offering significant comments and edits on Swerdlow’s 
writing.63 Wilson’s knowledge proved highly insightful due to her centrality to certain 
events, such as the organisation’s founding and WSP’s 1962 confrontation with the 
House Un-American Activities Committee. Nevertheless, Swerdlow often ceded to 
Wilson’s personal judgment and, on one occasion, apologised for a piece of writing that 
had not “given proper weight to the vulnerable position you were in.”64 She further 
sought to reassure the former leader that she had a final say on her work. “Don’t worry,” 
Swerdlow wrote Wilson, “nothing will be published without you seeing it.”65   
Meanwhile, branch leaders Hazel Grossman and Alice Hamburg, having headed 
the San Francisco Women’s Peace Office for many years, set about writing a history of 
women’s peace activities in the city.66 National Coordinator Ethel Taylor began drafting 
her own anecdotal account of Women Strike for Peace. In Seattle, branch leader Anci 
Koppel enrolled on an oral history course at her local college, hoping to record 
interviews dedicated to SWAP’s history.67 Alice Hamburg conducted interviewees for 
the Women’s Peace Oral History Project.68  
Most efforts had to run under the initiative of contemporary leaders who 
represented the point of contact for past and present members. However, they often 
struggled to rouse responses from grassroots figures. Cora Weiss appealed for archival 
material to build a history of anti-Vietnam War activism, but her efforts largely 
involved correspondence with key women.69 Hazel Grossman similarly argued that in 
order to compile an accurate history of WFP’s activities in San Francisco, “we will have 
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to depend at least in part on former chairs and officers.”70 Leaders recognised that they 
had simply lost touch with former activists when they withdrew from the organisation 
and were, therefore, unable to solicit their stories. Some branches, for various 
administrative reasons, did not send their materials to be recorded, meaning their own 
unique accounts were lost. SWAP in particular was unrepresented in the histories, 
having no involvement with nationwide oral history projects or the collection of records 
from the Vietnam War era. 71  Accordingly, few grassroots members, either past or 
present, added their own perspective to the rapidly building story of Women Strike for 
Peace. 
 
The Return of the Peace Movement 
As WSPers began to record the past, developing events ensured that their stories 
attained contemporary relevance. Signalling a stark departure from the policy of détente 
that had characterised the previous decade, blunt rhetoric from officials within the 
Reagan administration reignited Cold War tensions. 72  Officials openly levelled 
accusations of duplicity and malevolence at the Kremlin.73 Nuclear war appeared less 
“unthinkable” to members of the government.74 The remarks of T.K. Jones, the Deputy 
Undersecretary of Defence for Strategic and Nuclear Forces, were especially troubling. 
In conversation with Los Angeles Times journalist Robert Scheer, Jones asserted that the 
public need not fear a war. To protect themselves from the effects of a nuclear 
exchange, he suggested people simply “dig a hole, cover it with a couple of doors and 
then throw three feet of dirt on top. It’s the dirt that does it.” As if accepting the 
inevitability of a nuclear conflict, he reassured the public that “everybody is going to 
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make it if there are enough shovels to go around.”75  Even Reagan felt “somewhat 
chilled” by the comments of his staff.76 
Disparate parts of the peace movement, having remained somewhat muted since 
the end of the Vietnam War, saw such sabre-rattling as a dangerous change in 
circumstances.77 In late 1979 the AFSC organised a meeting of disarmament advocates 
to discuss arms control. Mobilization for Survival, Clergy and Laity Concerned, and the 
Fellowship of Reconciliation started to endorse a moratorium.78  Meanwhile Randall 
Forsberg, a young defence and disarmament researcher, became convinced that the 
peace movement should demonstrate greater unity and suggested that it coalesce around 
a single, achievable, and identifiable aim; a bilateral agreement between the US and 
USSR to halt the testing, production, and deployment of nuclear weapons.  
 Forsberg developed experience in peace research working for the Stockholm 
International Peace Research Institute in 1968 before founding the Institute for Defence 
and Disarmament Studies in 1974. Her experience led her to believe that the peace 
movement needed to appeal to a moderate base of support in a climate of rising 
conservatism and militarism. She stressed that “no major disarmament effort can 
succeed without the support of the majority of middle class, middle-of-the-road 
citizens.”79 In 1979, she drafted a “Call to Halt the Nuclear Arms Race,” stressing 
previous arms limitation campaigns were either circumvented, or “too technical for the 
patience of the average person.” She made an uncomplicated, single-issue demand that 
both the US and the USSR freeze nuclear stockpiles at their current levels.80 
 “The Call” became widely popular and rallied peace activists into a Freeze 
movement.81 With support from individuals, peace organisations, and major interest 
groups, the Freeze movement intended to build grassroots pressure through referenda 
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and ballot initiatives at a local political level. It was hoped that these efforts would 
culminate in Congressional legislation forcing the president to offer a bilateral freeze 
agreement with the USSR.82  Starting in November 1980, freeze resolutions started 
appearing on the election ballots of towns and cities across the United States. Victories 
started to mount. In western Massachusetts, 59 of 62 towns voted in favour of a freeze. 
In March 1982, 159 out of 180 Vermont town meetings backed the initiative. California 
peace groups brought together “professional political strategists and an enthusiastic 
grass roots” to ensure a freeze resolution appeared on the ballot in November 1982.83 
Senators Edward Kennedy and Mark Hatfield declared their support and, in March 
1982, introduced a freeze resolution in Congress.84 Freeze resolutions won in nine out 
of ten states, the District of Columbia and all but three of the local ballots they appeared 
on. The New York Times reported that voting on the resolution “constituted the largest 
referendum on a single issue in the nation’s history.”85 
The movement mobilised vast swathes of the American population. It stimulated 
the energies of peace activists and, through its respectable and moderate stance, drew 
countless others to the campaign, swelling the ranks of the disarmament movement to 
levels not seen in the US since the test ban campaign of the early 1960s.86 As McCrea 
and Markle surmise, the middle-class organising approach allowed “thousands of new 
recruits” to side with the peace movement.87 A demonstration in New York on 12 June 
1982, drew close to one million people into Central Park in support of the movement’s 
demands. 88  Reports of the gathering noted the widespread diversity of those in 
attendance.  Bradford Martin wrote that “children and octogenarians…World War II 
veterans and Tibetans for World Peace” arrived in New York for the march.89 The 
delight of participant Alex Willentz encapsulated the day’s sentiments, as he declared 
“there’s no way the leaders can ignore this now…it’s not just hippies and crazies 
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anymore. It’s everybody.”90 Journalist Robert McFadden reported “a kaleidoscope of 
humanity” on the march, “young people and old, rich and poor, the famous, the 
forgotten and countless thousands in between.”91 
WSPers initially felt unconvinced that the freeze movement could elicit any 
substantial change. Ethel Taylor wrote to her colleagues to explain that, though the 
freeze initiative was “a marvellous tool,” its results were not legally binding. She felt 
that Reagan had to accede to public will, and while the freeze movement busied itself 
introducing non-binding resolutions, the president would continue to exert his authority 
“unless we indulge in a primal scream.”92 Taylor’s criticisms echoed the observations of 
others. Forsberg’s determination to keep the freeze movement’s demands moderate and 
bilateral limited its effectiveness. By advocating reciprocal measures, it could not 
support a campaign against the American MX missile as no comparable Soviet system 
existed. Supporters promised a “first step” in disarmament negotiations, but made no 
demands for a reduction in weapons stockpiles. 93  Seymour Melman, an influential 
activist in the Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, probed the movement’s aims. 
“What have we actually frozen?” he asked, observing that weapons stockpiles were 
“already adequate to destroy every Soviet city of 100,000 or more population forty 
times over.”  As no arms agreement in history had managed to reduce nuclear 
inventories up to this point, many remained sceptical of the freeze’s potential.94 
On seeing the movement’s ability to mobilise members of the public, WSP 
changed tack, throwing its support behind Freeze resolutions. Leaders saw a chance to 
expand and meet the public’s rising interest in peace activism. 95  The organisation 
dovetailed perfectly with the respectable image and inclusive rhetoric exhorted by 
Randall Forsberg. She desperately wished the antinuclear movement to keep its appeals 
“simple, straight-forward, effective and mutual,” and warned against control “by a small 
cadre of leftist activists.”96 Robert Kleidman argues that she, rather acerbically, feared 
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that the imposition of a “pacifist-vegetarian anti-corporate value system” would alienate 
centrist supporters “vital to a mainstream campaign.”97 Women Strike for Peace fit 
Forsberg’s designs. Veteran activists began recommending that those interested in 
becoming a peace activist should contact Women Strike for Peace, since its open, 
moderate stance fit perfectly with the campaign.98  As interest in WSP increased it 
became more visible in the mainstream press. The group came to be seen as senior 
figures within the peace movement and pioneers of disarmament activism.   
WSP found most success with educational outreach projects. The group’s 
traditional view that an informed public was central to achieving nuclear disarmament 
reflected the intentions of the Freeze movement and fit perfectly with ongoing 
activities. 99  Pat Gross, a recent addition to WSP’s ranks, saw that “education and 
outreach is essential,” suggesting the group draw up “educational pamphlets on issues 
with which we have a concern.”100 WSPers criticised the news media’s communication 
of Reagan’s military policy, suggesting it skewed debate through one-sided perspectives 
and a lack of transparency.  East Bay WFPer Rose Dellamonica urged the public to “go 
beyond the commercial media, beyond radio and TV.”101 Donna Allen suggested that 
“we’ll forever be walking in front of the White House” to little effect unless they did 
“something about mass media…we have to get this back in our hands.”102 Projects 
tasked with educating the public, it was felt, would tackle misinformation while 
increasing the public’s awareness of Women Strike for Peace itself.103 
The group made particular efforts to highlight the absurdity of strategists who 
saw nuclear war as a winnable event. Activists railed against secret initiatives that 
prepared the US to engage in limited nuclear war, such as National Security Decision 
Directive 32 and the Pentagon’s Five Year Defence Guidance Plan.104 A 1980 article 
co-authored by Colin S. Gray, an advisory member to the ACDA, proved useful to 
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WSP’s endeavours. Gray expressed the view, shared by several defence planners, that 
the expected deaths of 20 million American citizens should not dissuade the 
government from launching a nuclear war.105 WSP exploited the comment, intimating 
that the government considered millions of American lives expendable. Asserting that 
Reagan considered there to be an “acceptable” level of civilian deaths, Ethel Taylor 
designed an advert for nationwide dissemination. It declared “I refuse to be One of 20 
Million ‘Acceptable’ Dead,” and urged members of the public to become “one of 
twenty million” to state “I am not a statistic. I and my family refuse to be part of the 20 
million acceptable dead.”106  
The campaign’s simplicity, both in highlighting government attitudes and 
personalising the effects of nuclear war, brought substantial support from members of 
the public.107 Thousands of people took part in the project. Though participation did not 
require communication with Women Strike for Peace, many sent notes of support to 
branch staff. 108  The campaign certainly raised interest in WSP and proved highly 
popular among other peace organisations. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists reproduced 
the ad as a full-page item in their February 1983 edition and the particular phrasing used 
by the campaign also brought acclaim. 109  Gender and security scholar Carol Cohn 
juxtaposed the slogan with the abstract language often employed when discussing 
nuclear war. She noted that the “very act of putting phrases like ‘20 million acceptable 
dead’ into human consciousness cracks our conceptions” and highlights the reality that 
exists behind the “theoretical plans of defence intellectuals.”110  
 Reagan’s confidence in the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) offered another 
avenue to criticise arms build-up. The president’s belief in the limitless potential of 
American science, added to his dismay at the absence of defence against nuclear attack, 
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led him on a determined pursuit of his SDI “dream” throughout the 1980s.111 Its planned 
use of intricate and futuristic lasers to blast missiles out of the sky saw the initiative 
derogatively labelled “Star Wars” by its opponents, including members of the scientific 
community who rebuffed the President’s unreasonable expectations of “current 
technology.”112 Yet Reagan pressed ahead with his plans in the midst of widespread 
public apathy. With public opinion on SDI remaining mixed, Women Strike for Peace 
sought to galvanise opposition. It predicted that “Star Wars will fall on the facts of it – 
when enough people have the facts.”113 Noting public confusion and lack of knowledge 
about SDI, Ethel Taylor drafted A Basic Primer on Star Wars for the Legitimately 
Confused. A central part of WSP’s Stop Star Wars campaign, the booklet addressed “all 
those Americans who are legitimately confused by and scared of this escalation of the 
nuclear arms race into space.”114 Taylor concisely described the impossibilities of SDI’s 
planned function and spelled out the farcical nature of research into the program. 
Referencing the criticisms of renowned scientists, the booklet argued that the public had 
a right to be confused about the program, as officials had systematically “swindled” 
them through a concerted program of “disinformation and the selling of Star Wars.”115 
WSP sought to ridicule Reagan’s vision by pointing out the similarities between SDI 
and a futuristic weapon featured in Murder in the Air, a 1940 movie starring the 
President. WSP mockingly remarked that he “is now starring in another science fiction 
production.”116 
 Primer was distributed with an “educational kit” designed to help activists teach 
the intricacies of SDI to the public.117  The inclusion of a detailed slide show and 
accompanying script encouraged WSPers to lead study groups and public meetings on 
the issue. “A Short Course for the Legitimately Confused” covered the origins and 
history of the nuclear arms race before discussing SDI and the 1968 Anti-Ballistic 
Missile treaty. It then explained, in simple terms, how missile defence was expected to 
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function and the problems involved, encouraging people to “start the process of change 
where they live.”118 By combining Primer with an appealing educational show, WSP’s 
Stop Star Wars campaign proved highly popular. Fellow peace activists called it an 
“excellent tool…both informative and readable.”119 The group distributed 45,000 copies 
of the booklet in 1986. By the following year Taylor reported it had gone into its 
“eighth 10,000 printing.”120  
 
The Relevance of Women Strike for Peace 
Resurgence in antinuclear activism re-energised WSP’s members, but also allowed 
them to reflect positively on their past efforts for peace and disarmament. New medical 
research vindicated the organisation’s historic stance against atmospheric nuclear 
testing, as studies claimed that communities subjected to the fallout from 1950s 
weapons tests developed cancer in higher numbers than those in other parts of the 
country.121  A law suit brought against the government on behalf of soldiers whose 
health was affected by their involvement in weapons tests became a national scandal.122 
A plethora of books supported the notion that the government consistently misled the 
public and knowingly subjected them to harmful doses of nuclear radiation.123 News 
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headlines began to report that the radiation emitted from earlier weapons tests exceeded 
the levels dispersed by the recent Chernobyl reactor meltdown. 124  Meanwhile, the 
concept of “nuclear winter” emerged to describe the environmental effects of a nuclear 
war. In addition to the immediate death and destruction caused by thousands of multi-
megaton explosions, studies predicted that a massive release of dust and smoke reaching 
the upper atmosphere would exacerbate the already deadly effects of radiation.125 A 
“climactic catastrophe” would occur with freezing temperatures and the failure of crops 
leading to global famine and billions of deaths.126 Doctors criticised notions that the 
health service could adequately treat the wounded amidst the inevitable ruins of 
American cities.127 The government’s predications that the United States could recover 
from a war within “just two to four years” seemed recklessly naïve in light of these new 
understandings.128  
The media also exhibited antinuclear sensibilities. In February The New Yorker 
published a series of articles by journalist Jonathan Schell, depicting the implications 
and consequences of a nuclear war. The serialisation and later publication of The Fate 
of the Earth drew substantial support, eliciting praise and horror in equal measure for its 
depiction, not only of “the extinction of mankind,” but of “the death of the earth.”129 
Film and television provided their own visual interpretations of a post-nuclear world. In 
November 1983, ABC aired The Day After, a television movie following the residents 
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of Lawrence, Kansas, as they attempted, in vain, to survive a nuclear exchange between 
the US and the USSR. A wave of controversy greeted the film. Images of victims, 
unable to escape the attack and left facing certain death amidst the rubble of their idyllic 
community, proved harrowing for many. 130  The film buttressed the notion that the 
public needed a voice in discussions over nuclear policy. Similar shows ensured that 
fear of nuclear war remained visible worldwide. Countdown to Looking Glass aired on 
Canadian TV in 1984, detailing the fictional events leading up to nuclear war from the 
perspective of news anchors, while the British public witnessed a catastrophic image of 
life following a nuclear attack when Threads aired in the same year. WSP felt their 
earlier demonstrations were validated by such public displays of antinuclear views.131 
Reagan’s policies in Central America supplied another opportunity for WSPers 
to publicly celebrate their past endeavours. With revolutions and counter-revolutions 
occurring across Central America, the president saw in the region “an opportunity to 
resume the anti-communist struggle abandoned in Vietnam.”132 He invoked the notion 
of falling dominoes to justify America military.133 WSP took solace from the difficulties 
the president faced in achieving support for his policies.134 Amy Swerdlow argued that 
the “United States can’t invade Nicaragua as easily as it could have” if anti-Vietnam 
War activism had not occurred.135  Ruth Pinkson found “tremendous progress” to have 
come from the group’s earlier activism, while Donna Allen proudly declared that “we 
stopped the thing in Central America. You know we did.”136 Todd Gitlin supported 
these sentiments, suggesting that Reagan’s continuing troubles with the Vietnam 
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Syndrome owed much to the work of previous anti-war campaigns. 137  Historian 
Bradford Martin said that “it is a notable outcome of this era…that Americans do not 
speak of the ‘Nicaragua War’.”138  
The increasing numbers of female activists suggested that WSP possessed a 
legacy as a pioneering peace organisation as public descriptions of the contemporary 
antinuclear movement referenced the past activities and history of the organisation.139 
Women’s Action for Nuclear Disarmament (WAND) demonstrated the continuing 
saliency of WSP’s appeal. Following her successful revival of Physicians for Social 
Responsibility, Dr. Helen Caldicott held an influential role within the peace movement 
and, along with Randall Forsberg, represented “the growing importance of women in 
the movement.”140 She founded WAND in Cambridge, MA, taking inspiration directly 
from Women Strike for Peace. Under Caldicott's guidance the group adopted a 
maternalist outlook towards its peace work, justifying the activism of its members by 
saying “as mothers we must make sure the world is safe for our babies.”141 Its founding 
statement argued that “as women, we have traditionally been assigned the responsibility 
of caring for and raising children” and, “accustomed to managing a home, a family, and 
a job, they can organize the United States for survival.”142 Even WAND’s aims imitated 
those of Women Strike for Peace.  The group listed as its most important legislative 
priority the passage of bills “that can lead to a bilateral testing moratorium and eventual 
negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty.”143 Though feminist commentators, such 
as Simone DeBeauvoir, remained critical of organising around maternal identity, 
WAND’s soaring membership showed the latent power of such a stance.144 
The rise of women’s peace camps in the early 1980s also raised interest in 
WSP’s historical example. The Greenham Common Peace Camp made headlines 
worldwide in 1981 for its direct action tactics against the stationing of American cruise 
missiles at RAF Greenham Common. Women chained themselves to the perimeter 
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fence, blockaded deliveries, and infiltrated the base. The peace camp inspired a wave of 
similar protest actions around the world. Peace encampments formed across the United 
States, notably at Puget Sound in Seattle and outside the Lawrence Livermore National 
Laboratory in California. The most significant iteration developed in Seneca, New 
York. Formed over summer 1983, the Seneca Women’s Encampment for a Future of 
Peace and Justice drew thousands to an area outside the Seneca Army Depot. Protesting 
the depot’s complicity in deporting missiles to Europe, the camp became a “bold 
experiment in a communal life of nonviolence” and a staging point for several acts of 
direct action protest.145 Women Strike for Peace had a notable role in the organising and 
maintenance of camps in the UK and the US. WSPers travelled to Greenham Common 
to offer their support, while activists remaining in the US served as contacts and 
organisational staffers for the Seneca Peace Encampment. Across the country WSPers 
added to the numbers engaged in demonstrations and acts of civil disobedience.146  
New activists were eager to learn about the history of the women’s peace 
movement. Jill Liddington, a contributor to Greenham Common, explained that the 
upsurge in activities stoked “curiosity about precedents” and provoked the question, 
“did women do anything for peace before Greenham?”147 Attempting to create a forum 
for integration, information sharing, dialogue, and action, the Seneca Women’s Peace 
Encampment offered a summer program of workshops dealing with issues relating to 
women and peace.148 Workshops celebrated “herstory” and placed the recent upsurge in 
protest within a long history of women’s activism.149 As activists became aware of past 
influences, the story of Women Strike for Peace was disseminated to a new generation. 
A pamphlet explaining the peace camp phenomenon stated that “seeds for believing the 
effectiveness of such actions” came from previously successful instances of feminist 
organising, such as the “women’s peace strike of 1961.” The piece continued by 
equating the impact of Women Strike for Peace with the historic 1848 Seneca Falls 
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Women’s Rights Convention.150 Workshops taught the history of “Women in the Peace 
Movement” by describing centuries of women’s efforts before reciting the “herstory of 
WSP.”151  Dagmar Wilson provided services as a guest lecturer for courses discussing 
the “roots of the women’s peace movement” and the publication of Amy Swerdlow’s 
first historical article on Women Strike for Peace, the celebrated “Ladies’ Day at the 
Capitol,” drew praise for its contextual relevance to women’s activism of the 1980s.152 
 The fortunes of the contemporary peace movement validated WSP’s historic 
efforts and raised the importance of the group’s history, but also determined the way 
activists framed their own experiences. The testimony of Esther Newill, a key figure 
from Riverdale WSP in New York, provides an excellent example of this. The 
Women’s Peace Oral History Project interviewed Newill in 1980, just prior to Reagan’s 
election and in the midst of Carter’s rising militarism. In this context, Newill offered a 
sobering reflection of her time with Women Strike for Peace. She condemned the 
group’s early reluctance to oppose the Vietnam War, referred to frequent divisions 
within groups, and offered a near-conspiratorial account of leading figures stymying 
grassroots voices. Reflecting on the contemporary peace movement, she chastised 
WSP’s “Jobs for Peace” campaign that intended to lobby Congress and call for the 
diversion of military funds towards work programs. Newill declared, “so far as I’m 
concerned this is just a lot of bullshit. Memorialize Congress? Why, these bastards are 
the same ones that have been approving more money for the war machine than any 
president has asked for!”153 Newill's diatribe offered a pointedly pessimistic reflection 
of the contemporary disarmament movement as she bemoaned her own inability to 
become enthused by its efforts. “I’m old and tired now, I want results! I’m not 
interested in any kind of an effort that does not have, well, I want a 75% chance of 
success!”154 
 Just three years later, Newill appeared transformed. She became involved with 
direct action protests at the Livermore weapons development facility in California in 
1983 that resulted in the mass arrest of hundreds of protesters and their detention in the 
                                                 
150 “Why a Women’s Peace Camp?” AU WSP Archives, Box 14, Seneca Women’s Peace Encampment, 
1983-1984. 
151 “Women in the Peace Movement: Conference on the Fate of the Earth, 22 September 1984,” AU WSP 
Archives, Box 14, Seneca Women’s Peace Encampment, 1983-1984. 
152 “Women in the Peace Movement,” AU WSP Archives, Box 8, Greenham Common Women, 1983-
1987; Ruth Milkman and Rayna Rapp, “Preface,” Feminist Studies, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Autumn 1982): 491-
492. 
153 Newill interview, 23 February 1980, ARS.0056. 
154 Ibid. 
  
255 
  
Santa Rita Women’s Jail. In an impudent twist, the protesters decided to call the prison 
the “Santa Rita Peace Camp” for the duration of their stay. They remade the prison in 
the image of the Greenham Common and Seneca Peace Camps, offering educational 
workshops, nightly entertainment shows, and art classes. The protesters’ jovial attitude 
won over several guards. The whole experience refreshed Newill. She recounted with 
humour her involvement with the Livermore protests and the Santa Rita Peace Camp. 
Departing from the sentiments expressed in her earlier interview, she praised WSP, 
remarking that its idea that “everyone is a leader and no one is a leader” created “a long 
and painful process, but my gosh it works!” Her faith in the peace movement renewed, 
she encouraged others to join the cause, claiming that “we’re unbeatable.” Newill 
continued by stating her belief that “in the course of winning this struggle, and I know 
we’re going to win, we’re going to change society!”155 The transformation in tone, from 
downhearted pessimism to unbridled positivity, reflected the persuasive influence of 
contemporary circumstances on Newill’s memory. As the fortunes of the movement 
improved and instances of activism increased, members of Women Strike for Peace 
adopted a more positive outlook on their past efforts. They saw their actions as “part of 
an ongoing process” that, they believed, would result in the attainment of their goals.156 
While providing WSPers with relevant contemporary issues to inform their histories, 
the rising fortunes of the United States peace and disarmament movement allowed 
Women Strike for Peace to reflect positively on their past achievements.  
 
The End of Women Strike for Peace 
Although individual activists felt rejuvenated, the future of their organisation did not 
appear bright as it moved into the latter half of the decade. Members continued to 
wrestle with the problems that had plagued WSP since its inception, as national 
meetings revived past uncertainties over membership and finances. Addressing the 1984 
national conference, Pat Gross voiced her exasperation at the perceived inability to 
make the organisation appealing to potential activists. “Although WSP has not lost 
ground, it is barely holding its own…now is an ideal time to increase our membership, 
but HOW?!”157 One activist remarked in March 1983, that “the sad fact is that in 22 
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years we have less branches than when we started and the same people are in positions 
of leadership.”158  Unease grew over the group’s aging character. Ethel Taylor remarked 
at the 1986 national conference that “25 years ago, our feet didn’t hurt, our eyesight was 
keener, and we had more of a waistline.”159 She saw the recruitment of young members 
as an urgent necessity if WSP was to groom the future of the organisation. WSPers 
worried that “we are not developing a replaceable leadership.”160 Los Angeles WISPer 
Mary Clarke observed in 1970 that “our natural allies in our work are our sons and 
daughters, a generation that has inherited our mistakes and problems, but a generation 
that has taken heart from our challenge.”161 But older activists began to recognise their 
inability to entice their children to join. Ethel Taylor’s daughter, while proud of her 
mother’s efforts, did not herself “take time for activism.”162 
Financial uncertainty still clouded WSP’s future. East Bay WFP persisted in 
their criticisms of the National Office, raising their concerns over the costs of upkeep 
amidst the “financial problems besetting our organisation.”163 That WSP should retain a 
“unique identity” remained a popular belief. Repeating the anxiety experienced over the 
group’s earlier involvement in anti-war coalitions, some stressed their fear that 
involvement in issues unrelated to nuclear disarmament could see WSP “end up a group 
of women without a real purpose.”164 
WSP’s problems were exacerbated by the group’s inability to adapt to a modern 
era of social protest. In the early 1980s, many organisations recognised that they needed 
to adopt a more professional approach towards their work than previous groups that 
relied almost exclusively on direct action tactics. John Trinkl, addressing the 
disarmament movement specifically, noted that “too many progressive grassroots 
organisations are wedded to old-fashioned notions about citizen participation.” In the 
1980s, he added, building a mass movement had less utility than “motivating grassroots 
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activists to execute a simple financial transaction – writing a small but substantial 
check.” 165  WAND confronted this necessity, conducting a nine-month research 
initiative into organisational strategy. The group accepted that “tremendous social and 
technological change,” including the development of telecommunications and the 
“complexity of everyday life,” necessitated a reassessment in how it communicated with 
the public.166 WAND acknowledged that its programs should consider that most people 
now “would prefer to write a check and delegate management responsibility to a trained 
professional staff.”167 The group felt that the majority of the public now understood the 
dangers and consequences of nuclear war and did not need further convincing. It instead 
set out to tackle policy at a governmental level. Professional lobbyists, complemented 
by donor networks and financial contributions, appeared the most effective way to 
achieve this. The Freeze movement also engaged with political processes and formed 
political action committees to “manipulate the technology and organisation of 
contemporary campaigning.”168 Bradford Martin suggests that, while heavily influenced 
by their 1960s predecessors, the majority of 1980s activists started to develop “new 
tactical innovations…to supplement 1960s-style direct action.”169 
Some WSP leaders attempted to update the organisation’s operations and 
conspired to create the WSP Foundation: Women Strike for Peace Research and 
Education Fund, Inc. Unveiled at the 1982 national conference, the creators explained 
their motives. The foundation would grant tax-exempt status to WSP for the first time, 
making it comparable to its contemporaries, such as WILPF, while yielding more 
financial benefits.170 The foundation promised an easier method of fundraising and the 
prospect of achieving donations from sources who exclusively offered grants to tax-
deductible organisations. 171  The appearance of the fund’s label on WSP campaign 
documents certainly made the group appear more professional, as well as assuring 
potential donors that “all contributions are tax deductible.”172  
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 WSP also began implementing official membership, reversing its lifelong 
opposition to such an organisational system. Jean Shulman broke news of the change to 
activists. She reassured women that requesting membership dues did not signify a 
departure from WSP’s past initiatives that sought yearly subscription payments in return 
for issues of the group’s newsletter. Shulman reasoned that most activists already 
“proudly proclaim ‘I am a member of WSP’ and consider their subscription 
synonymous with being a member of WSP” anyway. She argued that official 
membership simply formalised an existing system. 173  East Bay WFPer Edith Laub 
supported the new system. In the past, she explained, potential activists interested in 
joining WSP expressed “some unhappiness” when told “we were not a membership 
organisation. There are people who feel there is something more stable, valuable, 
meaningful in an organisation that gives you a card.”174 Supporters hoped that official 
membership would attract new activists, while the distribution of membership cards to 
existing WSPers would renew pride in the organisation among those already committed.  
 Those accustomed to the traditional methods, however, appeared uncomfortable 
with attempts to change WSP and expressed their discontent. Dagmar Wilson, at this 
stage more involved with Loudoun County Citizens for Disarmament, wrote of her 
unhappiness at modifications to WSP's organising. Edith Villastrigo, the National 
Legislative Director, also voiced concerns.175  New processes caused “quite a bit of 
confusion,” obliging Secretary Ruth Tabak to distribute a step by step guide of the 
organisation’s latest procedures.176 While some urged WSP to revert to its previous 
setup, those wishing to modernise grew exasperated with what they saw as stubborn 
unwillingness to adapt to contemporary circumstances.177 
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 Reluctance to alter WSP’s processes arose from more than simple uncertainty 
over new processes. Those in opposition to modernisation efforts were concerned that 
changes to the group’s methods could profoundly alter its very identity. WSP had 
forever publicised its members as non-political housewives agreeing on decisions by 
consensus and stressed that the structureless format of the group was an outgrowth of 
their attitudes towards activism and community organising generally. Attempts to 
change Women Strike for Peace into a more professional unit therefore troubled its 
activists on a personal level. Couching their opposition to the new membership policy in 
practical terms, Washington D.C. WSPers nevertheless opined that making Women 
Strike for Peace “a membership organisation and an activist women’s movement” 
deeply affected them personally. 178  Edith Laub, who continued to support the 
modernisation of WSP, acknowledged that “our women were terrified of losing their 
identity, their privacy, their ‘differentness’” should WSP try to change its method of 
organising.179  
As such, in contrast to other failing organisations, WSPers maintained a 
vigorous sense of their organisation’s identity and image.180  Even updates made to 
WSP’s newsletters yielded critiques of the group’s attempts to modernise. Following 
some redesigns, a complaint suggested that WSP no longer held its former appeal. The 
organisation now appeared “to have enough money to hire editors” and “pay for 
printing,” signalling a departure from its previously unsophisticated methods. “Hurrah 
for your becoming more affluent,” the complaint continued, “but you attract me less.” 
That the organisation now owned a word processor meant it had “enough money,” and 
therefore should no longer need to request funds from its supporters. The letter 
ruminated on the amateur qualities of past mailings, “mimeographed, stapled together. 
It gave me the impression that here were women really working for peace, an 
inexpensive voice crying in the wilderness that touched my heart and made me 
contribute.”181 By updating the newsletter to a “modern format,” the complainant felt 
that WSP had betrayed its own identity. 
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 Aversion to modernisation also hindered WSP’s ability to adapt to the changing 
status of women in the 1980s. In its 1960s heyday the organisation depended on people 
to volunteer their time by providing administrative and organisational help without pay. 
The assent of women’s liberation, however, empowered women to demand payment for 
these sorts of tasks. The National Organisation for Women (NOW) took the position 
that volunteering was akin to unpaid housework and extended women’s domestic 
subordination into the public sphere. NOW observed that modern-middle class women 
felt that such work conferred “little status” and reinforced women’s low self-image.182 
WSP acknowledged these sentiments. Leaders stated that “these are different times than 
25 years ago. Women need to work for money.” They observed that “the full-time 
volunteers who used to be available are not available anymore” and accepted that “two 
of our most active, loyal younger Philadelphia members” would look for part-time 
paying jobs and limit their contributions to WSP.183 But the organisation still struggled 
to adapt to this modern climate and chose not install more paid positions. Rather than it 
being “a reflection on the worth of the organisation,” WSP’s leaders felt these 
circumstances were “a reflection of reality” they could do little to change.184 
Many groups experienced similar problems in this period. Assessing WSP’s 
recruitment of new, young activists, Libby Frank asserted that “Church Women United” 
and WILPF also wrestled with membership issues. She noted that, at one meeting, she 
“sat next to” the 65-year-old William Sloane Coffin, President of SANE/Freeze and a 
veteran of the peace movement. “He spoke at a WILPF luncheon in NYC and he thinks 
he was the youngest person there!”185 But more robust peer organisations absorbed such 
challenges and actually expanded their membership in this period.  By early 1985 
SANE boasted over 100,000 members. WAND’s professional approach appealed to 
young female activists who swelled its ranks to 25,000. Meanwhile, the rigid 
organisation and historic prestige of WILPF ensured that it progressed throughout the 
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decade.186 WSP’s persistence in its loose organisational structure, in contrast, saw it ill-
equipped to deal with the issue. Discussions at national conferences conceded that it 
could not compete with its rivals. Its “sister group WILPF” appealed to WSP’s 
constituency, but was in a better position to do so, while “many women have already 
joined” SANE or WAND.187 
Ultimately Women Strike for Peace appeared unable to cultivate sustained 
commitment to its organisation from anyone but the loyal leadership that had served 
since the early 1960s. The widespread public distribution of WSP materials, such as the 
“1 in 20 Acceptable Dead” ads and the Stop Star Wars Primer, masked poor 
participation in WSP events. Only 22 women attended the 1982 Philadelphia national 
conference, while 29 travelled to Berkeley the following year, substantially lower than 
the near 100 members expected to attend in previous decades.188 National Coordinator 
Ethel Taylor initiated most of WSP’s projects during the 1980s as she felt solely 
responsible for the instigation of national campaigns.189 The burden on WSP’s leaders 
to keep the organisation going became clear in the aftermath of Shirley Lens’ 
withdrawal from Chicago WFP. Lens had influenced activities in the Chicago area since 
the branch’s foundation. On announcing her decision to retire in 1986, the branch 
panicked and, in her absence, felt it would struggle “to keep Women for Peace as a 
viable group.” Writing to its members, branch staff exhorted that “we will have to pitch 
in to help fill the gap.”190 By the end of the decade, Taylor acknowledged that, although 
WSP had made a “real national contribution in grassroots education” in the last few 
                                                 
186 Wittner, Confronting the Bomb, 156. 
187 “In Preparation for 1983 WSP Conference: Issue for Discussion – Reexamination of WSP 
Membership Policy,” SCPC WSP Archives, ACC 2013-050, Box 17, 21st Annual National Conference; 
“Minutes National Conference 1984, Presentation of Organizational Matters by Pat Gross,” SCPC WSP 
Archives, ACC 90A-028, Box 1, Conference 1984. 
188 Attendance at the 1962 national conference was 105, 82 participated in 1964, 76 WSP activists took 
part in 1966, while 82 travelled to Santa Barbara in 1972, at a time many considered the group to be at a 
nadir; “WISP Conference, Ann Arbor – June ‘62,” SCPC WSP Archives, A1, Box 1, National 
Conference – 1962, Ann Arbor MI; “Roster – 1964 National Conference of WSP,” SCPC WSP 
Archives, A1, Box 1, National Conference – 1964, Winnetka IL; “Women Strike for Peace – 6th Annual 
Conference – Attenders,” SCPC WSP Archives, A1, Box 1, National Conference – 1966, Chicago IL; 
“W.S.P. National Conference, 1972,” SCPC WSP Archives, A1, Box 1, National Conference – 1972, 
Santa Barbara CA; “Registration of Delegates to 1983 WSP Conference – Berkeley, CA,” SCPC WSP 
Archives, ACC 90A-028, Box 1, Conference 1983; “Minutes of the WSP National Conference, 
Monday, 4 October 1982,” SCPC WSP Archives, ACC 90A-028, Box 1, National Conference 1982 and 
Prior. 
189 Taylor, We Made a Difference, 129. 
190 “Letter from Noreen Warnock,” CHM WFP Archives, 8-11, Misc Administration Materials. 
  
262 
  
years, the National Office only survived thanks to the “continuous painful struggle on 
the part of a few of us to maintain it” and the “financial generosity” of several others.191  
WSP’s decline seemed inevitable. Despite its best efforts, the public viewed the 
organisation as peripheral and ineffectual compared to newer groups. Judy Mann, a 
journalist who wrote about the politics of the women’s movement, lamented that British 
peace activists visiting the US chose to base their operations in the headquarters of 
Women Strike for Peace, “which is hardly the political arm of the League of Women 
Voters.”192 A rumour circulating around San Francisco in 1984 claimed that Women for 
Peace was “dead.”193 By the end of the decade WSP members accepted “we are no 
longer visible and viable as a national movement. Although our cause is vital and 
connected to other causes, it is for the other causes that women are marching.”194 
 
“Unfinished Business” and Defining Success 
By the mid-1980s, the surge of optimism within the peace movement again receded. In 
addition to the fading fortunes of SANE, WSP, and the Freeze campaign, the 1984 re-
election of Ronald Reagan served to undermine the confidence of many peace activists 
within the United States.195  Defeated Vice-Presidential Candidate Geraldine Ferraro 
opined that the Democratic campaign could not have hoped to scupper the incumbent’s 
chances. Even though many voters agreed with the Democratic platform, Reagan’s 
“style had been more appealing to the voters than his substance…his politics of 
optimism, of never being the bearer of bad news, had catapulted him into popularity – 
and victory.” 196  WSPers, having campaigned for Walter Mondale, seethed with 
frustration at his defeat. Amy Swerdlow, now less involved with WSP, recalled wanting 
to “tear my hair out and say ‘for heaven’s sake, what’s going on in this country?!’”197 
The huge Republican victory came as a blow to Freeze activists who had hoped to 
influence the election. McCrea and Markle noted that the movement itself “began to fall 
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apart” in 1985.198 Randy Kehler, one of the leaders of the Freeze campaign, explained 
that “the movement suffered from having a support based that was ‘a mile wide and an 
inch deep.’” 199  In 1987 the Nuclear Weapons Freeze Campaign merged with the 
similarly struggling Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, renaming themselves Peace 
Action. 
 Those still working within Women Strike for Peace retained confidence and 
offered an altogether more positive attitude, refusing to dwell on the apparent setbacks 
they faced.  While the organisation’s strength depleted, individuals resolved to dig in for 
“four more years of Reagan.”200 Some voiced determined optimism on his re-election. 
At the 1984 national conference, Pat Gross declared that “now is an ideal time to 
increase our membership.”201 Ethel Taylor supported such an attitude, believing that 
“the Reagan victory will be the prod to goose millions of Americans into the peace 
force because of fear.”202 East Bay WFP activist Rose Dellamonica asserted that, while 
nuclear weapons continued to exist, “the job doesn’t end and the responsibility doesn’t 
end – I will probably have this sense of responsibility until the end of my life.”203  
Underlying this tenacity was an understanding that Women Strike for Peace had 
to tie up loose ends before it collapsed. The group had “unresolved business,” chiefly 
the passing of a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). In May 1985, WSP publicly 
endorsed Joint Resolution 3 legislation that urged President Reagan “to resume talks 
with the Soviets for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty.”204 In their statement the 
organisation invoked their own historical legacy, tying the CTBT to their earlier 
campaign for the Partial Test Ban Treaty. “President Kennedy’s Limited Test Ban 
Treaty pledged signers ‘to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear 
weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end.’ This commitment is yet 
to be fulfilled.” Emphasising their determination, WSPers declared “a ban on all nuclear 
explosions is the unfinished goal of Women Strike for Peace.”205  
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 Acknowledging the context in which activists recorded their history proves 
crucial to understanding their perspectives of Women Strike for Peace. With activists 
unrelentingly pursuing disarmament as the organisation declined, leading WSPers 
began offering their interpretations of the past in a series of interviews given to the 
Women’s Peace Oral History Project. But the varying commitments of those offering 
their reflections affected their perceptions of the group’s historical legacy. Notable 
differences emerged between those who remained active and those who had withdrawn. 
Amy Swerdlow, active in WSP only in a peripheral sense by the late 1980s, did not 
think it remained a relevant organisation. She acknowledged “I’m not that faithful in 
Women Strike for Peace…I don’t see myself as one of those women who kept 
marching.” This attitude towards activism appeared to influence her appraisal of WSP. 
Asked whether she had any advice to “a young person” wishing to get involved, she 
answered, “I would not send them to Women Strike for Peace” over other organisations. 
Based on Swerdlow’s contemporary attitude, it is perhaps unsurprising that her history 
of Women Strike for Peace placed the organisation in the context of the 1960s and early 
1970s. Its later activities did not seem relevant to the story Amy Swerdlow wished to 
tell. Throughout her 1987 oral interview she referred to the group in the past tense, 
despite its ongoing activities. She exclaimed that she would “hit the streets” again in the 
cause of peace, but her reduced interest in activism affected the way in which she 
addressed Women Strike for Peace.206 
 In contrast, existing members of the organisation exhibited a more positive 
reflection of the group’s continuing efforts than those no longer involved. Attitudes 
towards the group were not necessarily informed by the fortunes of the organisation as 
it declined towards the end of the 1980s, but by the ongoing belief that efforts towards 
disarmament had to continue. Ethel Taylor in particular felt the upkeep of WSP’s status 
as her personal burden. While Swerdlow could arguably take a more objective view of 
Women Strike for Peace, Taylor’s position as National Coordinator saw her defend the 
organisation’s work.207 In their interviews for the Women’s Peace Oral History Project 
in 1987, both she and Edith Villastrigo, the organisation’s National Legislative Director 
and essentially Taylor’s second-in-command, made deliberate efforts to praise WSP’s 
current activities.  They spoke of the “One in Twenty Million” Campaign and ongoing 
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efforts to cut funding for the Strategic Defence Initiative.208 While Swerdlow consigned 
WSP to history, Taylor considered the group’s late 1980s work “our most successful 
campaign.”209 
Additionally, the current WSPers proclaimed their enduring affinity with the 
group. Taylor spoke of Women Strike for Peace as “the most important entity” in her 
life. The organisation took on abstract qualities for the national coordinator, becoming 
“more than an organisation; it’s a state of mind.” In glowing terms, both Taylor and 
Villastrigo emphasised the transformative experience of working for peace and the 
harmonious community they encountered after becoming involved.210 The reflections 
offered by remaining WSP activists represented what William Howarth and Martha 
Solomon understood as “oratorical autobiography,” in that their motivations for 
recording the past determined what they recalled and how they recalled it. 211   In 
discussing their life stories current WSPers wished to create “a tool for recruiting new 
members” and provide an “inspirational model for followers” 212  Activists still 
embroiled in peace work did not offer reflections of the past from a teleological position 
but in the midst of their campaigning. As such they tied the history of Women Strike for 
Peace to the belief that their work was ongoing, offering an appraisal of the past that 
entailed a defence of the group’s continuing relevance. WSPers promoted an idealised 
vision of their peace work as a vocation that others should become involved in, whether 
or not WSP survived.213 
This perception explains the emphasis that activists placed on the personal 
fulfilment they experienced by participating in WSP’s campaigns. The transformative 
impact of working for the peace movement appeared through Taylor’s descriptions of 
the group’s past. She described herself as a housewife following her marriage in 1937. 
“I cleaned a lot” she wrote in her memoir, to the extent that she was “polishing the 
polish.”214 As a result of working in Women Strike for Peace, Taylor’s life changed. 
She proudly recalled her work as national coordinator of an internationally recognised 
peace group. Recounting her trip to Hanoi in December 1969, she gauged the progress 
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she had made in her life from childhood. “It blew my mind that little Ethel Barol, child 
of the Depression, formerly of Longstreth School, was standing with a baby in her 
arms in Hanoi, North Vietnam, as an emissary of the US women’s peace 
movement.” 215  Other narratives also revealed stories of members’ political 
transformation. Dagmar Wilson is frequently referred to as a “political novice,” 
someone with “no political experience” who managed to organise a nationally 
supported political movement that received recognition from around the world.216 Amy 
Swerdlow believed Women Strike for Peace created an environment for American 
women to become empowered. She explained that “thousands of women who had 
identified themselves only as housewives found to their surprise that they could do 
serious research.”217  In this sense, the depiction of Women Strike for Peace is altered 
from that of a group strictly concerned with peace to one that intended to change the 
lives of its activists. This fits the notion that members offered oratorical 
autobiographies with their recollections. It was through gauging their own 
transformation, as members of Women Strike for Peace, that activists shared their life 
stories. 
The underlying motivations driving WSPers’ historical pronouncements are vital 
to understanding perceptions of the organisation’s successes. Ethel Taylor used a 
number of rhetorical flourishes to demonstrate WSP’s continuing relevance, but one 
technique in particular involved distancing Women Strike for Peace from any notion 
that it had achieved its aims. One anecdote in particular served to emphasise the 
perception that the organisation remained an irreverent and outspoken critic of the 
establishment. Following the National Women’s Conference in 1977, Taylor was 
personally invited by President Jimmy Carter to attend a reception at the White House. 
On arriving she was stopped by a security guard for additional checks. Taylor asked 
why she alone had been subject to such scrutiny. The guard replied, “there's a bad Ethel 
Taylor out there and we had to make sure it wasn’t you.”218 Taylor revelled in the story 
and retold it on many occasions. “If only he knew!” she later quipped. “I silently 
cackled and went on to join my colleagues.”219  
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Social movement theorists, notably William Gamson, suggest that a group’s 
relationship with opposition figures can be used to gauge success. Gamson argued that 
the level of “acceptance of a challenging group by its antagonists, as a valid spokesman 
for a legitimate set of interests,” could show a group’s impact.220 Likewise, acceptance 
of a group by the public, through its position “as spokespeople for the cause concerned” 
would also demonstrate a measure of success.221 David S. Meyer, writing about the 
Freeze campaign specifically, argued that “social movements end when they are 
institutionalised, that is, when they have found a means of accommodation with 
established political institutions and society.”222 In keeping with the perception that 
WSP had “unfinished business,” Taylor publicly put distance between Women Strike 
for Peace and the authority figures it protested against.223 
The retelling of Taylor’s anecdote provides two useful insights. First, it 
demonstrates the leader’s perception of her ideal role - a subversive, rebellious figure 
who displayed irreverence towards authority. The anecdote became a source of pride for 
the peace activist, who gleefully assumed the identity of “Bad Ethel Taylor,” a constant 
check on the government’s otherwise rampant militarism. Taylor closely tied her own 
identity to the image of Women Strike for Peace through her role as national 
coordinator. By referring to her own conduct, she argued that WSP remained important 
critics of government policy. Second, by foregrounding WSP’s work in the late 1970s 
with reference to this brief incident, the national coordinator attempted to distance WSP 
from establishment figures that had actually supported the group’s work. Indeed, during 
President Carter’s term in office, WSP activists generally boasted that the 
administration tacitly endorsed the group’s work. Taylor herself worked closely with 
the IWY Committee having received the personal approval of President Carter. Midge 
Costanza, Carter’s liaison with non-governmental organisations, was a WSP supporter 
who managed to set up a meeting between activists and representatives of the Defence 
Department, the ACDA, and the National Security Council.224 However, Taylor felt that 
being considered “bad” by the security services better served WSP’s image than that of 
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it being welcomed into government circles as valid spokespeople for the peace 
movement.  
Given her strong affinity for Women Strike for Peace, other reflections on the 
group’s successes made by Taylor seem oddly pessimistic. She reflected that “to work 
for something or to have a job and rarely have a real success, never see the light, you 
can really go nuts.”225 She almost entirely dismissed the impact WSP had on nuclear 
disarmament and regretted that the passage of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, previously an 
emblem of WSP’s historical victories, did not yield further gains. Taylor remarked that 
on her entry into peace activism “there were two bombs, and they were both ours. Now 
there are 50,000 in the world.”226 This candid assessment was not totally unique within 
the anti-nuclear movement. Activists had a contemporary realisation that, while the 
Partial Test Ban Treaty made grounds, nuclear weapons testing had not completely 
ceased.227 Measuring the success of a peace activist group entails certain caveats, such 
as understanding that even small steps can count as achievements, especially if the goal 
is as difficult to obtain as general world disarmament.228 However, Taylor downplayed 
any notions of WSP’s success in favour of highlighting a perceived failure. As if to 
cement the perception that her fortunes were tied to those of Women Strike for Peace, 
she took the failure to secure general nuclear disarmament as a personal defeat, calling 
it something that would “look lousy on your resume.”229 
Understanding the intent behind Taylor’s recollections, however, this 
declaration appears less a despondent reflection on WSP’s history and more an 
incentive to continue working for peace. Taylor offered her perceptions in the midst of 
her activism, rather than from a teleological position. She remained energetically 
committed to peace work and looked to future goals. Because nuclear disarmament had 
not been achieved, she determined that women needed to continue mobilising and 
acting for peace.230 The tone of her recollections mirrored the pronouncements made by 
Taylor during her tenure as WSP’s National Coordinator. She wrote off the Partial Test 
Ban Treaty in 1973 as “less than half of what we wanted,” quashing the potential for 
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members to feel that their work was complete.231 A notice to branch leaders in March 
1989, urged WSPers to resolve the group’s “unfinished business,” the securing of a 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, within the next decade.232 Though referring to myriad 
small successes achieved during the Vietnam War and the widespread acceptance of 
antinuclear sentiments by the general public, Taylor discredited the notion that WSP 
had achieved what it had set out to achieve in 1961 out of a belief that, by highlighting 
the work still to be done, she could spur potential activists to join the peace 
movement. 233  Her later memoir built upon stories shared in oral interviews that 
continued to proclaim this message. Taylor argued that “the reason for WSP’s existence 
since 1961 was the eradication of these weapons as a step toward universal 
disarmament. It still is.”  
 The glowing reflections of their group’s impact aside, WSP leaders were unable 
to stymie the organisation’s inexorable decline. Faced with “galloping attrition in 
membership all over the country” and diminishing public influence, WSP began a two-
year initiative in November 1988, tasked with “building, growing, and maintaining” 
WSP “as a national organisation.”234 But the attempt to rally members was in vain. In 
February 1990, a national board of representatives from across the country made the 
decision to close the National Office. “With a heavy heart,” leaders broke the sad news 
to their branches and Ethel Taylor wrote “a difficult letter” to WSP members explaining 
the reasons for the closure.235  She offered her resignation and, without a National 
Office, felt her plans for future involvement “in abeyance.”236 Key women attempted to 
calm WSP members by intimating that the absence of a National Office would not end 
the organisation. Nevertheless, the news brought considerable upset.237 On 15 March 
1990, Women Strike for Peace closed the doors to its National Office. 
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 Any sense that members had ended their 29-year commitment to peace activism 
soon vanished. Individuals resolved to continue their campaigns locally under their 
existing Women Strike for Peace monikers. A “Transitional Coordinating Committee,” 
set up in April 1990, heard that Seattle members felt it “unanimous for WSP to 
continue.” New York WSPer Celia Fink reported that the branch had “got 82 renewals 
recently.” 238  Initiatives continued in Los Angeles, East Bay, Seattle, New York, 
Philadelphia, and Washington D.C. Though the Cold War drew to a close, members 
vowed to maintain pressure on the government. With President Bush hesitating on arms 
control and conflict brewing in the Persian Gulf, activists saw further avenues of 
protest. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty continued to elude negotiators and gave 
more motivation to WSP’s continuing members.239  Although their organisation had 
diminished significantly, their individual sensibilities allowed them to take comfort in 
their past achievements and look to the future with optimism and determination. In 
1998, Ethel Taylor published her own anecdotal account of her time with Women Strike 
for Peace. She closed her story with the forceful assertion that “we made a 
difference.”240 
In announcing the decision to close the National Office, Ethel Taylor offered her 
thoughts. “I think we should feel good about ourselves and nothing lasts forever. We 
have done fantastic things and broken ground in the forefront of other groups. But that’s 
not now.”241 The statement encapsulated the attitudes of WSP activists in the 1980s. In 
a practical sense, the organisation faded without much struggle, despite some campaigns 
exhibiting the group’s ability to engage with public concerns. Yet the state of the 
organisation did not diminish the resolve of activists who felt optimism towards the 
future and vindication of their past efforts. They felt their campaign had been successful 
in the sense that the public’s stance on nuclear weapons and American military 
intervention generally reflected WSP’s historic concerns. As most of the history relating 
to the group was compiled and recorded in this decade, WSP’s experience of the 1980s 
is vital to understanding how the organisation has since come to be perceived.  
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Although spent as an organisational force by 1990, positive reflections offered by 
members in this period would forever inform perspectives on WSP’s history. But 
attitudes towards the past were complex. In reflecting on their past, WSPers took into 
account the contemporary state of the peace movement, their own commitments towards 
peace activism, and their optimism for future achievements. Of equal importance was 
the motivation each activist held towards offering their recollection. WSPers, past and 
present, held very different perceptions of the organisation. The complexity of WSP’s 
1980s experience demonstrates the importance of understanding contemporary context 
when assessing the perceptions activists hold towards their history. 
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Conclusion: “Who Are These Women?” 
 
In 1962, sociologist Elise Boulding conducted a survey of WSP participants. 
Intending to shed light on the personalities involved in the “new social phenomenon,” 
Boulding’s guiding question became the title of her study; “who are these women?”1 
If ambiguity surrounded the organisation in its early years, by the time Women 
Strike for Peace closed the National Office its activists had developed and articulated 
a vigorous, monolithic historical narrative describing the group’s formation, its 
activities, successes, and values. In their personal recollections, WSPers portrayed a 
consistent image of the organisation as a close-knit group of like-minded women, 
united in their maternal fear for the world’s children. They described themselves as 
politically inexperienced housewives who, against all odds, influenced arms 
limitation agreements, ended the Vietnam War, and stymied the influence of the US 
military. Former members contended that they were not just part of an organisation, 
but a lifestyle. Women Strike for Peace was the “most important entity” beyond their 
immediate families and remained a part of their life beyond the years they were 
involved in its activities.2 Such was their confidence in the identity of WSP, leading 
figures affirmed that they considered “all women to be WSPers.”3 Simultaneously, in 
offering their impressions of the organisation, members could not help but impose 
their own sense of themselves into their stories of Women Strike for Peace 
This thesis provides the first assessment of WSP beyond the context of its test 
ban and anti-Vietnam War activism, expanding its history to assess its role within the 
peace and social justice movements of the 1970s and 1980s. It is the first study to 
give in-depth consideration to the latter two-thirds of the organisation’s life and 
document the closure of WSP’s National Office in 1990. It, therefore, fills a notable 
gap in the historiography while demonstrating the importance of this period for 
assessing recollections and historical descriptions of the group. Previously 
overlooked events in WSP’s history provide valuable insight into the attitudes of its 
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members, allowing fresh perspectives on the character, identity, and history of the 
organisation. 
 
Memory and Identity 
This thesis offers a methodological model for unpacking complex social movement 
organisations through engagement with memory studies. It explores the dynamics 
involved in the construction of history and memory in order to create a more 
comprehensive understanding of WSP’s identity. In doing so, it shows the fragility of 
historical assessments provided by former activists, demonstrating that recollections 
were influenced by a number of observable factors, including personal identity, 
social pressures, contextual circumstances, geographic location, and gender. 
Accounting for these influences provides a more accurate historical assessment of 
Women Strike for Peace. But, as Lisa Tetrault succinctly explains, questioning the 
construction of history and memory does not mean declaring existing perceptions 
“false.” Instead, the dissertation reveals alternative understandings of the past while 
explaining the significance of established narratives for perceptions of a group.4 It 
understands that the story of Women Strike for Peace “had to be created by people,” 
who infused their own version of the past “over other possible events, with a 
particular kind of meaning.”5 In order to grant the history of WSP “the respect it 
deserves” the study documents how and why the prevailing version of WSP’s past 
came about. 6  Acknowledging the alternative experiences of activists, the myriad 
external pressures on individual recollections, and the pervasive influence of identity 
on memory, this thesis demonstrates that existing work reflects only part of WSP’s 
story. 
From the group’s founding in autumn 1961, WSP’s key women claimed to 
marshal the support of housewives and mothers from across America. While many 
participants did identify with their domestic role, the decision to foreground the 
image of motherhood no doubt arose from savvy considerations of the contemporary 
cultural and political climate. Nevertheless, this image instructed WSP activists how 
to identify as a part of the organisation. Over time, the perception that WSP 
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represented a strictly maternal and domestic constituency influenced historical 
accounts produced by those within the group, as conformity with the group’s 
collective identity meant speaking to this desired image. WSPers downplayed their 
activist backgrounds in their biographies, presenting themselves as inexperienced in 
political and community organising. They displaced WSP from the contemporary 
context of peace activism that existed when it formed, intending to distance it from 
other contemporary groups it took influence from, such as SANE, WILPF, and SDS. 
Historical accounts spoke to the “politics of motherhood” that informed the group’s 
protest, something that has since become a defining feature of WSP.7 This perception 
remains prevalent in historical assessments.  
Analysing the memory of activists, this thesis shows that WSP represented a 
far more complex group of women. Not only did the organisation harbour a diverse 
assortment of political attitudes and personal characters, but activists endured 
significant changes to their identities between 1961 and 1990. By the late 1960s, 
WSPers replaced the image of “staid housewives” donning dresses, hats, and “white 
gloves” for their protests, by challenging police officers, engaging in tax resistance, 
and chaining themselves to the White House gates.8 With the onset of the women’s 
liberation movement, they began to alter their outlook, downplaying their role as 
mothers in order to appeal to second-wave feminists. The group’s single-issue 
prioritisation of nuclear disarmament wavered when the subject fell from the public 
agenda. On its return in the mid-1970s and 1980s, WSPers once more asserted their 
interest in the campaign, extolling disarmament as their most urgent concern.  
Identity is an ever changing concept, necessarily responding to new 
information and influenced by natural shifts in social and cultural contexts. As such, 
assessments of Women Strike for Peace cannot be static and must allow for the 
significant transformations in attitude WSPers experienced. The group was neither 
strictly a maternalist antinuclear organisation, nor a feminist group seeking social 
justice. Studies that explain WSP in such ways depend entirely on the context in 
which it is referred to.  
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Transformations in activist identities necessarily affected memory of the 
organisation. Eleanor Garst’s initial history of the organisation, drafted in 1968, 
spoke clearly to WSP’s maternal and “folksy” public image.9 An entirely different 
perspective pervaded historical accounts by the end of the 1970s. Members now 
reflected that they exhibited “fiercely feminist” compulsions and were the 
“harbingers of women’s liberation” from WSP’s founding, contradicting 
contemporary pronouncements that distanced the organisation from any intent to 
upset the social order.10 This was particularly evident in the re-evaluation of Bella 
Abzug, occasioned by WSP’s new attitude. Acknowledging these contextual 
influences proves vital when considering Amy Swerdlow’s motivations for recording 
WSP’s history. The former leading activist situated her evaluation in contemporary 
debates “regarding the relationship of traditional female culture to radical social 
change and to feminism,” while explaining that she wrote her work “in the spirit of 
WSP as it was transformed in the early 1970s.”11 Recollections spoke to particular 
themes and appropriately tailored the image of WSP to suit contemporary 
circumstances. Studies must contextualise the attitudes of WSP activists in order to 
fully understand the group’s identity. Equally, to provide an accurate assessment of 
the historical perspectives of its members, this thesis demonstrates the importance of 
assessing temporal influences on memory. 
The regional and personal subtleties at work within Women Strike for Peace, 
a dynamic uniquely brought out by this thesis, also problematizes allusions to a 
uniform, national memory of the group. Out of practical necessity, the principal 
agents of WSP’s memory were key women and participants from the east coast, as 
discussed in chapter 6. But their attitudes and experiences did not represent members 
working out of branches in other parts of the US. Activists associated strongly with 
their local branches, referring to themselves as, in the case of Rose Dellamonica, a 
member of “East Bay Women for Peace” before asserting their involvement in 
Women Strike for Peace nationally.12 Such findings confirm that national narratives 
of WSP, even those that engage with the activities of branches, inadequately 
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represent the recollections of local activists who often held entirely different attitudes 
towards their past than those in other parts of the country. Indeed, members of 
Seattle Women Act for Peace, a historically autonomous group, felt unrepresented by 
national narratives.13 Such broad overviews struggle to depict the various nuances 
and contradictions at work within WSP’s diverse regions. Even referring to the 
organisation as “Women Strike for Peace” serves to lower the importance of those 
who adopted alternative titles, exhibited varying levels of loyalty towards the 
national body, and developed differing memories depending on their geographical 
location.  
This thesis also contributes to the burgeoning field of gender memory theory, 
particularly in recognising consistent themes in the recollections of WSP activists. 
Reflecting the work of Selma Leydesdorff, Isabelle Bertaux-Wiame, and Deborah 
Tannen, this study has observed women who consistently affirmed notions of 
community in their recollections. Similarly WSPers’ accounts of particular instances 
of protest tally with the findings of Luisa Passerini, and demonstrate attitudes of 
rebellion and irreverence towards authority.  Indeed, the humour with which WSP 
activists recalled their encounters with government officials is prevalent throughout 
their testimonies, especially in discussions of surveillance and the HUAC hearings.  
Although conclusions regarding differences between gender cannot be extrapolated 
from this thesis, further comparative studies of female and male peace activists may 
yield valuable insight. Likewise assessing the impact of socialisation and norms of 
behaviour could emerge from a broader study of the historical consciousness of 
women’s peace activists generally. Nevertheless, this thesis demonstrates the benefits 
of acknowledging facets of gender memory theory in a study of this kind. 
 
Diversity and Representation 
By highlighting the nature of memory relating to WSP, this study uncovered 
alternative narratives and overlooked events that suggest it was a more fragmented 
and layered organisation than is commonly understood. Its 1962 national conference 
firmly decreed that WSP welcomed activists “of all races, creeds, and political 
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persuasions,” a stance reaffirmed at the HUAC hearings months later.14 Asked if her 
group would permit communists and Nazis to join, Dagmar Wilson replied “unless 
everybody in the whole world joins us in this fight, then God help us.”15 The group 
seemingly welcomed diversity and, by accepting anyone who would commit their 
energies towards nuclear disarmament, WSP attracted activists with varying levels of 
experience and differing attitudes towards peace protest. Like other expansive social 
movement organisations, WSP developed ambiguous stances to issues such as 
unilateral disarmament, civil rights, and feminism in order to placate the competing 
interests of those involved.16 But because WSPers were, for the large part, allowed to 
express their own sentiments, interpretations of the group’s identity can take many 
forms by focusing on a selective sample of actions and activists. For example, 
allowing Donna Allen, Bella Abzug, Barbara Deming, and Shirley Lens to be cast as 
representatives of the whole presents an image of a women’s group with a staunch 
feminist outlook at odds with the attitudes of many other figures.17 Adam Rome 
highlights particular aspects of the group’s atmospheric testing campaign to claim 
that WSP was an environmental activist organisation rather than a disarmament 
group.18 By limiting their scope to selective events and members, existing studies use 
WSP’s diversity to create divergent interpretations while paradoxically overlooking 
the group’s ranging and fragmented membership.  
WSPers’ experiences within their organisation also varied considerably. 
Depictions of heralded events in the group’s past serve to instil a particular narrative 
that downplays frequent resistance to particular stances. Claims that the group was an 
early opponent of the Vietnam War are problematized when considering that leading 
figures resisted such a stance at the time. The image of WSP activists as among the 
first to critique US intervention only emerged when later reflections expanded the 
role of local activists to represent the views of the national organisation as a whole. 
The 1965 Jakarta Meeting and the 1967 Pentagon protest provoked significant 
disagreement from WSPers who felt reluctant to endorse such activities. Substantial 
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consternation arose from the 1962 HUAC hearings as a result of WSP’s publicly 
ambiguous stance. Differences existed over the effectiveness of arms agreements, 
such as the Partial Test Ban Treaty and SALT II. These points of discussion 
problematize current perceptions of what WSP stood for, but remain somewhat 
absent in the group’s history and memory. For example, Alice Herz performed an 
unprecedented act with her immolation, but she received little attention in depictions 
of the group. Her historical footprint remains small. While the exact reasons for 
Herz’s relative absence are contestable, it nevertheless demonstrates alternative 
experiences that can produce a different narrative of WSP’s history. 
 Ultimately, WSP’s decentralised approach to organisation, one that intended 
to make life easier for participants located outside of the north east, facilitated drift 
and division. West coast branches, for example, were more inclined to collaborate 
with other women’s peace groups and those in the civil rights movement than their 
counterparts on the east coast. East coast women evidently wielded more power over 
national decisions than those located elsewhere, exercising this by demanding that 
national conferences be held within a reasonable distance of their own branches, 
often to the detriment of those located in the west. Even between local branches 
differences emerged. Though both Seattle and Tacoma branches felt isolated, they 
arguably displayed more animosity towards each other than that experienced by any 
other two groups. Regional dynamics and variations in approach at a local level 
contribute much to existing understandings of the organisation. As such, this study 
builds on the work of Byron Miller, Harriet Alonso, Amy Schneidhorst, Raymond 
Mohl, Robert Surbrug, Jr., and Yohuru R. Williams and Jama Lazerow, among many 
others, who have emphasised the utility of conducting local studies of national 
activist organisations in recent years.19 
 “Nonorganization” also fostered the growth of an informal “leadership 
clique” that gradually drifted from WSP’s grassroots base. The existence of “key 
women” within the organisation contradicts common perceptions of Women Strike 
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for Peace as a group in which women were “all leaders.”20 As such, recognising the 
layered nature of WSP provides unique insight into the operations of the group. 
Curiously for an ostensibly grassroots organisation, there remains a disproportionate 
focus on the activities and attitudes of leading figures without reference to this 
contradiction. While the presence of certain influential activists warrants attention, 
the attitudes, ideology, and activities of overlooked grassroots members offer an 
entirely different view of WSP’s identity. Grassroots activists felt overridden by 
ostensibly “consensus” decisions, particularly over events such as the 1965 Jakarta 
Meeting and by instances of civil disobedience during the Vietnam War. Pointing to 
these moments of conflict alters our perception of WSP as a cohesive group. 
 The findings of this study highlight the importance of examining conflict and 
unrest within activist groups. In extending the scope of existing historiography, this 
thesis has, arguably, highlighted some of the more unsavoury aspects of WSP’s past. 
But incidences of disagreement, tensions, and conflict add significant detail to the 
group’s history. The relationship between Bella Abzug and other WSPers, for 
example, demonstrates WSP’s fraught relationship with feminism, but also indicates 
personal dynamics within the group. As noted by R. Scott Frey, Thomas Dietz, and 
Linda Kalof, evaluating the impact of a social movement organisation involves 
assessing such relationships. “Students of social movements,” they argued, “would 
be well advised to direct more attention to organisational problems of internal 
movement politics and factionalism.”21  Likewise, Harriet Alonso noted the saliency 
of tensions between local and national bodies in building a comprehensive historical 
image. Observing the history of the women’s peace movement, she suggested that “a 
more accurate and complete history” emerges through seeking “to address the issues 
of difference and dissension as well as consensus.”22   
Conflict within a group is a valuable place to investigate how it understands 
its collective identity. It is from these disagreements that this study finds intriguing 
conversations over the essence of Women Strike for Peace and its attitude towards 
divisive issues. Features that are accepted as an integral part of the organisation’s 
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Research on WSP by Amy Swerdlow. 
21 R. Scott Frey, Thomas Dietz, and Linda Kalof, “Characteristics of Successful American Protest 
Groups: Another Look at Gamson’s Strategy of Social Protest,” American Journal of Sociology, 
Vol. 98, No. 2 (September 1992): 384. 
22 Alonso, “Dissension in the Ranks,” 342. 
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historical image have been problematized by this thesis. It shows the difficulty in 
describing WSP as a group universally inclusive of communists, as many disagreed 
with the ambiguity of such a stance. Likewise, WSP never quite affirmed its stance 
on unilateral disarmament. Conflict arose over its early protests against the Vietnam 
War. Highlighting such aspects may appear unpleasant, but acknowledges the 
competing attitudes of those involved in WSP to bring valuable insight to the elusive 
question, “who are these women?” 
The silence surrounding WSP’s decline in the late 1960s is a noteworthy 
example of this. Even WSP activists remained silent over the problems that beset 
their organisation. But charting the fortunes of the group in this period fills a 
significant historiographical gap. It explains the withdrawal of Dagmar Wilson from 
her leadership of WSP, an episode curiously absent from existing histories and the 
recollections of members given her centrality to the story of Women Strike for 
Peace. The circumstances of her withdrawal reveal the unique pressures she faced 
and show her somewhat irritated by her obligations as leader, demonstrating an 
entirely different side to common depictions of her involvement. Similarly, this 
thesis uniquely details the work of Trudi Young, whose status as the first official 
leader of an organisation known primarily for its non-hierarchical approach to 
organising needs more attention. Young faced exceptional difficulties in her role as 
national coordinator, and her experience provides an important example of the inner 
tensions that grew in Women Strike for Peace. Yet this period remains overlooked. 
Scholars and WSPers allude to WSP’s reduced influence as it entered the 1970s, but 
never discuss the reasons for this decline in depth. Although an unpleasant period for 
activists, examination of this period highlights important events and enlightens 
understandings of Women Strike for Peace. This dissertation’s consideration of these 
aspects is a unique contribution to existing knowledge. 
 
Making a Difference 
In examining its history, this dissertation asserts that Women Strike for Peace formed 
an important part of the US peace movement during the Cold War. For nearly 30 
years its activists strived to raise public interest in peace protest, from their visually 
effective marches in support of a Test Ban Treaty in the early 1960s to the 
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educational outreach projects of the 1980s. Activists made significant contributions 
to the antinuclear, anti-war, feminist, and environmental movements. But perceptions 
of success emerging from WSPers themselves varied considerably. The Partial Test 
Ban Treaty validated the group’s existence at the time, but seemed to fade as a 
significant achievement for members who remained committed to the disarmament 
movement and observed that weapons build-up continued unabated. As the group 
declined in the 1980s, some who had withdrawn from involvement felt WSP 
irrelevant, contrasting with those who, recognising the work still to be done, 
articulated a vision of a rewarding, if incomplete, campaign against nuclear weapons. 
Once again, contemporary circumstances and social influences seemed to dictate 
assessments of the group’s past.   
 Unanimous agreement occurred, however, over the significant role WSP 
played in the lives of activists involved. WSP brought women together, empowered 
them to speak out on issues they cared about, and fostered relationship that endured 
for decades. WSPers made emphatic statements declaring that, achievements aside, 
the experience of participating in Women Strike for Peace alone transformed their 
lives. Moreover, the group offered an identity through which members understood 
their past experiences. While historical assessments can debate substantive 
achievements, they cannot stymie the sense of achievement extolled by activists 
themselves. But such sentiments can contribute to nostalgic and complimentary 
perceptions of the past that unconsciously blur important historical details. It is 
exactly for this reason that this thesis resolved to produce a better understanding of 
the characters, attitudes, and experiences of those involved in Women Strike for 
Peace. 
 Although the doors to its National Office closed in 1990, the commitment of 
activists ensured that WSP’s influence continued into the 21st century. In Los 
Angeles, San Francisco, East Bay, Seattle, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C., 
WSPers supported the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, lamented war in the Balkans, 
criticised aggression in the Persian Gulf, and railed against the War on Terror. They 
witnessed the formation of new women’s peace organisations, such as Women in 
Black and CodePink, who replicated WSP’s historical example to project their own 
feminine critiques of militarism to a new generation of activists. WSPers made direct 
contributions to these new campaigns, linking peace efforts and transcending 
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historical divides. But historical recognition of Women Strike for Peace remains 
inadequate. While this thesis recognises that perceptions of the past can be critiqued, 
that WSPers considered themselves significant actors cannot be doubted. As Ethel 
Taylor emphatically declared, “WE MADE A DIFFERENCE…and the beat goes 
on.”23 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 Taylor, We Made a Difference, 155. 
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